1. With the consent of the parties, the writ petition is set down for final hearing and disposal.
2. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner. The petitioner seeks a declaration that the acquisition
proceedings with respect of the land of the petitioner bearing Khasra No.20/19 (1-5) situated in the revenue estate of village Pansali, Delhi
(hereinafter referred to as “the subject landâ€) are deemed to have lapsed in view of the fact that neither possession has been taken over nor
compensation has been paid. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner would be satisfied in case compensation is granted as per the Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the New Actâ€).
3. The necessary facts to be noticed for disposal of this writ petition are that a Section 4 notification of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Actâ€) was issued on 27.10.1999. Section 6 declaration was made on 03.04.2004. Thereafter an Award was made on
24.05.2004.
4. Ms. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the counter affidavit filed by the LAC in support her submission that the
compensation has not been paid. She submits that as per the counter affidavit of the LAC, the possession of the subject land has been taken but
compensation could not be paid. The counsel for the petitioner submits that since the compensation has not been tendered, the petitioner would be
entitled to a declaration and compensation under Section 24 (2) of the New Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the case of the
petitioner would be fully covered by the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand
Misirimal Solanki & ors., reported at (2014) 3 SCC 183.
5. Learned counsel for the LAC relies on para 6 of the counter affidavit to submit that the possession of the subject land has been taken but
compensation has not been paid.
6. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and considered their rival submissions.
7. Two questions arise for our consideration. Firstly, as to whether the petitioner had been paid compensation and secondly, whether the possession of
the subject land has been taken over or not. As far as payment of the compensation is concerned, all parties are in agreement that compensation has
not been paid.
8. Counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner would be satisfied if compensation is paid as per the New Act although she relies on the
decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Velaxan Kumar vs. Union of India and Others (2015) 4 SCC 325 in support of her submission that
the Supreme Court has finally held that the actual physical possession of the land pertaining to village Pansali was not taken as the LAC did not follow
the proper procedure as per law. Counsel submits that the Supreme Court took into account that large chunks of land were acquired measuring
1109.11 bighas situated in village Pansali on 12.05.2000. The Court took into account two previous judgments of the Supreme Court and held that
since Panchnama was not prepared, it cannot be said that the physical possession was taken. Be that as it may, the petitioner is willing to accept the
compensation as per the New Act.
9. Para 6 of the counter affidavit filed by the LAC reads as under:
6. That it is submitted that the lands of village Pansali were notified vide Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated
27.10.1999 which was followed by the Notification under Section 6 of the Act dated 3.4.2000. The Award was also passed vide Award No. 4-
B/2002-03 dated 24.4.2004. It is further submitted that the possession of the land falling in Khasra number 20/19 (4-15) have been duly taken by the
Government on the spot on 12.5.2000 (4-09) and 8.6.2000 (0-06) as such the land measuring (1-05) which is subject matter of the present writ petition
was also taken possession of by the Government and handed over to the requisition agency on the spot by preparing possession proceeding on the spot
however the compensation could not be paid to the petitioner.
10. Having regard to the fact that admittedly compensation has not been paid to the petitioners, we are of the view that the case of the petitioners
would be fully covered by the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. (supra). Paras 14
to 20 read as under:
“14. Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act enjoins upon the Collector, on making an award under Section 11, to tender payment of compensation to
persons interested entitled thereto according to award. It further mandates the Collector to make payment of compensation to them unless prevented
by one of the contingencies contemplated in sub-section (2). The contingencies contemplated in Section 31(2) are: (i) the persons interested entitled to
compensation do not consent to receive it (ii) there is no person competent to alienate the land and (iii) there is dispute as to the title to receive
compensation or as to the apportionment of it. If due to any of the contingencies contemplated in Section 31(2), the Collector is prevented from
making payment of compensation to the persons interested who are entitled to compensation, then the Collector is required to deposit the
compensation in the court to which reference under Section 18 may be made.
15. Simply put, Section 31 of the 1894 Act makes provision for payment of compensation or deposit of the same in the court. This provision requires
that the Collector should tender payment of compensation as awarded by him to the persons interested who are entitled to compensation. If due to
happening of any contingency as contemplated in Section 31(2), the compensation has not been paid, the Collector should deposit the amount of
compensation in the court to which reference can be made under Section 18.
16. The mandatory nature of the provision in Section 31(2) with regard to deposit of the compensation in the court is further fortified by the provisions
contained in Sections 32, 33 and 34. As a matter of fact, Section
33 gives power to the court, on an application by a person interested or claiming an interest in such money, to pass an order to invest the amount so
deposited in such government or other approved securities and may direct the interest or other proceeds of any such investment to be accumulated
and paid in such manner as it may consider proper so that the parties interested therein may have the benefit therefrom as they might have had from
the land in respect whereof such money shall have been deposited or as near thereto as may be.
17. While enacting Section 24(2), Parliament definitely had in its view Section 31 of the 1894 Act. From that one thing is clear that it did not intend to
equate the word “paid†to “offered†or “tenderedâ€. But at the same time, we do not think that by use of the word “paidâ€, Parliament
intended receipt of compensation by the landowners/persons interested. In our view, it is not appropriate to give a literal construction to the expression
“paid†used in this sub-section (sub-section (2) of Section 24). If a literal construction were to be given, then it would amount to ignoring
procedure, mode and manner of deposit provided in Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act in the event of happening of any of the contingencies contemplated
therein which may prevent the Collector from making actual payment of compensation. We are of the view, therefore, that for the purposes of Section
24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as “paid†if the compensation has been offered to the person interested and such compensation has
been deposited in the court where reference under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies contemplated under Section
31(2) of the 1894 Act. In other words, the compensation may be said to have been “paid†within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the Collector
(or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in court and made that amount
available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33.
18. 1894 Act being an expropriatory legislation has to be strictly followed. The procedure, mode and manner for payment of compensation are
prescribed in Part V (Sections 31-34) of the 1894 Act. The Collector, with regard to the payment of compensation, can only act in the manner so
provided. It is settled proposition of law (classic statement of Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad[1]) that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a
certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.
19. Now, this is admitted position that award was made on 31.01.2008. Notices were issued to the landowners to receive the compensation and since
they did not receive the compensation, the amount (Rs.27 crores) was deposited in the government treasury. Can it be said that deposit of the amount
of compensation in the government treasury is equivalent to the amount of compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested? We do not think
so. In a comparatively recent decision, this Court in Agnelo Santimano Fernandes[2], relying upon the earlier decision in Prem Nath Kapur[3], has
held that the deposit of the amount of the compensation in the stateâ€s revenue account is of no avail and the liability of the state to pay interest
subsists till the amount has not been deposited in court.
20. From the above, it is clear that the award pertaining to the subject land has been made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer more than five
years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It is also admitted position that compensation so awarded has neither been paid to the
landowners/persons interested nor deposited in the court. The deposit of compensation amount in the government treasury is of no avail and cannot be
held to be equivalent to compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the subject land
acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.â€
11. We are of the considered view that the necessary ingredients for the application of Section 24(2) of the New Act as has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court of India and this Court in the following cases stand satisfied:
(1) Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & ors., reported at (2014) 3 SCC 183;
(2) Union of India and Ors v. Shiv Raj and Ors., reported at (2014) 6 SCC 564;
(3) Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors, Civil Appeal no.8700/2013 decided on 10.09.2014;
(4) Surender Singh v. Union of India & Others, W.P.(C).2294/2014 decided on 12.09.2014 by this Court; and
(5) Girish Chhabra v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors; W.P.(C).2759/2014 decided on 12.09.2014 by this Court.
12. Since the compensation has not been tendered to the petitioner, it is declared that the acquisition proceedings qua the subject land of the petitioner
stand lapsed. However, as prayed by the petitioner, the petitioner would only be entitled to compensation as per the New Act. Compensation be
released within one year from today.
13. The writ petition stands disposed of.
C.M.15827/2016 (stay)
14. The application stands disposed of in view of the order passed in the writ petition.
