@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
B.A. Khan, J.@mdashThese two appeals are directed against orders passed by the Contempt Court dismissing contempt applications of Appellants and discharging the rule against Respondents. The short controversy raised is whether these two appeals were competent and maintainable under Clause X of the Letters Patent as no appeal was available against such orders u/s 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
2. Appellant''s case is that such an appeal was in order because the orders passed by the Trial Judge were in exercise of his original jurisdiction and "judgment" within the meaning of Clause X of Letters Patent. But the other version was that such appeal would not lie because the impugned orders fail to satisfy the test of ''judgment'' as contemplated by Clause X.
3. According to Shri Upadhyay, L.C. for first Appellant a distinction was required to be drawn between a civil and criminal contempt. In the first case, order passed by the contempt Court discharging rule was inter-parties and, therefore, applicant in such a case could not be treated as a mere informer on the specious plea that contempt was a matter between the Court and the contemnor. In this case his rights were at stake in the enforcement of the order allegedly breached and if he was turned away, it would tentamount to non-exercise of jurisdiction by the contempt Court and rendering his remedyless, besides contributing to lowering of the majesty and dignity of the Court. He buttressed all this by explaining that such like order passed by the trial Judge was in exercise of his inherent original jurisdiction and also qualified to be ''judgment'' under Clause X.
4. Shri P. Mathur, representing the second Appellant went a step further. He contended that an order discharging rule against an alleged contemnor was envisaged and recognised u/s 12 and 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act and, therefore, was as much an order/decision as an order or decision to punish conceived u/s 19. Therefore, such an order could not be treated differently for purposes of availability of appeal against it. According to him import of the provisions of Section 12 and 14 had gone unnoticed in some judgments of the Supreme Court holding that only punishment orders were appealable u/s 19. He alternatively argued that even if an appeal was excluded u/s 19 against an order dropping contempt proceedings, it would still be available under Clause X of the Letters Patent as such order was passed in exercise of original contempt jurisdiction of the Court and was also a ''judgment'', thus satisfying all requisite requirements.
5. It is no more res-integra that contempt jurisdiction of the High Court is a special and inherent jurisdiction. Article 215 of the Constitution declares that High Court shall be the Court of record and shall have the power of such Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. It would be useless to rake up the controversy whether such jurisdiction was inherent in it because of being Court of record or whether it was conferred on it under Article 215, so long as it was not disputed that it possessed such jurisdiction. But it surely requires to be made clear that this jurisdiction was not conferred on the High Court by Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. This Act only limited the jurisdiction and regulated the procedure for its exercise which finds support not only from statement of its objects but also from provisions of Section 22 which declares that it would be in addition and not in derogation of any other law relating to contempt of Court (See 1972(1) SCC 651 and 1991(4) SCC 406).
6. This Act amongst other things provides remedy of appeal u/s 19 against any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The provisions of Section 19 have, however, been interpreted by the Supreme Court to confer limited right of appeal against orders of punishment only and no other order including the one dropping proceedings or discharging the rule against the contemnor. This position stands firmly established by the judgments of Supreme Court in AIR 1974 SC 2255, AIR 1976 SC 1206 and AIR 1978 SC 1914.
7. The question that arises is how about the remedy against other orders passed by the contempt Court. Does any other law provide for an appeal against them. The Letters Patent comes handy in such a situation. It thus remains to be seen whether such order passed by the contempt Court were appealable under Clause X of the Letters Patent. The relevant clause is extracted hereunder in parts to facilitate proper appreciation.
PART I PART II
We do further ordain that an Not being a judgment passed in
appeal shall lie to the said High the exercise of appellate
Court of Judicature at Nagpur jurisdiction in respect of a decree
from the judgment of one Judge of or order made in the exercise of
the said High Court or one Judge appellate jurisdiction by a Court
of any Division Court pursuant to subject to the superintendence of
Section 108, Govt. of India Act. the said High Court, and not being
an order made in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction, and not
being a sentence or order passed or
made in the exercise of the powers
of superintendence under the
provisions of Section 107, Govt. of
India Act, or in the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction.
8. Before analysing relevant provisions of Clause X it must be borne in mind that an appeal is a creature of statute and it is not claimable as of right unless statutorily conferred. Clause 10 of Letters Patent fills up the vacuum and confers a general right of appeal against the judgment of a single bench of the High Court. Prior to the amedment of 1928, it provided for an unqualified right of appeal from a judgment of Single Judge whether it was passed in original, first appellate or second appellate jurisdiction. But thereafter this right was restricted and judgments falling in certain categories mentioned in Part II (supra) were excluded. The position now is that judgments falling in Part (I) are unconditionally appealable and those in Part (II) unappealable. Though Part (I) does not indicate any limitation or qualification as to the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the Singh Judge, but still the order appealed against must fall under validly conferred jurisdiction excluding the prohibited jurisdiction under Clause II. Then it must amount to a "judgment" within the meaning of the Clause i.e. it must decide rights and liabilities of parties or must work some injustice to them. If it passes these two tests, it becomes appealable under Clause 10.
9. It this context it remains to be seen whether the order dropping contempt proceedings is in exercise of any jurisdiction at all. Going by the Supreme Court judgment in Taneja''s case 1988 SCC (Cr.) 546 it is not in exercise of original contempt jurisdiction under article 215 whereunder contempt Court exercises jurisdiction only to punish for contempt and nothing more or less. The Court in this case observed thus:
There can be no doubt that whenever a Court Tribunal or Authority is vested with a jurisdiction to decide a matter, such jurisdiction can be exercised in deciding the matter in favour or against a person. For example a Civil Court is conferred with jurisdiction to decide a suit; the Civil Court will have undoubtedly the jurisdiction to decree the suit or dismiss the same. But when a Court is conferred with the power of jurisdiction to act in a particular manner, the exercise of jurisdiction or the power will involve the acting in a particular manner and in no other manner. Article 215 confers jurisdiction or power on the High Court to punish for contempt. The High Court can exercise its jurisdiction only by punishing for contempt. It is true that in considering a question whether the alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not, the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it, if necessary, examines witnesses and thereafter, passes an order either acquitting or punishing him for contempt. When the High Court acquits the contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, for such exercise will mean that the High Court should act in a particular manner, that is to say by imposing punishment for contempt. So long as no punishment is imposed by the High Court cannot be said to be exercising its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution.
10. Where can such order be placed then ? Could it be said to be an order passed under inherent jurisdiction of Court or under Sections 12 and 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act which contemplate passing of such orders. Assuming that the order was not wholly rootless, it had still to pass a second test of being a ''judgment'' within the meaning of this clause to satisfy its requirement. Therefore, would it qualify to be a ''judgment'' or not.
11. The meaning and scope of this term ''judgment'' has engaged attention of Courts all through and despite varying approaches and differing views there is a broad consensus over its broad features. On a wider and liberal interpretation it includes all orders which decide matters of movement and affect vital and valuable rights of the parties or result in serious injustice to the party concerned. The Supreme Court dealing with it in Shah Nabu Lal Khimji AIR 1981 SC 1786 held as under:
The concept of a judgment as defined by the CPC seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by Sub-section (9) of Section 2 cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word ''judgment'' as used in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent because the Letters Patent has advisedly not used the term ''order'' or ''decree'' anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers of the Letters Patent was than the word ''judgment'' should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word ''judgment'' used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It seems to us that the word ''judgment'' has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense.
These decisions clearly bring out the principles that appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent will not lie unless the order passed by a learned Single Judge has the characteristics and trappings of finality and is an order which affects vital and valuable rights of the parties and it causes serious injustice to a particular party. If the matter is open to consideration or reconsideration or where a party has a right or opportunity to put up its own case, the order cannot be treated as deciding something finally or an order which affects the rights of the parties.
12. Tested thus, it becomes difficult to hold that an order dropping contempt proceedings or discharge the rule against alleged contemnor even if assumed to have been passed under inherent jurisdiction of Court, would amount to a ''judgment'' to merit an appeal under clause 10. Firstly because such an order does not decide any rights of the parties nor does it work out injustice to any party. It only drops an allegation against the alleged contemnor who would have been otherwise punished.
13. At this stage it becomes necessary to clarify that object of contempt jurisdiction was to uphold the dignity and majesty of the Court and law and to foster and command respect for it. It was a matter solely between the Court and the contemnor even though proved by a motion or reference. The Court was the sole judge to decide and determine whether a particular act amounted to contempt or not. A private party was only an informer in the matter and could not insist that Court must necessarily commit the contemnor and punish him/her. Such party had no right to ask for the contempt power to be exercised in a particular manner and according to his/her perception. It would be vexatious if such party was allowed to have his/her way in the matter because contempt jurisdiction was not meant for settling private scores.
14. Mr. Upadhyay''s attempt to draw distinction between a Civil and Criminal contempt and his contention that a private party had a stake in the order, breach whereof was alleged is imaginary. This is so because neither Article 215 of the Constitution, nor Section 19 of the Contempt Act makes any distinction between the Civil and Criminal contempt. Moreover, it is misconceived to contend that the party had any stake in the Civil contempt because even in this also such party only ask for a punishment to the alleged contemnor. It is a different matter that the contempt Court may purge the contempt by granting any ancillary relief. Therefore, it is not understandable how the rights of such party could be said to be effected or prejudiced if the alleged contemnor was not committed and rule against him was discharged. That by itself would not effect or kill any of rights involved in the matter. It only leads to letting off of the alleged contemnor on the Court recording its satisfaction that no vindication of its order was required.
15. Looking at it from a different angle should such an appeal be held maintainable once it was conceded that exercise of contempt jurisdiction was a matter exclusively between the Court and alleged contemnor and that Section 19 of COCA provided for a limited right of appeal only against order of punishment and no other order based on logic that it would be vexatious to allow a party to carry on proceedings from Court to Court to secure punishment for the alleged contemnor. In other words if Parliament did not provide for an appeal save otherwise than against an order of punishment with the object to eliminate vaxatious proceedings, should it be made available indirectly by overstretching provision of Letters Patent.
16. All things considered we feel no difficulty in holding that an appeal would not lie under Clause X of the Letters Patent against an order of discharge/acqittal or dropping of contempt proceedings by the contempt Court. By holding so a party invoking contempt jurisdiction of the Court is not rendered remedyless. The remedy in such a case would be available under Article 136 of the Constitution as held by the Supreme Court.
17. The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed.
