W.A. Shah, J.
This. is defendant''s Second Appeal u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is directed against the judgment and decree dated 9-5-2005 passed by learned Second Additional District Judge, Ujjain in Civil Appeal No. 41-A/2005 confirming the judgment and decree dated 20-1-2005 passed by learned First Civil Judge, Class-II, Ujjain in Civil Suit No. 167-A/2004 discarding other matters and directing eviction of the defendant from the tenanted premises specified in plaint on the ground of bonafide requirement u/s 12(1)(e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ("Act" hereafter).
The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit against the appellant/defendant on 9-11-1998 for arrears of rent, eviction and mesne profits relating to tenanted premises. Decree for eviction was prayed on the grounds as envisaged under Sections 12(1)(a), (c) and (e) of the Act. The plaintiff also specifically pleaded that she was a divorcee as her husband had divorced her according to Chhod Chhutti mode prevalent in their society by custom. The defendant resisted the suit. It was also stated by him that in view of the plaintiffs special category of divorced wife landlord within the meaning of Clause (iii) of Section 23-J of the Act, Civil Court''s jurisdiction to entertain the suit stood barred under the provisions of Section 11-A read with Section 45 of the Act. The learned Trial Court framed issues, received evidence and at the conclusion reached the finding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred and ground of eviction only u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act could be proved. Accordingly decree for eviction followed. The defendant took the matter to appeal u/s 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Lower Appellate Court confirming the decree passed by the Trial Court, dismissed it. Hence this second appeal. It has been admitted for final hearing on the following substantial question of law:
Whether both the Courts have committed an error of law by holding that the plaintiff-respondent can prosecute the eviction proceedings before the Civil Court even though she comes within the definition of Section 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act ?
Learned Counsel for the appellant arguing in support of the appeal contended that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate relevant provisions of law and were thus in error in arrogating to themselves the jurisdiction which they did not possess. In his support he relied upon 2003(1) JLJ 85 (SC) (Dhannalal v. Kalawati Bai and Ors.) and
Here it is proper to have a look of the relevant provisions of the Act. They are as under:
Chapter III
Section 11-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961
11-A. Certain provisions not to apply to certain categories of landlords.-- The provisions of this Chapter so far as they relate to matter specially provided in Chapter III-A shall not apply to the landlord defined in Section 23-J.
Chapter III
Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961
12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:
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(b) *** *** *** *** ***
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(e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.
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Chapter III-A
Section 23-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961
23-A. Special provision for eviction of tenant on ground of bonafide requirement.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or contract to the contrary, a landlord may submit an application, signed and verified in a manner provided in Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) as if it were a plaint to the Rent Controlling Authority on one or more of the following grounds for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the accommodation, namely:
(a) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required "bonafide" by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, or for any person for whose benefit, the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.
Explanation:-For the purposes of this clause, "accommodation let for residential purposes" includes:
(i) any accommodation which having been let for use as a residence is without the express consent of the landlord, used wholly or partly for any non-residential purpose;
(ii) any accommodation which has not been let under an express provision of contract for non-residential purpose;
(b) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required "bonafide" by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned:
Provided that where a person who is a landlord has acquired any accommodation or any interest therein by transfer, no application for eviction of tenant of such accommodation shall be maintainable at the instance of such person unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of such acquisition.
Chapter III-A
Section 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961
23-J. Definition of landlord for the purposes of Chapter III-A.-For the purposes of this Chapter "landlord" means a landlord who is-
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(iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or
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Chapter VII
Section 45 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961
45. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred in respect of certain matters.- (1) Save as other wise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to the fixation of standard rent in relation to any accommodation to which this Act applies or to any other matter which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under this Act to decide and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Rent Controlling Authority under this Act shall be granted by any Civil Court or other authority.
(2) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall be construed as preventing a Civil Court from entertaining any suit or proceeding for the decision of any question of title to any accommodation to which this Act applies or any question as to the person or persons who are entitled to receive the rent of such accommodation.
It is pertinent to first note the relevant observations in Ashok Kumar (supra). The relevant passage from that reads as under:
We have bestowed our best of consideration to the interpretation of Section 11-A and we are of the opinion that the provision of Chapter III will not apply to Chapter III-A and not vice versa. The learned Single Judge has only read it to mean that if the landlords defined in Section 23-J seek a remedy of eviction of the tenant then they have only one forum and they cannot take the benefit of going to Civil Court alongwith other ground, with great respect, is not correct. In fact, this is not the intention of Section 11-A. If any landlord wants to get a benefit of summary proceedings of the tenant, who is a landlord defined in Section 23-J, then he can immediately invoke the remedy before the Rent Controlling Authority. But, if he does not want to invoke the benefit of that summary remedy then there is no prohibition for him to go to a Civil Court and seek remedy of eviction of the tenant on the basis of reasonable bonafide requirement of on other grounds mentioned in Section 12 of the Act. Section 45 does not prohibit the landlord defined in Section 23-J from seeking a remedy before the Civil Court. Section 45 only says that no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to fixation of standard rent in relation to any accommodation to which this Act applies or to any other matter which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under this Act to decide and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Rent Controlling Authority shall be granted. A close reading of this section means that so far as the matter relates to fixation of rent in relation to the accommodation concerned, the Rent Controlling Authority will have the jurisdiction to decide the matter and for any other matter, which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under this Act to decide, no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Rent Controlling Authority shall be granted by any Civil Court or other authority. A simple meaning of this is that if any matter in which suit has been filed by the landlord as defined in Section 23-J, for eviction of the tenant on a reasonable bonafide requirement, then to that extent, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. But, if any, landlord defined in Section 23-J, filed suit before the Civil Court raising a ground of reasonable bonafide requirement or on other grounds mentioned in Section 12 of the Act, then the Civil Court can decide the matter and there is no prohibition.
Now dealing with Dhannalal (supra), my attention goes to the following:
(2) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) Sections 11-A, 12(1), 23-A, 23-J and 45- Landlord falling in special category u/s 23-J- Cannot have recourse of eviction u/s 12(1)- He will have to seek remedy for eviction u/s 23-A only.
Such a landlord seeking eviction of his or her tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement of residential or non-residential accommodation, the ground as defined in Section 23-A of the Act, must have recourse of Chapter III-A only. Section 11-A of the Act provides that the provisions of Chapter III, so far as they relate to matter specially provided in Chapter III-A, shall not apply to the landlord defined in Section 23-J. Section 45 of the Act also provides that as to the matters which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under the Act to decide, are not entertainable by the Civil Court. The effect of these provisions is that a landlord as defined in Section 23-J of the Act cannot have recourse to the forum of the Civil Court.
In Nandlal (supra) following Dhannalal (supra), a Single Bench of this Court held as under:
M.P. Accommodation Control Act (41 of 1961), Sections 11-A, 12(1)(a), (d), (e) and 23-J.- Suit for eviction by widow landlady- Composite plea of eviction- Cannot be entertained by Civil Court- Jurisdiction to try and decide applications u/s 23-J is conferred on Rent Controlling Authority- Civil Court can proceed with trial of suit leaving aside the question of bonafide need u/s 23-J.
A conjoint reading of Sections 11-A, 12,23-A, 23-J and Section 45 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 would show that Civil Court''s jurisdiction is ousted with regard to claim of eviction based upon bonafide need of landlord as defined in Section 23-J. In view of this, it is clear, Trial Court required no investigation or enquiry to reach that conclusion. It cannot touch the merits of that plea in view of jurisdiction conferred upon the Rent Controlling Authority in respect of landlords covered by Section 23-J of the Act. It is settled law that when an authority is created by statute and matter is committed to its jurisdiction, that authority alone is competent and has jurisdiction to decide all matter connected therewith. Cause of action for eviction based upon bonafide need under Chapter III-A for one of the five specified categories of landlords, is altogether different and distinct and has no bearing on the cause of action for eviction on other grounds. Thus, the ejectment suit as framed and instituted by respondent in respect of her bonafide need could not be entertained by the Trial Court. Thus, the order impugned suffers from legal infirmity and has to be set aside. However, this does not take away her legal right of remedy available to her under the law. The Lower Court, therefore now shall proceed with the trial of suit leaving aside the question of bonafide need.
Accordingly in the light of Nundlal (supra), relying upon Dhannalal (supra), efficacy of Ashok Kumar (supra), no longer being in vague, in the circumstances of this appeal, it is clear that both the learned Courts below committed an error in law when they held that they had the jurisdiction to deal with the ground of eviction u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act on the prosecution thereto before them by the plaintiff/respondent though she was a divorced wife landlord as defined u/s 23-J of the Act. The width of their jurisdiction stood constricted. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Lower Appellate Court confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court deserve to be set aside allowing this appeal. Accordingly this appeal is allowed. The above judgments and decrees are set aside. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
