T. Amarnath Goud, J
[1] This is petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the Hon'ble High Court for quashing &
cancelling the judgment dated 11.07.2022 passed by the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in Misc. Appeal No.11 of 2022. The petition has been
filed for also quashing and cancelling the order dated 16.04.2022 passed by the Estate Officer, BSNL Tripura BA, Agartala (Asstt. General Manager
(HQ) O/o the GMTD, BSNL, Agartala 799001. The petitioners also prayed for passing an ad interim stay order, staying the operation of the judgment,
dated 11.07.2022 passed by the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in Misc Appeal No.11 of 2022 & the impugned order dated 16.04.2022 passed
by the Asstt. General Manager (HQ) O/o the GMTD, BSNL, Agartala, whereby directing the petitioners to vacate the premises as described in the
schedule of the impugned order, till disposal of the instant petition.
[2] It is the case of the petitioner that the Assistant General Manager (HQ) BSNL, Tripura by similar and identical letters, dated 29.12.2021 asked
each of the petitioners to make immediate payment of Rs.73,05,111/- as outstanding dues as penal rent of the quarter/land allegedly unauthorisedly
occupied by the petitioners from 01.01.1982 to 31.2.2021. Along with the said letter, a purported calculation sheet was also annexed. By the said
letters, each of the petitioners was asked to pay the alleged outstanding dues within 30 days from issuing of the said letter.
[3] It is further stated by the petitioner in the plaint that in 1956 Lt. Subhash Ranjan Datta took the suit land forcibly into his possession. At that time,
the suit land was lying vacant and Lt. Subhash Ranjan Datta after taking the suit land into his possession. Initially repaired and renovated the
dilapidated kaccha structure standing thereon, to construct it into a hut fit for dwelling purpose. At that time, the Indian Posts and Telegraphs
Department was the owner of the suit land.
[4] The petitioners jointly made response to the aforesaid letter, in writing by letter dated 21.01.2022. In the letter, dated 21.01.2022 it is specifically
pointed out, that many years ago also recourse to the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 was taken in respect to the
quarter/land. It is also further contended that due to possession for more than 5 decades by deceased employee, predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioners herein over the land, the petitioners due to uninterrupted, open and adverse possession, initially by Lt. Subhash Ranjan Data and thereafter,
by the petitioners and the India posts and Telegraphs Department, presently, the Department of Telecommunications has no right, title & interest over
the said property as their right, title and interest had already extinguished.
[5] Thereafter, on 02.02.2022 the respondent issued similar and identical letters to each of the petitioners. By that letters again the petitioners were
requested to pay alleged dues of Rs.74,86,946/- within 15 days positively, and to transfer possession of the quarter to the Respondent. The petitioners
made response to aforesaid letter, in writing by similar and identical letters dated 18.02.2022. By the letter dated 18.02.2022, the petitioners questioned
the competency of respondent to act as the Estate Officer. The petitioners specifically contended that the respondent has no jurisdiction to issue the
aforesaid letter dated 02.02.2022.
[6] Thereafter, on 23.03.2022, the respondent issued similar and identical notice under sub-section (1) and Clause B(ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 4
of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. By such notice the petitioners were asked to appear in person on 07.04.2022
before the respondent to answer all material questions, connected with the matter. The petitioner No.1 made response to the above mentioned notice
in writing by letter dated 04.04.2022. In the letter, the petitioners reiterated that the land in question is not in the name of BSN as per the land records
(RoR).
[7] The respondent issued letter dated 06.04.2022 enclosing a copy of the letter dated 22.09.2020 enclosing a copy of the letter dated 22.09.2020
issued by the Asst. General Manager (HQ), O/o the General Manager Telecom District, BSNL, Tripura, SSA, Agartala. From the letter dated
22.09.2020, it is found that DE (P&A), O/o the GMTD, Agartala was appointed as the Estate Officer in BSNL, Tripura, SSA, and at present, the
DE(P&A) post is not available in Tripura SSA. The AGM (HQ) is in charge of Planning and Administration Division, and hence the AGM (HQ) in
nominated as the Estate Officer in BSNL, Tripura SSA.
[8] Thereafter, the petitioners in writing by similar and identical letters dated 07.04.2022 communicated to the respondent. In the said letter, the
petitioner again raised the question about the competency of the Estate Officer to issue the eviction Notice because there was no appointment of the
respondent as the Estate officer. The petitioner further stated under Section 2(b) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1971 ""Estate Officer"" means an officer appointed as such by the Central Government under Section 3. The petitioners further stated that the
competent authority in Central Government had earlier issued eviction notice against Subhash Ranjan Datta on 26.06.1968. Ultimately the eviction
order was passed on 16.04.4973 and subsequently the said order was cancelled by the concerned Estate Officer, by title of BSNL over the land in
question. Along with the letter dated 07.04.2022, the petitioners also enclosed order dated 17.03.1972 and Notice dated 17.06.1972 passed by the
Estate Officer.
[9] The respondents on 07.04.2022 issued similar and identical letters asking each of the petitioners to submit additional document on 08.04.2022 and
to participate in the hearing fixed on 08.04.2022. The petitioners made response to the notice dated 07.04.2022, in writing by letter dated 08.04.2022
wherein the petitioners requested the respondent to postpone the hearing so that the petitioners may get sufficient time for preparation after getting
necessary clarifications from the respondent.
[10] The respondent issued similar letters dated 11.04.2022 to each of the petitioners fixing the next date for personal hearing on 13.04.2022 but on
13.04.2022 the petitioners could not appear for personal hearing as there was little time for taking preparation for personal hearing. The petitioners
further submitted that on 12.04.2022 they made similar response to the letter dated 08.04.2022 in writing. Ultimately, the impugned order dated
16.04.2022 has been passed by the respondent against the petitioners.
[11] It is further stated by the petitioners that the Department of Financial Services, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, vide Gazette Notification,
dated 25.08.2009 notified that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1971 the Central Govt. hereby appointed the officers of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, mentioned in Column No.2 of the table mentioned in the said
Notification, being officers equivalent to rank of Gazetted Officer of Govt. to be Estate Officers for the purpose of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. And further, directed that the said officers shall exercise the powers conferred and duties imposed on Estate
Officers by or under the said Act, 1971 within the limits of their jurisdiction in respect of the public premise specified in Column No.3 of the table. In
terms thereof, vide Sl. No.66 the Divisional Engineer (Planning) was appointed as Estate Officer for premises under the administrative control of the
General Manager, Telecom District -West Tripura, Agartala.
[12] It is further submitted by the petitioners that the impugned order dated 16.04.2022 was passed by the respondent in the capacity of Asstt. General
Manager (HQ) O/o the General Manager Telecom District, BSNL, Tripura SSA, Agartala who had no jurisdiction to pass such order, in view of the
gazette notification, dated 25.08.2009 wherein it has been specifically mentioned that the Divisional Engineer (Planning) is the sole authority
empowered to pass Order in terms of Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
[13] In due course of argument, it is submitted by Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the petitioners herein has
approached this court with a view to get justice against wrong done to him by the impugned order date 11.07.2022 and prayed for allowing the revision
petition.
[14] In order to buttress his argument, Mr. R. Datta, learned counsel for the respondent has contended before this court that the petitioners are
illegally in possession of the said property which is the subject matter of this revision petition. To support his contention he has drawn the attention of
this court to Sections 3, 9, 10 and 15 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. While referring to the sections under the
Act Mr. Datta, learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the petitioners do not have legal right to continue to reside in the said property
and they should abide by the order dated 11.07.2022 passed by the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. [15] For ready reference, Sections 3, 9, 10
and 15 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 have extracted here in below:
3. Appointment of estate officer: The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,-
(a) appoint such persons, being gazetted officers of Government [or of the Government of any Union Territory] or officers of equivalent rank of the
[statutory authority], as it thinks fit, to be estate officers for the purposes of this Act;
[Provided that no officer of the Secretariat of the Rajya Sabha shall be so appointed except after consultation with the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha
and no officer of the Secretariat of the Lok Sabha shall be so appointed except after consultation with the Speaker of the Lok Sabha: Provided further
that an officer of a statutory authority shall only be appointed as an estate officer in respect of the public premises controlled by that authority;
6[Provided also that the Custodian, Deputy Custodian and Assistant Custodian of the enemy property appointed under section 3 of the Enemy
Property Act, 1968 (34 of 1968), shall be deemed to have been appointed as the Estate Officer in respect of those enemy property, being the public
premises, referred to in sub-clause (4) of clause (e) of section 2 of this Act for which they had been appointed as the Custodian, Deputy Custodian
and Assistant Custodian under section 3 of the Enemy Property Act, 1968.]
(b) define the local limits within which, or the categories of public premises in respect of which, the estate officers shall exercise the powers
conferred, and perform the duties imposed, on estate officers by or under this Act.
9. Appeals. (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the estate officer made in respect of any public premises under [section 5 or section 5B] [or
section 5C] or section 7 to an appellate officer who shall be the district judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other
judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years standing as the district judge may designate in this behalf.
(2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred,--
(a) in the case of an appeal from an order under section 5, [within twelve days] from the date of publication of the order under sub-section (1) of that
section;
(b) in the case of an appeal from an order [under section 5B or section 7, within twelve days] from the date on which the order is communicated to
the appellant; [and]
(c) in the case of an appeal from an order under section 5C, within twelve days from the date of such order:] [Provided that the appellate officer may
entertain the appeal in exceptional cases after the expiry of the said period, if he is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that there was
compelling reasons which prevented the person from filing the appeal in time.
(3) Where an appeal is preferred from an order of the estate officer, the appellate officer may stay the enforcement of that order for such period and
on such conditions as he deems fit:
[Provided that where the construction or erection of any building or other structure or fixture or execution of any other work was not completed on the
day on which an order was made under section 5B for the demolition or removal of such building or other structure or fixture, the appellate officer
shall not make any order for the stay of enforcement of such order, unless such security, as may be sufficient in the opinion of the appellate officer,
has been given by the appellant for not proceeding with such construction, erection or work pending the disposal of the appeal.] (4) Every appeal
under this section shall be disposed of by the appellate officer as expeditiously as possible and every endeavour shall be made to dispose of the appeal
finally within one month from the date of filing the appeal, after providing the parties an opportunity of being heard. (5) The costs of any appeal under
this section shall be in the discretion of the appellate officer.
(6) For the purposes of this section, a presidency-town shall be deemed to be a district and the chief judge or the principal judge of the city civil court
therein shall be deemed to be the district judge of the district.
10. Finality of orders- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by an estate officer or appellate officer under this Act shall
be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by any court or
other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.
15. Bar of jurisdiction.-No court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of-
(a) the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises, or
(b) the removal of any building, structure or fixture or goods, cattle or other animal from any public premises under section 5A, or
(c) the demolition of any building or other structure made, or ordered to be made, under section 5B, or (cc) the sealing of any erection or work or of
any public premises under section 5C, or]
(d) the arrears of rent payable under sub-section (1) of section 7 or damages payable under sub-section (2), or interest payable under sub-section
(2A), of that section, or
(e) the recovery of--
(i) costs of removal of any building, structure or fixture or goods, cattle or other animal under section 5A, or
(ii) expenses of demolition under section 5B, or
(iii) costs awarded to the Central Government or statutory authority under sub-section (5) of section 9, or
(iv) any portion of such rent, damages, costs of removal, expenses of demolition or costs awarded to the Central Government or the statutory
authority.
[16] Mr. R. Datta, learned counsel for the respondent while arguing has referred to one judgment of the apex court in M/s Garment Craft vs Prakash
Chand Goel reported in AIR 2022 SC 27 whereby the court has observed inter alia:
18. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several
reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High
Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the
determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is
justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The
jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental
principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or
the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that
such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this
Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. has observed:-
6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained
in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals
within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with
any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or
tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and
flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is
also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in
place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the
findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can
possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.
[17] In due course of argument, Mr. R. Datta, learned counsel for the respondent has referred the judgment dated 11.07.2022 passed by the District
Judge, West Tripura, Agartala and made his submission with regard to the Para Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19 & 20. According to him, the said judgment is
correct in its spirit and needs no interference by this court. For ready reference, Paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19 & 20 are reproduced herein below:
16) The appellant on their part claimed that the impugned notices were not lawful as those were not issued by the authorized Estate Office from the
side of respondent. In this respect, they referred to the Gazette Notification of the Govt. of India dated 06th to 12th September, 2009 and referred to
designation of officers as Estate Officers under BSNL and it was submitted that at Sl. No.66, the Divisional Engineer (Planning) is designated as the
Estate Officer for the entire State of Tripura. It was contended that the impugned notices were not issued by the aforesaid officer and therefore, are
not lawful.
17) The aforesaid Gazette Notification is annexed by therespondent side along with the written objection and on perusal of the same it is found that the
Divisional Engineer (Planning) at Sl. No.66 is designated as the Nodal Officer for Tripura. This particular notification is a general notification through
which Divisional Engineer (Planning) has been designated as Nodal Officer for most of the States. It is possible that the Divisional Engineer
(Planning) may not be available in that particular State. In such a situation, the duty of Estate Officer has to be discharged by some other officers of
the State. In the case in hand, an officer of therank of AGM (HQ) was assigned the duties and responsibilities of Estate Officer in addition to his
regular work and in exercise of the power as an Estate Officer, he issued the impugned notices.
18) Section 3 of the Act, 1971 relates to appointment of Estate Officer and it reads that the Central Govt. may by notification in the official gazette
appoint a gazetted officer as Nodal Officer for a particular State. The word used in the aforesaid provision is ""may"". It is not stated any where in the
Act, 1971 that in absence of a regular Estate Officer, the officer holding the charge of Estate Officer cannot issue eviction notice U/ S 4 & 5 of the
Act. In the case in hand, the AGM (HQ) was assigned the additional charge of Estate Officer and he is empowered to issue notices u/ S 4 & 5 of the
Act. Therefore, the impugned notices for eviction which are under challenge were lawful.
19) The appellants also claimed right, title and interest over the said property by virtue of occupying it for more than 50 years. In this respect, it must
be appreciated that the concerned department allowed the predecessors of the appellants to use the premises as a govt. quarters and subsequent to
their death, the appellants and their family continued the possession which is completely illegal as transpired from the aforesaid discussion. Further, the
appellants failed to supplement the aforesaid plea with any document. The respondents on their part adduced judgments of 3 different Courts including
the High Court as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs and successfully established that the occupation by the appellants is completely illegal and
they are doing so forcefully defying all directions from the respondents side.
20) The respondent side to support the aforesaid position has referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in RSA 20 of 2008 (Rajesh Roy
Vs. Union of India and Ors.) decided on 24.01.2019.The Hon'ble High Court in this case was dealing with the Act of 1971 and at para no.17 gave the
following observations:-
The procedure as prescribed under the Act is admittedly a summary procedure. The question of title is not involved in a proceeding before the Estate
Officer but it is the issue to be decided as to whether the plaintiff/appellant is an unauthorized occupant of the public premises. The burden is not to
prove the title4 of the plaintiff/appellant but to show that she is not an unauthorized occupant of the land in question and she is not required to seek any
licence or permission from the Estate Officer in order to possess the premises under her occupation. While doing so, it cannot be inferred that the
dispute of title is relevant in a proceeding before the Estate Officer. But it is the burden to be discharged once the plaintiff /appellant decides to
contest the finding of the Estate Officer and the burden is the principal burden inasmuch as the plaintiff/appellant is required to show that the land
under the possession of the plaintiff/appellant is not within the ambit and scope of the definition of the public premises.
[18] Heard.
[19] Admittedly, the father of the petitioners was an employee of the Indian Po and Telegraphs Department, Government of India. He died on
03.02.1996. The property which is the subject matter of this case belongs to government. It is a general rule after the retirement, no employee is
supposed to continue to reside in government property. Moreover, any person, if in possession of such property even after his term of service is over
shall hand over the said property to the department which has accorded him the said property. In the present case, the petitioners being the children of
the deceased employee are illegally in possession of that property for prolonged period. If they continue to reside or unwilling to hand over the
possession to government, the subject property in question cannot be utilized for providing accommodation to other employees working under the
respondent-employer.
[20] Now, the petitioners have approached this court on the ground that impugned order dated 11.07.2022 which is passed by District Judge, West
Tripura, Agartala is the one without jurisdiction. This submission of the petitioners cannot be appreciated as the petitioners have not approached this
court with clean hands. In one hand, the petitioners contended that that they are, by way of an adverse possession, are occupying the property and, on
the other hand, they contended that since their father was employee, he was given the property by his employer for residing. Since then, they have
been residing there on the strength of that accommodation made by the employer to Late Subhash Ranjan Datta. It appears to this court the
submissions made by the counsel for the petitioners are contrary to each other and creates serious ambiguity to comprehend as to what they really
want to project before this court. Even for a moment, if it is presumed that the father of the petitioner was occupying the government property which
is the subject matter herein in such matter, this court cannot simply allow them to continue to reside there anymore.
[21] The petitioners further contended that they had a right in occupying the property for years together but when this court asked them to show any
such authorized document allowing them to have possession over that property, they could not produce any. An oral submission must be supported by
a piece of authentic document without which this court cannot adjudicate the matter.
[22] In so far as argument with regard to jurisdiction is concerned as contended by the petitioners, the same is answered by the court below in its
judgment dated 11.07.2022. It is also pertinent to mention here that the petitioners have pleaded by way of a letter dated 13.05.2022 requesting 15
days time for vacating the property and handing over the possession of the same accordingly. It is apparent from the records that the period of 15
days time has been expired by now.
[23] Since the cause of action has arisen under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, there is an implied bar for filing
the suit against any order when the same attains finality. It appears to this court that the present revision petition under Article 227 against the
impugned order dated 11.07.2022 is not maintainable. Moreover, the counsel for the petitioners has failed to make out his case and the same is liable
to be dismissed.
[24] For the discussion made above, this instant civil revision petition stands dismissed.
[25] After pronouncement of the judgment, Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel for the petitioners prays before this court to grant some
breathing time for vacating the premise and hand over the same to the respondent. In view of the balance of convenience in favour of the petitioner,
since the said premises was occupied for decades together, this court is inclined to grant one month from today for vacating the premises.
