Rajesh Tandon, J.@mdashHeard Shri K.S. Verma, counsel for the applicant and Shri Lalit Sharma, counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Shri Navneet Kaushik, counsel for the petitioner.
2. Present review application has been filed by the applicant-respondent No. 4 for reviewing the order dated 24.10.2005 passed in Writ Petition No. 809 of 2003 (MS).
3. The grounds alleged by the review applicant for review of the judgment are that the order dated 24.10.2005 was passed by this Hon4ble Court ex parte and the name of the counsel of respondent No. 4 was not published in the weekly cause list and, therefore, he could not attend the court while the Vakalatnama has been filed in this case earlier by the respondent No. 4.
4. The petitioner-respondent has filed the objections on the review application and has submitted that the ground taken by the respondent No. 4 for filing the present review application is sham and fraud being committed by him on affidavit sworn on oath before this Court as it is ample clear from the record that the final order was passed on 24.10.2005 whereas the vakalatnama was filed by the respondent No. 4 on 7.3.2006 i.e. after passing of the order and hence there existed no question that the name of the counsel for the respondent No. 4 could have been shown in the list dated 24.10.2005. The ground taken in the review application has no substance and the review application is devoid of merits and deserves to be rejected.
5. A perusal of the vakalatnama filed by the counsel for the respondent No. 4 clearly shows that the said vakalatnama was accepted on 7.3.2006 and, therefore, I find force in the objection made on behalf of the counsel for the petitioner-respondent that the said vakalatnama was filed after passing of the order dated 24.10.2005 and, therefore, there was no occasion to show the name of the counsel for the respondent No. 4 in the weekly cause list.
6. A perusal of the record shows that the second appeal has been filed by Mustakin against the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 91 of 1981 wherein the defendant was directed to rectify the sale deed in suit and correct the plot No. 1340/2 area 3 bigha 10 biswa instead of plot No. 1320 ara 3 bigha 7 biswa within a period of three months. Further, there were only two issues, firstly, whether there was any agreement between the plaintiff and defendant to execute the sale deed for khasra plot No. 1340/2 and, secondly, with regard to the relief. There was no question of title involved and the petitioner was not a party in the suit No. 91 of 1981 and, as such, the order passed by the appellate court has no illegality. Further, there was no stay order in the second appeal and the second appeal has been dismissed in default on 29.4.2002. The order was passed to the following effect:
In view of the aforesaid facts, the order dated 31.7.2003 passed by the revisional court is set aside and the orders passed by the trial court and the appellate court are upheld. The matter is sent back to the revisional court to pass appropriate order within two months after the receipt of the certified copy of this order.
7. So far as the merit of the review petition is concerned, the review petition can be filed only for consideration of important matters or evidence which, by mistake or error on the face of the record could not be considered when the order was passed. A review petition cannot be filed for re-hearing of the entire matter by changing the counsel as well.
8. The Hon4ble Apex Court in the case
It is well-settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan. For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment: G.L. Gupta v. D.N. Mehta15. The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice: O.N. Mohindroo v. Distt. Judge, Delhi. Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except ''where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility'': Sow
9. In the case
It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. (SCR at p. 186) this Court opined:
What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an 4error apparent on the face of the record4). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an 4error apparent on the face of the record4, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by 4error apparent4. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.
Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ''reheard and corrected''. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ''an appeal in disguise.''
10. In the case
As noted supra, for the first time in the review application it was disclosed that the representation was made to the President of India and no representation was made to the State of Tamil Nadu or the Union of India who were arrayed in the writ petition as parties. This appears to be a deliberate attempt to create confusion and reap an undeserved benefit by adopting such dubious device. The High Court also transgressed its jurisdiction in entertaining the review petition with an entirely new substratum of issues. Considering the limited scope for review, the High Court ought not to have taken into account factual aspects which were not disclosed or were concealed in the writ petition. While dealing with a habeas corpus application undue importance is not to be attached to technicalities, but at the same time where the court is satisfied that an attempt has been made to deflect the course of justice by letting loose red herrings the court has to take serious note of unclean approach. Whenever a representation is made to the President and the Governor instead of the indicated authorities, it is but natural that the representation should indicate as to why the representation was made to the President or the Governor and not the indicated authorities. It should also be clearly indicated as to whom the representation has been made specifically, and not in the manner done in the case at hand. The President as well as the Governor, no doubt are constitutional Heads of the respective Governments but the day-to-day administration at respective levels is carried on by the Heads of the Departments/Ministries concerned and the designated officers who alone are ultimately responsible and accountable for the action taken or to be taken in a given case. If really the citizen concerned genuinely and honestly felt or was interested in getting an expeditious consideration or disposal of his grievance, he would and should honestly approach the real authorities concerned and would not adopt any dubious devices with the sole aim of deliberately creating a situation for delay in consideration and cry for relief on his own manipulated ground, by directing his representation to an authority which is not directly immediately concerned with such consideration.
11. Hon4ble Supreme Court in the case
It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an 4error apparent on the face of the record4). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an 4error apparent on the face of the record4, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by 4error apparent4. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.
12. In view of the above, the review petition, is liable to be rejected on the grounds that the power of review cannot be exercised as an alternative mode of appeal or to permit the parties to provide another opportunity of hearing on merit, more so when the grounds taken by the review petitioner in the review application have already been discussed and considered on merit, this Court lacks jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and cannot act as a Court of appeal in the review application.
13. Consequently, the review petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
