1. The Court--The petitioner at the relevant time was working as Senior Mining Engineer/Safety officer in the Bharat Coking Coal Limited, a subsidiary of Coal India Limited. The petitioner was in the pay-scale of Rs.5200-160-6000-175-6875/- and was thus placed in E-5 Grade. The fact about the petitioner being in the aforesaid pay-scale and in E-5 Grade has been stated in para 8 of the writ application. This fact has not been disputed by the respondents.
2. It appears that the petitioner was Initially suspended on 30th July, 1989 in contemplation of some Investigation but later on the said suspension order was withdrawn on 5/6.10.89. Ultimately on 6th October, 1989 Director (Technical) Operations issued a charge sheet under his signatures to the petitioner. He was charged for the following acts of misconduct :--
(a) Neglect of work or negligence in the performance of duty including malingering or stowing down of work.
(b) wilful damage to property of the Company.
(c) Abetment of or attempt at abetment of any act which amounts to misconduct.
(d) Any breach of any of the provisions of the Rules or any other statues or rules.
Enquiring followed into the matter and ultimately by order dated 14th March, 1994 Issued by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Bharat Coking Coal Limited, respondent No. 1 herein the petitioner was removed from service of the respondents. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioner in this court through this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. On 26th June, 1997 in the case of Ram Lakhan Prasad Singh v. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and Others (W.P. No. 854 of 1994) I had set aside and quashed the dismissal order of the petitioner in that case. It is contended and submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner in the present petition that the case of Ram Lakhan Prasad Singh (supra) is Identical and similar to the case of the petitioner, both based on same facts and questions of law. In fact it is contended that in both the cases, same set of allegations were levelled and that in both the cases the charge sheet was served upon the delinquent officer by an Incompetent person and since on this ground alone 1 had quashed and set aside the dismissal order in the case of Ram Lakhan Prasad Singh, I should follow the same principle in the present case.
4. Learned Advocate for the respondents has raised two objections to the maintainability of this petition. The first is with regard to the lack of jurisdiction in this court on the ground that the entire cause of action has accrued in the State of Bihar and since no part of cause of action has accrued in the State of West Bengal, this court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter. Secondly, it has been submitted that the case of Ram Lakhan Prasad Singh is different from the present case.
5. I have heard the learned advocate for the parties and considered the record. The services of the petitioner as also of Ram Lakhan Prasad Slngh were governed by the Coal India Executives Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules. 1978. Under rule 27.0 thereof. It is provided that two types of penalties, i.e., Minor penalties and Major Penalties, can be imposed on an employee for misconduct, for good and sufficient reasons. "Removal from Service" is indicated as one of the penalties under the head "Major Penalties". Under Rule 27.2 of the said Rules, "Authorities competent to impose penalties" have been prescribed, wherein it has been mentioned that the authorities specified in column 3 of the Schedule appended to the said Rules are to impose the penalties specified in column 4 upon employees in different grades of pay shown in column 1 of the Schedule. A perusal of the Schedule clearly reveals that in respect of the Officers in Grades E-1 to E-9 posted in subsidiary of Coal India Ltd., in respect of "all penalties" the Chairman-cum-Managing Director. Coal India Ltd., has been described as the "Disciplinary Authority" and under Column 5 of the Schedule "Board of Directors. Coal India Limited" is the prescribed "Appellate Authority".
6. Rule 29.0 of the said Rules prescribes "Procedure for Imposing Major penalties". Rule 29.1 says that no order imposing any of the major penalties specified in rule 27 shall be made except after an enquiry is held tn accordance with the said rule. Rules 29.2 and 29.3 are relevant for our purpose. Rules 29.2 and 29.3 are reproduced as under:--
"29.2 Whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for enquiring into the truth of any Imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against an employee, it may itself inquire into, or appoint any official of the Company or any public servant (hereinafter called the Enquiring Authority) to enquire into the truth thereof.
29.3 Where it is proposed to hold an enquiry the Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations against the employee. The charges, together with a statement of the allegations, on which they are based, a list of documents by which and list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charges are proposed to be sustained shall be communicated in writing to the employee, who shall be required to submit within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority (not exceeding 15 days), a written statement whether he/she admits or denies any of or all the articles of charge."
7. A bare look at these two rules, i.e., rules 29.2 and 29.3, clearly suggests, beyond any doubt whatsoever, that it is the exclusive prerogative, domain and obligation of the Disciplinary Authority to form his opinion as to whether there are grounds to enquire into the truth of any imputation of any misconduct or misbehaviour, and if he comes to such an opinion that there does exist grounds for such an enquiry, he has to again decide whether he shall enquire himself into such misconduct or misbehaviour, or appoint an official of the Company or any other public servant to enquire into the truth thereof. The above two rules also clearly suggest that where the Disciplinary Authority proposes to hold an enquiry, it shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations against the employee and these charges shall be communicated in writing to the employee who shall be required to submit within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority written statement with regard to his explanation of the charges.
8. In the case before us the charge sheet admittedly has not been signed by respondent No. 1. It has been signed and Issued by respondent No.3 who also has appointed the enquiry officer to conduct the enquiry. In the case of Steel Authority of India. Successor of Bokaro Steel Limited v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court at Bokaro Steel City Dhanbad & Another, reported in 1980 SCC 475, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with a similar situation, were clearly of the opinion that it is only the competent Disciplinary Authority who has the power to Issue charge sheet against the employee concerned.
9. The only defence the learned advocate for the respondents has raised is that in exercise of the power vesting under Rule 27 of the 1978 Rules, the Board of Directors of Coal India Limited has Issued an office memorandum on 4th April, 1991 whereby it delegated the powers of "disciplinary authority" to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the concerned subsidiary company, Instead of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited as was originally prescribed in the schedule. Even though it may be a fact that the aforesaid Office Memorandum delegated the powers of the "disciplinary authority" to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the subsidiary company, the respondents still face two difficulties. Firstly, the Office Memorandum was issued on 4th April, 1991 which means that the delegation came into effect from and after 4th April, 1991 whereas the charge sheet in the present case was Issued by the respondent No. 3 on 6th October, 1989. In a case where disciplinary proceedings commenced prior to the issuance of the Memorandum dated 4.4.91, the disciplinary authority as was originally prescribed in 1978 Rules will continue to have exclusive Jurisdiction in the matter. Since the disciplinary proceedings were Initiated on 6th October, 1989, it is that date which is relevant for the purposes of determining as to who was the disciplinary authority on that date. Not only this, secondly, even in the Memorandum dated 4.4.91, the disciplinary authority for major penalties has been prescribed as Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the concerned subsidiary company, whereas the charge sheet in the present case has been Issued and signed by respondent No. 3 who admittedly was not the Chairman-cum-Managing Director and who was only a Director (Technical) operations in a subsidiary company.
10. On the analogy of the case of Ram Lakhan Prasad Singh therefore I have no hesitation in holding that the charge sheet and the disciplinary proceedings as also the Dismissal order suffered from patent lack of jurisdiction and were vitiated from the very beginning. Since the proceedings were set in motion by a person who did not have the Jurisdiction, authority or the power to do so, these would stand vitiated and thus be liable to be set aside. Since the Impugned order of removal from service, even though having been approved by the competent disciplinary authority, i.e., respondent No. 1. was based on the aforesaid illegal charge sheet and the enquiry proceedings, it has also to be quashed and set aside.
11. In so far as the question relating to the jurisdiction is concerned, the Impugned dismissal order which gave rise to the cause of action to the petitioner for filing this petition, the same has been passed with the approval of respondent No. 1. Undoubtedly respondent No. 1 resides in Calcutta where he has his Head Office. Since it is he who accorded his approval to the removal of the petitioner from service, which ultimately led to the passing of the Impugned order. It can be safely said that a part of cause of action did accrue to the petitioner in Calcutta where the head office of respondent No. 1 is situated.
12. In the result, the writ application is allowed.
13. The impugned order removing the petitioner from service of the respondents, the enquiry proceedings and the charge sheet preceding the same and all proceedings in connection therewith are quashed and set aside. All the necessary consequences will follow immediately and forthwith.
14. Since the order removing the petitioner from service, the enquiry proceedings and the charge sheet preceding the same have been quashed and set aside only on the ground of Incompetence of the respondent No. 3, no part of this Judgment shall be construed as any expression of opinion with regard to the allegations against the petitioner constituting the subject matter of the enquiry proceedings. It shall be open to the respondents or the competent Disciplinary Authority to enquire afresh into the allegations against the petitioner in accordance with law and to pass fresh consequential orders. The quashing and setting aside of the aforesaid order removing the petitioner from service, the enquiry proceedings and the charge sheet, therefore, shall not operate as any bar whatsoever for the respondents to enquiry afresh into the matter.
15. There will be no order as to costs.
16. Application allowed
