@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
Venkataswami, J.@mdashThis petition, which is really under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is by a stage carriage operator and directed against an order made by the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore (hereinafter called the M. R. A. T.). in Appeal No. 75/70 (M. V.) dated 30-6-1970. By that order, the M. R. A T. has rejected the appeal of the present petitioner as not competent la law.
2. The few facts may be briefly set out. The petitioner is a stage carriage operator, holding a permit on the route from Mysore to Maddur. The 4th respondent herein, waved for the grant of the permit between Mysore to Tumkur via., Mandya. The Regional Transport Authority concerned, granted the permit subject to a curtailment of the route lying between Mysore and Mandya. Before the grant, of this permit the procedure enjoined by Section 57 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter called the ''Act''), was followed and the application for a permit had been duly published Inviting objections from persons interested. The petitioner being an operator himself, did not choose to file any objections as in his view, the proposed timings did not affect him.
3. Not being satisfied with the grant, the 4th respondent appealed to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter called the ''S.T.A.T.''). The said Tribunal allowed the appeal and granted the permit after dispensing with the curtailment made by the Regional Transport Authority (hereinafter called the ''R.T.A.--. The said S.T.AT. also remitted the matter to the RT.A concerned, with a direction that suitable timings might be assigned to the petitioner. The R.T.A after hearing the parties assigned timings to the service of the 4th respondent Some of the other operators who were parties before the R. T. A. preferred appeals against assignment of such timings. The 4th respondent also appealed against such assignment of timings. The S. T. A. T. modified the timings and fixed 5-15 A. M. as the time at which the 4th respondent had to leave Mysore. Aggrieved by the said order, both respondents 4 and 16 in the present petition, preferred appeals to the M. R. A. T. The timing assigned to the 4th respondent was again modified and fixed at 7.45 A. M. It is to be noted that throughout these proceedings, the petitioner herein, was not a party. He, however had filed an application to be impleaded as a party before the S.T.A.T. at some stage of the proceedings before the said authority. The said application had been rejected. Earlier to this, the petitioner had preferred writ petition No. 1877 of 1968. before this Court and the same was disposed of on 29-7-1968 by an order, whereby the matter was remanded to S. T. A. T. with a direction to consider the application for impleading filed by the petitioner among other matters. It is only after such rejection of the said application of the petitioner, that the S. T. A.T. modified the timings in favour of the 4th respondent, which was subsequently taken up in appeal before the M. R. A. T. with the aforesaid result. The said appeal came to be dismissed as incompetent Hence this petition.
4. On behalf of the petitioner. Sri M. Gopalakrishna Shetty. the learned counsel contended that having regard to the facts of the case, particularly as to the closeness of timings assigned to the 4th respondent and himself viz., 7-45 A M and 8-15 A M. respectively, it would be clear that the petitioner would be considerably prejudiced in the operation of his service beneficially, and therefore, he was a ''person aggrieved'' within the meaning of Section 64 (2) (Mysore Amendment) of the Motor Vehicles Act He further contended that the words "person aggrieved'' are a much wider expression than a ''party aggrieved''. So construed, the petitioner''s appeal before the M. R. A. T. would be maintainable, notwithstanding the fact that he had not objected in the first instance, in response to the publication made u/s 57 (3) of the Act, and he had not been made a party to any of the proceedings in connection with the grant of a permit and the assignment of timings to the 4th respondent He placed reliance on a decision of this Court where a similar expression had been interpreted in the context of an appeal provided for under the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act It may. however, be mentioned that the said decision has been distinguished by the M. R. A. T. on the ground that it related to an Act which was not in pari materia with the Act, with which they were concerned. I see no reason to differ from this reasoning of the M. R. A. T. in regard to the said decision.
5. On a careful examination of the contention urged by Sri Shetty, I am not persuaded to agree with it for more than one reason. Firstly, it is seen from sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 64, that the words ''person aggrieved'' are common to both of them. It, therefore, follows that the legislature should have used these words to convey a meaning common to both these provisions. Section 64 (1), as it has come to be renumbered by the Mysore Amendment to the Act, clearly, relates to a first appeal, if it may be called as such, by any ''aggrieved person''. On a careful consideration of all the sub-clauses (a) to (h) contained in sub-section (1) it will be seen that the words ''persons aggrieved'' within the meaning of the said sub-section must necessarily have been parties to an order which is appealed against under that sub-section. In every Clause thereof, which specifies the condition under which an appeal could be filed by a ''person aggrieved'', there is a reference by implication to a party before the inferior Tribunal, whose orders are made appealable under that sub-section. In this view, the words ''person aggrieved'' occurring in sub-section (2) of Sec. 64, which provides for a further appeal which may conveniently be described as a second appeal, must be given the same meaning that the said words carry in the context of sub-section (1) of Section 64. So construed, it would be clear that a ''person aggrieved'' within the meaning of Section 64 (2) of the Act, must have been a party before the Tribunal authorised to hear appeals under sub-section (1) of Section 64. The petitioner is not one such ''person aggrieved''.
6. There is another reason why a "person aggrieved'', if he is not a party before any of the inferior Tribunals, should not be allowed an appeal u/s 64 (2) of the Act It is conceivable, as in the instant case, that a person who is not a party might be affected by any order made by the authorities constituted under the Act. If such a person is allowed to appeal under S. 64 (2) of the Act, in my view, it might lead to anomalous situation. It is this: If such a person, merely because he is affected, were to be permitted to enter Into the proceedings at the stage of a second appeal, he might try to introduce fresh facts into the case resulting perhaps in a review of all the orders made till then in favour of one or the other party on record. Such an intention could not be lightly imputed to the Legislature while1 enacting Section 64 (2) of the Act.
7. Lastly, in this context, an enunciation of James L. J. in Ex. P. Side-botham, (1880) 14 Ch D 458 may be usefully referred to. This enunciation, although rendered in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, has been refer-red to with approval by the Supreme Court in the context of a proceeding arising under the Advocates Act in
8. In Sidebothama case (l880) 14 Ch D 458, James. L.J., has stated the position thus:
But the words ''person aggrieved'' do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A ''person aggrieved'' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something," (emphasis (italics) by the Court).
It is clear from the above enunciation that a ''person aggrieved'' is one against whom a decision must have been pronounced. This can happen only when he is a party to a proceeding, wherein the order with which he is aggrieved, has been passed.
9. For the above reasons, the order of the M. R. A. T. impugned herein must be accepted as correct The petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to beau their own costs.
