U.P. Forest Corporation and Others Vs Bhim Singh

Rajesh Tandon, J.@mdashHeard Sri V.K. Bisht, Sr. Advocate assisted by Sri Anirudh Bhatt, counsel for the Appellants and Sri J.C. Pandey, counsel for the Respondent.

2. Present appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 14-10-1992 passed by the District Judge, Pithoragarh in Civil Suit No. 16 of 1988.

3. Briefly stated the Plaintiff Respondent filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 10,096.90 against the Defendant Appellant. According to the Plaintiff he was carrying out the work of cutting, sawing and transporting the Giltas and timbers at Dhandhura-Askote Range, Pithoragarh. There were several lots including lot numbers 7/84-85,8/84-85,9/84-85 and 10/84-85. The Giltas and timbers of these lots were to be transported through head load from the lot site to river bed from where they were to be transported ahead through wire span and head load to Jauljibi Depot.

4. The Plaintiff was entrusted the work of cutting and sawing in lot No. 7/84-85 to 10/ 84-85. The Defendants agreed to pay to the Plaintiff the charges of sawing and preparing Giltas @ Rs. 24/- per cubit meters and for transporting the same up to the river bed @ Rs. 250/- per cub meters. After the execution of the work, the Plaintiff was made payment by Defendants in respect of lot No. 7/84-85,8/84-85 and 10/84-85. The Defendants did not make payment to the Plaintiff with respect of the work executed by him in lot No. 9/84-85. As per the account prepared by the Accountant, the work in lot No. 9/84-85 was executed by the Plaintiff worth Rs. 10,096.90. The Plaintiff served a notice u/s 80 CPC on the Defendants but the Defendants have failed to pay the outstanding amount to the Plaintiff.

5. The Defendants have filed the written statement and has denied all the material particulars alleged in the plaint. The Defendants have alleged that the Plaintiff worked only in the lots as per agreed rates according to work order. The payment of the same has already made to him. Neither he executed any work in respect of lot No. 9/84-85 nor he was given work order for that work.

6. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:

1. Whether the Plaintiff executed contract for the work in respect of lot No. 9/84-85 and also completed the same in March 1986? If so, its effect ?

2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to payment in respect of work completed in lot No. 9/84-85 ?

3. Whether the Defendants gave contract of lot No. 9/84-85 to one Sri Narain Dutt Patni and the payment thereof was made by the Defendants to him, if so, its effect ?

4. To what relief, if any, is the Plaintiff entitled ?

7. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties the trial Court has decided issues No. 1 and 2 in the affirmative in favour of the Plaintiff and issue of Rs. 10,096.90 against the Defendants with costs and interest @ 6% per annum.

8. Feeling aggrieved the present appeal has been preferred by the Defendant- Appellants.

9. In this case the Defendants have come with the case of total denial. The Defendants have asserted that there was neither anywork order given to the Plaintiff for the work of Job No. 9/ 84-85 nor there is any contract in between the parties for that work. The Defendants have submitted that the work on job No. 9/84-85 has been done by one Sri Nartain Dutt Patni but Sri Narain Dutt Patni has not been examined by the Defendants. The Defendants have examined D.W.1 Ram Singh to prove that payment was made to Sri Narain Dutt Patni for job No. 9. However, this witness in his cross-examination has stated that there was no work order in the name of Sri Narain Dutt Patni. The Plaintiff has filed Ex.3, which has been prepared by D.W.1 R.S. Nayal, an official of the Forest Department. The Plaintiff has successfully proved that he has done work in job No. 9/84-85.

10. If there is no agreement or contract in writing, the claim of the Plaintiff that he has actually done the work covers by the provisions of Section 70 of the Contract Act, which clearly go to show that the liability of the Defendants arise in such cases as a quasi contract or as a implied contract for the other party receives a benefit under it. Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act reads as under:

70. Obligation of person enjoying benefit of non-gratuitous act. - Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such another person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered.

11. In the case Mulamchand Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, , the Apex Court has observed the aforesaid proposition of law as under:

In our opinion, the reasoning adopted by the trial court and by the High Court for rejecting the claim of the Appellant is not correct. It is now well-established that here a contract between the Dominion of India and a private individual is not in the form required by Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, it was void and could not be enforced and therefore the Dominion of India cannot be sued by a private individual breach of such a contract (See the decision in Seth Bikhrai Jaipuria v. Union of India 4). It was stated in that case that u/s 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the contracts had (a) to be expressed to be made by the Governor-General, (b) to be executed on behalf of the Governor-General and (c) to be executed by officers duly appointed in that behalf and in such manner as the Governor-General directed or authorised. The evidence in the case showed that the contracts were not expressed to be made by the Governor-General and were not executed on his behalf. It was held by this Court that the provisbns of Section 175(3) were mandatory and the contracts were therefore void and not binding on the Union of India which was not liable for damages for breach of the contracts. The same principle was reiterated by this Court in a later case - Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria Vs. Union of India (UOI), . The principle is that the provisions of Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 or the corresponding provisions if Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India are mandatory in character and the contravention of these provisions nullifies the contracts and makes them void. There is no question of estoppel or ratification in such a case. The reason is that the provisions of Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act and the corresponding provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution have not been enacted for the sake of mere form but they have been enacted for safeguarding the Government against unauthorised contracts. The provisions are embodied in Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act and Article 299(1) of the Constitution on the ground of public policy - on the ground of protection of general public - and these formalities cannot be waived or dispensed with. If the plea of the Respondent regarding estoppel or ratification is admitted, that would mean in effect the repeal of an important constitutional provision intended for the protection of the general public. That is why the plea of estoppel or ratification cannot be permitted in such a case. But if money is deposited and goods are supplied or if services are rendered in ternis of the void contract, the provisions of Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act may be applicable. In other words, if the conditions imposed by Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act are satisfied then the provisions of that section can be invoked by the aggrieved party to the void contract. The first condition is that a person should lawfully do something for another person or deliver something to him, the second condition is that doing the said thing or delivering the said thing he must not intend to act gratuitously; and the third condition is that the other person for whom something is done or to whom something is delivered must enjoy the benefit thereof. If these conditions are satisfied, Section 70 imposed upon the latter person the liability to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing done or delivered. The important point io notice is that in a case failing u/s 70 the person doing something for another delivering something to another cannot sue forthe specific performance of the contract, nor ask for damages for the breach the contract, for the simple reason that there is no contract between him and the other person for whom he does something or to whom he delivers something. So where a claim for compensation is made by one person against another u/s 70 it is not on the basis of any subsisting contract between the parties but a different kind of obligation. The juristic basis of the obligation in such a case is not founded upon any contract or tort but upon a third category of law, namely, quasi-contract or restitution. In Fibrosa v. Fairbaim 1943 AC 32, 61 Lord Wright has stated the legal position as follows:

...any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of that has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from, another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English Law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognised to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution". In Nelson v. Larholt 1948 (1) KB 330, Lord Denning has observed as follows: "It is no longer appropriate to draw a distinction between law and equity. Principles have now to be stated in the light of their combined effect. Nor is it necessary to canvass the niceties of the old forms of action. Remedies now depend on the substance of the right, not on whether they can be fitted into a particular framework. The right here is not peculiar to equity or contract or tort, but falls naturally within the important category of cases where the court orders restitution if the justice of the case so requires.

12. In view of the above proposition of law the Plaintiff could not be deprived of his claim even if there has been no formal document executed in accordance with law. The claim of the Plaintiff has been supported by one of the official examined by the Defendants themselves by proving Ex.-3.

13. Thus I find no illegality or material irregularity in the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge. The appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with costs.