Amit Bansal, J
IA No.430/2020(u/O.XXXIX R.1&2 of the CPC) & IA No.3030/2020 (u/O.XXXIX R.4 of CPC)
1. By the present order, I propose to dispose of the application filed on behalf of the plaintiffs under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for grant of interim injunction and the application filed on behalf of the defendant nos. 1 to 4 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of
the CPC seeking vacation of ex parte ad-interim injunction granted by this Court vide order dated 15th January, 2020.
2. Vide order dated 15th January, 2020, this Court had granted an ex parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants from creating any third
party rights in respect of the three suit properties being, (i) land admeasuring 4 bighas 17 biswas bearing Khasra Nos.1029 Min. (0-5), 1025(0-5) and
1028 Min (4-7) with the structure standing thereon situated in Village Chhattarpur and also known as part of Farm No.15, North Drive, DLF
Chhattarpur Farms, New Delhi, (ii) land admeasuring 5 bighas 5 biswas bearing Khasra No.1012 Min (3-0), 1029 (2-0) and 1013 (0-5) with the
structure standing thereon situated in Village Chhattarpur and also known as part of Farm No.15, North Drive, DLF Chhattarpur Farms, New Delhi
and (iii) land admeasuring 4 bighas 17 biswas bearing Khasra No.1027 (4-17) with the structure standing thereon situated in Village Chhattarpur and
also known as part of Farm No.15, North Drive, DLF Chhattarpur Farms, New Delhi.
Case set up in the plaint
3. The case set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint is that:-
i. The defendant nos.1 to 3 are the owners of land measuring 14 bighas 19 biswas in Khasra No.1012 Min. (3-0), 1013 Min. (0-5), 1025 (0-5), 1027 (4-
17), 1028 Min. (4-7) and 1029 (2-5) with boundary wall, tube well, electric connection and structure standing thereon situated in Village Chhattarpur,
Tehsil Saket, New Delhi and also known as Farm No.15, North Drive, DLF Chhattarpur Farms, New Delhi (‘suit property’).
ii. The defendant nos.1 to 3 are real sisters and they had executed a registered Power of Attorney dated 21st August, 2018 in favour of the defendant
no. 4, who is the husband of the defendant no.3, in respect of the entire suit property. On the basis of the aforesaid Power of Attorney, defendant no.4
entered into an Agreement to Sell dated 6th May, 2019 in favour of the defendant no.5 qua the entire suit property.
iii. Plaintiffs entered into an Agreement to Sell dated 6th July, 2019 with the defendant no. 5 in respect of the entire suit property for a consideration of
Rs.14,00,00,000/-. Out of the aforesaid consideration of Rs.14,00,00,000/-, the plaintiffs paid a sum of Rs.21,00,000/- as an advance through cheque in
favour of the defendant no.5 and a receipt was also executed by the defendant no. 5 qua the said payment.
iv. It was further agreed between the parties that the plaintiffs would purchase the entire suit property in three parts and therefore, three different Sale
Deeds would be executed in respect of different portions of the entire suit property, as detailed above.
v. On 9th August, 2019, three demand drafts of Rs.30,00,000/- each were prepared by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendant nos.1, 2 and 3
respectively and handed over to the defendant no.5, in respect of which, a receipt was executed by the defendant no. 5. Further, a sum of
Rs.50,00,000/- was paid in cash to the defendant nos.4 and 5, in respect of which, a receipt was executed by the defendant no.5.
vi. On 21st August, 2019, a public notice was issued by the plaintiffs in the newspapers in respect of its agreement to purchase the suit property.
vii. The plaintiffs also purchased the e-stamp papers for the Sale Deeds to be executed in their favour and also got prepared the demand drafts in
respect of the remaining sale consideration. Since the defendants did not confirm any date for execution of the Sale Deeds, the plaintiffs got the
demand drafts cancelled on 13th September, 2019.
viii. On 14th September, 2019, a legal notice was sent on behalf of the plaintiffs to the defendants.
4. In January, 2020, the present suit was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs seeking the following reliefs:
“(i) Pass a decree of specific performance in favour of the Plaintiffs No. 1 & 2 and against the Defendants thereby directing the
Defendants to receive the balance sale consideration after adjusting the part Sale Consideration already received by the Defendants towards
sale consideration of the entire land and execute Sale Deeds in respect of the land measuring 4 bighas 17 biswas bearing Khasra No. 1029
Min. (0-5), 1025 (0-5) and 1028 Min. (4-7) with structure standing thereon situated in Village Chhattarpur known as part of Farm No. 15,
North Drive, DLF Chhattarpur Farms, New Delhi, in favour of the Plaintiff No. 1 & 2 herein and put the Plaintiff No. 1 & 2 in possession of
the said portion;
(ii) Pass a decree of specific performance in favor of the Plaintiff No. 3 & 4 and against the Defendants thereby directing the Defendants to
receive the balance sale consideration after adjusting the part Sale Consideration already received by the Defendants towards sale
consideration of the entire suit property and execute Sale Deeds in respect of the land measuring 5 bighas & 5 biswa bearing Khasra No.
1012 Min. (3-0), 1029 (2-0) and 1013(0-5) with structure standing thereon situated in Village Chhattarpur known as part of Farm No. 15,
North Drive, DLF Chhattarpur Farms, New Delhi, in favour of the Plaintiff No. 3 & 4 herein and put the Plaintiff No. 3 & 4 in possession of
the said portion;
(iii) Pass a decree of specific performance in favour of the Plaintiffs No. 5 & 6 and against the Defendants thereby directing the Defendants
to obtain NOC and receive the balance sale consideration after adjusting the part Sale Consideration already received by the Defendants
towards sale consideration of the entire land and execute Sale Deeds in respect of the land measuring 4 bighas & 17 biswas bearing Khasra
no. 1027 (4-17) with structure standing thereon situated in Village Chhattarpur known as part of Farm No. 15, North Drive, DLF
Chhattarpur Farms, New Delhi, in favor of the Plaintiff No. 5 & 6 herein and put the Plaintiff No. 5 & 6 in possession of the said portion;
(iv) Pass a decree of permanent injunction in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants thereby restraining the Defendants, their
legal heirs, assigns, nominees, successors, attorneys, representatives, etc. from selling, alienating, transferring, disposing off, parting with
possession of either whole or part of the suit property or in any manner creating third party interest in respect of the entire suit property i.e.
land measuring 14 bighas 19 biswas bearing Khasra No. 1012 min (3-0), 1013 min (0-5), 1025 (0-5), 1027 (4-17), 1028 min (4-7), 1029
Min. (0-5) with structure standing thereon situated in Village Chhattarpur known as Farm No. 15, North Drive, DLF Chhattarpur Farms,
New Delhi, except the Plaintiffs;
(v) Award costs of the present Suit in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants;
(vi) Pass any such other or further orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper on the facts and in the circumstances of the case in
favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants.â€
Plaintiffs’ Submissions
5. Based on the above averments in the plaint, counsel for the plaintiffs has made the following submissions:-
(i) A sum of Rs.21,00,000/- was paid to the defendant no.5 by way of a cheque, which was duly encashed. Further, three demand drafts of
Rs.30,00,000/- each were also made in favour of the defendant nos. 1, 2 and 3 ,which were also duly encashed. In addition, Rs.50,00,000/- was paid in
cash to the defendant no.5. Therefore, a total consideration of Rs.1,61,00,000/- out of Rs. 14,00,00,000/- has been paid by the plaintiffs to the
defendants.
(ii) The plaintiffs also got the demand drafts prepared in respect of the balance sale consideration, thereby showing the readiness and willingness on
part of the plaintiffs to perform their part of the agreement.
(iii) Draft Sale Deeds were also sent on behalf of the plaintiffs to the defendant no. 5 and the same were sent again after making minor corrections as
suggested orally by the defendant no. 5, thereby showing the intent of the parties to execute the Sale Deeds in respect of the suit property.
(iv) Legal notice was sent on behalf of the plaintiffs to the defendants on 14th September, 2019 and no reply was received by the plaintiffs thereto.
(v) The defendant no.4 in his written statement has admitted the Agreement to Sell dated 6th July, 2019 between the plaintiffs and the defendant no.5.
Case set up in the written statement
6. The case set up by the defendant nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the written statement is as follows:-
(i) No Agreement to Sell in respect of the suit property, written or oral, was ever entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant nos.1 to 3. In
fact, defendant nos.1 to 3 have never even met the plaintiffs.
(ii) The case set up by the plaintiffs is self-contradictory. The plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant nos.1 to 3 have entered into an Agreement to
Sell dated 6th May, 2019 qua the entire suit property in favour of the defendant no.5, therefore, the defendant nos. 1, 2 and 3 could not have entered
into an agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiffs.
(iii) Even otherwise, the entire suit property is a piece of one contiguous parcel of land, which has not been divided till date. Therefore, there cannot be
three separate Sale Deeds in respect of one contiguous parcel of land. The land could only be divided after receiving No Objection Certificate from
the concerned authorities, which has not been applied for till date.
(iv) The alleged Agreement to Sell referred to in the plaint is an oral agreement.
(v) The defendant nos.1 to 3 had entered into negotiations with the defendant no.5 for selling the entire suit property, but the same never materialised.
(vi) As per the plaintiff’s own case, out of the total sale consideration of Rs.14,00,00,000/-, only Rs.90,00,000/- has been paid to the defendant nos.
1 to 3. The remaining amount has been paid to the defendant no.5. Therefore, less than 10% of the total sale consideration has been paid by the
plaintiffs.
(vii) It has been stated in paragraph 17 of the plaint itself that the plaintiffs cancelled the demand drafts for the remaining amounts of sale
consideration on 13th September, 2019, which is even before the issuance of the legal notice dated 14th September, 2019.
(viii) The three demand drafts of Rs.30,00,000/- each were accepted by the defendant nos.1 to 3 on the basis that only one acre out of the three acre
suit property was to be sold. But, when the defendant nos.1 to 3 came to know that the price of Rs.14,00,00,000/- was in respect of the entire land,
they did not wish to proceed further with the deal.
(ix) The entire suit property is valued at about Rs.45,00,00,000/- to Rs.50,00,00,000/- and therefore, there was no reason why the defendants would
agree to sell the same for Rs.14,00,00,000/-.
(x) The defendant nos.1 to 3 got the demand drafts prepared in respect of the aforesaid amount of Rs.90,00,000/- on 12th September, 2019 and the
said amount was ultimately deposited with the Court, as permitted by the order dated 3rd March, 2020.
Defendants’ Submissions
7. Based on the above averments in the written statement, counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant nos.1 to 4 has made the following
submissions :-
(i) The ex parte interim injunction order dated 15th January, 2020 was passed by this Court on account of gross misrepresentations by the plaintiffs
inasmuch as this Court was not informed that there was an oral Agreement to Sell and not written Agreement to Sell. Further, it was not disclosed to
the Court that only two draft Sale Deeds were sent by the plaintiffs.
(ii) A sum of Rs.21,00,000/- was paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant no.5 and it was the defendant no.5, who issued the receipt in respect thereof.
Similarly, the receipts in respect of the three demand drafts of Rs.30,00,000/- each and the cash amount of Rs.50,00,000/-, were also executed by the
defendant no.5 and not by the defendant nos.1 to 4.
(iii) The revised Sale Deeds were sent on behalf of the plaintiffs only to the defendant no.5 and not to the defendant nos.1 to 3.
(iv) In the plaint, there is no prayer with regard to specific performance of an Agreement to Sell. The prayers are only seeking execution of Sale
Deeds. Therefore, the present suit filed for specific performance is not maintainable.
(v) Reliance is placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Ltd. vs. KS Infraspace LLP Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 410
and M.P. Mathur vs. DTC, (2006) 13 SCC 706 to contend when there is a doubt with regard to a conclusion of an agreement for sale, injunction
cannot be granted.
(vi) In view of the fact that less than 10% of the consideration has been paid by the plaintiffs, no relief of specific performance can be granted in
favour of the plaintiffs. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgments in Om Prakash Aggarwal vs. Raj Kumar Mittal (2019) 258 DLT 248 and
Gayatri Gupta vs. Ruby Sharma, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6741.
8. In rejoinder, it has been contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that:-
(i) There is no prohibition in law to sell a part of a land even if the entire land is jointly owned by the parties.
(ii) There is nothing in law to contend that if the consideration paid is less than 10% then specific performance of the contract cannot be ordered.
(iii) Oral agreement in respect of an Agreement to Sell is valid in law.
(iv) No misrepresentation was made on behalf of the plaintiffs to obtain the ex parte ad-interim injunction order.
(v) Plaintiffs have duly pleaded the readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs to pay the sale consideration in the plaint.
9. I have perused the record and heard the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties.
10. First, I propose to deal with the issue of misrepresentation and concealment raised on behalf of the defendants as against the plaintiffs.
11. A perusal of the ex parte ad interim order dated 15th January, 2020 passed by this Court seems to convey the impression that the Court was not
made aware of the fact that the agreement to sell in respect of the suit property was an oral agreement and not a written agreement.
12. In my view, this is a vital aspect that should have been brought to the attention of the court. Perhaps, if the court would have been aware that the
aforesaid agreement to sell was oral in nature, the ex parte ad interim injunction would not have been granted. Unlike an agreement that has been
reduced into writing, there is likely a doubt about the existence of an oral agreement to sell. When large amounts are to be paid as consideration for
transfer of property, it is hard to believe that the parties would not enter into a written agreement to sell.
13. A party that approaches the court for discretionary relief has to come with clean hands and is duty-bound to disclose all material facts that would
have a bearing on the merits of the case. As per the first proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC, if in an application for temporary injunction or
in any affidavit supporting such application, a party has knowingly made a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular and the
injunction was granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall vacate the injunction. Therefore, in terms of the language of Order
XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC, an interim order that is based on false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular, is liable to be vacated on
the ground of misrepresentation and concealment alone.
14. In a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff has to establish a strong prima facie case based on undisputed facts, for grant of interim injunction.
In this regard, it would be relevant to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Ltd. vs. KS Infraspace LLP Ltd.
(supra). Paragraphs 15 and 21 are set out as follows:-
“15.    Chapter VII, Section 36 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the Actâ€) provides for grant of
preventive relief. Section 37 provides that temporary injunction in a suit shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. The grant of
relief in a suit for specific performance is itself a discretionary remedy. A plaintiff seeking temporary injunction in a suit for specific
performance will therefore have to establish a strong prima facie case on basis of undisputed facts. The conduct of the plaintiff will also be a
very relevant consideration for purposes of injunction. The discretion at this stage has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily.
xxx                              xxx                              xxx
21. Â Â Â Â Â W e are therefore of the considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, and the nature of the
materials placed before us at this stage, whether there existed a concluded contract between the parties or not, is itself a matter for trial to be
decided on basis of the evidence that may be led. If the plaintiff contended a concluded contract and/or an oral contract by inference,
leaving an executed document as a mere formality, the onus lay on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the parties were ad idem having
discharged their obligations as observed in Brij Mohan [Brij Mohan v. Sugra Begum, (1990) 4 SCC 147] . The plaintiff failed to show the
same on admitted facts. The draft MoU dated 30-3-2018 in Clause C contemplated payment of the income tax dues of Rs 18.64 crores as
part of the consideration amount only whereafter the agreement was to be signed relating back to the date 29-3-2008. Had this amount
been already paid or remitted by the plaintiff, entirely different considerations would have arisen with regard to the requirement for
execution of a written agreement remaining a mere formality. Needless to state the balance of convenience is in favour of the defendants on
account of the intervening developments, without furthermore, inter alia by reason of the plaintiff having waited for seven months to
institute the suit. The question of irreparable harm to a party complaining of a breach of contract does not arise if other remedies are
available to the party complaining of the breach. The High Court has itself observed that from the negotiations between the parties that
“some rough weather was being reflected between the plaintiff and the defendant …â€. The Special Civil Judge failed to address the
issue of delay. The High Court noticed the arguments of the defendants with regard to delay in the institution of the suit but failed to deal
with it.
15. Reference may also be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.P. Mathur vs. DTC, (2006) 13 SCC 706, wherein, the Supreme Court
has laid down some of the factors to be kept in mind while granting an ad interim injunction in a suit for specific performance. Paragraph 14 of the
aforesaid judgment is set out below:-
“14.    The present suit is based on equity. The term “equity†has four different meanings, according to the context in which it is used.
Usually it means “an equitable interest in propertyâ€. Sometimes, it means “a mere equityâ€, which is a procedural right ancillary to some right
of property, for example, an equitable right to have a conveyance rectified. Thirdly, it may mean “floating equityâ€, a term which may be used to
describe the interest of a beneficiary under a will. Fourthly, “the right to obtain an injunction or other equitable remedyâ€. In the present case, the
plaintiffs have sought a remedy which is discretionary. They have instituted the suit under Section 34 of the 1963 Act. The discretion which the court
has to exercise is a judicial discretion. That discretion has to be exercised on well-settled principles. Therefore, the court has to considerâ€"the
nature of obligation in respect of which performance is sought, circumstances under which the decision came to be made, the conduct
of the parties and the effect of the court granting the decree. In such cases, the court has to look at the contract. The court has to
ascertain whether there exists an element of mutuality in the contract. If there is absence of mutuality the court will not exercise
discretion in favour of the plaintiffs. Even if, want of mutuality is regarded as discretionary and not as an absolute bar to specific
performance, the court has to consider the entire conduct of the parties in relation to the subject-matter and in case of any disqualifying
circumstances the court will not grant the relief prayed for (Snell's Equity, 31st Edn., p. 366). In the present case, applying the above test,
we do not find an iota of mutuality. There is no contract between DTC and the plaintiffs. There is no communication at any point of time between
DTC and the plaintiffs. No sale consideration was ever fixed. The plaintiffs were never called upon to make payment. The decision to allot remained
tentative. In the circumstances, neither contract nor equity existed at any point of time so as to compel DTC to convey the tenements to the
plaintiffs.â€
16. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in Anil Kumar vs. Seema Thakur & Ors, 2010 (115) DRJ 62 has laid down essential ingredients to be
established at a prima facie stage for existence of a contract to purchase a property. The relevant observations of this Court are set out below:
“12.The rulings of this Court in Aggarwal Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Focus Properties (P) Ltd., 63 (1996) DLT 52; and Amarjit Singh Johar &
Company (DC) v. Shri Prakash Chand Brahmin, 79 (1999) DLT 289 : 1999 (50) DRJ 169, state what are essential ingredients to an
agreement to sell immovable property. Those were cases where the plaintiff had inter alia, relied on a receipt of money. The Court held that
the following four essential ingredients should be necessary for an inference about prima facie existence of a contract to purchase property:
(i) particulars of consideration;
(ii) certainty about identity of parties
(iii) certainty about to the property to be sold; and
(iv) certainty as to other terms relating to probable cost of conveyance, time, etc.
The Court also held that in the absence of any of the above elements, it could be concluded that there was no binding agreement. This view
was endorsed, and followed High Way Farms v. Sh. Chinta Ram, 85 (2000) DLT 355.
13.In Mool Chand Bakhru v. Rohan, (2002) 2 SCC 612, the Supreme Court held that when an oral agreement is put forward, for purchase
of property (in that case an inference was drawn from letters which adverted to such oral agreement), the terms of the agreement should be
ascertained with reasonable certainty. Essential terms of the agreement to sell, such as the time-frame within which the sale deed is to be
executed, and also who would pay the registration charges etc. should be discernable.       Â
17. Applying the aforesaid principles of law to the present case, in my view, there are sufficient doubts with regard to execution of an agreement to
sell by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs. As per the plaintiffs’ own case, there is no written agreement to sell executed in favour of the
plaintiffs. Although an oral agreement to sell is permissible in law, but a heavy burden of proof has to be fulfilled by the plaintiffs to prove such an oral
agreement. It appears in the present case that there was no direct interaction or interface between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The negotiations
were going on through the defendant no.5, who was a property broker. The consideration of Rs.21,00,000/- and Rs.50,00,000/- in cash was paid by the
plaintiffs to the defendant no.5 and it was the defendant no.5, who issued the receipts for the same. Even the draft Sale Deeds were sent by the
plaintiffs to the defendant no.5 and not to the defendant nos.1 to 4. The three demand drafts of Rs.30,00,000/- each were in the name of the defendant
nos.1, 2 and 3, but they were handed over to the defendant no.5, who executed the receipts for the same. Though the aforesaid demand drafts were
encashed by the defendant nos.1, 2 and 3, they were promptly sought to be refunded back to the plaintiffs on 12th September, 2019. Upon the refusal
of the plaintiffs to accept the same, the said demand drafts were permitted to be deposited in the Court on 3rd March, 2020 as noted in the order dated
3rd March, 2020 passed by this Court.
18. Admittedly, the demand drafts in respect of the remaining amount of the sale consideration made by the plaintiffs were also got cancelled on 13th
September, 2019, even before the issuance of the legal notice dated 14th September, 2019. This demonstrates that the plaintiffs were also aware of
the deal not going through. Reference may also be made to the email dated 9th September, 2019 sent by the defendant no.5 to the defendant no.4.
The contents of said email are reproduced below:
“Mr. Sandeep Khanna,
                                                          9-09-19
C 670, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi.
Dear Sir,
This is in furtherance to your letter regarding the verbal discussions we have had earlier for the sale of 1 acre of your agricultural land in
village Chattarpur, Mehrauli, New Delhi.
We had accepted your initial condition to deposit an initial token to show our intention to start the talks and had therein given you three
drafts of Rs. 30.00 lacs each totaling Rs. 90.00 lacs (rupees ninety lacs only). However thereafter since we have not been able to agree on
the terms and conditions, we have not been able to conclude the talks and take the matter any further.
Considering these circumstances we accept your decision to stop the talks and return our initial token given to you. For this we would
request you to inform us when the refund drafts are ready so that the same could be collected from you.
Thanking you.
Yours truly,
Gunveen Singhâ€
As per the plaintiffs’ own case, they were interacting with the defendants through defendant no.5. The aforesaid email seems to suggest that the
transaction did not progress and the money was to be refunded by the defendant nos. 1 to 3 to the plaintiffs. Â
19. No time frame was also fixed between the parties for execution of the Sale Deeds. Further, doubts with regard to the transaction are also created
on account of the fact that the entire suit property is one piece of contiguous land, which has not been divided till date. Admittedly, no permissions had
been applied for or received from the concerned authorities for the sub-division of the suit property. In that view, whether three separate Sale Deeds
could be executed in respect of the three separate portions of the suit property is also doubtful.
20. All the aforesaid facts taken together, suggest that there was a lack of mutuality between the parties. Therefore, at this stage, it cannot be stated
that there was a legally valid and binding agreement between the parties. In fact, as correctly pointed out by the counsels for the defendants, there is
not even a prayer made in the plaint for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The prayers in the plaint, as set out above, are more in the
nature of a mandatory injunction for the defendants to execute the sale deeds in favour of the plaintiffs.
21. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the total consideration for the suit property was fixed at Rs.14,00,00,000/-. Out of the aforesaid sum, only a sum
of Rs.90,00,000/- has been paid to the defendant nos.1, 2 and 3. Remaining amounts of Rs.50,00,000/- in cash and Rs.21,00,000/- have been paid to
the defendant no.5. Whether these amounts were remitted by the defendant no. 5 to the defendant nos. 1, 2 and 3 is a matter of trial. The amount of
Rs.90,00,000/- is less than 10% of the total consideration. Further, even the possession of the suit property has not been handed over to the plaintiffs.
It may also be noted here that prior to issuance of legal notice, the plaintiffs had got cancelled the demand drafts in respect of the remaining
consideration. This also creates a doubt with regard to readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiffs to perform their part of the contract.
22. In view of the discussion above, the plaintiffs have failed to make out a prima facie case in their favour for grant of interim injunction. As noted
above, I am not satisfied that in the present case, there was a valid and binding contract executed between the parties. Further, the consideration paid
by the plaintiffs to the defendants is too insignificant in relation to the total consideration, which would disentitle the plaintiffs for grant of interim relief.
I have also noted above that it was not disclosed to the Court at the time of passing of ad interim order dated 15th January, 2020 that there was only
an oral agreement to sell between the plaintiffs and the defendants.
23. Consequently, the ex parte ad interim order dated 15th January, 2020 is liable to be vacated.
24. IA No.3030/2020 (u/O.XXXIX R.4 of the CPC) is allowed and IA No.430/2020 (u/O.XXXIX R.1&2 of the CPC) is dismissed.
25. No observations made in the present order shall be considered for the final adjudication of the present suit.
CS(OS) 13/2020, IA No.3028/2020 (u/S.151 of CPC) & IA No.3029/2020 (of the defendants u/O.VII R.11 of CPC)
26. List on 2nd August, 2022