Residents of Shri Chitrapur Co-operative Housing Society Limited Vs District Registrar and Another

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

A.S. Bopanna, J.@mdashSince common questions of law and facts arise in all these petitions, they are considered and disposed of by this common order.

2. The petitioners in W.P. Nos. 14231, 14464 and 16838 of 2005 are residents of the flats of Sri Chitrapur Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Malleswaram, Bangalore, while the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 19385, 23474, 33759, 50597 of 2004 and 11678 of 2005 are residents of the flats of Dattaprasad Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Malleswaram, Bangalore. The petitioners are questioning the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner for Stamps and District Registrar, whereunder the possession certificate issued by the Co-operative Housing Society in favour of each of the petitioners is interpreted as a conveyance and has imposed the stamp duty and penalty in respect of the flats which are in the occupation of the petitioners. The petitioners contend that they are not liable to pay the same and as such have sought for quashing the orders.

3. The case put forth by the petitioners is that the Society which has given them the possession of the flats is a tenant Co-partnership Society. Insofar as the Chitrapur Society, it has taken the land on long lease of 99 years and built the flats. In the case of Dattaprasad Society, the Society purchased the land in its own name and constructed the apartments. The Chitrapur Society has 96 flats while Dattaprasad Society has 66 flats. It is contended that the respective lease hold rights and ownership vests with the Society and each tenant member is allotted the flat on the basis of holding distinctive shares and loan stock subscribed by the members. The members jointly hold the property through the Society. In the case of Chitrapur Society, it is stated that the land held on lease by the society would revert back to the lessor on expiry of the lease period. The said societies are said to have registered in 1980 and 1970 respectively, under the provisions of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (the ''KCS Act'' for short). It is contended that Section 38 of the KCS Act provides exemption from compulsory registration of instruments stated therein u/s 17(1) (a) and (b) of the Registration Act, 1908. No doubt, by introduction of a proviso, the said exemption in respect of House Building Co-operative Society is removed with effect from 1-4-2001.

4. The contention of the petitioners is that in any event, since there is no transfer of title and only possession is handed over to the tenant/members and the only documents executed being possession certificate, share certificate and loan stock certificate, the same does not require registration and in any event, since Section 38 of the KCS Act provided for exemption prior to 1-4-2001, the registration and payment of stamp duty did not arise in respect of transaction prior to amendment. The petitioners have not derived any title and as such the said documents cannot be classified as ''conveyance'' to attract stamp duty in terms of Article 20(2) of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 (''Stamp Act'' for short). That being so, the said document could not be impounded u/s 33 nor could the duty and penalty be imposed u/s 39 of the Stamp Act. In any event, the transactions are beyond the period as contemplated u/s 46A of the Stamp Act and as such the amount is not recoverable. Therefore, according to the petitioners, the orders impugned in these petitions are not sustainable.

5. The respondents on the other hand seek to justify their action. It is contended that the concept of tenant Co-partnership Housing Society as contended by the petitioners is not provided for nor contemplated under the KCS Act. When the Society was registered, there is no mention of the society being a tenant co-partnership society as per their bye-law. The amendment made to the bye-laws is in violation of Rule 5 of the KCS Rules and the amendment being opposed to public policy is unsustainable. The discriminatory bye-law is in the process of being withdrawn. The members of the society are enjoying possession and occupation as defined in Section 2(47) (v) and (vi) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (''the IT Act'' for short) and Article 20(2) of the Stamp Act having paid the full cost of construction. Some of the petitioners have acquired their apartments in subsequent resale/transfer from the first allottee members on paying the agreed consideration amount, but have evaded the payment of stamp duty. The transfers have been carried out by possession certificates and loan stock certificates as substitute for deed for conveyance. Though the copies are impounded, the deficient duty could be imposed in terms of Section 3 of the Stamp Act. The respondents have also stated with regard to the steps taken to secure registration, notices issued and W.P. No. 39921 of 2001 filed by the petitioners and the liberty granted by this Court to hold proceedings in terms of Sections 67 and 67B of the Stamp Act and the said provisions permit impounding. Original documents were not produced and as such the examination of photocopies indicated that they were not duly stamped. The special squads were formed for initiating action. The exemption of registration though was available till the amendment with effect from 1-4-2001, the same was with regard to only certain documents and not for the instant documents. Since the same was being misinterpreted, the amendment made is only by way of clarification. Even assuming that registration was exempted, the same did not exempt the payment of stamp duty and merely because it was not registered, it does not mean that stamp duty was not payable. The transaction being conveyance and being transfer in terms of Sections 53A and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (T.P. Act'' for short), the stamp duty is payable. The documents in question answer the definition in Sections 2(1) (d) and (j) being an instrument of conveyance and as such the order impugned in these petitions are justified and the same does not call for interference.

6. On these rival contentions, I have heard Sri S.G. Bhat, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri B.V. Acharya, learned Advocate General for the respondents and perused the writ papers.

7. Though several contentions have been urged, the crux of the matter is to determine the following questions:

(i) What is the scope and ambit of the exemption contemplated u/s 38 of the KCS Act even prior to the amendment introduced vide Karnataka Act No. 6 of 2001 with effect from 1-4-2001 and whether such exemption was available even to documents which were in the nature of conveyance?

(ii) Whether the possession certificate and loan stock certificate in the facts and circumstances of the case constitute conveyance documents so as to attract stamp duty and require registration and/or whether the documents in the present case were designedly adapted, without a conventional title document so as to avoid registration and payment of stamp duty?

(iii) Even if registration is exempted, whether the stamp duty is payable in terms of Article 20(2) of the Stamp Act?

(iv) Whether the impugned orders are justified?

Though the above questions are framed, they are only to understand the scope of examination in these petitions and are not answered independently under each head since the facts involved and legal aspects for consideration would overlap each other. Accordingly, they are considered together.

8. The first aspect would be with regard to the nature of exemption that was available u/s 38 of the KCS Act prior to introduction of the proviso by way of amendment with effect from 1-4-2001 since it is contended that stamp duty for earlier period is not payable. It would be useful to extract and notice the provision:

38. Exemption from compulsory registration of instruments.-Nothing in Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act XVI of 1908), shall apply to:

(a) any instrument relating to shares in a co-operative society notwithstanding that the assets of the society consist in whole or in part of immovable property;

(b) any debentures issued by any such society and not creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, -title or interest to or in immovable property except insofar as it entitles the holder to the security afforded by a registered instrument whereby the society has mortgaged, conveyed or otherwise transferred the whole or part of the immovable property or any interest therein to trustees upon trust for the benefit of the holders of such debentures; or

(c) any endorsement upon or transfer of any other debenture issued by any such society.

However, noticing the misinterpretation of the said exemption to their advantage by certain Housing Co-operative Societies, a proviso was inserted by Act No. 6 of 2001, with effect from 1-4-2001 making it compulsory to register the instruments which intended to transfer or in effect transfer the right, title or interest in the immovable property executed by or in favour of House Building Co-operative Societies which reads as follows:

Provided that the exemption from compulsory registration of instrument shall not apply to any instrument which is intended to transfer or in effect transfers the right, title or interest in immovable property executed by or in favour of House Building Co-operative Societies registered under this Act.

9. The compulsory registration with effect from 1-4-2001 insofar as House Building Co-operative Societies does not call for detailed discussion since this is concluded in view of the order dated 17-11-2005 passed in Dattaprasad Co-Operative Housing Society Limited and Others Vs. State of Karnataka, accepting the memo filed by the parties and for the transaction after the said date, there is no scope for interpretation of Section 38 of the KCS Act inter se between the parties. Therefore, the question is with regard to the period prior to 1-4-2001 to consider whether, in the present facts, and in respect of the nature of documents in the present case, registration was a requirement notwithstanding the provisions contained in Section 38 of the KCS Act in view of the fact that physical possession was transferred and an additional document of possession certificate being issued specifying the portion of the property over which physical possession and right was created even for succession.

10. In this context, before analysing Section 38 of the KCS Act, a perusal of Section 17(1) (b) and (c) of the Registration Act, 1908 is necessary which reads as follows:

Section 17. x x x x

(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property;

(c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest; and

xxx xxx.

In view of the compulsory nature of registration as indicated therein, exemption as contained in Section 38 of the KCS Act is provided. Clause (a) provides that instrument relating to shares in Co-operative Society notwithstanding that the assets of the society is immovable, and clause (b) provides that debentures issued and among other things not creating title or interest to an immovable property are exempt from registration. In the instant cases, the share certificates issued is a category which would no doubt fall under Clause (a) and the loan stock certificate which is in the nature of debenture would fall under Clause (b). But, the question would be in view of the possession certificate being issued and physical possession of a flat i.e., a portion of the property belonging to the society being delivered to the member, whether the immovable property initially being the asset of the society would remain to be the absolute asset of the society or whether something more than a mere interest for a unspecified share would devolve on the member so as to be, or cease to be a document as in the nature contemplated in Section 38 of the KCS Act. Though it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Co-operative Society is a body corporate in terms of Section 9 of the KCS Act and it would have the power to hold property and enter into contracts etc. like in case of joint stock company and the instrument relating to shares should be treated as exempted u/s 17(2) of the Registration Act, even on this aspect, what is to be noticed is the character of the transaction and the nature of right or interest created in favour of the member. For this purpose, the corporate veil would have to be lifted to find out whether the documents in the nature of exempted category is being executed only as a camouflage though the transfer in fact is in the nature of creating title or interest.

11. In order to understand the scope of exemption, I would deem it necessary to consider illustrative instances i.e., for example, if a co-operative society was formed with the intention of starting a co-operative factory and if the members subscribe to the shares and also contributions are made to the stock of the society by way of loan and by such amount and other finance, if immovable assets are possessed by the society and towards the shares subscribed and loan advanced, if the share certificate and loan stock certificate in the nature of debentures are issued, such documents would not require registration since such instrument is exempted u/s 38 of the KCS Act though relating to the immovable property belonging to the society since the society would continue to hold the immovable property as its asset and carry on with the activity for the benefit of all the members and the right of the member would be only to the extent of the shares and loan stock without any specific identification of a portion of the property belonging to the society.

12. On the other hand, if the society possesses immovable property in a similar fashion and if housing units are constructed and if each unit is put in possession of a member, though without a deed of conveyance but only with a possession certificate coupled with loan stock certificate indicating a definite and distinct portion of the immovable property, the instruments put together cannot be treated on par with the documents as in the nature of the first illustration to get the exemption as contemplated u/s 38 of the KCS Act even prior to assertion of the proviso. The proviso introduced only clarifies the position since the section as it existed provided scope for interpretation and even the Housing Co-operative Societies were also taking advantage of the same and the members were being denied title documents.

13. Having stated regarding general illustration, the case on hand requires further examination, since it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners are the members of a tenant co-partnership society and the member is only a tenant member and that the member does not get title over the flat and therefore, it is distinct from ownership flats and when no right and title is claimed, the question of payment of stamp duty nor registration arises. It is also contended that in the case of Chitrapur Co-operative Society, the society itself is a lessee of the land and the building is constructed by the loan stock and the loans advanced by HUDCO and after the lease period, the property would revert. The learned Advocate General would however refer to the original bye-laws of the society to contend that it is not registered as tenant co-partnership and in any event, there is no such category of society provided under the Act. Further, the documents would indicate that a right is created in favour of the occupant of the flat and this is further evident from the fact that the members have executed the transfer deeds and the appreciated value of the flat is to the benefit of such occupant member and only a transfer fee is charged by the society. Therefore, the instruments are in the nature of conveyance.

14. In this backdrop, it is noticed that the societies in question in these petitions are registered as Co-operative Housing Society Limited, even though subsequent amendment is claimed, the same would not be relevant. The bye-laws indicate the objects and also a tenant member is defined. It is in those terms, the members have paid the share capital and certificates are issued and loan stock certificate is issued towards the loan stock amount, that in effect is the value of the flat. In the instance of Sri Manohar K. Koundinya, i.e., the documents annexed to the petition which was taken as the lead case, the share certificate is dated 17-12-1980, while the loan stock certificate is dated 1-7-1987. On the same day, a possession certificate is also drawn and executed which refers to the share and loan stock certificates and in fact contains detailed recitals and it states that Sri M.K. Koundinya has requested the society for allotment of one apartment. Though the possession certificate refers to an agreement dated 1-7-1987, a sample of the tenancy agreement produced by the petitioners would not indicate any terms of relationship of tenant and landlord between the member and the society, except for terming it as tenancy agreement. The commentaries referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioner regarding tenant Co-partnership Housing Societies would indicate that the same refers to a definite pattern of payment of rent etc. which is not found in the present case. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has also relied on the decision of the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court in the case of Mulshanker Kunverji Gor and Others Vs. Juvansinhji Shivubha Jadeja, and of the Bombay High Court in the case of Usha Arvind Dongre v. Suresh Raghunath Kotwal 1991 Co-op. Cases 549 (Bom.), to contend that regard to the concept of tenant co-partnership society. In the former of the above cases, the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court had noticed the existence of the two types of Societies namely ''Tenant Co-partnership Society'' and ''Tenant Ownership Society" and after noticing that the learned District Judge, on facts, had found the society in question to be a tenant co-partnership society, had come to its conclusion, but there is no reference as to how it was concluded that there were two types of societies. In the latter of the cases, the Bombay High Court was dealing with a circumstance relating to the requirement of registering an arbitration award and in that context, while noticing the nature of right that the deceased person had in the flat, the Court had considered Rule 10 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 which described various types of co-operative societies and in that context, the categories were indicated as (a) tenant ownership; (b) tenant co-partnership; and (c) other housing societies and in such circumstance, it was held that it was category (b) society in that particular case. But, in the instant case, the Karnataka Act and Rules does not provide for or recognise such categories of societies and as such the societies of which the petitioners are members would have to be treated like any other housing society and as such the said decisions would not be of assistance to accept the contention that the societies of which petitioners are members as Tenant Co-partnership Society, even if they claim that the nature of their activity is similar since the law makers have not thought it fit to recognise the same and provide any benefits to such of those societies even if they exist. Therefore, the societies calling themselves as tenant co-partnership society or the members calling themselves as tenant member cannot change the complexion until the law recognises the same by way of statutory provisions or Rules.

15. Hence, in this context, the activity of the society as a Housing Co-operative Society and also the manner in which the transactions have taken place, would have to be examined. As already noticed, insofar as the first allotment, it is made to the member by the loan stock certificate and possession certificate coupled with physical possession. To confirm the nature of transaction and as to whether it is chargeable with stamp duty, the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Stamp Act is to be noticed. Section 2(1)(d) defines ''conveyance'' and it includes every ''instrument'' by which property, whether movable or immovable or any estate is transferred to, or vested in, any other person, and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by the schedule. Such ''instrument'' included in the definition ''conveyance'' is defined in Section 2(1)(j) as including every document and record created or maintained in or by an electronic storage and retrieval device or media by which any right or liability is, or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. Further Section 2(47)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, defines the transaction whether by becoming a member of or acquiring shares in a co-operative society, by way of any agreement or any arrangement or in any manner which has the effect of transferring or enabling the enjoyment of immovable property as ''transfer1.

16. In the background of the said provisions, if the documents in question are analysed, the fact that there is a transfer of immovable property cannot be in doubt, since apart from being a shareholder, the flat is put in possession of the member by way of possession certificate and the arrangement regarding holding and enjoying the property is well-defined in the bye-laws and the so-called tenancy agreement. However, for the said documents to constitute an ''instrument'' as defined in Section 2(1)(j) of the Stamp Act, the right or liability created or purported to be created by such document is to be further examined. The loan stock certificate indicates the value of such property to which the member is entitled and commensurate to the same, the flat is put in possession. The possession would be to the entitlement of the member, successors, legal heirs, assignees and nominees. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that by the said documents, title is not claimed by the member and further insofar as Chitrapur Society, the land is a leased land, the nature of right exercised by the member would indicate that a member would be entitled to transfer the shares to another entrant member, who would in fact pay the appreciated market value of the flat as on the date of transaction and the said appreciated market value does not go towards the corpus or become the profit of the society, but the society only charges a fee for permitting the transaction and effecting the transfer of shares and the appreciated market value is the consideration received by the ''outgoing member", which indicates that the member is not in possession merely as a tenant member but had a greater interest in the property including the right of disposition. Though as per the bye-laws, the society had the right to accept or not, the incoming member, the decision regarding the sale, transfer and market value for finalising such transfer was with the member concerned which is nothing short of ownership right.

17. Further, even though the Chitrapur Society is a lessee of Chitrapur Math, a perusal of the indenture of lease dated 19-12-1980 amongst themselves itself would indicate that the lessor and lessee had envisaged the situation where the holder of flat would sell the flat and in such event, the lessor has retained the right for a portion of the fee that would be charged by the society-lessee in respect of such transfer. No doubt, prior to the insertion of proviso to Section 38 of KCS Act, no document was being executed by the outgoing member to the incoming member except for transfer of physical possession and document through society. In respect of transactions subsequent to amendment dated 1-4-2001, the transfer deeds have been executed and registered, one such deed being dated 10-6-2004 between Smt. Anuradha Gokarn and Sri Vinay P. Nadkarni and the same indicates that the transfer of shares is made for a consideration. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, no doubt, contends that the said transactions of subsequent transfer cannot be the basis but what is relevant to be seen is the transaction between the society and original tenant member. But, in my view, even though some original members have not transferred and though it is stated that they do not claim title to the property under the said document, the subsequent transfers made by some members, the manner in which transactions have occurred and the way in which it is dealt with by the society as noticed earlier would only be a pointer to determine the nature of interest created by the documents executed by the society to the member and merely because certain members have not claimed or exercised such right thus far cannot determine the nature of the document. Since the loan stock certificate coupled with possession certificate created the right of disposition for consideration namely the market value of the property, they are documents which purport to create right and as such is an ''instrument'' as defined, consequently it is to be treated as conveyance. To support this view, the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court relied on by the learned Advocate General in the case of Hanuman Vitamin Foods Pvt. Ltd. and Others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Another, would be apposite. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in answer to the question whether transfer of shares in a co-operative society is subject to levy of stamp duty, was of the view that instrument of transfer of shares was in fact ''conveyance''. The learned Counsel for the petitioner however contends that the said decision would not apply since the same was rendered by relying on the earlier judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Veena Hasmukh Jain and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, , wherein the said question was answered in the context of considering an agreement executed in terms of Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963. But the facts in Hanuman Vitamin Food''s case does not indicate under which of the Acts, the Hon''ble Supreme Court was considering, but the decision rendered in Veena Hasmukh''s case is noticed and has held that instrument of transfer of shares would be ''conveyance''. In any event, as already noticed, since tenant co-partnership as contended is not provided for in the Karnataka Act, the transfer in the instant case is necessarily under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act and the society being a Housing Co-operative Society, the transaction being in the nature of second illustration stated above and being a transfer of share of a Housing Co-operative Society along with the right to occupy and deal with a housing unit, and as such it would acquire the character of a conveyance and to that extent, the principle laid down would apply.

18. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when no right was claimed under the said documents and when it was not relied on before any authority, the same could not have been impounded u/s 33 of the Stamp Act and could not be dealt with u/s 39 of the Act and that too relying on an order passed by this Court in W.P. No. 39921 of 2001. It is also contended that in any event, a photocopy could not have been impounded. The learned Advocate General however contended that power to proceed u/s 33 of the Stamp Act is available under Sections 67 and 67B of the said Act. Further, the explanation to Section 3 of the Stamp Act provides that duty could be charged on the copy. In this regard, it is no doubt true that initially the notice was issued by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and the same was questioned in W.P. No. 39921 of 2001 which was disposed of directing the same to be treated as notice and to furnish all details. Thereafter, the proceedings have been initiated by the Deputy Commissioner of Stamps and District Registrar under Sections 67 and 67B of the Stamp Act also in view of the constitution of special squads. The decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the case of Dr. Usha Mohan Das Vs. The Divisional Commissioner, Bangalore Division, Bangalore and others, would also be of no assistance since that was a case where the Sub-Registrar, impounded the document even before registration, while it was presented for registration and the same was upheld by the Deputy Commissioner and in that context, this Court took the view that a document cannot be impounded unless it is registered.

19. However, in the instant case, as noticed, the power exercised is under Sections 67 and 67B of the Stamp Act whereunder the Deputy Commissioner is empowered under the circumstances mentioned therein to impound u/s 33 to secure stamp duty. For the same reason, the decision in the case of Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan, , relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioners also cannot be of any assistance. Further, even though the order impugned refers to the earlier writ petition, since the authority has exercised power available under the Act, the same cannot be faulted. That apart, one other decision cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in the case of AIR 1971 1070 (SC) , either to contend that an instrument does not cover copy of the document or that a copy cannot be impounded would also not be of assistance since that is a situation where the Hon''ble Court was considering a case where copy was relied as a document in Court, while in the instant case, the authorities have looked into the available copies to determine the nature of the document and collect the duty while exercising their power under Sections 67 and 67B of the Stamp Act. In this regard, explanation to Section 3 would provide that the provisions would apply mutatis mutandis in respect of a copy of such instrument whether certified or not. Therefore, the order to the extent of the Deputy Commissioner coming to the conclusion to impound the instrument is sustainable. However, the further proceeding as contemplated u/s 39(1)(b) insofar as requiring payment of proper duty and penalty, the order impugned does not indicate application of mind. There is no reference to the period of transaction, the market value at that point, the manner in which it is computed, the exercise of discretion with regard to penalty etc. The respective orders instead disclose just a figure indicated as market value without any reference and 8% or 10% as the case may be of the same being charged as stamp duty and a similar amount as penalty. This process appears not only arbitrary but without proper basis. This portion of the order therefore cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be quashed so as to enable the authority concerned to redo the same in accordance with law.

20. One other contention which requires to be noticed is that the learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the recovery would be barred by time in view of the provision contained in Section 46A of the Stamp Act. The learned Advocate General would dispute the same and contend that the same would arise only when the recovery is resorted to in the manner provided under the said provision and not otherwise. As rightly contended by the learned Advocate General, in the instant case, the proceedings were initiated under Sections 67 and 67B of the Stamp Act, pursuant thereto the impounding was done u/s 33 and determination and demand u/s 39. If the said amount is not paid, it would be recovered u/s 46 and as such Section 46A does not come into operation, which is an independent provision and the question of limitation would have to be considered only if the power is exercised under that provision.

21. Therefore to sum up, the position would be that for the reasons stated above, the respondent was justified in treating the instruments involved in the present cases as conveyance and impounding the same u/s 33 of the Stamp Act for the purpose of recovering the stamp duty vide the orders dated 17-4-2004, 22-7-2004, 20-9-2004, 24-9-2004, 16-10-2004, 24-1-2005, 27-1-2005 and 31-3-2005 respectively but the method of determination of the market value, stamp duty and the penalty are not sustainable and to that extent, the same requires reconsideration.

22. In the result the following:

ORDER

(i) The respective impugned orders at Annexure-H to H46 in W.P. No. 14231 of 2005; Annexure-A to A7 in W.P. No. 11678 of 2005; Annexure-Dl to D 13 in W.P. No. 50597 of 2004; Annexure-Al to A8 in W.P. No. 19385 of 2004; Annexure-Al and A2 in W.P. No. 23474 of 2004; Annexure-Dl to D15 in W.P. No. 33759 of 2004; Annexure-H to H6 in W.P. No. 16838 of 2005 and Annexure-H to H10 in W.P. No. 14464 of 2005 to the extent of holding the documents in question as conveyance and impounding the same u/s 33 of the Karnataka Stamp Act are affirmed;

(ii) The respective impugned orders to the extent of determining the market value, stamp duty and penalty u/s 39(1)(b) are quashed only to that extent and the matter is remanded to the first respondent to reconsider the same to that extent and redetermine the stamp duty and penalty, if any payable;

(iii) Consequently the above writ petitions are allowed in part and Rule made absolute to that extent;

(iv) Parties to bear their own costs.