@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
In this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, quashing of the order dated 15-10-1977 in Case No. LRM. 3D. 306 of 74-75 made by respondent No. 2 Land Tribunal. Hiriyur (to be referred to as the Tribunal) and the consequential Notification No. RD 35 LRN 78 dated 22-5-1978 of respondent No. 3 Special Tahsildar and Secretary, Land Tribunal, Hiriyur (to be referred to as the Tahsildar) published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 20-6-1978, is sought. On 24-12-1974, the writ petitioner had furnished to the Tahsildar, a declaration of his holding as required under S. 66 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, to be referred to as the Act. The declaration was furnished in Form 11 prescribed under R. 33 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Rules, 1974, to be referred to as the Rules. Pursuant to Form 11 declaration furnished by the petitioner, the Tahsildar, in the purported exercise of his powers under S. 67(1)(a) of the Act read with R. 24(1) of the Rules, has prepared some data sheets containing information throwing light on the particulars in the declaration and placed the declaration and the data sheets along with the connected records before the Tribunal. Thereafter, the Tribunal has, in the purported exercise of its powers under S. 67(1)(b) of the Act, made an order on 15-10-1977 (to be referred to as the impugned order) which reads thus;-
"An extent of 0-8 units is declared as surplus. The Spl. Tahsildar will take action to take possession of the surplus land after observing the formalities under the Act and the Rules."
Pursuant to the impugned order, the Tahsildar has, in the purported exercise of his powers under S. 73(1) of the Act, issued the Notification published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 20-6-1978 (to be referred to as the impugned Notification).
On the facts and in the circumstances of case, two short questions which are of considerable importance that arise for my consideration and decision are as follows:
1. Whether an order made by the Tribunal in the purported exercise of its powers under S. 67(1)(b) of the Act, but, without holding an enquiry as would enable the declarant to make a representation, has to be treated as an illegal order and as such a nullity?
2. Whether an order made by the Tribunal in the purported exercise of its powers under S. 67(1)(b), has to be a speaking order, and if not, should it be treated as an illegal order and as such a nullity?
I shall now deal with the first question.
Sri B.V. Balaji, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the requirement relating to an enquiry provided for in S. 67(1)(b) of the Act being a mandatory procedural requirement, an order made by the Tribunal in violation of such requirement has to be treated as an illegal order and as such a void order. According to him, the requirement relating to an enquiry provided for in the said provision is intended to achieve the purpose of affording an opportunity to the declarant to make an effective representation to the Tribunal as regards the information, placed before it by the tahsildar before an order could be made by it affecting the declarant''s right to hold the property. His submission, therefore, was, when an enquiry is made a pre-requisite before an order could be made by the Tribunal as would affect the right to property of a declarant, such a requirement relating to an enquiry should be necessarily construed as a mandatory requirement as would render the order made in breach of such mandatory requirement, a nullity. I consider that the submission made by the learned counsel as regards the mandatory requirement relating to an enquiry provided for in S. 67(1)(b) of the Act deserves to be upheld for the following reasons.
As to whether the requirement relating to the enquiry contained in S. 67(1)(b) is mandatory or not, has to depend on the purpose sought to be achieved by the legislature in making the provision for such enquiry. In this context, reference to the provisions contained in sub sec. (1) of S. 67 of the Act becomes necessary. They are:
"67. Surrender of lands in certain cases:
(1) (a) Save as provided in S. 66A, on receipt of the declaration under S. 66, the Tahsildar shall- (i) verify the particulars contained therein as regards the survey number and the extent of the land;
(ii) determine to which class. A, B, C, or D, the land belongs; and (iii) place the declaration and the connected records before the Tribunal.
(b) Thereupon and after such enquiry as may be prescribed, the Tribunal shall determine the extent of the holding and the area by which such extent exceeds the ceiling area.
(c) Where the total extent of the holding so determined by the Tribunal is equal to or less than the ceiling area, the person concerned shall toe entitled to retain his entire holding; but where the total extent is more than the ceiling area, such person shall be liable to surrender such extent of land as will, after such surrender, bring the total extent of land retained by him to the extent of the ceiling area.
(d) The order of the tribunal shall be final and shall be communicated to the person concerned and also the Tahsildar."
S. 67(1)(c) of the Act contains the declared policy of the legislature as regards surrender of lands, namely, (i) when a persons''s holding is in excess of the ceiling area, such person shall surrender the land to the extent it is in excess of the ceiling area and (ii) when a person''s holding is equal to or less than the ceiling area, he shall be allowed to retain his entire holding. S. 67(1)(a) and S. 67(1)(b), as becomes clear by a reading of them, are intended to carry out the declared policy of the legislature laid down in S. 67(1)(c) S. 67(1)(a) of the Act empowers the Tahsildar, who will have received the declaration relating to the holding of the declarant, to act as the agent of the State in the matters of verifying the correctness of the contents (particulars) of the declaration and collecting information thereto by holding necessary investigation. It is not in dispute that the Tahsildar is, under this provision, enabled to hold an investigation and collect information relating to the declarant''s holding and place it before the Tribunal, so that the declarant may be prevented from retaining any land which he is liable to surrender as surplus land. While S. 67(1) (a), thus, enables the Tahsildar to place before the Tribunal such information winch prevents the declarant from retaining the land which he is liable to surrender as surplus land, S. 67(1)(b) requires the Tribunal to act upon the information furnished by the Tahsildar only after holding an enquiry. In fact, it provides, in express terms, that the Tribunal, after it obtains the information regarding the declaration from the Tahsildar, has to hold an enquiry before determining the holding of the declarant and the area by which such extent exceeds the ceiling area. If regard is had to the context in which the enquiry is required to be held by the Tribunal, it becomes clear that the enquiry is intended to safeguard the interests of the declarant in that the Tribunal in determining the extent of the holding of the declarant and the area by which such extent exceeds the ceiling area may not act on the information furnished by the Tahsildar, if the declarant can prove the incorrectness or unreliability of such information. Thus, in my view, the duty to enquire imposed on the Tribunal by S. 67(1)(b), having regard to the purpose sought to be achieved by it, must be taken to include by necessary implication, the right of the declarant to make a representation in the course of the enquiry by the Tribunal. In fact, the enquiry contemplated in the provision, if it fails to take within its ambit, the right of the declarant to make an effective representation against the information furnished by the Tahsildar to the Tribunal and intended to be used against the declarant, the provision for enquiry loses both its purpose and meaning.
In Sangappa v. Land Tribunal, AIR. 1978 Kar. 47, this Court, when it had an occasion to consider the scope of S. 67 as it stands has, in fact, held that the Tahsildar while placing the declaration of the landholder and the connected records before the Tribunal, has to make out the case which he proposes to make against the declarant and thereupon the Tribunal has to issue notice to the land-holder to meet such a case. Thus, the requirement relating to an enquiry provided for in S. 67(1)(b) of the Act, which is intended to achieve the purpose of affording an opportunity to the declarant to make an affective representation to the Tribunal as regards the information placed before it by the Tahsildar before an order could be made by it affecting the declarant''s right to hold the property, has to be necessarily construed as a mandatory requirement as would render the order made in breach of such mandatory requirement a nullity.
The next question relates to the nature of the order which is required to be made by the Tribunal in exercise of its powers under S. 67(1)(b) of the Act.
The Tribunal, when in exercise of its powers under S. 67(1)(b) of the Act, makes an order, it is not in dispute that such order being that of a quasi-judicial Tribunal, would affect the right to property of citizens. Such an order made by the Tribunal in exercise of its powers under S. 67(1)(b) of the Act, by the operation of the provision contained in clause (d) of S. 67(1) of the Act, becomes final. If the provisions in clauses (b) and (d) of sub-section (1) of S. 67 are read along with other provisions contained in the same sub-section, the Legislative intention that the matter relating to determination of surplus lands is left to the decision of an independent Tribunal and such order should also attain finality, becomes obvious. While deciding the first question. I have pointed out that the enquiry required to be held by the Tribunal under S. 67(1)(b) of the Act, by necessary implication, includes the right of the declarant to make a representation as regards the information in respect of the declaration, made available by the Tahsildar. The fact that clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S. 67 makes it obligatory for the Tribunal to make an order after an enquiry which affords opportunity of representation to the party likely to be affected by such order and the further fact that clause (d) of sub-section (1) of S. 67 of the Act makes the order so made by the Tribunal, final, impels me to hold that the requirement of a ''speaking order'', i.e., an order containing reasons for its conclusions, is also implied in the said provisions inasmuch as the recording of reasons is usually regarded as a necessary requirement of a fair decision. Moreover, it is well settled that any order made by a quasi-judicial Tribunal, which is required to make orders in discharge of statutory obligations imposed upon it and affecting rights to property of citizens has to make a speaking order, that is, an order which contains reasons for its conclusions. The necessity for making such speaking orders becomes obvious when such orders are not immune from judicial reviewability. Hence, in myview, if a non-speaking order is made by the Tribunal, in exercise of its powers under S. 67(1)(b) of the Act, the same has to be treated as an illegal order and as such, a nullity.
The impugned order made by the Tribunal is since made in breach of the mandatory requirement relating to the enquiry provided for in S. 67(1)(b) of the Act and is also a non-speaking order, the same has to be treated as an illegal order and as such, a nullity.
For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and it is accordingly quashed. As the impugned Notification is made pursuant to the impugned order which is quashed treating it as an illegal order, the impugned notification is also liable to be quashed and it is accordingly quashed The rule already issued in this writ petition is made absolute.
However, it is made clear that the Tribunal shall now be at liberty to hold a fresh enquiry and make an order on the basis of the declaration of the petitioner in the light of this order and in accordance with law, after affording adequate opportunity of making effective representation and of being heard to the declarant. It is further made clear that this order does not prevent the Tahsildar also from producing further material before the Tribunal as regards the particulars contained in the declaration of the declarant and the Tribunal making use of such material in making its order, provided it affords an opportunity to the declarant to have his say with regard to fresh material which may be produced by Tahsildar.
In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
