Subramonium Prasad, J
1. The Petitioner seeks bail in FIR No.60/2020 dated 25.02.2020 registered at PS Dayalpur for offences under Sections
186/353/332/323/147/148/149/336/427/302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPCâ€) and Sections 3/4 of the Prevention of Damage to
Public Property Act, 1984 (hereinafter, “PDPP Actâ€).
2. The FIR relates to the violence that took place in the National Capital Territory of Delhi in the month of February 2020.
3. The brief facts leading to the instant Bail Application are that a protest against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (hereinafter, “CAAâ€)
had been taking place for 1.5 months prior to the incident at Khajuri Square to Loni Circle at Wazirabad Road, Chand Bagh near 25 Futa Service
Road by the Muslim community.
4. It is stated in the instant FIR that the Complainant, i.e. Constable Sunil Kumar, was on duty with the deceased, HC Ratan Lal, and others, namely
Giri Chand, Ct. Mahavir, Ct. Jitender, HC Narender, HC Brijesh, W/HC Savitri, as well as DCP Shahdara District Amit Kumar and his staff.
5. It is stated that on 24.02.2020, at about 01:00 PM, the protestors had mobilized near the Chand Bagh area and 25 Futa Road, and were moving
towards the Main Wazirabad Road. When they assembled near Main Wazirabad Road, it is stated that the Complainant and other police officers
present attempted to convince the protestors to not move towards the Main Wazirabad Road, however, it is stated that the protestors were carrying
sticks, baseball sticks, iron rods and stones. It is stated that ACP Gokalpuri and DCP Shahdara warned the protestors via loudspeaker of a
government vehicle that lack of adherence to legal warnings would necessitate strict action against the crowd. It is stated that some people amongst
the crowd started pelting stones at the police officials, and beat them as well as other passersby with aforementioned weapons that had been hidden.
6. It is stated that the Complainant herein received an injury on his right elbow and right hand due to a huge stone. It is further stated that the crowd
even snatched tear gas balls and lathis from the police, and started beating them with it. It is stated that ACP Gokalpuri, HC Ratan Lal and DCP
Shahdara Amit Kumar were also beaten with sticks and stones, and as a result, they fell down and suffered grievous head injuries.
7. The FIR states that post the incident, the protestors fled away and the injured were sent to a hospital, with the Complainant receiving treatment at
Panchsheel Hospital, Yamuna Vihar, Delhi.
8. The Complainant then states that he was informed that HC Ratan Lal had succumbed to a bullet injury, and some other police officers as well as
public persons had also suffered injuries. It is stated that the protestors had also set fire to the vehicle of DCP Shahdara and private vehicles of police
officers, and also damaged public and private property.
9. It is stated that investigation is now completed and chargesheet has been filed against the Petitioner on 08.06.2020 wherein the Petitioner has been
added. The chargesheet states that there is sufficient material to proceed against the Petitioner herein under Sections Sections
186/353/332/323/109/144/147/148/149/153A/188/333/336/427/307/308/397 /412/302/201/120-B/34 of the IPC, read with 3/4 of the PDPP Act.
Thereafter, supplementary chargesheets have been filed on 30.06.2020, 20.08.2020, 17.11.2020 and 30.12.2020.
10. Mr. Dinesh Kumar Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, has submitted that the Petitioner herein has been falsely implicated in the
instant FIR, and that there exists no evidence which can prove the connection of the Petitioner to the incident beyond reasonable doubt. It is also
submitted that the evidence is fabricated, cannot be admissible and therefore the Petitioner cannot be convicted on the basis of the available material.
11. It has further been submitted to the Court by Mr. Tiwari that the Petitioner has been in judicial custody since 01.04.2020 and has not even
received interim bail. The Court has been informed that the Petitioner is 26 years of age and is the sole bread earner of a family with aged parents.
12. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner states that the investigation has been completed and chargesheet has been filed, and therefore, the custody
of the Petitioner is no longer required for the purpose of investigation. Moreover, it has been submitted that keeping the Petitioner in custody with
other hardened criminals will serve no fruitful purpose and will only be injurious to the health of the Petitioner.
13. On the aspect of evidence, Mr. Tiwari has argued that neither is there any electronic evidence like CCTV footage, video clip etc. against the
Petitioner in the instant case, but also that the exact CDR location of the Petitioner has not been established by the prosecution and is inconclusive as
the Petitioner is the resident of the area.
14. Mr. Tiwari has brought the attention of the Court to the bail order dated 16.02.2021 of this Hon’ble Court in Bail Appln. No. 3550/2020
wherein co-accused Mohd. Danish has been enlarged on bail, and has submitted that this bail order entitles the Petitioner herein to be released on
parity.
15. It has been submitted that no public witnesses are present in the matter against the Petitioner and that the Petitioner has only been arrested on the
basis of the disclosure statements of other co-accused.
16. Mr. Tiwari has contended before the Court that no incriminating material has been recovered from the Petitioner or at his instance. Furthermore,
he has submitted that the Petitioner has no criminal history or previous convictions. It has also been stated that the Petitioner has no motive to commit
a heinous offence.
17. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has gone on to argue that Article 21 of the Constitution of India states that, “No person shall be deprived
of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by lawâ€, and this includes the right to live with dignity. Therefore, the
continued incarceration of the Petitioner would violate his liberty and deprive him of his personal freedom.
18. Mr. Tiwari, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has stated before the Court that the Petitioner will not misuse the concession of liberty, will
maintain good behaviour during the period of bail, and will appear before the Trial Court and co-operate in the expeditious disposal of the case. He has
concluded his submissions on the note that the rule is to allow bail and that bail should not be the punishment in itself as the basic principle of criminal
law dictates that an accused shall be presumed innocent till proven guilty.
19. Mr. Amit Prasad, learned SPP for the State has painstakingly taken this Court through the videos pertaining to the topography of the area where
the riots happened and the preparatory work that allegedly took place prior to the incident. Mr. Prasad brought to the attention of the Court three
videos that had been found during the course of investigation which depict the scene of crime - Vishal Chaudhry Video (1.48 minutes) shot from Gym
Body Fit Garage, Skyride Video (1.37 minutes) and Yamuna Vihar Video (40 seconds), and has submitted that the three videos shed a light on how
the assault on the police personnel was pre-meditated. The learned APP has further taken this Court through all the available CCTV footage
displaying timestamps and respective galis (lanes) wherein the accused have been caught on camera. He has further pointed out the timestamps
which showcase the dislocation and deactivation of the CCTV cameras and has submitted that the same has been done in a synchronised and planned
manner.
20. The learned ASG Shri SV Raju, opposing the instant bail application, has submitted that the instant case is regarding the brutal assault on police
officials wherein HC Ratan Lal succumbed to his injuries, and DCP Shahdara Amit Sharma and ACP Gokalpuri suffered grievous injuries along with
more than 50 police officials also getting injured.
21. It has been submitted that the death of HC Ratan Lal was the first death in the North-East Delhi riots, and that the Trial Court has been dealing
with the riot cases since then. It has also been submitted that the Trial Court has been apprised of the matter and has already dismissed the bail
application of the Petitioner herein, and that the order of rejection of bail does not contain any legal infirmities.
22. The learned ASG has iterated that on 23.02.2020, the protestors who were convened at Wazirabad Main Road, Chand Bagh, unauthorizedly came
onto the road and blocked the same. He submitted that in response to the same, the local police had issued a proclamation under Section 144 of the
Cr.P.C. in order to bring the law and order under control. He further submitted that the protestors held a meeting on the night of 23.02.2020 at Chand
Bagh to finalise a plan for 24.02.2020 as the President of the United States, Donald Trump, was coming to New Delhi. This meeting was subsequently
attended by several of the accused persons.
23. The learned ASG has submitted that on the morning on 24.02.2020, CCTV cameras which had been installed by GNCTD for security in the area
were systematically disconnected or damaged or dislocated right from 08:00:41 AM to 12:50:57 PM. He argued before the Court that the protest at
Chand Bagh continued despite the proclamation of Section 144 Cr.P.C. orders. As a consequence, police officials had been deployed for law and
order arrangements. The learned ASG averred that between 12:30 PM and 1:00 PM, at the behest of the organisers of the protest, a crowd carrying
various weapons such as dandas, lathis, baseball bats, iron rods, and stones convened at the main Wazirabad Road, and refused to pay heed to the
orders of the senior officers and police force. The crowd soon got out of control and started pelting stones at the police officers and resultantly, more
than fifty police personnel suffered injuries and HC Ratan Lal was shot dead. It was further submitted by the learned ASG that the protestors turned
violent, burnt private and public vehicles, as well as other properties in the vicinity, including a petrol pump and a car showroom.
24. It was then submitted by the learned ASG that absence of an accused from a video does not translate into absence of the accused from the scene
of crime. He has argued that the role of the accused could be discerned from the statement of Ct. Gyan who had identified the presence of the
Petitioner in the CCTV footage. He has stated that identification of an accused in videography was a Herculean task, and therefore, if an accused has
been identified, that would be a positive point. Additionally, he relied upon Masalti and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1964) 8 SCR 133, and
submitted that by way of application of Section 149 IPC, the Petitioner herein would be deemed to be a member of the unlawful assembly and,
therefore, would be equally and squarely liable for the crime committed.
25. The learned ASG has also contended that the addition of the offence under Section 302 IPC meant that ordinarily bail should not be granted. He
has argued that it was not a case of a simple offence; if it was a grievous offence which was specially punishable with death, then bail could not be
granted. On the issue of the parameters of bail, the learned ASG has submitted that in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 1 SCC
118, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the principle underlying Section 437 is towards grant of bail except in cases where there appears to be
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and also when there are other
valid reasons to justify refusal of bail. He has argued that the over-riding considerations in granting bail are, inter alia, the nature and gravity of the
circumstances in which the offence is committed. The learned ASG has submitted that in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13
SCC 791,the Supreme Court had held that in addition to the triple test or tripod test, gravity of the offence had to be considered while making a
decision on grant of bail. Further, one of the circumstances to consider the gravity of offence would be the term of sentence that is prescribed for the
offence which the accused is said to have committed. The learned ASG has argued that as the instant case pertains to the offence of murdering of a
police officer and that Section 302 IPC has been invoked, the matter lies within the four corners of the gravest of grave offences, and therefore, the
accused cannot be entitled to bail.
26. Mr. Raju, the learned ASG, has then contended that conspiracy had been established on 23 February, 2020, and that the offence was pre-planned.
He has submitted that meetings were held 1-2 days prior to the alleged incident wherein the protestors were motivated to gather at the site of the
alleged incident on 24.02.2020 in order to instigate violence, and therefore, there was a meeting of minds due to which Section 149 and Section 120B
of the IPC were made out. Furthermore, secret codes had been used, and the Petitioner herein was fully involved.
27. It was also submitted by the learned ASG that there was only a small contingent of police officers present, and they were trying to protect
themselves from the frontal attack by the crowd as they were outnumbered. He argued that had it been a simple protest, the crowd would not have
been required to come with sticks, weapons etc. Furthermore, if sticks and other weapons were to be utilised for self-defence, then the damage and
dislocation of CCTVs defeated the case because such an action would only lead to the inference that the accused wished to destroy the evidence or
to ensure that the evidence did not surface.
28. The Court has heard the learned ASG SV Raju with Mr. Amit Prasad, learned SPP for the State, and Mr. Dinesh Kumar Tiwari, learned Counsel
for the Petitioner. The Court has also perused the material on record.
29. A perusal of the chargesheet indicates that the Petitioner is a resident of Chand Bagh and works as a salesman at a garment shop in Jaffrabad. It
states that the Petitioner visited the protest site at Chand Bagh regularly.
30. It is further stated in the chargesheet that during interrogation, it had been revealed by the Petitioner on 24.02.2020 that he had participated in the
protest and assaulted police officials with sticks. The chargesheet also indicates that this disclosure statement was corroborated vide CCTV footage
of GNCT Camera Id no. 7033191 installed at F-141 Chand Bagh at 12:05:15 PM on 24.02.2020. It is stated that the Petitioner was seen wearing a
cream-coloured t-shirt with the logo of “Adidas†and was carrying a stick in his hands with the other rioters.
31. The chargesheet additionally states that the CDR of the Petitioner places him at the location of the scene of crime. Furthermore, it is stated that
the identity of the Petitioner was confirmed by the statement of Ct. Gyan recorded on 25.03.2020. It is stated that the statement of Ct. Gyan under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. reveals that the Petitioner was present at the site of protest and, along with the other accused, pre-meditated the attack on the
police with various weapons. The statement also notes that he destroyed public and private property.
32. A perusal of the video footage shows that the Petitioner was seen on the CCTV camera of GNCT Camera Id. No. 7033191 which shows him in
Gali No. 5 (Ravi Wali Gali) at 12:05:16 PM on the day of the incident with a danda in his hand, and on CCTV camera of GNCT Camera Id. No.
7033172 which shows him in Gali No. 3 at 12:02:57 PM without a danda in his hand. It is pertinent to note that the Petitioner is a resident of the local
area, i.e. Gali No. 5.
33. It is also revealed from the perusal of the chargesheet that the Petitioner was not seen in any of the video footage retrieved from the Scene of
Crime, i.e. the video from Skyride, the video taken by Vishal Chaudhary which was shot from Gym Body Fit Garage, and the video from Yamuna
Vihar.
34. In the instant case, the issue which arises for consideration is whether when an offence of murder is committed by an unlawful assembly, then
should each person in the unlawful assembly be denied the benefit of bail, regardless of their role in the unlawful assembly or the object of the
unlawful assembly. In order to understand the contention of the learned ASG, it is useful to refer to Section 149 IPC which reads as follows:
“149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.-If an offence is committed by any
member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to
be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is
guilty of that offence.â€
(emphasis supplied)
35. The Supreme Court has consistently held that in order to convict an accused with the aid of Section 149, a clear finding needs to be given by the
Court regarding the nature of unlawful common object. Furthermore, if any such finding is absent or if there is no overt act on behalf of the accused,
the mere fact that the accused was armed would not be sufficient to prove common object.
36. In Kuldip Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 324, the Supreme Court has categorically stated:
“39. It is not the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 149 to render every member of unlawful assembly liable to punishment for every
offence committed by one or more of its members. In order to attract Section 149, it must be shown that the incriminating act was done to accomplish
the common object of unlawful assembly and it must be within the knowledge of other members as one likely to be committed in prosecution of the
common object. If the members of the assembly knew or were of the likelihood of a particular offence being committed in prosecution of the common
object, they would be liable for the same under Section
149.†(emphasis supplied)
37. In Sherey and Ors. v. State of U.P., (1991) Supp (2) SCC 437, the Supreme Court considered as to whether Section 149 of the IPC could be
applied to hold an accused constructively liable on the basis of omnibus allegations made by witnesses and on the basis of their mere presence at the
spot/scene of crime.
“4. We have carefully gone through the evidence. We have no doubt that all the eye-witnesses were present. Nothing significant has been elicited
in their cross-examination. However, the eye-witnesses simply named these appellants and identified them. So, the question is whether it is safe to
convict all the appellants. In a case of this nature, the evidence of the witnesses has to be subjected to a close scrutiny in the light of their former
statements. The earliest report namely the FIR has to be examined carefully. No doubt in their present deposition they have described the arms
carried by the respective accused but we have to see the version given in the earliest report. In that report PW 1 after mentioning about the earlier
proceedings has given a fairly detailed account of the present occurrence. He has mentioned the names of the witnesses and also the names of the
three deceased persons. Then he proceeded to give a long list of names of the accused and it is generally stated that all of them were exhorting and
surrounded the PWs and the other Hindus and attacked them. But to some extent specific overt acts are attributed to appellants 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 17, 22
and 25. It is mentioned therein that these nine accused were armed with deadly weapons and were seen assaulting the deceased Ram Narain and
others. Now in the present deposition he improved his version and stated that in addition to these nine accused, five more persons also attacked the
deceased and others. In view of this variation we think that it is safe to convict only such of the appellants who are consistently mentioned as having
participated in the attack from the stage of earliest report. With regards the rest PW 1 mentioned in an omnibus way that they were armed with lathis.
He did not attribute any overt act to any one of them. Further, the medical evidence rules out any lathis having been used. The doctor found only
incised injuries on the dead bodies and on the injured PWs. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the prosecution case that the other appellants were
members of the unlawful assembly with the object of committing the offences with which they are charged. We feel it highly unsafe to apply Section
149 IPC and make everyone of them constructively liable. But so far as the above nine accused are concerned the prosection version is consistent
namely that they were armed with lethal weapons like swords and axes and attacked the deceased and others. This strong circumstance against them
establishes their presence as well as their membership of the unlawful assembly. The learned counsel appearing for the State vehemently contended
that the fact that the Muslims as a body came to the scene of occurrence would show that they were members of an unlawful assembly with the
common object of committing various offences including that of murder. Therefore all of them should be made constructively liable. But when there is
a general allegation against a large number of persons the Court naturally hesitates to convict all of them on such vague evidence. Therefore we have
to find some reasonable circumstance which lends assurance…†(emphasis supplied)
38. It is, therefore, noted that the applicability of Section 149 IPC, specifically read with Section 302, cannot be done on the basis of vague evidence
and general allegations. When there is a crowd involved, at the juncture of grant or denial of bail, the Court must hesitate before arriving at the
conclusion that every member of the unlawful assembly inhabits a common intention to accomplish the unlawful common object. There cannot be an
umbrella assumption of guilt on behalf of every accused by the Court, and every decision must be taken based on a careful consideration of the facts
and circumstances in the matter therein. This principle, therefore, gains utmost importance when the Court considers the question of grant or denial of
bail.
39. With regard to the submission that if there appears to be reasonable grounds that the accused has committed an offence which is punishable with
death or life imprisonment, then there is a bar imposed by Section 437(1) Cr.P.C on granting of bail, this Court states that the case of Gurcharan Singh
(supra) also acknowledges that it is the Court which has the last say on whether there exists any reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is
guilty of committing the said offence. Furthermore, there is no blanket bar as such which is imposed on the Court on granting of bail in such cases and
that the Court can exercise discretion in releasing the accused, as long as reasons are recorded which clearly disclose how the discretion has been
exercised. Additionally, in the case of the Prabhakar Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2020) SCCOnline 75, the Supreme Court has held that despite the
alleged offence being grave and serious, and there being several criminal cases pending against the accused, these factors by themselves cannot be
the basis for the refusal of prayer for bail. In Gurcharan Singh (supra), the Supreme Court had held as follows:
“24. Section 439(1), Cr.P.C. of the new Code, on the other hand, confers special powers on the High Court or the Court of Session in respect of
bail. Unlike under Section 437(1) there is no ban imposed under Section 439(1), Cr.P.C. against granting of bail by the High Court or the Court of
Session to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment of life. It is, however, legitimate to suppose that the High Court or
the Court of Session will be approached by an accused only after he has failed before the Magistrate and after the investigation has progressed
throwing light on the evidence and circumstances implicating the accused. Even so, the High Court or the Court of Session will have to exercise its
judicial discretion in considering the question of granting of bail under Section 439(1), Cr.P.C. of the new Code. The over-riding considerations in
granting of bail to which we adverted to earlier and which are common both in the case of Section 43791) and Section 439(1), Cr.P.C. of the new
Code are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to
the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being faced with a
grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well as its investigation and other relevant
grounds which, in view of so many valuable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out.â€
40. The Petitioner was arrested on 01.04.2020 and has been in judicial custody since then. It has been 16 months since the arrest of the Petitioner.
Bail jurisprudence attempts to bridge the gap between the personal liberty of an accused and ensuring social security remains intact. It is the intricate
balance between the securing the personal liberty of an individual and ensuring that this liberty does not lead to an eventual disturbance of public order.
It is egregious and against the principles enshrined in our Constitution to allow an accused to remain languishing behind bars during the pendency of
the trial. Therefore, the Court, while deciding an application for grant of bail, must traverse this intricate path very carefully and thus take multiple
factors into consideration before arriving at a reasoned order whereby it grants or rejects bail.
41. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496, the Supreme Court laid down the parameters for granting or refusing the grant
of bail which are as under:
“i. whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
ii. nature and gravity of the accusation;
iii. severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
iv. Danger of the accused absconding or fleeting, if released on bail;
v. character, behavior, means, position and standing of the accused;
vi. Likelihood of the offence being repeated;
vii. Reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and
viii. Danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.â€
In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118, the Supreme Court had observed as under:
“12. The determination of whether a case is fit for the grant of bail involves the balancing of numerous factors, among which the nature of the
offence, the severity of the punishment and a prima facie view of the involvement of the accused are important. No straitjacket formula exists for
courts to assess an application for the grant or rejection of bail. At the stage of assessing whether a case is fit for grant of bail, the court is not
required to enter into a detailed analysis of the evidence on record to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime by the accused.
That is a matter of trial. However, the Court is required to examine whether there is a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had committed the offence and on a balance of the considerations involved, the continued custody of the accused subserves the purpose of the
criminal justice system. Where bail has been granted by a lower court, an appellate court must be slow and ought to be guided by the principles set out
for the exercise of the power to set aside bail.â€
42. It is the Constitutional duty of the Court to ensure that there is no arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty in the face of excess of State power.
Bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and Courts must exercise their jurisdiction to uphold the tenets of personal liberty, subject to rightful regulation
of the same by validly enacted legislation. The Supreme Court has time and again held that Courts need to be alive to both ends of the spectrum, i.e.
the duty of the Courts to ensure proper enforcement of criminal law, and the duty of the Courts to ensure that the law does not become a tool for
targeted harassment.
43. As has been stated above, the Petitioner herein has been in custody for 16 months and was formally added by way of chargesheet dated
08.06.2020. A perusal of the material on record has revealed to the Court that there is no electronic evidence which places the Petitioner at the Scene
of Crime, and the CDR in the instant case of the Petitioner is inconclusive as the Petitioner is a resident of the local area, i.e. Gali No. 5. Furthermore,
the Petitioner was identified in above-mentioned video footage which showcased Gali No. 5, i.e. the area wherein he resided, with a danda in his hand
about an hour before the crime was allegedly committed. Additionally, no incriminating material was recovered from the Petitioner.
44. The Court has also noted that the arrest of the Petitioner has taken place on account of disclosure statements of other co-accused and, therefore,
at this juncture, this cannot form the basis of the continued arrest of the Petitioner. Whether the disclosure statements of the co-accused and the
identification of the Petitioner by Ct. Gyan in statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C dated 27.02.2020 is enough to connect the Petitioner herein to the
case is a matter of trial.
45. The presence of the Petitioner in the video footage with a danda in his hand near his residence also does not justify the continued incarceration of
the Petitioner, and the authenticity of the same is not to be delved into at this point and is a matter of trial. The fourth chargesheet has already been
filed, and trial in the matter is likely to take a long time. This Court is of the opinion that it would not be prudent to keep the Petitioner behind bars for
an undefined period of time at this stage. The Petitioner has roots in society, and, therefore, there is no danger of him absconding and fleeing.
46. In view of the facts and circumstances of the cases, without commenting on the merits of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the Petitioner
cannot be made to languish behind bars for a longer period of time, and that the veracity of the allegations levelled against him can be tested during
trial.
47. Accordingly, this Court is inclined to grant bail to the Petitioner in FIR No. 60/2020 dated 25.02.2020 registered at PS Dayalpur for offences under
Sections 186/353/332/323/147/148/149/336/427/302of the IPC, read with 3/4 of the PDPP Act, on the following conditions:
a) The Petitioner shall furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 35,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court/Duty
Magistrate.
b) The Petitioner shall not leave NCT of Delhi without prior permission of this Court.
c) The Petitioner shall report to the concerned Police Station every Tuesday and Thursday at 10:30 AM and should be released after completing the
formalities within half an hour.
d) The Petitioner is directed to give all his mobile numbers to the Investigating Officer and keep them operational at all times.
e) The Petitioner has given his address in the memo of parties as House No. E-176,Gali No. 5, Chand Bagh, Delhi. The Petitioner is directed to
continue to reside at the same address. In case there is any change in the address, the Petitioner is directed to intimate the same to the IO.
f) The Petitioner shall not, directly or indirectly, tamper with evidence or try to influence the witnesses.
g) Violation of any of these conditions will result in the cancellation of the bail given to the petitioner.
29. It is made clear that the observations made in this Order are only for the purpose of grant of bail and cannot be taken into consideration during the
trial.
48. Accordingly, the bail application is disposed of along with the pending application(s), if any.
