K.N. Keshavanarayana, J.@mdashThis appeal is directed against the order dated 1.8.2005, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. Nos. 46942 to 45/2004, dismissing the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants.
2. Following are the facts leading to the presentation of writ petitions and the present appeal:
(i) One Rangegowda @ Chikkahydegowda, S/o Lakke Gowda, father of respondents 5 to 8 to this appeal who were not parties to the Writ Petitions, was the owner of lands bearing Survey No. 210 measuring 3acres 16 guntas, Survey No. 223/4 measuring 4 acres 21 guntas, Survey No. 182/1 measuring 1 acre 32 guntas and Survey No. 182/2 measuring 1 acre 34 guntas in all measuring 11 acres 23 guntas all situated in Bogadi Village, Mysore.
(ii) After coining into force of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (for short the Act), said Rangegowda filed statement in Form No. I, as per Rules 3 and 9 of the Rules framed under the Act giving particulars of the extent of vacant land held by him within the urban agglomeration of Mysore city, and other particulars, as required by Section 6(1) of the Act on 13.9.1976, before the competent authority under the Act.
(iii) According to the appellants, said Rangegowda formed a revenue lay-out of residential building sites in land bearing Survey No. 210, and sold sites to different persons. According to the appellants during 1982 & 1983, each of them purchased one site in the said lay-out from Rangegowda under unregistered sale deeds, and their were placed in vacant possession of the respective sites purchased by them, and thereafter, they constructed structures thereon. Thus according to the appellants they have been in possession of the respective sites.
(iv) In the mean while the competent authority, published draft statement as per Section 8(1) of the Act, as regards vacant land held in excess of ceiling limit, on 15.11.1983, showing that the declarant Rangegowda is holding 36,344.01 sq.mts. of excess land. Thereafter, final statement as per Section 9 and notification u/s 10(1) of the Act were published on 1.8.1985; notification u/s 10(3) of the Act was published on 25.9.1985 declaring that the excess vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by the State Government with effect from 10.10.1985; possession of excess vacant land was taken on 19.9.1990 as per Section 10(6) of the Act, and award as required by Section 11(7) of the Act was passed on 28.10.1990 and on 31.3.1993.
(v) By order dated 19.3.1992 Annexure-E to Writ Petition in exercise of Section 23 of the Act, the State Government allotted the entire extent of 13,759.72 sq.mts. in Survey No. 210, to Mysore Urban Development Authority (MUDA)- respondent No. 4. By official memorandum dated 21.9.1993 (Annexure - F to the Writ Petition) MUDA, in exercise of its power u/s 13(2)(h) of Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, allotted 13,759.72 sq.mts. of land in Survey No. 210, in favour of respondent No. 3, CFTRI Employees Co-operative Society, Mysore.
(vi) According to the appellants, in the year 1989, MUDA had issued notice to them calling upon them to pay charges for regularisation of unauthorised structures put up on the respective sites, and though they offered to deposit the amount, it was not received.
(vii) After coming to know of the order dated 21.9.1993 - Annexure-F passed by MUDA allotting the land in Survey No. 210 to respondent No. 3, Society, the appellants and others filed W.P. No. 26913 to 920/95 and W.P. Nos. 22529 to 549/96, before this Court, seeking to quash the said order dated 21.9.1993 passed by MUDA, and for issue of a Writ of Mandamus directing MUDA to regularise their occupation of respective sites by collecting the amount specified in the notices. These Writ Petitions were opposed by MUDA & CFTRI Employees House Building Society. An interim order of stay dated 26.2.1996, staying all further proceedings pursuant to the order impugned in W.P. No. 26913-920/95 was issued. As the respondents to those Writ Petitions contended that the petitioners therein are not in possession of any sites or any portions of Survey No. 210, and that none of them have put up any structures thereon, a Commissioner was appointed for local inspection to report as to whether any structures are existing on the sites claimed to be in possession of the petitioners therein. The Commissioner, after conducting local inspection, submitted his report to the effect that no structure exists on any of the portions of land bearing Survey No. 210. Thereafter, by a considered order dated 16.4.1997, the interim order of stay granted on 26.2.1996, was vacated and later by order dated 7.8.1998; the Writ Petitions were dismissed. The said order dismissing the Writ Petitions was not challenged by any of the petitioners therein.
(viii) Upon repeal of ULC Act by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act 1999, (Central Act 15 of 1999), the appellants filed the instant Writ Petition Nos. 46942 to 45/2004, seeking declaration that the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Act, in proceedings No. ULA 753/76-77 dated 31.3.1993, is ineffective in view of Section 3 of Act 15 of 1999 and for a declaration that all consequent proceedings including the order of Government dated 19.3.1992 Annexure-E and the official memorandum dated 21.9.1993 Annexure-F issued by MUDA are void and ineffective.
(ix) In these Writ Petitions. The appellants contended that pursuant to unregistered sale deeds executed by Rangegowda, they are in possession of respective sites and at no point of time possession of the sites was taken from them by the competent authority, as per Section 10(6) of the Act, and no notice as required by Section 10(5) of the Act was served on them, as such, they continued to remain in possession of the respective sites, therefore, by virtue of the provisions of Sections 3(2) & Section 4 of the Repeal Act 1999, all further proceedings stood abated. They also contended that Bogadi Village was not within the urban agglomeration of Mysore City, as such, the entire proceedings initiated were illegal and without jurisdiction. They further contended that, even prior to passing of the award dated 31.3.1993 and taking possession of the land by the Government as per the provisions of the Act, the Government purported to have exercised its power u/s 23 of the Act by issuing order dated 19.3.1992 � Annexure-E, as such the order Annexure-E is illegal and without authority of law. It was further contended that official memorandum dated 21.9.2003-Annexure-F issued by MUDA allotting Survey No. 210, in favour of respondent No3., is also illegal, as their applications for regularisation have not been disposed off and by the date of said order, the proceedings under the Act had not at all been completed.
(x) The respondents 1 to 4 resisted the Writ Petitions. Respondents 1 and 2 filed common objections, while respondent No. 3 filed its separate objections. In their objections, the respondents 1 to 3 denied the entire case of the appellants. They denied that the appellants purchased sites in Survey No. 210 from Rangegowda, under unregistered sale deeds. The respondents further contended that the alleged sale deeds are concocted and created ones only to make false claims in collusion with the erstwhile owners of the land; that, the alleged sale deeds are not properly stamped nor registered, as required by law, as such, no reliance can be placed on them; that the appellants were not in possession of any sites in Survey No. 210, at any time as such, they were not entitled for any notice from the competent authority under the Act; that the alleged sales effected during 1982 & 1983, are null and void as per Section 5(3) of the Act, as the alleged sales are after the date of filing of declaration u/s 6(1) and before publication of notification u/s 10(1) of the Act; that the appellants have no locus standi to question the legality of orders at Annexures - E and F; that, as no proceeding under the Act was pending and possession of the land had been taken from the erstwhile owners of land who did not dispute the same, much prior to Repeal Act came into force, the repeal of the Act, has no effect on the acquisition of the land in question, as such, the appellants are not entitled for any of the reliefs sought in the petition; Therefore, the respondents sought dismissal of petitions.
(xi) After hearing both sides, the learned Single Judge by the order under appeal, dismissed the petitions holding that the appellants being not the persons who filed the declaration and not being the parties to the proceedings before the competent authority, have no locus standi to challenge the orders passed by the respondent No. 2 - Deputy Commissioner. The learned Single Judge further held that the original owner appears to have joined hands with the appellants to execute the so called sale deeds as such, the sale deeds on which the appellants based their rights, are collusive documents, created by the original declarant to over come the effect of order issued u/s 10(3) of the Act, which he did not challenge as provided by Section 12 of the Act before the Divisional Commissioner.
(xii) Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, dismissing the Writ Petitions, the appellants have filed this appeal. Upon service of notices of appeal, the respondents have appeared through their learned Advocate.
3. We have heard Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants; Sri. P.S. Manjunath, learned Advocate for MUDA, Sri. H.M. Manjunath, learned Advocate appearing for respondents 1 and 2, and Sri. A. Sai Prakash, learned Advocate for respondent No. 3 - CFTKI Employees Co operative Society. We have perused the original records pertaining to ULA 753/76-77 of the Deputy Commissioner, Mysore, made available by the learned Government Advocate.
4. Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel would submit that, as could be seen from the recitals of the agreement of sale/sale deeds, the appellants are the purchasers of 4 sites in Revenue lay out formed by the original owner Rangegowda, and they were placed in possession of respective sites and in the absence of any material to show that ULC authorities took possession of the sites from the appellants as provided by Section 10(5) and (6) of the Act, the appellants deemed to be in possession of the sites as such, the entire proceedings stood abated by virtue of Repeal Act of 1999, and the learned Single Judge has not at all considered this aspect of the matter, as the learned Single Judge, has dismissed the Writ Petition only on the ground that the appellants not being the declarants, have no locus standi to question the correctness of the orders at Annexures-E and F; that though the respondent No. 2 in its statement of objections has stated that the possession was taken, other details regarding compliance of Section 10(5) & (6) of the Act has not been stated, therefore, it is clear that, provisions of Sub-sections (5) & (6) of Section 10 of the Act, have not been complied with; that the observation of the learned Single Judge that the unregistered sale deeds are collusive documents is without any basis; that the possession of property alleged to have been taken is not in accordance with law; that the dismissal of earlier Writ Petitions has no effect on the present petitions. In support of his submissions regarding admissibility of unregistered documents for collateral purposes, the learned Senior counsel relied on following decisions:
1. ILR 2003 Kar. 503 (SC) in the case of Shrimant Shamrao Suryavamsi and Anr. v. Prahlad Bhairova Suryavamsi (dead) by LRs. and Ors.;
2.
3. 1971 (2) Kar LJ 161 in the case of Romaji Appaji Kulkarni by LRs v. Badibi and Ors.;
4. AIR 1963 SC 70 in the case of Padma Vithoba Chakkayya v. Mohd. Multani and Anr.;
5.
6.
He relied on the decision in the case of Kishan Lal v. State of M.P. and Ors. 2005 AIR SCW 1166 to support, his contention that Court can look into materials and record a finding as to whether or not possession has been taken as required by Section 10(5) & (6) of the Act. He placed reliance on the decision of Division Bench of this Court reported in the case of Mangalore Urban Development Authority v. Leelavathi and Ors. reported in DLR 2008 Kar 5059, to support his contention that the alleged taking of possession is not in accordance with law.
5. On the other hand, Sri. P.S. Manjunath learned Advocate for MUDA would submit that, the case of the appellant is not consistent, as initially they contended that they are holders of agreement of sale but later they contended that absolute sale deeds have been executed in their favour, that the appellants have not produced any documents to show that they are in possession from 1982 and 1983 and onwards and On the other hand, Annexure-A produced would show that the appellants are not in possession and the possession has been taken over by the Government; that the alleged agreement of sale or sale deeds are not properly stamped and are not registered as such, no reliance can be placed on them for any purpose in view of Sections 34 and 35 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, and admission of an unregistered document for collateral purpose as per Section 49 of Registration Act, does not apply to documents in sufficiently stamped; that, the alleged sale of sites in favour of appellants during 1982 & 1983, is null and void as per Section 5(3) of the Act, as the alleged sales are effected after the submission of declaration u/s 6(1) of the Act on 13.9.1976 and before the publication of notification u/s 10(3) of the Act on 25.9.1985 & no permission as per Section 27(2) & (3) was obtained; that since the original owner of the property who was the declarant did not question the actions on the part of the respondents, and since the declarant and his family members themselves have admitted that they have voluntarily delivered possession of the property to ULC authorities, the appellants have no locus standi to question the orders Annexures - E and F; that as the excess vacant land vests with the Government upon publication of notification u/s 10(3) of the Act, and since the possession of the land had been taken in accordance with the provisions of Section 10(5) & (6) of the Act, much prior to Repeal Act coming into force, acquisition of the land in question as such, the Repeal of the Act had no effect on the acquisition of the land in question as such, the learned Single Judge is justified in dismissing the Writ Petitions; that since there is nothing on record to show that as on the date of taking possession of land as per Section 10(5) & (6) of the Act, the appellants were in possession of the sites, they were not entitled for any notice from the competent authority u/s 10(5) of the Act; that the observation made during the course of the order dated 16.4.1997 - Annexure-R2 and the final order dated 7.8.1998 passed in W.P. Nos. 26913 to 20/1995 & W.P. Nos. 22529 to 549/96, Annexure-R1 clearly indicates that no structures were in existence in any portion of Survey No. 210, as reported by the Court Commissioner as such the petitioners therein were not entitled for regularisation, that since in the said Writ Petitions the very order dated 21.9.1993. Annexure-F was called in question on the ground that it is contrary to the provisions of Section 23 of the Act, and since during the course of the order dated 16.4.1997- Annexure-R2, it has been observed that the allotment of the land in question by MUDA in favour of CFTRI Employees Co-operative Society would serve the common good of public and since, the said order was not challenged by any one, in the present Writ Petition, it is not open to the appellants to once again question the legality of the order Annexure-F; that after the allotment of land, respondent No. 3, has formed lay-out as per the approved lay-out plan, the sites have been allotted to the members of the Society some of whom have already constructed houses, and in respect of civic amenity and park area, the society has executed relinquishment deed in favour of MUDA, therefore, at this stage, if the proceedings are held to be bad and if it is held that the Act is applicable, it would affect the interest of third parties who are not parties to this appeal; that as the heirs of Rangegowda, have been allotted with five sites hi the lay-out formed by respondent No. 3, as per the scheme framed by MUDA, if the appellants have derived any right under the alleged agreement/sale deeds, they have to proceed against their venders. Therefore, the learned Advocate sought for dismissal of this appeal. The learned Government Advocate, and learned Advocate for respondent No. 3, submitted that they would adopt the arguments of Sri. P.S. Manjunath.
6. We have carefully considered the arguments advanced by both sides. The points that arise for our consideration are:
1. Whether the appellants have no locus standi to seek the reliefs sought in the Writ Petitions?
2. Whether the repeal of the Act, by Repeal Act 1999, has any effect on the acquisition of excess vacant urban land held by Rangegowda and his family, as per the provisions of the Act?
3. Whether the learned Single Judge is justified in dismissing the Writ Petitions?
7. Point No. 1: There is no dispute that land bearing Survey No. 210 among other lands was owned by one Rangegowda. According to the appellants, the said Rangegowda formed a revenue lay out of residential building sites and thereafter he sold the sites and each of the appellants purchased a site from the said Rangegowda in the said revenue lay out during 1982 & 1983, as such they are in possession of the respective sites, therefore, they have locus standi to question the actions of the respondents. The respondents have disputed the case of the appellants. The learned Single Judge while dismissing the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants has held that the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner-respondent No. 2 on the ground that the appellants herein were not the parties to the original proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner and that they were not the declarants u/s 6(1) of the Act. The learned Single Judge has also noticed that the alleged agreements/unregistered sale deeds are all created documents in collusion with the erstwhile owner. Before this Court the appellants have produced the alleged unregistered sale deeds, along with a memo. Reading of the contents of these documents indicates that they are absolute sale deeds transferring title in respect of immovable properties. As could be seen from these documents, they are not properly stamped and they are unregistered. Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act directs that no document not properly stamped shall be received in evidence for any purpose. No doubt, Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act permits admission of unregistered document for collateral purpose to prove a transaction, which does not require registration. However, the prohibition imposed u/s 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act is total and as per the said provision a document which is not properly stamped or insufficiently stamped cannot be received and looked into for any purpose including the collateral purpose. The decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in this regard have been rendered in the light of the provisions of Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. In none of these decisions the bar created u/s 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act has been considered. Therefore, no sustenance can be drawn from any of those decisions. Therefore, no reliance can be placed on these unregistered sale deeds produced by the appellants. Apart from these unregistered sale deeds no other document is produced by the appellants to show that they have derived any title to the sites claimed to have been purchased by them, and that they were put in possession of the sites.
8. Assuming for the purpose of argument that the unregistered sale deeds produced by the appellants can be looked into, we shall proceed to consider as to whether the appellants have derived any title to the sites which they claim to have purchased. As per Section 5(3) of the Act, any person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately prior to the commencement of the Act, shall not transfer such vacant land or part thereof by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise until he has furnished a statement u/s 6(1) and a notification regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been published under Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act, and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void. Thus from Sub-section (3) of Section 5, it is clear that transfer of vacant lands between the date of filing of declaration under Sub-section (1) Section 6 and the date of publication of notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 10 is null and void. In the case on hand, admittedly Rangegowda filed declaration on 30.9.1976 as required by Section 6(1) of the Act and the notification u/s 10(1) of the Act was issued on 1.8.1985, whereas the alleged sale in favour of the appellants were on 10.1.1982, 7.4.1982, 4.2.1983 and 4.2.1983 respectively. From this, it is clear that the alleged sales in favour of the appellants were after the original owner filed his declaration on 30.9.1976 and before publication of the notification u/s 10(1) on 1.8.1985. In this view of the matter, the alleged sales in favour of the appellants are null and void in terms of Section 5(3) of the Act. Therefore, the appellants have not derived any right or title in respect of the sites, which they claim to have purchased.
9. It is an undisputed fact that these appellants along with others had earlier filed W.P. No. 26913-20/95 c/w 22529-49/1996 questioning the very order dated 21.9.1993 impugned in this Writ Petition as Annexure-F and also seeking regularisation of their unauthorised occupation of the respective sites. As could be seen from the interim order dated 16.4.1997 produced as per Annexure-R2 by respondent No. 3 along with its additional statement filed on 10.9.2008, a Commissioner was appointed by this Court in those Writ Petitions and the Commissioner after conducting local inspection reported that no structure exist on any portion of Survey No. 210. It is in the light of the said observation, the interim stay was vacated and subsequently as could be seen from Annexure-R-1, the Writ Petitions were dismissed holding that the petitioners therein are not entitled for regularisation of their occupation as no construction exist thereon. The challenge to the impugned order Annexure-F was also rejected. From this it is manifestly clear that the appellants are not in possession of the alleged sites claimed to have been purchased by them. In the circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge is justified in holding that the appellants have no locus standi to question the orders of the respondents. Hence we answer point No. 1 in the affirmative.
10. Point No. 2:
As noticed earlier Rangegowda - the original owner of the land in question filed declaration as required u/s 6(1) of the Act on 13.1.1976 and thereafter the competent authority issued a draft statement as required u/s 8(1) on 15.11.1983, final statement u/s 9 on 1.8.1985, notification u/s 10(1) on 1.8.1985 and notification u/s 10(3) on 25.9.1985, fixing the date of deemed vesting of the excess vacant land in the State Government as 10.10.1985. It is the further contention of the respondents that thereafter notice as required under Sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act was issued on 30.10.1985 to the owner of the land to surrender and deliver possession of the excess vacant land to the Government within 30 days from the date of the service of the said notice, and that the said notice was served on the owner of the land and pursuant to the said notice the owner delivered possession of excess vacant land to the Tahsildar on 19.9.1990. The owner or subsequent to his death, his legal representatives did not question the correctness of any of the orders passed by the competent authority nor they disputed the fact of delivery of possession of excess vacant land. In view of our finding on point No. 1 that the appellants have no locus standi to question the actions of the respondents and since no material is placed on record by the appellants to show that they were in possession of the respective sites claimed to have been purchased by them as on the date of the authorities taking possession of the property and in the absence of challenge to the action of the competent authority by the owner of the land, it is not necessary for us to go into the question as to whether or not the taking of possession by the competent authority was valid. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the appellants have not proved that they have acquired any right or interest over the sites and that they were in possession of the same. No doubt, Sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act contemplates issue of notice to any person who may be in possession to surrender or deliver possession. Unless it is established that the appellants were in possession of the property as on the relevant date, it is not open to them to contend that notice u/s 10(5) ought to have been issued to them. Therefore, from the above discussions, it is manifestly clear that the possession of the land bearing Survey No. 210 was taken on 19.9.1990 itself from the original owner. Therefore, the decisions of the Supreme Court in 2005 SIR SCW 1166 and decision of this Court in ILR 2008 Kar 5059, have no application to the facts of the case on hand. The records reveal that subsequently award required u/s 11(7) in respect of Survey No. 210 came to be passed on 28.10.1990. The award as produced at Annexure-C to the Writ Petition dated 31.3.1993 relates to the lands bearing Survey Nos. 223/4 and 182/4 and it does not relate to Survey No. 210. Therefore, the appellants cannot draw any sustenance from the fact that the award as per Annexure-C is passed on 31.3.1993.
11. In the light of the fact that the possession of the land in question had been taken on 19.9.1990 itself, the question whether the Repeal Act of 1999 has any effect on the acquisition of the land in question is required to be considered.
12. The Repeal Act of 1999 came into force on 18.3.1999. This Act was preceded by an ordinance bearing No. 5/99. Section 2 of the Repeal Act of 1999, repeals the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act; 1976 i.e., the Act. However, Section 3 saves the vesting of the land under the Principal Act subject to the conditions stated therein. According to Sub-section (1) of Section 3, the repeal of the Principal Act has no effect on the vesting of any vacant land under Sub-section (3) of Section 10 possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the Government in this behalf or by the competent authority. According to Sub-section (2) of Section 3 where any land is deemed to have been vested in the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 10 under the Principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government or by the competent authority, and any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect of such land, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid has been repaid to the State Government. Section 4 of the 1999 Act deals with abatement of legal proceedings. According to this Section, all proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, before any court, Tribunal or other authority shall abate. However, according to the proviso to Section 4, the said Section has no application to the proceedings relating to Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Principal Act, if such proceedings are relatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government or by any competent authority. Admittedly, in this case by 1999, no proceedings as referred to u/s 4 of the 1999 Act was pending before any Court, Tribunal or authority. In view of the fact that possession had been taken much prior to the 1999 Act came into force, as per Section 3, vesting of excess vacant land in Survey No. 210, is saved. In this view of the matter, the Repeal Act of 1999 has no effect on the action taken by the competent authority in declaring that the excess vacant land has been acquired by the State Government in terms of Section 10(3) of the Act.
13. In this connection, it is also necessary to note that admittedly, the Government in exercise of its power u/s 23 of the Act has allotted land in Survey No. 210 to MUDA, which in turn has allotted the same to the third respondent. The documents produced by respondent No. 3 along with its objection statement would clearly establish that respondent No. 3 has deposited the entire value of the land and thereafter it has formed a lay out of building sites as per the approved lay out plan and has also distributed the sites among its members and many of them also appears to have put up construction thereon. Therefore, if at this stage it is held that the Repeal Act is applicable on the ground that possession of the property had not been taken from the appellants who have not derived any right over any portion of the land in Survey No. 210, it would certainly affect the interest of the third parties who are not parties to these proceedings. Therefore, at the instance of these appellants, it is not proper for this Court to hold that the actions taken by the respondents are not in accordance with law. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the Repeal Act of 1999 has no effect on the orders passed by the respondents. Hence, we answer point No. 2 accordingly.
14. In view of our findings on points 1 and 2, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge is justified in dismissing the Writ Petition. It is pertinent to note that in the earlier Writ. Petitions filed by these appellants and others, the very order dated 21.9.1993 passed by MUDA allotting the land in question in favour of respondent No. 3 herein was questioned on the ground that it violates to Section 23 of the Act. However, the learned Single Judge while vacating the interim order of Stay by order dated 16.4.1997 - Annexure-R2, observed that the allotment of the land in favour of respondent No. 3 herein serves the common good of the public, therefore, the allotment is not in contravention of Section 23 of the Act. Ultimately, the Writ Petition was dismissed and the said order was not challenged. Therefore, it is not now again open to the appellants to question the very same order in this Writ Petition also. Therefore, the challenge to Annexure-F in this Writ Petition is not competent as the appellants have suffered an adverse order in respect of this very impugned order Annexure-F, in the earlier Writ Petition. In so far as the order dated 19.3.1992 passed by the Government as per Annexure-E allotting the land in question in favour of MUDA is concerned, the validity of the said order was not questioned in the earlier Wilt Petition though in the order dated 21.9.1993 - Annexure-F, a reference has been made to Annexure-E and it is only pursuant to Annexure-E, Annexure-F came to be passed. From this, it is clear that the appellants were not aggrieved by the order Annexure -E passed by the Government when they filed the earlier Writ Petition. In fact, their relief in the earlier Writ Petition for regularisation of their unauthorised occupation sought against MUDA was based on the notice said to have been issued by MUDA admitting that MUDA has become the owner of the property. Therefore, in these proceedings the appellants were not entitled to question the validity of the order Annexure - E. In that view of the matter, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the appellants/petitioners are not entitled for any of the reliefs sought in the Writ Petition. Therefore, the learned Single Judge is justified in dismissing the Writ Petitions. We see no ground to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge.
15. Before parting with the case, we may notice that as could be seen from the documents produced by respondent No. 3. five sites in the lay out formed by respondent No. 3, each measuring 30 feet x 40 feet have been allotted to the erstwhile owner of the property as per the scheme framed by MUDA and the Society has also executed sale deeds in favour of the wife of Rangegowda in respect of these five sites. Though the sons of Rangegowda have been impleaded to this appeal as respondent Nos. 5 to 8, they have not contested the claim of the appellants. Therefore, if the appellants have derived any title under the alleged unregistered sale deeds, it is open to them to proceed against the legal representatives of the original owner. However in these proceedings, no relief can be granted in favour of the appellants against respondent Nos. 5 to 8 being the legal representatives of Rangegowda. In view of the above discussion, we answer point No. 3 in the affirmative. Therefore, there are no merits In this appeal and the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
16. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
