Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J
IA No.15008/2016 (under Order VII Rule 11 CPC)
1. Rejection of the plaint is sought on the ground of this Court not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
2. The counsels have been heard.
3. The plaintiff, based in Singapore, has instituted this suit to restrain the defendant no. 1, carrying on business in the name and style of defendants no.
3 and 4 i.e. Millennium Hotel, Faridabad and Millennium Hotel & Resorts, Palwal, Haryana, from infringing the trade mark “MILLENNIUM†of
the plaintiff and from thereby passing off its services as that of the plaintiff. The defendant no.2 Sanjay Makkar is described as Chairman-cum-
Managing Director of defendant no.1.
4. The suit was entertained and summons thereof issued, though no ex parte interim order, sought, granted.
5. It is the case of the defendants that this court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit inasmuch as the registered office of the
defendant no. 1 is outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the hotels and resorts of the defendant no. 1 are also outside the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court.
6. The counsel for the defendants/applicants has firstly relied upon Renaissance Hotel Holdings, Inc. Vs. B. Vihaya Sai 2009 (39) PTC 547 (Del.)
where a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court refused to entertain the suit holding that on the basis of online booking from Delhi of a hotel room situated in
USA or situated at Bangalore, the jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked.
7. I have however enquired from counsel for the defendants/applicants, whether the subsequent judgment in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited Vs. A.
Murali Krishan Reddy 2010 (42) PTC 361 (Del) (DB) is to the contrary.
8. The counsel for the defendants/applicants has referred to paras 41 to 45 & 58 of Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited supra to contend that the same
are also in his favour.
9. It is contended (i) that the website of the defendants is not interactive; (ii) that the plaintiff has invoked the territorial jurisdiction of this Court on the
basis of it being possible to make bookings in the hotels and resorts of the defendants through third party websites; and, (iii) that the plaintiff has cited
a booking made by its Advocate and filed documents in that regard but which booking also did not fructify and no services of the defendants were
availed in pursuance thereto.
10. I have however enquired from counsel for the defendants/applicants, whether it is possible for any person situated in Delhi to make a booking for
the hotel or other services offered by the defendants through third party websites or whether it is the case of the defendants that the defendants do
not take any bookings from customers in Delhi or do not entertain customers from Delhi.
11. The counsel for the defendants/applicants has fairly stated that it is possible to make bookings from Delhi for availing the services of the
defendants and the defendants do not bar any bookings from Delhi or refuse to entertain customers from Delhi. It is also fairly admitted that the
bookings are in fact made and services availed by the customers in Delhi.
12. I have further enquired from the counsel for the defendants/applicants, as to how is it possible in business through such websites, to target viewers
in any particular State or at any particular destination, as is the test laid down in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited supra. Per my understanding, an
interactive website cannot be targeted to any particular city or State of India and would be identically accessible throughout, at least India, wherever
the reach of internet is. In fact, I have been asking this question in several cases but have not got any reply thereto.
13. No answer is forthcoming from the counsel for the defendants/applicants either.
14. The counsel for the defendants/applicants has lastly referred to paras 10 and 19 of judgment dated 3rd January, 2018 in CS(COMM) No.111/2017
titled Impresario Entertainment & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. Vs. S & D Hospitality reported as 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6392, holding the Courts at Delhi to
be not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, reasoning that the defendants†restaurants in that case could only invite customers from Delhi
but could not offer services at Delhi and on the basis of solitary transaction through internet, cause of action could not be said to have arisen in Delhi.
Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited supra was relied for holding so.
15. Per contra, the counsel for the plaintiff has drawn attention to page 2646 in Part-III, Volume-XI, being an extract from the website of the
defendants, where the defendants, while describing themselves, have stated that for a tour of the city, its patrons could head to ISKCON Temple,
Garden of Five Senses, Qutub Minar, Badkahal Lake, Sohna Lake, Lotus Temples and Tuglak Fort, and has argued that the defendants are thus
representing themselves to be in Delhi. Attention is also invited to page 2273 in Volume-X of Part-III file, again an extract from the website of the
defendants, where the defendants have described themselves as “Millennium Hotel, New Delhi, Faridabad, Gurgaon, Noida, India, Budget Hotelâ€
and again while describing themselves, have claimed themselves to be strategically located in the heart of “Faridabad (Delhi NCR)â€. It is argued
that defendants are themselves attracting business from Delhi.
16. The counsel for the plaintiff has also stated that the plaintiff has filed additional documents on 18th May, 2017 and which contain comments on the
internet of Delhiites, on the hotels/resorts of the defendants. The said documents are however not found on record and the counsel for the defendants
also states that he has not received the copy of the same.
17. Judicial notice can also be taken of, hotels/resorts situated in Gurgaon, Faridabad, NOIDA, all situated in the National Capital Territory (NCT) of
Delhi, becoming the venues of weddings and other celebrations of residents of Delhi owing to dearth of such venues to meet the requirement of
citizens of the city of Delhi as distinct from NCT of Delhi and such hotels/resorts in NCT of Delhi targeting customers at Delhi.
18. The counsel for the defendants/applicants, on enquiry, whether the defendants†hotels are also at New Delhi, Gurgaon and NOIDA, answers in
the negative and states that the defendants are only at Palwal and Faridabad. Notwithstanding the same, the defendants advertise themselves on their
website as having presence in Delhi, again indicating targeting of customers at Delhi.
19. The counsel for the plaintiff had at the outset also referred to my order dated 3rd January, 2018 in CS(COMM) No.865/2016 filed by the plaintiff
herein against one Valliyil Kunhimon Mohamed & Another and vide which I have dismissed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC on
similar grounds.
20. The counsel for the plaintiff has also referred to World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. Vs. M/s. Reshma Collection 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2031
(DB) particularly to paras 2, 6, 8, 17, 18 and 22 to 25 thereof, where an order of return of plaint was set aside and it was inter alia held that with the
advent of e-commerce, the expression “carries on business†at a certain place, has been impacted and is much wider than the other expressions
used in Section 20 of the CPC.
21. I have considered the controversy.
22. The cause of action paragraph and the jurisdiction paragraph of the plaint are as under:-
“60. Plaintiff first became aware of the website www.millenniumhotelindia.com of Defendants on or around December 13, 2013, and
invoked this cause of action by addressing a notice to Defendants requisitioning them to give up the use of the trade mark/name
MILLENNIUM and the impugned logo identical/deceptively similar to Plaintiff’s prior registered trade mark MILLENNIUM and
 logo in every manner in relation to their business or services. The cause of action further arose when Defendants refused to comply with
the requisitions of Plaintiff by way of the reply dated January 17, 2014. The cause of action further arose when Defendant No.2 registered
a fresh domain name www.millenniumhotel.in on March 5, 2015 incorporating Plaintiff’s prior registered trade mark MILLENNIUM in
its entirely. Another cause of action arose when Defendants registered the domain name millenniumhotelsandresort.com on October 20,
2015, started the new website www.millenniumhotelsandresort.com, and tried to sail further close to Plaintiff’s MILLENNIUM branding
including its registered trade mark and trading style “MILLENNIUM HOTELS AND RESORTSâ€. Another cause of action arose when
Defendants registered the domain name millenniumhotelandresort.com on March 11, 2016 and started the new website
www.millenniumhotelandresort.com infringing upon Plaintiff’s MILLENNIUM branding. It is humbly submitted that the cause of action
is a continuous and recurring one and will continue to subsist and arise afresh on day-to-day basis till such time Defendants cease all use
of the trade mark/name MILLENNIUM and the impugned logo and/or are restrained by this Hon’ble Court.
“61. It is submitted that this Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present Suit inasmuch as Defendants offer,
advertise and sell their services all over India including in Delhi through third party websites such as www.goibibo.com,
www.makemytrip.com and www.tripadvisor.com. Illustrative extracts from the third party websites evincing such reservations from Delhi and
also a receipt of a transaction pertaining to bookings made from Delhi by way of the website www.goibibo.com have been filed as
documents with the plaint. Defendants are thus carrying on business and offering services for sale and indeed selling their services in
Delhi. The impugned activities of Defendants of providing services under the mark MILLENNIUM and the impugned logo are carried on
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. Therefore, the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Hon’ble Court. Additionally, Plaintiff’s MILLENNIUM and logo  trade marks, which are the subject matter of the Suit, are
also registered and have their situs in Delhi. Plaintiff’s services are also widely availed of by customers in Delhi and transactions made
through its website www.millenniumhotels.com and other third party travel and hotel booking websites. It is thus submitted that this
Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present Suit.â€
23. The plaintiff has not only pleaded itself carrying on business within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court on account of it being possible to book
services of the hotels and resorts of the plaintiff, though outside India, from Delhi but also pleaded the factum of the defendants carrying on business
at Delhi.
24. In continuation of what was held by the Division Bench in World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., I may state that the mode of booking/reserving
rooms and other facilities particularly of dining therein, in hotels/resorts/spas, has changed over the years with maximum number of
bookings/reservations being made through such third party websites, so much so that the rates available on the third party websites are also found to
be considerably lower than the rates offered through traditional mode of agents or offices in major cities. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that
much of the volume of businesses of hotels is now through such third party websites, in comparison to the business through direct bookings and/or
through travel agents. Thus, if the Courts at Delhi will have jurisdiction over subject matter of suit owing to defendants having interactive website
accessible at Delhi and enabling defendants situated outside Delhi to carry on business at Delhi, I see no reason to hold that it will not be so where the
defendants, instead of hosting its own interactive website, avails the service of third party websites to carry on business at Delhi. There is no rationale
for carving out such a distinction. Certainly, making a booking/reservation, even if the same does not subsequently materialise, is part of carrying on
business, inasmuch as the hotel which has taken the booking, even if has not received any payment, being unable to turn back a customer if shows up
in pursuance to such booking. The defendants, by showing on their websites, their location to be at Delhi, are also found to be attracting and luring the
customers, otherwise intending to visit Delhi, into believing that the hotels and resorts of the defendants are at Delhi, though actually, territorially
speaking, outside Delhi. The defendants, cannot be permitted to take different stand / position while carrying on business than before this Court. In any
case, such acts of the defendants amount to specifically targeting the viewers at Delhi, within the meaning of Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. supra.
25. I am thus unable to hold that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction, for the plaint to be returned/rejected.
26. Before parting with this aspect, I may mention that the test evolved in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. supra, that “the jurisdiction of the forum
State does not get attracted merely on the basis of the interactivity of the website which is accessible in the forum State……the nature of the activity
permissible and whether it results in a commercial transaction has to be examined……the plaintiff must necessarily plead and show prima facie that
the specific targeting of the forum state resulted in an injury or harm to the plaintiff within the forum State……where the plaintiff is not located within
the jurisdiction of the Court, the injurious effect on plaintiffâ€s business, goodwill or reputation within the forum State as a result of defendantâ€s
website being in the forum State would have to be shown….to show that the injurious effect has been felt by the plaintiff it would have to be shown
that viewers in the forum State were specifically targeted…therefore the “effects†test would have to be applied in conjunction with the
“sliding scale†test to determine if the forum Court has jurisdiction to try a suit concerning internet based disputesâ€, was evolved after surveying
the law as it had developed in different jurisdictions i.e. United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK) and Australia by adopting the
essential principles developed as part of the common law in determining whether the forum Court has jurisdiction where the alleged breach is related
to an activity on the internet. The “effects†test and the “sliding scale†test referred to, as per the judgment, were laid down for the first time
in Calder Vs. Jones 465 U.S. 783 (1984) and in Zippo Mfg. Co. Vs. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 respectively, to determine if the forum
Court has jurisdiction. The “effects†test and the “sliding scale†test came to be evolved by the US Courts in interpretation of the “Due
Process†clause in the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution permitting personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a state with which the
defendant has certain minimum contacts …. such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, as held in Calder supra. Though judgments of the Courts in Canada, UK and Australia also were noticed but in the ultimate analysis, the
judgments of the Courts of USA only were followed in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. supra.
27. However, the law relating to territorial jurisdiction in India is codified, generally for all suits, in Sections 15 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 and for suits relating to trade marks, in the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Sections 19 and 20 of the CPC which would be applicable to suits for
infringement of trade mark and compensation therefor, are as under:
“19. Suits for compensation for wrongs to person or movables.-
Where a suit is for compensation for wrong done to the person or to movable property, if the wrong was done within the local limits of the jurisdiction
of one Court and the defendant resides, or carries on business or personally works for gain, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of another Court,
the suit may be instituted at the option of the plaintiff in either of the said Courts.
20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises.- Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be
instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdictionâ€
(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily
resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on
business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry
on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in [India] or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place
where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.â€
28. Section 19, as aforesaid, permits a suit for compensation for wrong done to the person or to the movable property to be instituted either within the
local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court where the wrong was done or within the local limits of the Court where the defendant resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain. Section 20 permits suits other than the suits to which Sections 16 to 19 apply, to be instituted, either where the
defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises.
29. It will thus be seen that all that a plaintiff in a suit for infringement of trade mark or for passing off and for ancillary reliefs including of
compensation with respect thereto is required to plead and show to invoke the jurisdiction of any Court, is that wrong was done to it within the local
limits of the jurisdiction of that Court and wherein the cause of action would axiomatically accrue to the plaintiff and/or that the cause of action, in
whole or in part accrued within the jurisdiction of that Court. In view of the codified law of India, conferring territorial jurisdiction on a Court where
wrong is done to plaintiff or where even a part of cause of action arises and it being indisputable that cause of action arises in a Court within whose
jurisdiction confusion or deception essential for an infringement or passing off suit takes place or injury caused to the plaintiff and the plaintiff is also
entitled under Section 19 supra to sue where wrong is done, all that the plaintiff is required to plead is these ingredients, howsoever miniscule they may
be. Once the plaintiff has pleaded so, in my respectful opinion, there is no need to further test territorial jurisdiction applying the principles evolved by
the US Courts in the context of their “Due Process†clause.
30. Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act further entitles a suit to be instituted, besides in the aforesaid Courts, also in Courts within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction the plaintiff at the time of institution of the suit actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.
Thus a suit as prescribed in Section 134(1) of the Act is permitted to be instituted, at the option of the plaintiff, besides in the Court where the wrong
has been done or the cause of action has accrued or where the defendant resides or carries on business, also in the Courts where the plaintiff resides
or carries on business, notwithstanding no wrong having been done or cause of action having been accrued in that Court and even where the
defendant may not be the resident of or carrying on business within the jurisdiction of that Court.
31. The plaintiff in the present case as aforesaid has invoked the territorial jurisdiction of this Court by pleading that the defendants sell their services
under the impugned mark all over India including in Delhi through third party websites which accept reservations to the hotels and resorts of the
defendants from Delhi. It is further pleaded that the plaintiffâ€s services are also widely availed by the customers in Delhi. Axiomatically, the wrong is
pleaded as having been caused to the plaintiff at Delhi and cause of action is pleaded to have accrued at Delhi.
32. I have recently in Zenner International GMBH & Co. KG Vs. Anand Zenner Company Pvt. Ltd. 2018 SCC OnLine Del 7011, referring to Pratap
Singh Vs. Bank of America 1976 SCC OnLine Bom 111 and Wipro Ltd. Vs. Oushadha Chandrika Ayurvedic India (P) Ltd. AIR 2008 Mad 165, held
that a clear distinction is made in Section 20(c), of the CPC and in Section 134(2) of Trade Marks Act between “carrying on business†and
“personally working for gainâ€; while in latter, the legislative requirement is that defendant should personally work for gain, no such requirement is
postulated in “carrying on business†â€" it means that the defendant may “carry on business†himself or through an agent. It was yet further
held that the word “defendant†in Section 20 of the CPC includes both natural or artificial persons and no distinction in law can be made between
corporations that are incorporated in India and corporations that are incorporated outside India. It was further held that while there is a limitation
regarding residence, there is no restriction with reference to “carrying on business†â€" this is clear indication that the term “carries on
business†is not confined to only principal place of business â€" if the legislature intended to mean the principal place only, it would have suitably
qualified the expression “carries on businessâ€. Applying the said law, the plaintiff even though not having any office in Delhi would still be
carrying on business in Delhi and would qualify to institute the suit in Delhi under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act also.
33. There is thus no merit in the application.
34. Dismissed.
IA No.15007/2016 (of defendants under Order XXV Rule 1 CPC).
35. The defendants seek a direction to the plaintiff to furnish security for costs.
36. The counsel for the defendants has argued that since the plaintiff is situated at Singapore and has no business including in India and no assets in
India, in the event of the suit being ultimately dismissed and costs being awarded to the defendants, the defendants would have no means to recover
the said costs.
37. Not only is it the plea of the plaintiff that it is carrying on business by inviting bookings for its services from Delhi but as noticed above, the plaintiff
has filed at least one other suit in this Court with respect to its trade mark which is also registered in India and in which suit the plaintiff has also made
a claim for damages. It is further stated that the third party websites in India, through whom booking is done of hotels of plaintiff outside India, also
transmit money received by them to the plaintiff.
38. Order XXV Rule 1 of the CPC is as under:
“ORDER XXV
SECURITY FOR COSTS
1. When security for costs may be required from plaintiff.- (1) At any stage of a suit, the court may, either of its own motion or on the application of
any defendant, order the plaintiff, for reasons to be recorded, to give within the time fixed by it security for the payment of all costs incurred and likely
to be incurred by any defendant:
Provided that such an order shall be made in all cases in which it appears to the court that a sole plaintiff is, or (when there are more plaintiffs than
one) that all the plaintiffs are, residing out of India and that such plaintiff does not possess or that no one of such plaintiffs possesses any sufficient
immovable property within India other than the property in suit.
(2) Whoever leaves India under such circumstances as to afford reasonable probability that he will not be forthcoming whenever he may be called
upon to pay costs shall be deemed to be residing out of India within the meaning of the proviso to sub-rule (1).â€
39. The question for consideration is, whether it is mandatory for the Court to direct the plaintiff, residing out of India and not possessing any sufficient
immovable property within India other than the property in suit, to furnish security for payment of costs incurred and likely to be incurred by the
defendants or the Court has discretion in the matter.
40. While the counsel for the plaintiff referred to New Machine Co. Ltd. Vs. S.B. Air Controls Pvt. Ltd. ILR (2009) V Delhi 173 and Alberto-Culver
USA Inc. Vs. Nexus Health & Home Care (P) Ltd. 2009 (41) PTC 197 (Del) both of the same learned Single Judge of this Court, the counsel for the
defendants referred to Gotham Entertainment Group LLC Vs. Diamond Comics Pvt. Ltd. 2009 SCC OnLine Del 4009, S.A. Brothers & Co. Vs. John
Bartholomow & Sons Ltd. 88 (2000) DLT 425 and Kiran Shoes Manufacturers Vs. Welcome Shoes Pvt. Ltd. (2017) 237 DLT 241.
41. While in the judgments cited by the counsel for the plaintiff, it has been held that where on a reading of the plaint, it does not appear that the suit of
the plaintiff is false and frivolous, the Court is not bound to pass an order under Order XXV Rule 1 of the CPC, in the judgments cited by the counsel
for the defendants, it has been held that a perusal of proviso to Order XXV Rule 1(1) of the CPC suggests that it is mandatory in terms and where the
conditions, of the plaintiff residing outside India and not possessing any sufficient immovable property within India, are satisfied, the Court has no
option but to pass an order asking for security of costs from the plaintiff and the Court cannot divert to examination of any other issue including prima
facie evaluation of rival claims / counter-claims for passing such an order. It was however held that the mandatory language of the proviso to Order
XXV Rule 1(1) of the CPC does not take away the discretion of the Court with respect to the quantum of the amount. In Kiran Shoes Manufacturers
supra, it was also held that Alberto-Culver USA Inc. supra does not address the language of the proviso to Order XXV Rule 1 of the CPC and also
did not notice the earlier decision of the Co-ordinate Bench in S.A. Brothers & Cos. supra.
42. I am faced with the difficult choice between the two sets of judgments both of Co-ordinate Benches of this Court.
43. A literal reading of Order XXV Rule 1 and its proviso does initially indicate that while the sub-Rule, by use of the word “mayâ€, vests a
discretion in the Court whether to order the plaintiff to give security for payment of costs or not, the proviso thereto, by use of the word “shallâ€,
does not leave the Court with any discretion where the conditions in which the proviso applies are attracted. However, what none of the judgments
aforesaid appear to notice, is that while sub-Rule (1) refers to “a suitâ€, whatsoever may be the claim therein, the proviso thereto refers to “all
cases in which the plaintiff is residing out of India and does not possess any sufficient immovable property within India other than the property in
suitâ€. Such language of the proviso conveys no other meaning than, that the same applies to cases subject matter whereof is immovable property.
Though the word “property†in the expression “property in suit†is not qualified by the word “immovable†but the word “immovableâ€
is found to have been used just prior thereto and the only interpretation can be that the expression “property in suit†also refers to immovable
property in suit. Thus, the proviso applies only to cases subject matter whereof is immovable property and not to cases subject matter whereof is not
immovable property. Admittedly, the subject matter of the present suit is trade marks which though generally are referred to as “intellectual
property†but are certainly not immovable property. The fact that the trade marks in the present case are used in the context of immovable property
also does not make the present suit as concerning any immovable property.
44. Seen in this light, the proviso to sub-Rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order XXV would have no application to the present case and the suit would be
governed by sub-Rule (1) which it is not in dispute, is discretionary.
45. The exercise of such discretion of course has to be on settled parameters. Applying the said tests, suit is found to be bona fide and having prima
facie merit and cannot be termed as frivolous. The factum of the hotels of the plaintiff, to which the trade mark pertains, being marketed and sold
from within the jurisdiction of this Court and the plaintiff having taken care to also register its marks in India, also demonstrates that the plaintiff cannot
be termed as fly-by-night operator from which security for costs if any to be awarded to the defendants at the time of decision of the suit, needs to be
taken.
46. I am even otherwise of the view that in the present day context, when all round efforts are being made to attract foreign investment and business
in India, an interpretation of the proviso to Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order XXV of the CPC as mandatorily requiring such foreign businesses
approaching the Court for enforcement of their rights in India, to furnish security for costs if any ultimately required to be awarded to the defendant,
would be detrimental in the larger economic interest of the country. Though these are matters falling in the Executive domain but the Courts have not
remained oblivious of the same. Supreme Court in Ramniklal N. Bhutta Vs. State of Maharashtra (1997) 1 SCC 134 noticed the efforts in that regard
being made by the government and the need for the Courts to support the same. Moreover, today the mode of conducting business has undergone a
huge change from yesteryears. While in yesteryears, all businesses were brick and mortar businesses with huge assets / properties including
immovable properties, today most successful businesses are in electronic trade and commerce with no tangible assets. Instances of Ola, Uber, Flipkart
etc. immediately come to mind, which though have large revenues and high prices of their stock are, owing to the nature of their business, not required
to have title to any property, not even the property, which they are transacting. The law has to keep pace with the times and the proviso to sub-Rule
(1) of Order XXV of the CPC enacted more than a century ago, cannot be read as ignoring all such property which the foreign plaintiff may have in
India.
47. No merit is thus found in the application. Dismissed.
