Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs The Assistant Commissioner (CT) INT LTU

2. M/s. Godrej Consumer Projects Ltd (the petitioner in W.P. No.6365 of 2016) is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of Mosquito Repellant Instruments, Mosquito Repellant Mats, Refills (Vaporizers), Coils and other products like flying insect killers and crawling insect killers (popularly known as "Lal Hit" and "Kala Hit"), Rat Killing Cakes, Chalk Pencils for killing cockroaches etc. They claim to have launched a new product called HIT Anti-Roach Gel intended to kill hidden cockroaches, especially certain species like American and German cockroaches.

3. The goods manufactured by M/s.Godrej Consumer Products Ltd, which are the subject matter of these proceedings, are HIT AEROSOL CIK, HIT AEROSOL FIK, HIT Rat and HIT Chalk. HIT AEROSOL CIK, popularly known as Lal Hit, is an aerosol spray used for killing hidden cockroaches. It is said to contain poisonous chemicals such as imiprothrin and cypermethrin. This product is described, both on the label of the aerosol can and on the website of the Petitioner, as ''crawling insect killer'' with a ''unique seek and kill applicator which kills hidden cockroaches''. The petitioner claims that the said product is an insecticide that kills cockroaches. HIT AEROSOL FIK, popularly known as Kala Hit, is used for killing flying insects such as flies, mosquitoes etc. It is also said to contain the poisonous element "d-trans Allethrin" that fatally affects the nervous system of the flying insect thereby killing it almost immediately. HIT Rat is a rat killing poison containing Bromadialone. HIT Chalk is a chalk pencil used for killing ants, cockroaches and other crawling insects, and is said to contain the poisonous chemical Cypermethrin. In the assessment orders, impugned in these Writ Petitions, the assessing authority held that these goods are not pesticides/insecticides falling within the ambit of Entry 20 of the IV Schedule to the VAT Act, and they were liable to be taxed at 12.5%/14.5% under Schedule V of the VAT Act as residuary goods. The Petitioner also manufactures Mosquito coils, Mosquito repellant vaporizers, and mosquito mats.

4. TREVC No.25 of 2015, TREVC Nos.4, 8, 10, 11 and 12 of 2016, relating to the three assessment years 2005-06 to 2007- 2008, are filed by M/s. S.C. Johnson Products Pvt. Ltd, assailing the common order dated 20.01.2015 passed by the Telangana Sales Tax and VAT Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad whereby classification of the products manufactured by them, under the residuary entry of the V Schedule to the Telangana Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred as the "VAT Act"), was upheld primarily on the ground that Entry 20 of Schedule IV to the VAT Act was limited to goods used for agriculture/horticulture purposes, and ''insect killers'' used for house-hold purposes did not fall within its scope.

5-6. M/s. S.C.Johnson deals with, among others, various categories of products manufactured under a License granted in terms of the Insecticides Act, 1968 (the "1968 Act" for short), and the Rules made thereunder. The petitioner has been paying VAT @ 4%, as applicable during the relevant period, classifying the said goods under Entry 20 of the IV Schedule to the VAT Act. The subject goods, as detailed in the table below, are referred to by M/s. S.C. Johnson as ''insect killers''/''insecticides''.

7. In addition to the above, M/s. S.C.Johnson also manufactures mosquito Repellants on which they pay VAT @ 12.5%/14.5% treating them as unclassified goods under Schedule V to the VAT Act. It is the petitioners case that, ever since 01.09.2005, they have been collecting tax on Mosquito Coils, Mosquito Repellant Vaporizers, Mosquito Mats at 12.5%, (as the said goods fall under the residuary category), and have been remitting the same to the department. With respect to other goods, they have been filing their returns on the basis that they fall under Entry 20 of Schedule IV, and have been collecting and remitting tax at 4%. They contend that a reading of the history of the Entries would show that pesticides and insecticides were always eligible for concessional rate of tax; w.e.f. 01.01.2000, the concessional rate of tax was not available to mosquito repellants; till 01.09.2005, when the amended Entry 20 was introduced, the department did not dispute the petitioner''s eligibility to be extended concessional rate of tax under Entry 78 of Schedule I of the APGST Act, or Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act; there has been no change in the nomenclature of the earlier Entry 78, and the present Entry 20, except for exclusion of ''mosquito repellent in any form''; and the said exclusion was earlier present by way of a separate entry viz Entry 203.

8. On the other hand, it is the case of the revenue that the sole issue, in the present case, is whether the products sold by the petitioners are insecticides and pesticides falling under Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act or are unclassified goods chargeable to tax at the rate fixed in Schedule V; as the subject goods are not insecticides in terms of manufacturing, presentation, packaging, ingredients, marketing, name etc, they cannot be treated as insecticides falling under Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act; and there is an underlying difference between household insecticides manufactured by the petitioners, and the insecticide/pesticide referred to in Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act.

9. Elaborate oral submissions were put forth by Sri S. Ravi, Learned Senior Counsel and Sri Karan Talwar, Learned Counsel for the petitioners. Written submissions were also filed, on behalf of the petitioners, by their Counsel Sri Vivek Chandrasekhar and Sri Karan Talwar. Oral submissions were made, and written submissions were filed, on behalf of the revenue by Sri M. Govind Reddy, Sri T. Vinod Kumar and Sri J. Anil Kumar, Learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Taxes. It is convenient to examine the rival submissions, urged by Learned Counsel on either side, under different heads.

I. Factors To Be Taken Into Consideration In Determining The Classification of A Product In Tax Statutes

10. The dispute, in the present batch of cases, relates to the classification of the subject goods. While the petitioners claim that they are "pesticides and insecticides" under Entry 20 of the IV Schedule to the VAT Act and are liable to be subjected to tax at the concessional rate of tax of 4%/5%, it is the case of the revenue that these goods do not fall within the ambit of Entry 20 of the IV Schedule, and are therefore liable to tax at 12.5%/14.5% under the residuary Schedule V of the VAT Act. Before examining this question in its various facets, it is necessary at the outset to briefly note the factors to be borne in mind in determining the classification of goods under tax statutes. For the purposes of classification, the relevant factors, inter-alia, are the statutory entry, the basic character, function and use of the goods. (Commissioner of Central Excise v. Wockhardt Life Sciences Ltd., 2012 (277) E.L.T. 299 (S.C), CCE v. Carrier Aircon, ((2006) 5 SCC 596). The functional utility and predominant or primary usage of the commodity must be taken into account, apart from the understanding of the product in common parlance. (Wockhardt Life Sciences Ltd, 2012 (227) E.L.T. 299 (SC); O.K. Play (India) Ltd. v. CCE, (2005) 2 SCC 460; Alpine Industries v. CEE, New Delhi, (2003) 3 SCC 111, Sujanil Chemo Industries v. CEE & Customs, (2005) 4 SCC 189, ICPA Health Products (P) Ltd v. CEE, (2004) 4 SCC 481, Puma Ayurvedic Herbal(P) Ltd v. CCE, Nagpur, (2006) 145 STC 200 (SC); CCE Delhi v. Ishaan Research Lab (P) Ltd., 8 2008 (230) E.L.T. 7 (SC), CCE v. Uni Products India Ltd., (2009) 9 SCC 295

11. While understanding the meaning of the words used in a tax Statute, the legislative history should also be taken note of. (State of Karnataka v. M/s.Godrej Consumer Products Ltd., (2014 (80) Kar.L.J. 328). If a provision, which falls to be applied, is found to be ambiguous, a subordinate presumption comes into play, namely that it is presumed that there was no intention to change the meaning of the provision which has been taken and repeated in the same or similar language in the subsequent Act. In such circumstances, it may be relevant to try to determine the meaning of the relevant provision by looking at what it meant in a previous statute, including by reference to authority on the provision as it appeared in that statute. (Wilsons Solicitors LLP v. Serena Bentine (Acting by her Litigation Friend, The Official Solicitor), (2015) EWCA Civ 1168.

II. Evolution of Entry 20 of The IV Schedule To The AP Vat Act:

12. Entry 78 of Schedule I of the APGST Act, as it stood in the year 1970 (Act No.9 of 1970), read as "Pesticides and Plant Protection Equipment". The objects and reasons of Act 9 of 1970, with specific reference to this Entry, read as follows:

"Pesticides and Plant Protection Equipments are at present liable to tax at 3 paise in the rupee at each point of sale. With a view to reducing the incidence of tax on these essential requisites for agricultural production, the government proposes to restrict the levy of tax to single point....".

(emphasis supplied)

13. When the scope of Entry 78 was expanded in 1976 it included insecticides, fungicides, weedicides, etc. Prior to the year 2000, Entry No. 78 of Schedule I of the APGST Act provided for a tax rate of 1% on Pesticides, insecticides fungicides, herbicides, weedicides and other plant protection equipment and accessories thereof. From 1.01.2000 onwards, the APGST Act, in its first schedule, incorporated a distinct entry i.e. Entry 203 which specifically provided for a higher rate of tax at 8% in respect of "Mosquito repellants and devices of all kinds including electronic repellant devices, refills, mats, coils and accessories thereof". Entry 78 of Schedule I of the APGST Act as it stood, before introduction of the VAT Act, read thus:-

"Pesticides, Insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, weedicides and other plant protection equipment and accessories thereof".

Entry 78A of Schedule-I of the APGST Act related to:-

"Pesticides concentrate or technical grade pesticides used by any registered manufacturer in the State for manufacture of formulated pesticides".

"Pesticides, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, weedicides and other plant protection equipment and accessories thereof."

"Pesticides, Insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, weedicides and other plant protection equipment and accessories thereof including drip and sprinkler irrigation systems but excluding mosquito repellants in any form".

"Insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, weedicides and pesticides of technical grade".

18. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the subject goods are intended to kill flies, mosquitoes, cockroaches, rats, etc; they are classifiable as "insecticides/pesticides" under Entry 20 of Schedule IV to the Act; if mosquito repellants were classifiable under the expression "insecticides" (prior to its amendment), there is no reason why the subject goods are not classifiable as "insecticides" under the VAT Act; the decision of the Commercial Tax Department, to classify the subject goods under the residuary entry, runs counter to the decision of this Court in Godrej Hicare Ltd v. Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Legal), Hyderabad, (2007) 6 VST 639 (AP) the subject goods are preparations of chemicals designed to kill insects and pests; such products can only be classified as insecticides and/or pesticides; any preparation, containing any substance specified in the Schedule to the 1968 Act, is an insecticide; HIT CIK contains D-trans Allethrin which is an insecticide; HIT FIK contains imiprothrin and cypermethrin which are insecticides; HIT Chalk contains cypermethrin which is an insecticide; HIT Rat cake contains bromadialone which is a rodenticide; rat is a pest and thus HIT Rat is a pesticide; HIT Anti Roach-Gel contains fipronil which is an insecticide; the subject goods are insecticides within the meaning of the term ''insecticide'' as defined in the Insecticides Act, 1968; insecticide is a generic product having wide varieties, among which mosquito repellants stand excluded under Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the Act; it is evident, therefore, that the rest of the varieties of household insecticides have been included under the genus of ''insecticides''; since the subject goods are insect killers, they have been rightly classified under Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the Act; the extent or quantity of active ingredients used in the goods is not a relevant factor for the purpose of classification; as held by the Supreme Court in Puma Ayurvedic Herbal (P) Ltd., and CCE v. Wockhardt Life Sciences Ltd, 2012 (277) E.L.T. 299 (SC) minimal use of an active ingredient in the subject goods does not detract from its being classified as an insecticide; the department has acknowledged, in the impugned order, that HIT Rat, specifically meant for rats, is a rodenticide; as the term "rodenticide" is not specified in Entry 20 of Schedule IV, the department has contended that the subject goods do not fall within its ambit; the department has artificially tried to create a difference without there being any distinction; the term "pesticide" is of wide import, and brings within its scope "rodenticide" also; and a rodent is nothing but a house-hold pest.

19. It is contended, on behalf of the revenue, that the subject products are more in the nature of ''urban oriented household products'', and are not ''insecticides'' as understood in common parlance; they are thus classifiable as ''general goods'' liable to tax at the ''Revenue Neutral Rate'' (RNR) of tax; the products manufactured and sold by the petitioners are distinct from regular ''insecticides''; they are not only branded as ''household insecticide'', but are also understood differently in common parlance; even under the Insecticides Act, insecticides intended for ''household use'', which are formulations consisting of a small portion of ''active ingredient'', are treated as a different class/category of insecticides; the aerosol products, manufactured by the petitioners, use ''LPG''/''kerosene'' as a propellant; it is by direct application that crawling insecticides are killed, and not because of the composition of the ''active ingredient'' contained therein; the ''active ingredient'' in the so called repellants, which are specifically excluded from the scope of the Entry, contain a higher percentage of ''active ingredient''; it is because of the medium through which it is used, such as ''electric units'', that its effectiveness changes; if the same repellant is applied through some kind of aerosol, these products would be more effective; the medium, through which the products are used, cannot form the basis for determination/classification of the products; section 18 of the Insecticides Act imposes a prohibition on the sale of insecticides by any person without a licence; the subject products are being sold off the shelf in the market, which shows that the petitioner''s claim, on the basis of their having obtained registration under section 9 of the Insecticides Act, is contrary to the provisions of the Act; registration under Section 9 serves a different purpose; in the absence of any material being placed on record, in relation to compliance with section 13 or 18 of the Insecticides Act, no reliance can be placed thereupon; Rodenticide is not included in Entry 20; and, therefore, it must be treated as unclassified goods.

20. As the words "pesticides", "insecticides", "fungicides", "weedicides" and "plant protection equipment", used in Entry 20 of the IV Schedule, are not defined in the VAT Act, it is necessary to understand their meaning. The ordinary meaning of the word "pest", as given in Chamber''s Twentieth Century Dictionary, is:

"Any deadly epidemic disease; plague anything destructive; any insect, fungus, etc., destructive of cultivated plants:......." and the meaning of the word "pesticide" is "pest killer".

"For the purposes of this handbook, pesticides include insecticides (to control insect pests), herbicides (to control weeds), fungicides (to control fungal diseases), nematocides (to control nematodes) and rodenticides (to control rats)."

23. "Pesticide application plays an important role in pest management. Proper technique of application of pesticide and the equipment used for applying pesticide are vital to the success of pest control operations........". (Page 1, Para 1)

"Different types of pesticides are used for controlling various pests. For Example Insecticides are applied against insect pests, Fungicides against crop diseases, Herbicides against weeds etc. in order to protect crop losses. (Page 2, Para 2 from bottom).

"Pesticide (economic poison) - As defined under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, economic poison (pesticide) means any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any insects, rodents, nematodes, fungi, or weeds, or any other forms of life declared to be pests; and any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant or desiccant. " (Sonic Electrochem (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1994) 92 STC 117.

25. The Asian Development Bank, in its publication called "Handbook on the use of Pesticides in the Asia-Pacific Region", has stated : "For the purposes of this handbook, pesticides include insecticides (to control insect pests), herbicides (to control weeds), fungicides (to control fungal diseases), nematocides (to control nematodes) and rodenticides (to control rats). This being the ordinary meaning of the words "pest" and "pesticide", "pesticide'' will include "insecticide" within it. If one of the meanings of the word "pest" is "any insect", and the meaning of the word "pesticide" is "pest killer", then any material which is an "insect killer", being an "insecticide", would come within the expression "pesticide". (Sonic Electrochem (P) Ltd.).

26. The term ''pesticide'' includes a large variety of compounds of diverse chemical nature and biological activity grouped together usually on the basis of what kind of pests they are used to destroy or eliminate. As noted hereinabove "pesticide" is a substance or mixture of substances intended for use, as a plant regulator, defoliant (i.e a chemical that is sprayed on plants and causes their leaves to fall), or a desiccant (i.e a substance that promotes drying and is used to remove moisture). It is evident, therefore, that a pesticide is used mainly for protection of plants.

27. Hawley''s Condensed Chemical Dictionary, by Richard J. Lewis, SR. Fifth Edition, defines ''Insecticide'' as :

''Insecticide: ''A type of pesticide designed to control insect life that is harmful to humans, either directly as disease vectors or indirectly as destroyers of crops, food products, or textile fabrics. General types are as follows: (1) Inorganic: arsenic, lead, and copper (inorganic compounds and mixtures); the use of these has diminished sharply in recent years because of the development of more effective types less toxic to humans. (2) Natural organic compounds, such as rotenone and pyrethrins (relatively harmless to humans since they quickly decompose to nontoxic compounds), nicotine, copper naphthenate, and petroleum derivatives. (3) Synthetic organic compounds: (a) Chlordane, lindane, pdichlorobenzene; (b) the organic esters of phosphorus (the parathions and related substances). (4) of comparatively recent development are pyrethroids, or insect growth regulators, which act as neurotoxins, preventing larvae from becoming adult forms (juvenile hormones); and metabolic inhibitors, e.g. imidazole, which function as structural antagonists.

The word ''Fungicide'' is defined therein to mean:-

Fungicide: Any substance that kills or inhibits the growth of fungi. Older types include a mixture of lime and sulfur, copper oxychloride, and Bordeaux mixture. Copper naphthenate has been used to impregnate textile fabrics such as tenting and military clothing, Dithiocarbamate and quinone types were introduced about 1940. Mercury compounds are also effective but have been discontinued because of their toxicity to humans. Hypochlorite solutions are used in swimming pools and water-cooled heat exchangers. Some types of fungi that infect the human body are extremely hard to eradicate and require highly specific medical treatment.

"....... We define a weed as a plant growing where it is not desired, or a plant out of place - some plant that, according to human criteria, is undesirable. We decide for each particular situation which plants are or are not desired in terms of how they affect our health, our crops our domesticated animals, or aesthetics.

...... ..

Weeds are also classed as pests and included with insects, plant diseases, nematodes, and rodent pests. A chemical used to control a pest is called a pesticide and a chemical used specifically for weed control is known as a herbicide."

Wikipedia defines -

"Herbicide(s) also commonly known as weedkillers, are chemical substances used to control unwanted plants. Selective herbicides control specific weed species, while leaving the desired crop relatively unharmed, while non-selective herbicides (sometimes called "total weedkillers" in commercial products) can be used to clear waste ground, industrial and construction sites, railways and railway embankments as they kill all plant material with which they come into contact".

"Herbicides have been used to control weeds in "non-agricultural" areas for around 50 years, Non-agricultural uses cover very diverse situations from forestry to parks and gardens, from waterways to roads and railways, and from pavements to industrial sites. Not only area the uses varied, but also the uses, many of whom have little knowledge of plants, weed control or the use of herbicides.

Perhaps the greatest volume of herbicide is used to maintain man-made surfaces such as railways ballast, road edges, pavements and channels, gravelled areas etc. These are now officially called "land not intended to bear vegetation" by the Pesticides Safety Directorate. They are often referred to as "hard surfaces", and can be divided into porous or non-porous surfaces.

32. Entry 20 uses the words "accessories thereof" in conjunction with the words "and other plant protection equipment". It also specifically includes within its ambit "drip and sprinkler irrigation systems". The word "accessories" was construed by this High Court in Indo National Ltd., v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1987 (64) STC 382 (AP) While dealing with the classification of "Dry Batteries or Cells", it was held that till the date of coming into force of Entry 152 of the First Schedule to the APGST Act, covering "dry batteries or cells", "dry cells", described as meant for use in transistors and/or radios, were assessable and taxable under Entry 3 thereof as accessories of wireless reception instruments; multipurpose cells, although falling under both Entry 3 and Entry 38, were to be taxed only at the lower rate under Entry 38 as "other accessories" of "all electrical goods" and from the date of coming into force of Entry 152, all dry-cells, for whatever purpose they were used, would be exigible to tax under Entry 152 only.

33. The Supreme Court, in Union Carbide India Ltd v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1995 (76) ELT 489 (SC) held that "dry cells batteries or cells" marked for use in transistors, as is the case of some such batteries manufactured by the Union Carbide India Ltd. alone during the period prior to the 1976 amendment, fell under Entry No.3; however, multi-purpose batteries, not specified for use in transistors alone could not be treated as "accessories thereof" of wireless reception instruments etc., for the purpose of Entry 3.

34. By the use of the word "thereof", the deciding factor is the predominant or ordinary purpose or use and it is not enough to show that the articles can be put to other uses also. The general or predominant user seems to determine the category in which an article will fall. On a comparison between different entries in which the term "accessories" is used in the Schedule to describe goods, the word should be construed taking into account whether the goods have been manufactured for use as an aid or addition to any of the specified articles in that entry or not. When it is intended to confine the entry to particular gadgets and particulars thereof, the entry would say so. Therefore, the expression "accessories thereof" ''must mean the general or predominant user of the article only as an accessory of one of the specified items mentioned in that entry. (Union Carbide India Ltd.). The word "accessories thereof" in Entry 20 are accessories of plant protection equipment.

35. In G. Radhakrishna Murthy & Company v. Commercial Tax Officer, (1997) 8 SCC 37 : (1999) 113 STC 161 (SC) the Supreme Court held that an inclusive definition had been given clarifying that cosmetic and toilet preparations would include scents, perfumes, face powders, talcum powders, hair tonics, hair oils, hair lotions, face creams and snows, pomades, depilatories, toothpowder, toothpaste, toothbrushes and shaving creams; the things specially mentioned in the entry "cosmetic and toilet preparations " are all of the nature of personal application; Incense sticks or agarbattis are goods of a different character altogether; these may emit a pleasant odour when burnt; but that, however, would not bring agarbattis within the class of articles mentioned in Item 36 of the First Schedule as all these goods were articles of personal application.

36. Entry 20 of Schedule IV uses the words "including drip and sprinkler irrigation systems". The word "including" must be given some meaning. In ordinary parlance it indicates that what follows the word "including" comprises or is contained in or is a part of the whole of the word preceding. The nature of the included items would not only partake the character of the whole, but may be construed as clarificatory of the whole. The word ''includes'' may, in certain contexts, be a word of limitation (South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers v. State of Gujarat, (1976) 4 SCC 601, Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2005) 2 SCC 515. Consequently "drip and sprinkler irrigation systems" would also constitute "plant protection equipment and accessories thereof."

37. It is through the equipment (referred to in the second limb of Entry 20) that the pesticides, insecticides, weedicides, fungicides and herbicides are applied on plants for their protection. The question whether pesticides, insecticides etc referred to in Entry 20 are only those used for plant protection, or those used for other purposes also including to kill household insects and pests, shall be examined hereinafter.

38. Reliance is placed, on behalf of the petitioners, on the definition of "insecticide" in the Insecticides Act, 1968 on the ground that the words "insecticides" and "pesticides" are not defined in the VAT Act. In examining whether the meaning of the word "insecticide" in the VAT Act can be borrowed from its definition in the Insecticides Act, it is necessary, in the first instance, to consider the scope and object of the said Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of an Act can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the same, and the extent and urgency of the evil which he sought to remedy. (State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, 1954 SCR 587, M.K. Ranganathan v. Govt. of Madras, (1955) 2 SCR 374 : AIR 1955 SC 604, Chern Taong Shang v. Commander S.D. Baijal, (1988) 1 SCC 507 For determining the purpose or object of the legislation, it is permissible to look into the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law was passed and which necessitated the passing of that law. For the limited purpose of appreciating the background and the antecedent factual matrix leading to the legislation, it is permissible to look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which actuated the step to provide a remedy for the then existing malady. (A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti, AIR 1956 SC 246; State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241, Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397 and Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 2114.

39. From the Statement of Objects and Reasons, for enacting the Insecticides Act, 1968, it is evident that, in the months of April and May, 1958, many persons died in the States of Kerala and Madras as a result of food poisoning arising from contamination of food with a poisonous organo-phosphorous insecticide ''Parathion'' (Falidol). There were also cases of persons who fell seriously ill, though not fatally, on account of food poisoning in the same areas. The Justice J.C. Shah Enquiry Commission enquired into and reported the circumstances in which the foodstuffs came to be contaminated; and the measures to be taken against similar occurrences in future. On receipt of the recommendations, the Government appointed an Inter-Ministerial Committee to suggest measures to give effect to the recommendations made by the Commission. The Inter-Ministerial Committee suggested certain short-term and long term measures. The long term measures AIR 1990 SC 2114 envisaged the enactment of legislation to regulate the manufacture, sale, storage, transport, distribution and use of insecticides including pesticides, herbicides or fungicides in the country.

40. The 1968 Act, is an Act to regulate the import, manufacture, sale, transport, distribution and use of insecticides with a view to prevent risk to human beings or animals, and for matters connected therewith. The purpose for which the Insecticides Act was enacted is to ensure that all risks therefrom, to human beings and animals, are prevented. It is with a view to achieve this object that "insecticides" of all forms are brought within the ambit of the 1968 Act. Section 3(e) of the 1968 Act therefore defines ''insecticide'' to mean (i) any substance specified in the Schedule; or (ii) such other substances (including fungicides and weedicides) as the Central Government may, after consultation with the Board, by notification in the Official Gazette, include in the Schedule from time to time; or (iii) any preparation containing any one or more of such substances.

41. Before examining whether the words "insecticide" and "pesticide" in Entry 20 of Schedule IV can be given a wide meaning in terms of the definition in Section 3(e), it is useful to refer to the other provisions of the 1968 Act, and the Rules made thereunder. Section 9 of the 1968 Act relates to registration of insecticides and, under sub-section (1) thereof, any person, desiring to import or manufacture any insecticide, may apply to the Registration Committee for the registration of such insecticide, and there shall be a separate application for each such insecticide. Section 9(3) stipulates that, on receipt of any such application for the registration of an insecticide, the Committee may, after such enquiry as it deems fit and after satisfying itself that the insecticide, to which the application relates, conforms to the claims made by the importer or by the manufacturer, as regards the efficacy of the insecticide and its safety to human beings and animals, register, on such conditions as may be specified by it and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed, the insecticide, allot a registration number thereto, and issue a certificate of registration in token thereof, within a period of 12 months from the date of receipt of the application. Under the second proviso thereto, if the Committee is of the opinion that the precautions claimed by the applicant as being sufficient to ensure safety to human beings or animals are not such as can be easily observed or that, notwithstanding the observance of such precautions, the use of the insecticide involves serious risk to human beings or animals, it may refuse to register the insecticide. Section 13 relates to grant of licence and, under sub-section (1) thereof, any person, desiring to manufacture or to sell, stock or exhibit for sale or distribute any insecticide or to undertake commercial pest control operations with the use of any insecticide, may make an application to the licensing officer for the grant of a licence. Section 13(5) stipulates that, in prescribing the fees for the grant or renewal of licences under Section 13, different fees may prescribed for the sale or distribution of insecticides for purposes of domestic use and for other purposes.

42. Section 18 of the 1968 Act relates to prohibition of sale, etc. of certain insecticides and, under sub-section (1) thereof, no person shall himself, or by any person on his behalf, sell, stock or exhibit for sale, distribute, transport, use, or cause to be used by any worker - (a) any insecticide which is not registered under the Act; (b) any insecticide, the sale, distribution or use of which is, for the time being, prohibited under Section 27; and (c) any insecticide in contravention of any other provision of this Act or of any rule made thereunder. Under sub-section (2) thereof, no person shall himself, or by any person on his behalf, sell, stock or exhibit for sale or distribute or use for commercial pest control operations any insecticide except under, and in accordance with, the conditions of a licence issued for such purpose under the Act. Section 36 confers power on the Central Government to make Rules and, under Section 36(2)(zb), such Rules may prescribe the maximum proportion of any insecticide which may be added to, or contained in, any preparation for domestic use and the restrictions thereon.

43. Chapter IV of the Insecticides Rules, 1971 relates to grant of licences, and Rule 10 prescribes licences for sale, etc. of insecticides. Under sub-rule (1) thereof, application for the grant or renewal of a licence to sell, stock or exhibit for sale or distribute insecticides shall be made in Form VI or Form VII, as the case may be, to the licensing officer and shall be accompanied by the fees specified in sub-rule (2). Rule 10(2) prescribes that the fee, payable under sub-rule (1) for grant or renewal of licence, shall be Rs. 500/- for every insecticide for which the licence is applied. There shall be a separate fee for each place, if any insecticide is sold, stocked or exhibited for sale at more than one place. Under the first proviso thereto, the maximum fee payable in respect of insecticides, commonly used for household purposes and registered as such, shall be Rs. 7,500/- for every place. Rule 10C prohibits sale or storage of insecticides in certain places and, thereunder, no person shall manufacture, store or expose for sale or permit the sale or storage of any insecticide in the same building where any articles, consumable by human beings or animals, are manufactured, stored or exposed for sale. In terms of the Explanation thereto, nothing contained in Rule 10C shall apply to retail sales of household insecticides from the building wherefrom other articles, consumable by human beings or animals, are usually sold provided such household insecticides have been registered as such, and are packed and labelled in accordance with the Insecticide Rules.

44. Section 13(5) of the 1968 Act, r/w the proviso to Rule 10(2) of the Insecticide Rules, prescribes a separate fee for grant or renewal of licence in respect of insecticides for domestic use. Under the Explanation to Rule 10-C, the restriction placed by Rule 10-C on the sale of insecticides does not apply to retail sales of household insecticides. Section 18 prohibits the sale, distribution and transport of any insecticide in contravention of the provisions of the 1968 Act and the Rules made thereunder. Unlike other insecticides, the subject products (household insecticides) can be stored and sold from the same building where any article, consumable by human beings and animals, are stored and sold. The subject products, classified as "household insecticides" under the Insecticides Act, are not ''insecticides'' as commonly understood and considered either by the people in the trade or by those using it. Where the context does not permit or where it would lead to absurd or unintended result, the definition of an expression need not be mechanically applied. (Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. Asst. Commercial Tax Officer, (1994) 93 STC 95 (SC), GMR Energy Limited v. Govt. of Karnataka, 2010 LAWS (KAR) (3) 40.

45. Even under the 1968 Act, insecticides intended for ''household use'', which are formulations consisting of a small portion of ''active ingredients'', are considered a different class/category of insecticides. When the rigor of the Insecticides Act is relaxed for "household insecticides", which the subject products admittedly are, can the extremely wide definition of an "insecticide" therein be applied to the said word used in Entry 20 of the IV Schedule, and the said Entry be understood to bring within its ambit all forms of insecticides including "household insecticides"? The answer to this question can only be in the negative. Whether one or more kinds of products containing its ingredients should be included under the Entry relating to pesticides is the exclusive prerogative of the State, and during the period when one category is excluded from the purview of the entry, it is not open to import the provisions of the Insecticides Act so as to enlarge the scope of the Entry under the Sales Tax Act. Where the words used in the entry are clear and unambiguous, there is no need to refer to the meaning of the words used under other enactments. (Span Diagnostics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 136 STC 196.

IV. Do The Subject Products Lose Their Identity As An "Insecticide" On Its Mixture With Other Substances?

46. Aerosol (HIT CK), a household insecticide used against crawling insects like cockroaches, contains as an active ingredient - imiprothrin (a.i.) at 0.07% and Cypermethrin (a.i.) at 0.20%, as against 50% LPG as the propellant. Insecticides constitute a miniscule component of these products. The subject products, manufactured and sold by the petitioner, contain a very small percentage of ''Insecticide'', which is used as a formulation not exceeding the percentage prescribed by the Government in terms of Section 36(z-b) of Act, and are registered and packed for sale as household insecticides. The subject products cater to the specific requirement of urban households, and are not used either for plant protection or for agricultural operations. The goods marketed and sold by the petitioner contain a negligible quantity of d-trans Allethrin, an insecticide mixed by a process with other ingredients like deodorized Kerosene, perfume, pipnoil bentoxide, and propellant Gas; and it loses its original identity and a new or a different product/commodity emerges.

47. Where the quality of a product is changed, and it is commonly and commercially known as a different commodity, it cannot then be said that the new product would fall in the original Entry. (Tiki Enterprises v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore, (2010) 27 VST 67 Sales tax enactments are intended to tax sales of different commercial commodities, and not to tax the production or manufacture of particular substances out of which these commodities may have been made. On separate commercial commodities comingzx into existence, they become separately taxable goods or entities for the purpose of sales tax. (A.P. Products v. State of A.P., (2007) 8 VST 373 (SC) State of Tamilnadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra, (1976) 1 SCC 834 and Rajasthan Roller Flour Mills Association v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1994 SC 64 : 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 413

48. In State of Kerala v. Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd, (2010) 34 VST 164 (Ker) the Kerala High Court held that the contention of the respondent that "Equal" is not used for food preparation was unacceptable, as it was contrary to the company''s own claim in their website; the fact that it is used as a sweetening agent, in the preparation of non-alcoholic drinks and other beverages like tea or coffee, did not take it outside the Entry; and, even though reference was made to the exemption available to sugar produced in India, and the low rate of tax at 4% for imported sugar, to contend that a sugar substitute should not be subjected to tax at a higher rate, the court could not apply the rate of tax of "sugar" to "sugar substitute" as it was a matter of legislative policy.

49. It is evident, therefore, that pesticides/insecticides, as they are commonly known, are mixed with LPG/Kerosene which is used as a propellant and, after such a process, a new product emerges which, even under the Insecticides Act, 1968, are separately classified as ''household insecticides". It is difficult, therefore, to hold that the subject goods are "pesticides/insecticides" as referred to in Entry 20 of the IV Schedule of the VAT Act.

50. The question which arose for consideration, in Puma Ayurvedic Herbal (P) Ltd., was whether the subject goods were cosmetics or medicaments. The Supreme Court held that, while the word ''cosmetic'' was defined in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the word ''medicament'' was not; a "medicament" is used to treat some medical condition, and a "cosmetic" is used to improve the appearance of a person; the quantity of medicament, used in a particular product, is not relevant; and, normally, the extent of its use as a medicinal ingredients is very low, because a larger use may be harmful for the human body. As noted hereinabove, the word ''insecticide'' is defined, for the purpose of the Insecticides Act, 1968, to include all kinds of insecticides irrespective of the quantity of insecticides used in the particular product. The question, in the present case, is not whether the quantity of insecticides used is high or low, but whether Entry 20 includes all kinds of insecticides or only those insecticides used for plant protection. Reliance placed by the petitioners on Puma Ayurvedic Herbal (P) Ltd. is, therefore, misplaced.

51. In Wockhardt Life Sciences Ltd., the question which arose for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the subject products were to be classified as a "medicament" or as a "detergent". The Supreme Court held that there was no fixed test for classification of a taxable commodity; this was the reason why the ''common parlance test'' or the ''commercial usage test'' are the most common; whether a particular article would fall within a particular tariff heading or not had to be decided on the basis of tangible material or evidence to determine how such as article is understood in ''common parlance'' or in the ''commercial world'' or in ''trade circle'' or in its popular sense meaning; it is they who are concerned with it, and it is the sense in which they understand it, that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention, when the statute was enacted; one of the essential factors for determining whether a product is a medicament or not is whether the product in understood as a pharmaceutical product in common parlance; and the quantity of medicament used in a particular product is not a relevant factor for, normally, the extent of use of medicaments as ingredients is very low because a larger use may be harmful for the human body. While a miniscule quantity of insecticide used in the product would bring it within the ambit of an "insecticide", for the purposes of the Insecticides Act, the question which necessitates examination herein is not whether the subject goods are "insecticides" for the purposes of the Insecticides Act, but whether Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act would bring within its ambit only pesticides and insecticides used for plant protection, or all insecticides including household insecticides such as the subject goods.

V. Is The Scope of Entry 20 Restricted Only To Insecticides/pesticides Used For Agricultural Purposes Or Does It Include Such Goods When Used For Non Agricultural Purposes Also?

52. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that Entry 20 is a comprehensive entry, and the language employed therein does not suggest that its scope is restricted only to the items used for agricultural/horticultural purposes; a taxing entry must be read literally and strictly; there is no scope for intendment in a taxing entry, and there is no presumption as to tax; Entry 20 is plain, clear and unambiguous; an additional condition cannot be read into it regarding the end use of the product; the scope of Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act is not limited only to insecticides used for agricultural purposes; merely because the term ''plant protection equipment'' follows the terms ''insecticides'' and ''pesticides'', the scope of these words cannot be so restricted as to exclude therefrom ''insecticides'' and ''pesticides'' used for household purposes; the term "insecticides" and "pesticides" are words of wide import; the legislature has deliberately used these words, as its intent was to include all types of ''insecticides'' and ''pesticides'', including those used for house-hold purposes, within the ambit of the Entry; each term in Entry 20 must be given meaning, and construed independently, as they are distinct classes of goods; pesticides, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides weedicides are not equipment; the words ''plant protection'' do not qualify the earlier words "pesticides, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides or weedicides", but only qualify the word ''equipment''; in Ashok Agencies v. State of Karnataka, [2008] 16 VST 570 (Karn.)it has been held that all kinds of insecticides, whether used in agricultural operations for killing insects that attack agricultural crops or used for killing domestic insects, fall within Entry 23 of the Schedule annexed to the KVAT Act; from the dictionary meaning and technical literature, it is evident that both ''herbicide'' and ''weedicide'' are synonyms and refer to similar goods having non-agricultural uses like in parks and gardens, waterways, roads and railways, and pavements to industrial sites; the intended usage of both ''herbicide'' and ''weedicide'' is to kill unwanted plants either for agricultural or nonagricultural purposes; even otherwise since weedicides and herbicides are only one category of "plant associates" amidst three other categories that are not exclusively for the use of plants, Entry 20 cannot be confined only to plants; the intended usage of ''insecticides'', mentioned in the Entry, is to kill unwanted insects either for agricultural or non-agricultural purposes; usage is not restricted only for agricultural purposes as there is nothing in the said entry to qualify the usage of the items mentioned therein; and the contention that insect killers, meant for household purposes, are not covered by the scope of Entry 20 has no merit.

53. The best rule of construction of a statutory provision, including an Entry in a Schedule to a Tax Statute, is that which takes the words to comprehend a subject that falls within their usual sense, unless there is something plain to the contrary. You are to give the words their larger meaning, unless you find something which plainly shows that they were intended to be read in a more restricted sense. (Anderson v. Anderson, (1895) Q.B. 749, Church v. Mundy, 15 Ves. 396, 406 If the definition has deliberately used words of wide import, it would be necessary to read those words in their wide denotation. State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 General words are to be taken in their larger sense, unless you can find that in the particular case the true construction requires you to conclude that they are intended to be used in a sense limited to things ejusdem generis with those which have been specifically mentioned before. (Anderson; Church). As shall be elaborated hereinafter the object and reasons for Act 9 of 1970, in so far as it related to Entry 78 of Schedule I of the APGST Act, states that the incidence of tax on pesticides and plant protection equipment was reduced as these were essential requisites for agricultural production. Similarly the white paper on VAT shows that all agricultural and industrial inputs were to be taxed at the concessional rate of 4% tax.

54. Light is thrown on the ambit of the words by the context in which they appear. An object of general concern, other than those mentioned, to come within the Section, must have a degree of similarity to those mentioned. (Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jordan, (1976) 3 All ER 775 While the subject goods no doubt contain as small element of insecticide, it has no similarity with the insecticides mentioned in Entry 20 which brings within its ambit only insecticides used for plant protection. It is not in dispute that the subject products are household insecticides used to kill insects in households, and are not used for plant protection.

55. Where the words of a Statute are plain and unambiguous, effect must be given to them. The legislature may be safely presumed to have intended what the words plainly say. The plain words can be departed from when reading them as they are leads to patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity or invalidation of a law. (Bhaiji v. SDO, (2003) 1 SCC 692; Girdhari Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur,(1986) 2 SCC 237 The use of general words in a statute does not preclude inquiry into the object of the statute or the mischief which it was intended to remedy. (Attorney-General v. Brown, (1920) 1 K.B. 773, Cox v. Hakes, (1890) 15 App. Cas. 506). In a taxation statute where literal interpretation leads to a result that does not subserve the object of the legislation, another construction in consonance with the object can be adopted. (State of Kerala v. A.P. Mammikutty, (2015) 10 SCC 632, Keshavji Ravji & Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1990) 2 SCC 231 Where various interpretations of a Section are admissible, it is a strong reason against adopting a particular interpretation if it shall appear that the result would be unreasonable or oppressive". (Attorney-General v. Brown; Attorney-General v. Till, (1910) A.C. 50, 51.In all doubtful matters, an enactment which is in general terms is to receive such a construction as may be agreeable to the rules of common law in cases of that nature, and the Section ought therefore to be construed according to the appropriate rule of the common law. (Attorney-General v. Brown; Arthur v. Bokenham, (1707) 11 Mod. 148

56. Courts can, by ascertaining legislative intent, place such construction on a Statute as would advance its purpose and object. (Bhaiji; Girdhari Lal & Sons) (supra). Though Courts must find the intention of the statute from the language used, but language more often than not is an imperfect instrument of expression of human thought. It would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. We must not make a fortress out of the dictionary but remember that statutes must have some purpose or object, whose imaginative discovery is judicial craftsmanship. The Court need not always cling to literalness and should seek to endeavour to avoid an unjust or absurd result. One should not make a mockery of legislation. To make sense out of an unhappily worded provision, where the purpose is apparent to the judicial eye, ''some'' violence to language is permissible. A.P. Mammikutty (supra); State of T.N. v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd., (1986) 3 SCC 91, K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, (1981) 4 SCC 173 and Luke v. IRC, 54 ITR 692.

57. While all the chemicals, referred to in the first limb of Entry 20, may have other uses also, they are all primarily used for plant protection. As the second limb of Entry 20 deals with equipment used for plant protection, it is evident that the chemicals referred to in the first limb are those which are to be applied for plant protection through the equipment referred to in the second limb of the said Entry. Entry 20 must be read restrictively so as to exclude "pesticides, insecticides etc" which are not used for plant protection, and are used for other purposes, including as household insecticides. As a plain reading of Entry 20 shows that it was intended to be read in a restricted sense, and as being limited only to those goods used for plant protection, there is no justification in bringing such goods within the ambit of Entry 20 which, on a plain reading, are excluded from its ambit.

58. It is no doubt true that the words "plant protection" qualify the word "equipment" in the second limb of Entry 20 and not the chemicals referred to in its first limb as the words "and other" are used between them. The very fact that "plant protection equipment" are placed in Entry 20 along with the chemicals referred to in the first limb which are mainly used for plant protection, makes it clears that the chemicals, referred to in the first limb of Entry 20, are only those used for plant protection, and none else.

59. Entry 20 of Schedule IV is conditional. It does not bring within its ambit all kinds of pesticides, insecticides, weedicides etc. The concessional rate of tax at @ 4%/5%, under the IV Schedule is available only when these goods are used for plant protection. All the goods included in the first limb of Entry 20 are commonly used for plant protection. The second limb of Entry 20 brings within its ambit equipment used for plant protection. Chemicals used for plant protection, and the equipment through which they are applied on plants, are grouped together in Entry 20 which is a combined entry. ''Insecticides'', covered by Entry 20 are those used by farmers for purposes of protection of crops/plants.

60. While a broad meaning was given to Entry 23 of the KVAT Act by the Karnataka High Court in "Ashok Agencies 35", and insecticides of all kinds were brought within its ambit, the said judgment has only persuasive value and does not constitute a precedent binding on this Court. It is not known whether an Entry similar to Entry 78-A of Schedule I of the APGST Act or Entry 100 (140) of the Telangana VAT Act, existed in the Karnataka Sales Tax Act or the Karnataka VAT Act. In any event no such provisions were considered by the Karnataka High Court in the said judgment. Judicial decorum, propriety and discipline require that the High Court should, especially in the event of its contra view or dissent, discuss the judgments of the other High Courts and record its own reasons for its contra view. While the judgments of a High Court are not binding on the other High Court(s), they have persuasive value. A High Court would be within its right to differ with the view taken by other High Courts but, in all fairness, it should record its dissent with reasons therefor. That the judgments of other High Court have persuasive value should be taken note of by the High Court and dissented from only by recording its own reasons. (Pradip J. Mehta v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad, 2008 (14) SCC 283.

61. The decision of a High Court will have the force of a binding precedent only in the State or territories over which the Court has jurisdiction. In other States or outside the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court it may, at best, have persuasive effect. The doctrine of stare decisis cannot be so stretched as to give the judgments of one High Court the status of a binding precedent so far as other High Courts are concerned. (Geoffrey Manners & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1996 (89) Taxman. 287 (Bom. HC DB), Commissioner of Income Tax v. Thana Electricity Supply Co. Ltd., [1994] 206 ITR 727 (Bom), Consolidated Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, [1994] 209 ITR 277 (Bom) This doctrine is applicable only to different benches of the same High Court. The ratio of the decisions of other High Courts cannot be exalted to the status of a binding precedent nor can the ratio decidendi of those decisions be perpetuated by invoking the doctrine of stare decisis. (Valliama Champaka Pillai v. Sivathanu Pillai, [1979] 4 SCC 429 (Thana Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.). Reliance placed by the petitioners on Ashok Agencies is therefore misplaced.

62. Insecticides and pesticides which kill insects and pests which cause damage to plants are chemicals used for plant protection. As shall be elaborated hereinafter, if the legislative intent was to include all forms of insecticides and pesticides within the ambit of Entry 20, it was wholly unnecessary to provide for a separate entry in Entry 100(140) for technical grade insecticides, fungicides, weedicides, herbicides and pesticides, that too at the same rate of tax at 4%/5%. It is evident, therefore, that the legislature intended to tax insecticides, pesticides etc at a concessional rate only when they were used either as industrial inputs or for plant protection, and not otherwise. The subject products, dealt with by petitioners, are used for purposes other than for plant protection or as industrial inputs. They are household insecticides, considered as a separate class of goods even under the Insecticides Act, and are outside the scope of Entry 20 of the IV Schedule. The products manufactured and sold by the petitioners, though they contain a small percentage of ''Insecticide'', are used as a formulation not exceeding the percentage prescribed by the Government in terms of Section 36 (z-b) of the Insecticides Act, and are registered and packed as specified for being sold as "household insecticides". They are not ''insecticides'' as commonly understood, and considered by people dealing with it or by those who put it to use. These products are largely urban household products, and are not connected with plant protection which alone fall under Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act.

VI. Can The Statement of Objects & Reasons of An Earlier Statute, And The White Paper On Vat Be Relied Upon?

63. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the Statement of Objects and Reasons issued in the year 1970, for the earlier APGST Act, cannot be relied upon to restrict and control the plain meaning of the language employed by the Legislature in the VAT Act; even if the APGST Act did not contemplate coverage of present day household insecticides within its purview, it does not preclude their coverage within the existing VAT Act when words of wide import, like insecticides and pesticides, are used by the Legislature; when Entry 78 was introduced, the objects and reasons referred to the essential requisites for agricultural production, but did not state that it was meant only for agricultural production or that it could not be applied to any other product; in the year 1974, when ''insecticides'' was inserted in the said entry, there was no Statement of Objects and Reasons to clarify that "insecticides" referred only to agricultural production; further in the year 1976, when the words "fungicides" and "weedicides" were inserted, there was no Statement of Objects and Reasons to clarify that the items were intended only for agricultural production; it is evident that the legislature sought to expand rather than restrict the scope of the Entry; it is not open to the department to rely upon extraneous material such as the White Paper, to interpret the words "insecticides" etc when the language used by the Legislature is plain, clear and unambiguous; the White Paper does not even remotely indicate any such exclusion; the discussion paper, on road map for national and sub-national VATs in India, was appended by a list of floor rates of 4% categories, as finalized by the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers; Entry 17 in the said list makes no mention of ''plant protection equipment'', unlike the present Entry 20 under the VAT Act; both the Entries are at variance; there are many entries such as Entry 2, Entry 20, Entry 39, Entry 123, etc of Schedule IV which neither relate to agricultural nor to basic necessities; and reliance placed on the White Paper, in order to contend that the scope of the Entry is restrictive in nature and is only for agricultural purposes, is incorrect.

64. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of Act No.9 of 1970, by which Entry 78 was inserted in the First Schedule to the APGST Act, states that levy of tax was restricted to a single point with a view to reduce the incidence of tax on the essential requisites for agricultural production. A reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons is permissible for understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute sought to remedy. The weight of judicial authority leans in favour of the view that the Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be utilized for the purpose of restricting and controlling the plain meaning of the language employed by the legislature in drafting a statute, and excluding from its operation such transactions which it plainly covers. The Statement of Objects and Reasons, Parliamentary Debates, Reports of Committees and Commissions preceding the legislation and the legislative history can be referred to for the purpose of gathering the legislative intent. (Bhaiji; Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 8th Edn., 2001, pp. 206-09). A report which precedes an Enactment is invaluable as an aid to construction, but it is one thing to use it to resolve a real ambiguity in the statutory language, and quite another to use it to cut down the meaning of the language that Parliament has used in implementing the report''s recommendation when the ordinary meaning of that language is plain. (Comdel Commodities Ltd. v. Siporex Trade Sa.).

65. The White Paper on State Level Value Added Tax, prepared by the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers dated 17th January 2005, formed the basis for the changed system of taxation under the VAT regime. The ''Preface'' to the White Paper explains the rationale for the uniform system of VAT which is to avoid unhealthy competition, and have certain features of VAT 56 common to all the States. These features were to constitute the basic design of VAT. It was expected that, at the same time, the States would have the freedom for appropriate variation consistent with the basic design. The White Paper was a collective attempt of the States to strike a balance between the need for commonality, and the desired federal flexibility in the VAT structure. (Sony India Pvt. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Trade & Taxes, (2015) 85 VST 90 (Delhi).

66. In para 1.4 of the White Paper the methodology adopted by the Empowered Committee, in preparing the White Paper, has been explained. One of the tasks was to harmonise the tax structure "through implementation of uniform floor rates of sales tax and discontinuation of sales tax related incentive schemes". With a view to simplify the tax structure, the Empowered Committee recommended that there should basically be only two rates of VAT i.e. 4% and 12.5%, plus a specific category of tax exempted goods and a special VAT rate of 1% only for gold and silver ornaments etc. It was suggested that "under 4% VAT rate category, there should be the largest number of goods (about 270), common for all the States, comprising of items of basic necessities such as medicines and drugs, all agricultural and industrial inputs, capital goods and declared goods". The list of goods with 4% floor rate, as finalized by the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers, contained about 41 items under the table "Goods with 4% Floor Rate". The basic entries in the list finalised by the Empowered Committee were more or less reproduced in the same manner in many of the State Legislations, including in the VAT legislation of Andhra Pradesh. Sony India Pvt. Ltd., (2015) 85 VST 90 (Delhi). The White Paper on Value Added Tax, (which is a result of the efforts of all States in formulating the basic design of State Level Value Added Tax), under the caption "VAT Rates and Classification of Commodities", read as follows:

".... Under 4% VAT rate category there will be the largest number of goods (about 270), common for all the States, comprising of items of basic necessities such as medicines and drugs, all agricultural and industrial inputs, capital goods and declared goods. The schedule of commodities will be attached to the VAT Bill every State".

"chemical fertilizers, pesticides, weedicides and insecticides".

69. The word ''insecticide'', used by the legislature in Entry 20, when read with the preceding and succeeding terms, shows that the legislature intended to group items of the same kind under one entry. The legislative intent, in the present case, can be gathered from the Statement of Objects and Reasons when the entry was inserted, and also on a reference to the White Paper on VAT, wherein a broad consensus as to the rate of tax on goods of basic necessities, and agriculture and industrial inputs, was agreed upon. Both the White Paper on the VAT Act, and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of Act 9 of 1970 (under the APGST Regime) view agricultural inputs, and essential requisites for agricultural production, as requiring reduction in the incidence of tax. The legislative intent, when Entry 78 was initially introduced in the APGST Act, was to cover essential requisites of agriculture production. The consensus, arrived at the time of introduction of VAT across the country, was that a uniform rate structure should be imposed. The lower rate of 4% tax was agreed upon in respect of basic necessities, and all agriculture and industrial inputs. On a plain reading of the contents of the White Paper, the products enumerated in Entry 20 of Schedule IV are those goods required for Agriculture/Plant Protection; they are, therefore, placed in Schedule IV for being extended the concessional rate of tax @ 4%/@ 5%. The products, dealt with by the assessees, can neither be said to be ''basic necessities'' nor are they ''agriculture products''; or products used for plant protection.

70. While Entry 17 of Annexure I to the White Paper does not include plant protection equipment, it includes, among others, insecticides and pesticides under the head "goods with 4% floor rate". Under the caption "VAT rates and classification of commodities" the 4% VAT rate category was to comprise of items of basic necessities such as all agricultural and industrial inputs. It is evident therefore that only pesticides and insecticides, used as agricultural and industrial inputs, were extended the concessional rate of 4% tax. This understanding of the Empowered Committee, in the White Paper, has weighed with the State Legislature in providing for "pesticides and insecticides", when used as agricultural inputs/plant protection, under Entry 20, and when used as industrial inputs under Entry 100(140) of the IV Schedule to the VAT Act.

VII. Can The Dictionary Meaning And Trade Parlance Meaning Of Words, Not Defined In The Act, Be Relied Upon?

71. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the terms ''insecticides'' and ''pesticides'' have not been defined in the Act; hence recourse may be taken to the dictionary meaning, and the trade parlance meaning, for the purposes of interpreting Entry 20; Butterworths Medical Dictionary, Second Edition, defines ''pesticide'' as ''a comprehensive word to include substances that will kill any form of pest, e.g., insects, rodents and bacteria''; the Commercial Tax Department, the traders marketing the goods, and the consumers using the goods have all understood the subject goods as insecticides and pesticides; in the absence of a precise definition in the Statute, the common parlance test should form the basis for interpreting the nature of the subject goods, in the context of levy of VAT; many Entries in the Schedules are a description of the category of the goods; a person, intending to procure or purchase the goods, may either go by the description or the alternative name or the trade name; it is necessary, while determining whether a class of commodities fall within a particular entry, to understand the meaning of the said commodity as understood in common parlance; the popular sense meaning would be ''that sense which people conversant with the subjectmatter, with which the statute deals, would attribute to it; in the instant case, the subject goods were manufactured under a license issued under the Insecticides Act, 1968, and the goods are meant for the purpose of killing insects viz., mosquitos, cockroaches and flies; the subject goods are sold and bought as insect killers; the technical meaning of the subject goods also indicates that the goods are meant for the purpose of killing insects; the subject goods are packaged and marked as ''insecticides''; the package of the products, and the leaflets in the package, state that the products are insect killers, and are useful for killing cockroaches, houseflies, mosquitoes, etc; and, in common parlance, the subject goods are known as insecticides.

72. While the meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law, the proper construction of the Statute is. (Revenue and Customs v. Premier Foods Ltd, (2007) EWHC 3134 (Ch)., When considering the meaning of a word, often one goes to a dictionary. But we have been warned, time and again, not to substitute other words with the words of the Statute and there is a very good reason for that. Few words have exact similes. The overtones are almost always different. Premier Foods Ltd., (2007) EWHC 3134 (Ch) The question of what a word means in its context within the Act is a question of legal interpretation and, therefore, of law. The Court is required to arrive at the legal meaning of the term. If the word is not a term of art, it must be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning as a word in the English language and the context in which it has to be construed; that is to say, the Court is to interpret it as a man who speaks English and understands English correctly, but not pedantically, would interpret it. Premier Foods Ltd., (2007) EWHC 3134 (Ch) Benyon on Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edition, page 945 to 956; Brutus v. Cozens, (1973) AC 854 The Court, in determining what is the true meaning of a particular word used in a Statute which it has to construe, has to ascertain in what sense the word has been used: all the help the Court can derive from dictionaries in such a case is, in case of doubt, to ascertain that the meaning, which it comes to the conclusion ought to be attributed to the word, is one which may properly be given to it". Mills v. Cannon Brewing Co. Ltd., (1920) 2 Ch 38 at pp 44, 45, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v. Zest Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd., (1949) HCA 61 : (1949) 79 CLR 166.

73. The Legislature, in enacting Sections and Schedules, is not using words which were applied to any particular science or art and, therefore, the words used are to be construed as they are understood in common language. Commissioner, Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. Prayag Chemical Works, (1970) 25 STC 85 While interpreting the words in the Schedule, its language should not be strained; and it is only the meaning, which is attributed to the disputed word in commercial parlance, which should be given to it. Scientific and Glass Laboratories v. The State of Gujarat, (1974) 34 STC 418 Sales Tax Commissioner v. S. N. Bros., (1973) 31 STC 302 (SC) : AIR 1973 SC 78 There is no fixed test for classification of a taxable commodity. (Wockhardt Life Sciences Ltd. (supra), A. Nagaraju Bros. v. State of A.P., 1994 Supp (3) SCC 122 Whether a particular article will fall within a particular Entry or not has to be decided on the basis of tangible material or evidence to determine how such an article is understood in ''common parlance'' or in the ''commercial world'' or in the ''trade circle'' or in its popular sense meaning. It is they who are concerned with it, and it is the sense in which they understand it, that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention, when the statute was enacted. The combined factors that are required to be taken note of, for the purpose of classification of the goods, are the composition, the product literature, the label the character of the product and functional utility and predominant or primary use of the commodity which is being classified. (Wockhardt Life Sciences Ltd. (supra) D.C.M. v. State of Rajasthan, (1980) 4 SCC 71.

74. The words, used in a law imposing a tax, should be construed in the same way in which they are understood in ordinary parlance in the area in which the law is in force. Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. CST, (1981) 3 SCC 542 The words or expressions must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. It is they who are concerned with it, and it is the sense in which they understand it that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention when the statute was enacted. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 1980 (6) E.L.T. 383 (SC); Porritts & Spencer (Asia) Ltd v. State of Haryana, 42 STC 435 : (AIR 1979 SC 300).

75. We must give the word its ordinary meaning, and must ask what view would be taken by the ordinary man in the street, who had been informed as we have been informed." Shortly put, the only issue is whether such a man in the street would regard this product as a pesticide or an insecticide. Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Ferrero UK Ltd., (1997) STC 881 at 884 , United Biscuits (UK) Ltd. v. The Commissioners of Customs and Excise, (2004) UK V 18596 Technical and scientific tests offer guidance only within limits. Once the articles are in circulation and come to be described and known in common parlance, then there is no difficulty for statutory classification under a particular entry. Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 597, M/s. Godrej Consumer Products Ltd.

76. In Bombay Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court held that disinfectant fluids used in bathrooms, gutters, for floor cleaning, etc., capable of killing bacteria are understood in commercial parlance as insecticides and classified accordingly. It observed:-

"Each of the words insecticides, pesticides, fungicides or weedicides are understood both in the technical and common parlance as having broad meaning. Therefore, if any goods or items satisfy the test of being covered in either of the expression, then it is entitled to exemption. The broad and basic characteristic for exemption under the notification is that the goods must have the property of killing germs and bacteria insects or pest and it should be understood in the common parlance as well as being covered in one of the broad categories mentioned in the notification. Since the goods produced by the appellant are capable of killing bacteria and fungi which too, is covered in the expressions ''pesticide'' and ''fungicide'' there appears no reason to exclude the goods from the aforesaid notification."

78. As noted hereinabove, the composition of the subject goods contains a very small portion of "insecticide" as its active ingredient. The product literature and the label classify the subject goods as "household insecticide". When a consumer purchases these products he does not ask for a pesticide or an insecticide but asks for the product by its brand name as it is a household insecticide used to kill household insects and pests. People in the trade, i.e the persons who sell the goods in the market and those who purchase it, would ask for pesticides and insecticides when they require them as agricultural inputs or for plant protection. Even, on application of the "common parlance test", the subject goods, which are all "household insecticides", would not fall within the ambit of "pesticides and insecticides" under Entry 20 of the IV Schedule to the VAT Act.

VIII. Certification By Government Agencies : Its Effect:

79. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the Central Insecticide Board, after carrying out the required tests of safety, efficacy and utility of the product, issues a certificate to the applicant; in the certificate issued to the Petitioner, the subject goods are described as ''household insecticides''; the Central Insecticide Board is the apex body regulating production, storage and disposal of insecticides; the finding of the expert body, that the impugned goods are insecticides, is sacrosanct; a government agency, called the Haffkine Institute, has confirmed that, as per the mortality test conducted by it, HIT aerosol and HIT chalk have cent percent mortality effect (killing effect on mosquitoes, flies, ants, etc); and the tests of bio-efficacy were conducted as a pre condition for obtaining the certificate from the Central Insecticides Board.

80. In State of Haryana v. Anil Pesticides Limited, (2003) 132 STC 29 the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that, where the disputes are highly technical in nature, and the court does not possess the requisite expertise to determine whether the items manufactured by the company are "chemicals" as alleged by it, or "pesticides" as claimed by the department, it has necessarily to depend on technical opinion in such matters.

81. The case on hand does not, however, present any such difficulty. The certificate issued to the petitioners is by the Central Insecticides Board, a body constituted under the Insecticides Act to regulate the manufacture, sale, distribution and use of insecticides. As noted hereinabove, the Insecticides Act brings all kinds of insecticides within its ambit with a view to ensure the safety of human beings and animals from the use of such insecticides. As a person who manufactures products, using any of the insecticides enumerated in the Schedule to the Insecticides Act, is required to be registered under the 1968 Act, the subject products were certified by the Board as "household insecticides". The Insecticides Act has itself made an exception of household insecticides, and has exempted it from the rigors of the Insecticides Act. The mere fact that it contains a very small portion of insecticides, would not make the subject products "pesticides and insecticides" falling within the ambit of Entry 20.

IX. Would The Interpretation Placed on Entry 78, Of Schedule I of The A.P.G.S.T. Act, Be Applicable To Entry 20 of Schedule IV of The A.P. VAT Act?

82. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the expression in item - 78 of Schedule I to the APGST Act, i.e "Pesticides, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, weedicides and other plant protection equipment and accessories thereof", was comprehensive enough, even according to the Commercial Tax Department, to include the subject goods; tax was, hitherto, being levied on the said goods under item 78 prior to the introduction of the VAT Act; the same has been reproduced verbatim in Entry 20 of Schedule IV to the AP VAT Act (w.e.f. 01.04.2005); consequently, the legal position prevailing under the APGST Act should continue to receive the same interpretation under the VAT Act also; the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, while interpreting the erstwhile Entry 78 of the First Schedule of APGST Act in Kumar Agencies, Nellore v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, 1990 (11) APSTJ 28 (STAT) held that the word ''and'' clearly indicates that the words ''plant protection'' do not qualify the earlier words "pesticides, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides or weedicides" but only qualifies the word ''equipment'', and ''Jet Mat'' falls within the expression ''insecticides'' as they are used for repelling or killing mosquitos in residential and nonresidential buildings; the said decision has been followed by the Tribunal in Amitha Agencies Hindupur v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2002) 34 APSTJ 17 (STAT) the contention that the Entry is only meant for agricultural production is contrary to the interpretation placed on Entry 78 of Schedule I to the APGST Act by the Tribunal in Kumar Agencies and Amitha Agencies; the legislature must be deemed to have known the pre-existing legal position, while enacting the VAT Act; the subject goods are, therefore, liable to be classified under Entry 20 of Schedule IV to the APVAT Act; the Commercial Tax Department was taxing the subject goods under item - 78 of Schedule I to the APGST Act upto 31.03.2005; they had accepted the returns filed by the petitioner, declaring the subject goods under Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the APVAT Act after 01.04.2005, without demur; and if the department did not dispute eligibility of the subject goods earlier, it is not open to them to now dispute the same.

83. In Kumar Agencies, the question which arose for consideration before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal was whether "Jet Mats", used in electric mosquito repellers, should be treated as Insecticides or as an unclassified item? The assessing authority had treated Jet Mats as an unclassified item. The appellate authority had held that "Jet Mat" was an insecticide, but only insecticides intended for plant protection fell under Item 78 of Schedule I of the APGST Act. The Tribunal held that the words ''other plant protection equipment and accessories thereof'' started with the word ''and''; this clearly indicated that the words "plant protection" therein did not qualify the earlier words "pesticides, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides or weedicides", but only qualified the word "equipment" weedicides are not plant protection equipment, but are chemicals used as suppressors of weeds and killers of weeds; the word ''insecticides'' is normally used to denote chemicals used in buildings for eradication of insects like cockroaches, flies, mosquitoes, ants, white-ants etc; plant protection insecticides are generally known by the word ''pesticides''; the Ministry of Agriculture, Directorate of Plant Protection, had specifically stated in its circular that "Allothrin 4", which is a chemical used in mosquito mats, is an "insecticide" and, therefore, they were unable to agree with the interpretation that though Jet Mats came under insecticides, as clarified by the Department of Agriculture, Directorate of Plant Protection, it did not fall under Item 78. The Tribunal held that Jet Mats fell under "insecticides" as they are used for repelling or killing Mosquitos from residential and non-residential buildings, and as the chemical is classified as an "insecticide" even by the Directorate of Plant Protection.

84. In Amitha Agencies, the question which arose for consideration before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal was whether ''Mosquito Repellents", sold by the appellants, were insecticides falling under Entry 78 of the 1st Schedule to APGST Act as contended by the appellants, or whether they were not covered by the Entry and were to be treated as unclassified goods. While reliance was placed on behalf of the assessee on the earlier order of the Tribunal in Kumar Agencies, and the judgment of the Madras High Court in Transelektra Domestic Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Porur Assessment Circle, Madras, (1993) 90 STC 436 the learned State Representative relied upon the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Sonic Electrochem Limited v. Sales Tax Officer, City Division, Ahmedabad, (1998) 111 STC 181 as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Sonic Electrochem Limited v. Sales Tax Officer, (1998) 111 STC 181

85. The Tribunal held that the judgments of the Gujarat High Court, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, related to the interpretation of entries contained in the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, and the same could not be imported while dealing with other Sales Tax Acts in other States; the interpretation placed by the Gujarat High Court and the Supreme Court were in the light of a separate and specific entry dealing with mosquito repellents; in the APGST Act there was no such separate entry dealing with mosquito repellents, during the relevant assessment years; a specific entry was introduced for "mosquito repellents", as Entry 203 of the 1st Schedule to APGST Act, only w.e.f. 1.1.2000; in the absence of a specific entry for mosquito repellents, the question which arose for consideration was whether mosquito repellents fell within the Entry dealing with insecticides; insecticides may be sold in the form of powder, liquid to be spread or sprayed or they may be manufactured in the shape of coils and mats, the use of which has the effect of repelling or killing insects like mosquitos; in the absence of a specific entry dealing with mosquito repellents, the articles dealt with by the assessees should be considered as nothing but insecticides falling under Entry 78 of Schedule I, and not as unclassified goods; in Transelektra Domestic Products P Ltd., the Kerala High Court was dealing with mosquito repellents manufactured by the dealer in the name of "Good Knight" and "Banish" in support of its decision that, in the absence of a specific entry, mosquito repellent should be classified as insecticides, the Kerala High Court referred to the relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in Sonic Electrochem Ltd. that "Jet Mat" had, as one of its constituents, "d-Allathrin 4%", and the qualities of an insecticide; it not only repelled mosquitos but was also capable of killing them, but in view of the most specific entry "mosquito repellent" in the Schedule, it could be classified only under that entry; and in the absence of a specific entry, during the relevant assessment years, mosquito repellents fell under classified insecticides covered by Entry 78 of the 1st Schedule to the APGST Act.

86. Where the legislature uses in an Act a legal term which has received judicial interpretation, it must be assumed that the term is used in the sense in which it has been judicially interpreted unless a contrary intention appears. (Craies on ''Statute Law''; Dewan Brothers v. Central Bank of India, (AIR 1976 SC 1503). Where the Legislature uses an expression bearing a well-known legal connotation, it must be presumed to have used the said expression in the sense in which it has been so understood. Banarsi Debi v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1964 SC 1742 : (1964) 7 SCR 539 Where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear judicial interpretation, the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar context, must be construed so that that word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has been previously assigned to it. Barras v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. Ltd., 1933 AC 402 at p. 411 Banarsi Debi, AIR 1964 SC 1742 : (1964) 7 SCR 539 Dewan Brothers, AIR 1976 SC 1503.

87. It is true that ordinarily the department, having accepted the principles laid down in the earlier case, cannot be heard to take a contra stand in subsequent cases Commissioner of Central Excise., Hyderabad-I, v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd, 2010 (259) ELT 673 (AP) It is also well settled that an Entry in a tax statute should be interpreted as at the relevant date on which it falls to be applied, giving the words its natural meaning without recourse to antecedent previous legislation. (Willsons Solicitors L.L.P.).

88. While this Court would, ordinarily, not permit the department to agitate the same issue repeatedly, and may have non-suited them as they have implemented the earlier orders of the Tribunal, we are satisfied that the conclusion of the Tribunal, in the aforesaid judgments, suffers from a serious infirmity, and since the earlier decision of the Tribunal is sought to be relied upon in construing Entry 20, it is necessary for us to revisit the issue and consider the ambit of Entry 78 and 78-A of the first Schedule to the APGST Act, in examining the scope of Entry 20 and 100 (140) of Schedule IV of the VAT Act. Further the scope of Entry 20 has been considered by the VAT Appellate Tribunal in the orders under revision, and it is the assessee which has questioned it by way of a revision before this Court. As the view taken by the Tribunal in the present case is at variance with the earlier decisions of the Tribunal in Kumar Agencies and Amitha Agencies, it is also necessary for this Court to decide this issue in the light of the conflicting opinions of the Tribunal.

89. While Entry 78 of Schedule I of the APGST Act (which is similar to the earlier part of Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the A.P. VAT Act) was considered by the Tribunal in Kumar Agencies and Amitha Agencies, the scope of Entry 78-A of the I Schedule, (similar to Entry 100 (140) of the IV Schedule to the A.P. VAT Act) and its inter-play with Entry 78 was not examined. Entry 78 of the 1st Schedule to the APGST Act related to:-

"pesticides, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, weedicides and other plant protection equipment and accessories thereof;

"pesticides concentrate or technical grade pesticides used by any registered manufacturer in the State for manufacture of formulated pesticides".

91. In both Kumar Agencies and Amitha Agencies, the Tribunal failed to consider the scope of Entry 78-A of Schedule I of the APGST Act nor was the said Entry read or understood in the light of Entry 78 thereof. In construing a provision in a statute regard may be had to the other provisions of the Statute. (Attorney-General v. Brown, (1920) 1 K.B.773). For the purpose of construing any enactment, it is right to look not only at the provision immediately under construction, but at any others found in connection with it, which may throw light upon it, and afford an indication that general words employed in it were not intended to be applied without some limitation. (Cox v. Hakes (1890) 15 App. Cas. 506, Jordan, (1976) 3 All ER 775.

X. Entry 100(140) of the IV Schedule - Its Scope:

92. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that reliance placed on Entry 100(140) of the IV Schedule is misplaced; the items covered under Entry 100(140) of the IV Schedule are technical grade insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, weedicides, and pesticides which are used as ''industrial inputs/chemicals'' for manufacture of pesticides, insecticides, etc; the STAT- Hyderabad, in Revathi Pulvarisers, Kurnool v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, (1988) 7 APSTJ 21 (STAT) as held that technical grade Methyl Parathion 80% solution is not a pesticide falling under item 78 of the First Schedule to the APGST Act; it is a chemical and cannot be used as a pesticide, and the ratio laid down in Anil Pesticides Ltd., is attracted; technical grade items, mentioned under Entry 100(140) of IV Schedule, cannot be used for agricultural purposes without undergoing a manufacturing process; and the items, covered under Entry 100(140), are only meant for industrial use.

93. Entry 100 of the IV Schedule relates to goods when sold as industrial inputs, and contains 235 sub-entries. It is only if all of them are sold as industrial inputs would they qualify to be taxed under this Entry. Entry 100(140) relates to technical grade insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, weedicides and pesticides, that too those used as industrial inputs to manufacture pesticides, insecticides etc. If all forms of insecticides are understood to fall within the ambit of Entry 20, it was unnecessary for the legislature to separately provide for these goods in Entry 100(140). As pesticides and insecticides, when used as industrial inputs, fall under Entry 100(140), the pesticides and insecticides referred to in Entry 20 can only be those used for plant protection, and not others.

94. It is only because technical grade insecticides and pesticides cannot be directly used for agricultural purposes would they not fall under Entry 20. The Legislature has, in its wisdom, provided for tax to be levied at the concessional rate of 4%/5% on technical grade insecticides and pesticides also, provided they are used as "industrial inputs/chemicals" for manufacture of pesticides and insecticides. While technical grade insecticides and pesticides used as inputs are brought within the ambit of Entry 100(140), the pesticides and insecticides, which are the outputs of such a process of manufacture, are brought within the ambit of Entry 20 provided they are used for plant protection. All other pesticides and insecticides (i.e other than those falling within Entry 20 and 100(140) of the IV Schedule) would only fall within the residuary entry in the V Schedule, in the absence of a specific Entry for such goods.

XI. Specific Entry Prevails Over The General Entry:

95. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that, when there is a specific entry covering the subject goods, they cannot be subjected to tax under the residuary entry; and since the competing entry is a residuary entry, the subject goods must be brought within the ambit of Entry 20 of the IV Schedule.

96. It is well settled that, unless the department can establish that the goods in question can, by no conceivable process of reasoning, be brought under any of the specific items mentioned in the Schedule, resort cannot be had to the residuary item. (Indian Metals & Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1991 (51) E.L.T. 165 (S.C) Bharat Forge & Press Industries (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1990 (45) E.L.T. 525 (SC) Only such goods, as cannot be brought under the various specific entries, should be attempted to be brought under the residuary entry. In other words, unless the department can establish that the goods in question can, by no conceivable process of reasoning, be brought under any of the Entries, resort cannot be had to the residuary item. (Bharat Forge & Press Industries (P) Ltd., 1990 (45) E.L.T. 525 (SC). A residuary entry can be taken refuge of only in the absence of a specific entry; that is to say, the latter will always prevail over the former. (Wockhardt Life Sciences Ltd. CCE v. Jayant Oil Mills (P) Ltd, (1989) 3 SCC 343, HPL Chemicals v. CCE, (2006) 5 SCC 208; Western India Plywoods v. Collector of Customs, (2005) 12 SCC 731, Carrier Aircon, 2006 (7) SCJ 448 : (2006) 5 SCC 596. A commodity cannot be classified in a residuary entry, in the presence of a specific entry, even if such specific entry requires the product to be understood in the technical sense. (Wockhardt Life Sciences Ltd.), Akbar Badrudin Giwani v. Collector of Customs, (1990) 2 SCC 203, Commissioner of Customs v. G.C. Jain, (2011) 12 SCC 713. A specific entry would override a general entry. Resort should be had to the residuary entry only when a liberal construction by the specific heading cannot cover the goods in question. (State of Maharashtra v. Bradma of India Ltd, (2005) 140 STC 17 (SC), CCE v. Wood Craft Products Limited, (1995) 3 SCC 454.

97. In Bradma of India Ltd., (2005) 140 STC 17 (SC) the Supreme Court, while dealing with the classification of ''Electronic Cash Register'' under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, held that a specific entry would override the general entry; and resort should be had to the residuary heading only when a liberal construction by the specific heading cannot cover the goods in question. In Bharat Forge and Press Industries (P) Ltd. the Supreme Court held that "the question before it was whether the Department was right in claiming that the items in question are dutiable under tariff entry No.68; this was the residuary entry, and only such goods as could not be brought under the various specific entries in the tariff should be attempted to be brought under the residuary entry; in other words, unless the department can establish that the goods in question can, by no conceivable process of reasoning, be brought under any of the tariff items, resort cannot be had to the residuary item".

98. In Wockhardt Life Sciences Ltd. the Supreme Court considered the issue of classification of "Povidone Iodine Cleaning Solution" used by surgeons for the purpose of cleaning or degerming their hands and scrubbing the surface of the skin of the patient in that portion which is operated upon to prevent infection or disease. The assessee claimed the classification of the product as medicament under chapter sub-heading 3003 which is a specific entry, whereas the revenue contended that, as the product in question was primarily used as detergents/cleansing preparation, they cannot be brought under the definition of medicaments and sought classification under chapter sub-heading 3402.90 which is a residuary entry. The Supreme Court held that "a commodity cannot be classified in a residuary entry, in the presence of a specific entry, even if such specific entry requires the product to be understood in the technical sense. A residuary entry can be taken refuge of only in the absence of a specific entry; that is to say, the latter will always prevails over the former".

99. The Supreme Court, in Dunlop India Ltd. & Madras Rubber Factory Ltd. v. Union of India, 1983 (13) ELT 1566 (SC) held that "when an article has, by all standards, a reasonable claim to be classified under an enumerated item in the Tariff Schedule, it will be against the very principle of classification to deny it the parentage and consign it to an orphanage of the residuary clause. The question of competition between two rival classification will, however, stand on a different footing".

100. It is no doubt true that in case of competing entries, one falling under the specified items mentioned in the Schedules and the other a residuary entry, the burden is on the revenue to show that the goods can, by no conceivable process of reasoning, be brought within the specific Entry. As noted hereinabove, it is only if all kinds of pesticides and insecticides are held to fall within the ambit of Entry 20, can the subject goods, which are household insecticides, be said to fall within the said Entry. Such a construction would then render Entry 100 (140) redundant, as technical grade pesticides which are classified under Entry 100(140) would also fall within Entry 20. The only manner in which these two entries can be reconciled is if pesticides and insecticides used for plant protection are alone construed as falling within Entry 20, and technical grade insecticides and pesticides alone as falling within the scope of Entry 100(140). In such an event "household insecticides", which are neither used for plant protection nor do they constitute technical grade pesticides and insecticides used as industrial inputs for manufacture of pesticides and insecticides, would not fall either under Entry 20 or 100(140) of the IV Schedule to the VAT Act. They would, therefore, be taxable at the revenue neutral rate of 12.5%/14.5% treating them as falling within the residuary items in Schedule V of the VAT Act.

XII. Applicability And Effect Of Competing Entries In The Same/Different Schedules Of A Tax Statute:

101. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the scope of competing Entries (Entry 1 of Schedule 1, Entry 1 of Schedule IV and Entry 20 of Schedule IV) cannot be examined for testing the appropriate classification of the equipment; the submission of the revenue does not disclose any rationality in taxing goods under Entry 1 of Schedule IV, and the goods under Entry 20 of Schedule IV, at the same rate; Entry 226 of the First Schedule to the APGST Act dealt with Agricultural implements, and was introduced with effect from 01.01.2000; prior thereto there was no entry in the First Schedule which dealt with ''agricultural implements''; however, the phrase "Plant Protection Equipment" finds mention in Entry 78 i.e. with effect from 27.04.1970; and, if the contention of the Revenue is accepted, then agricultural equipment, sought to be taxed under Entry 20 of Schedule IV, would be sufficient to cover Entry 1 of Schedule IV also.

102. It is true that Entry 226 of the First Schedule to the APGST Act, introduced with effect from 01.01.2000, read as under:

"Agricultural implements whether hand operated, animal drawn or power operated including post harvesting instruments and hand tools, sprayers and dusters (and parts and accessories thereof)."

104. It is evident from Entry 1 of the First Schedule and Entry 1 of the IV Schedule to the VAT Act, that Entry 20 covers only such physical equipment which are not covered by either of the aforesaid Entries. While the first part of Entry 20 relates to products i.e., goods used for plant protection, the second part deals with equipment & accessories meant for plant protection through which the goods, covered by the first part, are applied/used. Entry 20 brings within its ambit two different categories i.e., ''goods & equipment'' of the same ''genus''. The Entry has to be read in its entirety, and each word used therein has to be given meaning. No part of the Entry can be considered ''surplussage'' nor can the legislature be said to have used words in the Entry superfluously. The words ".....and other ..." in Entry 20 of Schedule IV do not take within its fold items under Entry 1 of Schedule I of the VAT Act & Entry 1 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act. Only "plant protection equipment", other than those mentioned in both Entry I of Schedule I and Entry I of Schedule IV, qualify to be assessed under Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act; and by no means are the words ".....and other ..." in Entry 20 a surplusage, as no statutory provision can be so read as to make any word used in an Entry redundant or inapposite surplussage.

105. Agricultural implements which fell within Entry 226 of the I Schedule to the APGST Act have now been divided between Entry I of Schedule I and Entry I of Schedule IV of the VAT Act. While hand operated or animal drawn agricultural implements in Entry 226 are now classified under Entry I of Schedule I of the VAT Act, power operated agriculture implements, which hitherto formed part of Entry 226 of the I Schedule, are now classified under Entry 1 of Schedule IV. "Plant protection equipment", which was classified within Entry 78 of the I Schedule to the APGST Act earlier, are now brought under Entry 20 of the IV Schedule to the VAT Act. Even under the APGST regime, "other plant protection equipment" were brought within a separate Entry (i.e., Entry 78) other than the entry relating to agricultural implements (i.e., Entry 226). The mere fact that both of them are in Schedule IV and are liable to tax at the same rate is of no consequence as "pesticides and insecticides used for plant protection" and "technical grade pesticides and insecticides" also fall within Schedule IV albeit in two separate entries (Entry 20 and Entry 100 (140)).

XIII. Doctrine Of Noscitur A Sociis And Ejusdem Generis:

106. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the principle of "noscitur a sociis" cannot be applied to artificially curtail the scope of Entry 20 only to items used for agricultural/horticultural purposes; this legal maxim is merely an aid to interpretation, and is applied where a particular piece of legislation is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one interpretation; the language employed in Entry 20 is capable of only one interpretation; as Entry 20 enumerates various items that are mutually exclusive, each term must be given its own meaning and construed independently; the maxim "noscitur a sociis" is not applicable as the terms "pesticides" and "insecticides" are terms of wide import that have been deliberately used to include insecticides and pesticides of all forms including those used for household purposes; this maxim is not applicable in cases where wider words are deliberately used to broaden the scope of the word/phrase; if the genus of "Plant Associates" is applied to the former three items then, because of "Herbicide" and "Weedicide", they would include "plant killers" and "plant protection" products; such an interpretation would also not have a common genus amongst all the items; accepting the contention of the department would mean that the suggested common genus of "Plant Associates" would cover both ''plant protectors'' and ''plant killers'', for it is only then can the common genus of "Plant Associates" be attributed to all the five items in the Entry; it would then mean that "herbicide" and "weedicide" would cover both plant protectors and plant killers; the preceding three items i.e pesticides, insecticides and fungicides would only cover plant protectors; even to apply the rule of Noscitur a Sociis, there must be a common genus to all the items in the entry; if the common genus of "Plant Associates" is applied to the Entry, "herbicide" and "weedicide" would, in effect, cover two categories of products i.e. plant killers and plant protectors; in effect the only common genus would again be of plant protectors from pesticides till weedicides; all the five items in the first part of the entry are capable of covering not only plant protectors but also non-plant protectors; attributing a common genus of plant protection or plant associates would not be justified on a true interpretation of Entry 20; the doctrine of ejusdem generis has no application; the terms ''insecticides and pesticides'', and the term ''plant protection equipment'', belong to two different categories of products; insecticides and pesticides are not equipment; not just the species, but the genus of the Entry itself is different i.e. while insecticides, etc. belong to one genus, ''plant protection equipment'' belong to an entirely different genus; the words ''plant protection'' cannot be read separately from ''equipment''; they form one phrase as a whole to classify products of a distinct genus i.e. ''plant protection equipment''; if insecticides on the one hand, and plant protection equipment on the other, are not of the same genus or category, neither can influence the interpretation of the other; if the preceding words do not constitute mere specifications of a genus, but constitute description of a complete genus, the rule of ejusdem generis has no application; insecticides and pesticides are not equipment; as there is no ambiguity in the language employed in Entry 20, the suggested rule of Ejusdem Generis has no application; the doctrine of ejusdem generis is not an inviolable rule of law; it can be applied only in the absence of an indication to the contrary; and it cannot be applied when the preceding words and the general words constitute description of two categories, or the general words themselves constitute description of a distinct category.

107. In Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd v. Globe Hi-Fabs Ltd, (2015) 5 SCC 718 while interpreting a clause of an agreement providing that no interest shall be payable on "earnest money, security deposit or on any money due to the contractor by employer", the Supreme Court held that "in the present case we noticed that the clause barring interest is very widely worded. It uses the words "any amount due to the contractor by the employer". In our opinion, these words cannot be read as ejusdem generis along with the earlier words "earnest money" or "security deposit". Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that no interest is payable for pre-award period.

108. Entries, which are descriptive of the category of goods, have certain characteristics. Therefore, when a question arises whether a particular good is covered in any category or not, it has to be examined if it satisfies the characteristic which go to make it a good of that category, whether in trade circle it is understood as such, and if it is a good of a technical nature then whether technically it falls in the one or the other category. Once it is found that a particular good satisfies the test, then the issue which would arise for consideration is whether it should be construed broadly or narrowly. (Bombay Chemical Pvt. Ltd.). It is while examining the question whether the Entry should be read broadly or narrowly that the rules of Noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generic should be borne in mind.

109. The Rule ''Noscitur a sociis'', according to Maxwell, means that where two or more words which are susceptible of analogus meaning are coupled together they are understood to be used in their cognate sence. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610; Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd v. Shankarprasad, (1999) 6 SCC 275, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd, (2015) 5 SCC 718, Brindavan Bangles Stores v. Asst. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, (2000) 1 SCC 674, Nositur a Sociis means that when two words are capable of being analogously defined, then they take colour from each other. The term ejusdem generis, a facet of Nositur a Sociis, means that the general words following certain specific words would take colour from the specific words. Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P. v. M/s. Kartos International, Judgment in Civil Appeal Nos.2983-2988 of 2011 dated 06.04.2011 Entries in the Schedules of Sales Tax statutes list some articles separately, and some articles are grouped entry draws colour from the other words therein. This is the principle of noscitur a socis. Paradeep Aggarbatti, Ludhiana v. State of Punjab, (1997) 96 ELT 219, M/s. Kartos International, (Judgment in Civil Appeal Nos.2983-2988 of 2011 dated 06.04.2011)

110. In examining the question as to what is the meaning of words occurring in an entry in the Schedules to a sales tax enactment, the Court should not only look at the words, but should also look at the context, the collection and the object of such words, relating to such a matter and interpret the meaning, according to what would appear to be the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under such circumstances. A word is known by the company it keeps. (Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. K.A. Latheef, (1988) 69 STC 29 (Kerala DB), Rein v. Lane, 36 LJQB 81, Varkey v. Agricultural Incometax and Rural Sales Tax Officer, [1954] 5 STC 348 (T-C) and M.K. Ranganathan, (1955) 2 SCR 374 : AIR 1955 SC 604. The rule of construction noscitur a sociis is that the meaning of each of the words is to be understood by the company it keeps. It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act with reference to the words found in immediate connection with them. The rule is explained differently: "that meaning of doubtful words may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it". (Ahmedabad (P) Primary Teachers'' Assn. v. Administrative Officer, (2004) 1 SCC 755 : AIR 2004 SC 1426 Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 8th Edn.).

111. It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act with reference to words found in immediate connection with them. (M.K. Ranganathan (supra), Angus Robertson v. George Day, (1879) 5 AC 63. When two or more words, which are susceptible of analogous meaning, are coupled together noscuntur a sociis, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, i.e the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general". (M.K. Ranganathan; Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Tenth Edition, p'' 332).

112. The rule of "nositur a sociis" cannot, however, prevail where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear, that this rule of construction can be usefully applied; it can also be applied where the meaning of the words of wider import is doubtful; but where the object of the legislature in using wider words is clear and free from ambiguity, this rule of construction cannot be pressed into service. (Hospital Mazdoor Sabha; Brindavan Bangle Stores, (2000) 1 SCC 674.

113. The Latin words "ejusdem generic" (of the same kind or nature) are attached to a principle of construction whereby wide words associated in the text with more limited words are taken to be restricted by implication to matters of the same limited character. The doctrine of ejusdem generis applies when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or category; (iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; and (iv) there is no indication of a different legislative intent. General words must ordinarily bear their natural and larger meaning, and need not be confined "ejusdem generis" to things previously enumerated unless the language of the statute spells out an intention to that effect. (GMR Energy Limited, M/s. Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 458 : AIR 1989 SC 1019.

114. The general expression has to be read to comprehend things of the same kind as those referred to by the preceding specific things constituting a genus, unless of course from the language of the statute it can be inferred that the general words were not intended to be so limited and no absurdity or unintended and unforeseen complication is likely to result if they are allowed to take their natural meaning. Unless there is a genus which can be comprehended from the preceding words, there can be no question of invoking this rule. Nor can this rule have any application where the general words precede specific words. Asstt. C.C.E. v. Ramdev Tobacco Company, [AIR 1991 SC 506] Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar v. Union of India, (1969) 3 SCC 99 : AIR 1970 SC 540, GMR Energy Limited (supra). The preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class. GMR Energy Limited (supra); Statutory Interpretation Rupert Cross (p.116); Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. The Collector of Excise, Tripura, AIR 1972 SC 1863, UPSEB v. Hari Shankar, (1978) 4 SCC 16 : AIR 1979 SC 65.

115. For the ejusdem generis principle to apply there must be sufficient indication of a category that can properly be described as a class or genus, even though not specified as such in the enactment. (Francis Bennion : Statutory Construction [pgs 830- 831). ''Unless you can find a category'' ''there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine''. The only test is whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category. This means that the specified things must possess some common and dominant feature. (S.S. Magnhild v. Mclntyre Bros. & Co., (1920) 3 KB 321.

116. To invoke the application of the ejusdem generis rule, there must be a distinct genus or category running through the bodies already named. The specific words must apply not to different objects of a widely differing character but to something which can be called a class or kind of objects. Unless there is a genus or category, there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine. (Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857, Maxwell : ''Interpretation of Statutes''; United Town Electric Co., Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Newfoundland, (1939) 1 ALLER 423 (PC) The nature of the special words and the general words must be considered before the rule is applied. Jagdish Chander Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd, AIR 1964 SC 1882 : (1964) 8 SCR 50 The inclusion of several articles under the same heading does not mean that they all constitute one commodity when it is apparent that a particular article belongs to a distinct category. Sukhu Ram Tamrakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1978) 41 STC 376.

117. It is a requisite that there must be a distinct genus, which must comprise more than one species, before this rule can be applied. (State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, AIR 1955 SC 810 Interpretation ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis need not always be made when words showing particular classes are followed by general words. Before the general words can be so interpreted there must be a genus constituted or a category disclosed with reference to which the general words can and are intended to be restricted. (Jagdish Chander Gupta, AIR 1964 SC 1882 : (1964) 8 SCR 50.)

118. The construction placed by the petitioners, on Entry 20 of Schedule IV, ignores the "Noscitur a sociis" and "Ejusdem Generis" principles. If the principle "Noscitor a sociis", is applied, the word ''insecticide'' cannot be considered in isolation, ignoring the other words used in Entry 20 which form part of the same genus, all of which are connected with plant protection. The words ''Insecticide'' would get its color from the associated words which are all chemicals, among others, to be used for plant protection as generally understood in common parlance, and not the technical usage of the commercialized products sold by the petitioners. The words ''plant protection'' add colour to both the first and the second limb of Entry 20. If the doctrine of Noscitor-a-sociis is applied to the first part, and the rule of ''Ejusdem Generis'' to the second, plant protection would be the ''genus'', ''equipment and accessories thereof'', being general words, would be restricted by the specific words "plant protection". The artificial distinction sought to be made between plant protectors and plant killers necessitates rejection, as the goods referred to in sales tax enactments must be understood in its commercial sense, as those involved in the trade understand it, and not as understood by agricultural scientists in its technical sense. Applying the common parlance test it is evident that the subject goods, which are household insecticides and pesticides, are not covered under Entry 20 of the IV Schedule to the VAT Act.

119. The words "pesticides", insecticides", "fungicides", "herbicides" and "weedicides", in the first limb of Entry 20, are susceptible of analogous meaning, and are compiled together so that they are understood as being used in their cognate sense. "Pesticides" and "insecticides" are used to control pests and insects, "herbicides" and weedicides" to kill unwanted plants especially weeds, and "fungicides" are used to inhibit or kill the growth of fungi. These chemicals prevent destruction or damage to crops/plants, and are mainly "pesticides", "insecticides" and "fungicides" is to be restricted to a sense analogous to "herbicides" and "weedicides" which are less general. When each of these words take colour from each other, it is evident that the scope of Entry 20 is restricted to these chemicals when they are used for plant protection alone, and not when it is used for other purposes. The common genus is "plant protection" and each of these items are species of plant protectors.

120. "Pesticides, Insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, weedicides", in the first part of Entry 20, are goods basically intended for plant protection/connected with plant protection. While herbicides and weedicides are indisputably related/connected with plants, and are used for their growth and protection, "pesticide" and "insecticide", which are words used along with herbicides, weedicides and fungicides, also form part of the same group of chemicals meant for plant protection. The genus of all these products, as one ''group'', is plant protection, growth and regulation. Applying the rules of "noscitur a sociis" and ejusdem generics" it is evident that the "pesticides" and "insecticides" referred to in Entry 20 of Schedule IV are those used for plant protection, and do not bring within its ambit the subject goods which are "household insecticides".

121. Entry 1 of Schedule 1 of the Vat Act relates to manually operated or animal driven agricultural implements. Entry 1 of Schedule IV relates to agricultural implements not manually operated and not driven by animals. Plant protection equipment, other than those referred to in Entry 1 of Schedule 1 and Entry 1 of Schedule IV, are placed in Entry 20 of Schedule IV along with the chemicals used for plant protection. The basis, underlying both the first and second limb of Entry 20, is "plant protection" and while the first limb refers to the chemicals used for plant protection, the second limb refers to the equipment used for plant protection, with the word "other" denoting equipment other than those mentioned in Entry 1 of Schedule I and Entry I of Schedule IV of the VAT Act. The items in the first limb of Entry 20 constitute a common category in that they are all chemicals used for plant protection.

122. Accepting the submission, urged on behalf of the petitioners, that "pesticides" and "insecticides" constitute one genus and "plant protection equipment" a completely different genus would render the word "and other" used in Entry 20 between the words "weedicides" and "plant protection equipment" redundant, which as held hereinabove is impermissible. The object of placing the words "plant protection equipment" in Entry 20 is only because the preceding items in the said Entry, including "pesticides" and "insecticides" relate only to those used for plant protection, and none else.

123. Although the doctrine of ejusdem generis is to be applied with caution, where in a legislative enactment there are strong reasons (a) from the history and circumstances connected with its passing, (b) from the structure of the Act itself, to indicate the real meaning of the Legislature, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is one which not only can, but ought to, be applied. Attorney-General v. Brown, (1920) 1 K.B. 773 The statement of objects and reasons of Act 9 of 1970 in so far as it related to Entry 78 of Schedule I of the APGST Act, the white paper on VAT, and the very structure of Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act require application of the ejusdem genus rule, and when so applied it is evident that the "insecticides" and "pesticides" used in Entry 20 of Schedule IV relate only to those used for plant protection.

XIV. Is Entry 20 A Combined Entry:

124. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the terms ''insecticides and pesticides'', and the term ''plant protection equipment'', belong to different categories of products; insecticides and pesticides are not equipment; the interpretation placed by the revenue, in effect, restricts the scope of the entire Entry; the contention that the scope of the items, mentioned in the said entry, are restricted only for agricultural purposes is not supported by any reasoning except referring to the words ''plant protection equipment''; the various items, enumerated in the Entry, are of wide import and there is no ambiguity in the language employed therein; and inclusion of several articles, under the same heading, does not mean that they all constitute one commodity when it is apparent that a particular article belongs to a distinct category.

125. The mere fact that certain articles are mentioned under the same heading in a statute does not automatically mean that they all constitute one commodity. The inclusion of several articles under the same heading may also be for reasons other than that the articles constitute one and the same thing. Sukhu Ram Tamrakar, (1978) 41 STC 376, Haji Abdul Shakoor v. State of Madras, (1964) 15 STC 719 : (AIR 1964 SC 1729). In the present case, however, all the items in the first limb of Entry 20, are analogous to each other, and their purpose is to provide plant protection. Entry 20 is a combined Entry which covers items viz., ''pesticides'', ''insecticides'', ''fungicides'', ''weedicides'' and ''plant protection equipment'' used for agricultural purposes. While the second part of Entry 20 deals with ''Plant Protection Equipment and Accessories thereof'', the first part of the Entry basically deals with products which gets consumed in the process of their application, and are joined together with products of a physical nature which are used for plant protection ie they are not consumed in the process, and are physically available for multiple uses. The goods mentioned in the first part of the Entry are applied by the use of the goods referred to in the second part. The term ''equipment and accessories'' are general words, and are restricted by the specific words ''plant protection''. Not all ''equipment'', which are of general use, are covered under Entry 20. It is only those equipment, used or intended for the use of plant protection, which are covered thereunder. The term ''plant protection'' is the ''genus'' in Entry 20, and covers not only equipment and its accessories which are physical goods meant for plant protection, but also the goods, referred to in the first part of Entry 20, which are consumables used for plant protection.

XV. Should The Meaning of Words, Used In An Entry In A Schedule To A Tax Statute, Be Ascertained In The Light of Development of Science & Technology?

126. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that once the goods, manufactured by the assessee, are held to be "insecticides", there is no justification in excluding them from the term "pesticides" with development of science and technology, a continually expanding content and a new kind of pesticide/insecticide may be found; a Statute is to be understood as a dynamic document which contemplates changes in technological and socio-economic conditions; the House of Lords, in Comdel Commodities Ltd., has held that when a change in the social conditions produces a novel situation, which was not in contemplation at the time when the statute was first enacted, there can be no apriori assumption that the enactment does not apply to the new circumstances; and if the language of the enactment is wide enough, to extend to those circumstances, there is no reason why it should not apply in the instant case.

127. In Porritts & Spencers (Asia) Ltd., the Supreme Court, while considering the question whether ''dry felts'' fell within the category of "all varieties of cotton, woolen or silken textiles" specified in Item 30 of Schedule ''B'' to the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, held:-

".... there may be wide ranging varieties of woven fabric and they may go on multiplying and proliferating with new developments in sciences and technology and inventions of new methods, materials and techniques but nonetheless they would all be textiles. It is true that our minds are conditioned by old antiquated notions of what are textiles and, therefore, it may sound a little strange to regard "dryer felts" as "textiles": But it must be remembered that the concept of "textiles" is not a static concept. It has, having regard to newly developing materials, methods, techniques and processes, a continually expanding content and new kinds of fabric may be invented which may legitimately, without doing any violence to the language, be regarded as "textiles"...."

(emphasis supplied)

128. In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. La Bela Products, (1985) 59 STC 221 (Bom) the Bombay High Court opined that "the connotation of the term "kumkum" has been enlarged with the passage of time; Entries in a Schedule to a Sales Tax Act must be interpreted in the light of "current conditions" and, thereby, "auto-sticking bindies", sold under the name of "beauty spots", more appropriately fell within the Entry in respect of ''kumkum'', and not under the Entry in respect of toilet articles. The Orissa High Court, in Sonic Electrochem (P) Ltd., observed that pesticides have wide usage apart from agriculture; pests includes ''insects''; and any material which is used as an insect killer would come within the ambit of ''pesticide''.

129. In interpreting statutes, the primary object of which is to raise revenue and for which purpose various products are differently classified, resort should not be had to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms and expressions used, but to their popular meaning, ie the meaning attached to them by those using the product. Scientific and technical meanings should not be applied if they run counter to how the product is understood in popular parlance. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Nagpur, (1996) 9 SCC 402 The usual method would be to provide the popular meaning or the meaning attached to the products by those who deal in them i.e in their commercial sense. Functional utility, and predominant use, play an important role in determining the classification of taxable goods. The dictionary meaning, the technical meaning and the meaning from users'' point of view or popular meaning would all furnish a clue to understand the classification of a product. Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd v. State of A.P., (2012) 56 VST 1 Scientific and Glass Laboratories, (1974) 34 STC 418, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, [1967] 19 STC. 469 (SC) Prayag Chemical Works, (1970) 25 STC 85. The words, used in Entries in sales tax legislations, must be construed as understood in common parlance. The words used by the legislature must be given their popular sense meaning "that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it." Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue Taxes, Ernakulam v. G.S. Pai & Co., (1980) 45 STC 58.

130. Words, in a sales tax statute, must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance. If it has not been defined in the Act, and is a word of every day use, it must be construed in its popular sense. It is to be construed as understood in common language. Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Asstt. STO, AIR 1961 SC 1325 Craies on Statute Law, p. 153 (5th Edn.); Planters Nut Chocolate Co. Ltd. v. The King, (1952) 1 D.om. L.R. 385, Madhya Pradesh Pan Merchants'' Association, Santra Market, Nagpur v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (Sales Tax Department), (1956) 7 STC 99 Where a word has a scientific or technical meaning, and also an ordinary meaning according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense that the word must be held to have been used in a taxing Statute, unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed by the Legislature. The reason is that the Legislature does "not suppose our merchants to be naturalists, or geologists, or botanists". (Porritts & Spencer (Asia) Ltd.; Prayag Chemical Works. That word should be given the meaning attributed to it by people who daily deal with it as consumers or dealers in the market. The reason for this rule is that the Sales Tax Act concerns itself with commercial goods and, therefore, these commercial goods should be attributed with that meaning which is generally attributed to it in the market by the persons who deal with it daily. A purely scientific meaning, which is theoretical and is given from a scientific point of view, of a particular article would be of no help in ascertaining whether the article in question falls within the purview of a particular Entry. (Scientific and Glass Laboratories; Ramavatar Budhaiprasad, AIR 1961 SC 1325; Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, ([1967] 19 STC. 469 (SC).

131. The subject products, manufactured by the petitioners, would not be considered as ''insecticide'' in common parlance. These products are, admittedly, not used for agriculture/plant protection. They are not essential requisites for agricultural production. These products are therefore liable to be taxed at a higher rate, and not at the concessional rate @ 4 %/@ 5 %. While passage of time has no doubt resulted in new found uses of pesticides, insecticides, weedicides, fungicides and herbicides, what we are called upon to examine is whether the subject products fall within the ambit of an Entry in a Schedule to a Sales Tax enactment. As a Sales Tax enactment relates to levy of tax on commercial goods, the words used in an Entry in a Schedule to a Sales Tax Act must be given the meaning attributed to it in the market by persons dealing with them daily, and not in their technical or scientific sense. When construed in its popular sense, it is evident that the words "pesticides" and "insecticides" used in Entry 20 relate to chemicals used as inputs for agriculture or plant protection, and not to "household insecticides" used to kill household insects and pests.

XVI. Reasons For Exclusion of "Mosquito Repellents" From The Ambit of Entry 20:

132. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the subject goods cannot be construed as mosquito repellants; HIT CIK, HIT Rat and HIT Chalk pertain to rats and cockroaches, and other crawling insects; they are not used in relation to mosquitoes; HIT FIK is an insecticide as it is used as a flying insect killer i.e. its application pertains to all kind of flying insects, and not only to mosquitoes; HIT FIK contains d-Transallethrin, a poisonous substance that directly affects the nervous system of the flying insect thereby killing it almost immediately; the subject goods, especially HIT FIK, cannot be construed as a mosquito repellant; Entry 20 of Schedule IV specifically excludes ''mosquito repellants'' from its ambit; an Entry cannot exclude from its scope what is not included within its ambit; even the exclusion, i.e. ''mosquito repellents in any form'', in Entry 20 establishes that the legislature never intended to limit the scope of the Entry to insecticides, pesticides, etc used only for agricultural/horticulture purposes; the words ''in any form'' demonstrate that mosquito repellents used for household use alone fall outside the ambit of the said entry; if the intention of the Legislature was to limit the scope of Entry 20 only to goods used for agricultural/horticulture purposes, the words ''in any form'' would not have been used along with mosquito repellents; the contention that the legislature was conscious that mosquito repellents (which undisputably are used in households) were not insecticides, yet it thought that they should be excluded from the Entry is as absurd as exclusion of "paper and pencil" from insecticides; the specific exclusion of mosquito repellants shows that the intention of the legislature was not to restrict the scope of Entry 20 only to agriculture uses, but to extend it to domestic uses also; since Entry 20 specifically excludes goods which are otherwise covered within its purview, and the item ''mosquito repellants'' are used as household insecticides, it is incorrect to restrict the scope of the said Entry only for agricultural purposes; various legal fora, including this High Court, have held that ''mosquito repellants'' are insecticides, and have classified them within the ambit of the Entries covering ''pesticides'' or ''insecticides''; this Court in Godrej Hicare Ltd., held that, since there was no separate entry for "mosquito repellents" in the said Act at the relevant time, but a specific entry had been carved out in the Schedule with effect from 01.01.2000 as Entry 203, "mosquito repellents" should be treated as insecticides till 01.01.2000; the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad, while interpreting the erstwhile Entry 78 of the First Schedule to the APGST Act, in Kumar Agencies, held that ''Jet Mat'' falls within the expression ''insecticides'' as they are used for repelling or killing mosquitos from residential and non-residential buildings, and the chemical is classified as an insecticide even by the Directorate of Plant Protection; the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad, in Amitha Agencies following the decision in Kumar Agencies, held that "Mosquito Repellent" is an insecticide falling under Entry of the First Schedule to the APGST Act; and a similar view was taken in Transelectra Domestic Products Pvt. Ltd.

133. Learned Counsel for the petitioners would submit that the judgment in Sonic Electrochem is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as it dealt with the interpretation of a specific Entry which deals with mosquito repellants under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, and the Entry therein specifically dealt with ''jet mats'' i.e. mosquito repellant mats, whereas undisputedly the subject goods were different; in any event, the Supreme Court denied the benefit to ''Jet Mats'' on the ground that the same were commonly known and perceived by the market as mosquito repellant mats, and therefore the said goods were to be treated as mosquito repellants irrespective of their ability to kill mosquitoes; in the present case, the subject goods are not perceived by the market as ''mosquito repellants'', but as insect killers which, in turn, are only insecticides; except for CIK, which is meant for Cockroaches, all other products ie MIK, FIK, AIK, have multipurpose uses against cockroaches, flies, and mosquitoes; these products are meant for killing these insects; and, therefore, the goods are classifiable as insect killers, and do not fall under the ambit of "mosquito repellent".

134. As Entry 20 of Schedule IV specifically excludes "mosquito repellents in any form" from its ambit, it is necessary to understand what a "mosquito repellent" is. A repellent is defined as any chemically volatile substance that induces arthropods to move in the opposite direction from its source thereby preventing man and vector contact. Repellents may be formulated in various dosage forms like lotions, aerosols, sprays, cream oils and grease sticks. Different chemicals show different intrinsic protection and repellency time. Most repellents act by a common mechanism. They repel arthropods by providing vapors around the applied area. Volatile oils from plant sources possess this property and thus they act as a natural mosquito repellent. Many commercially available formulations use volatile oil as an active ingredient. Repellant activity is reduced due to washing with water, rubbing and sweating of skin. A repellent is a substance that causes an insect or animal to turn away from it or reject it as food. Repellents may be in the form of gases (olfactory), liquids, or solids (gustatory). The aerosol products, manufactured by the petitioners, use ''LPG''/''kerosene'' as propellant and it is by direct application that crawling insects are killed. Repellents, which are specifically excluded from the scope of Entry 20, contain a slightly higher percentage of ''active ingredient'' but its effectiveness is less due to the medium through which it is used such as ''electric units''.

135. In Sonic Electrochem, mosquito repellents were subjected to tax under the residuary Entry 13 of Schedule III prior to August 1990, i.e before insertion of Entry 129 in the Gujarat Sales Tax Act with effect from 1-8-1990. A notification was issued, under Section 49(2) of the said Act, granting partial exemption to the sale or purchase of pesticides and insecticides under Entry 98. The Supreme Court held that, in view of the specific Entry 129 dealing with mosquito repellents, it was difficult to accept the contention that the product in question would not come within the ambit of Entry 129 since one of its constituents "d-Allethrin 4%" happened to be an insecticide; the product Jet Mat, which was the trade name, contained "d-Allethrin 4%" it was commercially known as "Mosquito Repellent Mat", and was a mosquito repellent notwithstanding the fact that it not only repelled mosquitoes but was also capable of killing mosquitoes; it was difficult to hold that it was an insecticide entitled for partial exemption under Entry 98 of the Act; and when Entry 129 clearly stipulated that mosquito repellent was taxable, the rate of tax had been provided therein, and as the product in question was also a mosquito repellent, there was no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court.

136. In Godrej Hicare Limited the question which fell for consideration was whether "mosquito repellents" were exigible to tax under Entry 78 of the First Schedule which included pesticides and insecticides, or whether "mosquito repellents" were exigible to tax under "general goods". The Division Bench held that, prior to 01.01.2000, mosquito repellents were classifiable as insecticides under Entry 78; however w.e.f. 1.01.2000, mosquito repellents were specifically classifiable under the specific entry i.e. Entry 203 at the rate of 8%; and even after incorporation of Entry 203 in the APGST Act, w.e.f 01.01.2000, the subject goods (being insecticides and pesticides) were being taxed under Entry 78; even the Department understood the scope of the Entry to include all insecticides and pesticides, and not merely those used in agriculture; Entry 78 of the APGST Act was introduced verbatim, in the AP VAT Act, 2005, as Entry 20 in Schedule IV and was amended on 23.10.2005 w.e.f 01.09.2005; this matter had been decided by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in Kumar Agencies, a Full Bench of this Court, in Indo-National Limited v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, A. P. Hyderabad, [2004] 136 STC 586 : [2001] 33 APSTJ 206 had held that the judgments of the Tribunal were binding on the sales tax authorities; however, it was contended on behalf of the revenue that, after the judgment of the Tribunal, the Supreme Court had delivered its judgment in Sonic Electrochem, which differentiated "mosquito repellents" from "pesticides and insecticides" the Supreme Court, in Sonic Electrochem, was dealing with a case under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act which had a specific entry for "jet Mat" the Supreme Court had therefore concluded that, as there was an entry for "jet Mat" separately, it could not be included in an entry for "pesticides and insecticides" admittedly, there was no separate entry for "mosquito repellents" in the APGST Act at the relevant time; a specific entry, however, had been carved out in the Schedule with effect from January 1, 2000 as Entry 203; and, in these circumstances, "mosquito repellents" should be treated as "insecticides" till January 1, 2000.

137. In Ashok Agencies, a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court held that it was not in dispute that Mosquito repellants contained the chemical Allethrin as one of its constituents; since Allethrin is a constituent chemical in Mosquito repellants, it comes within the definition of "insecticide" which also finds place in Entry 23 of the III Schedule annexed to KVAT Act without any further qualification as to its kind; whether an insecticide is used in agricultural operations for the purpose of killing insects that attack agricultural crops, or it is used for killing domestic insects, the fact remains that all kinds of insecticides fall within Entry 23 of the III Schedule annexed to the Karnataka VAT Act; and therefore mosquito repellant, being insecticide, fell within Entry 23 of the said Schedule.

138. In M/s.Godrej Consumer Products Ltd., it was held that mosquito repellants, including devices, parts and accessories, were not treated as part of the Entry relating to Insecticides; it had an independent entry; when the Karnataka Sales Tax Act came into force, it had only one entry; it was subsequently substituted by the Entry at Sl.No.23; the understanding of the Legislature was that, as the words used in the said entry were clear and unambiguous, it did not include mosquito repellant; but when the Karnataka High Court in Ashok Agencies ruled that, because of the presence of "allethrin" in the mosquito repellant, it fell within the definition of "insecticide", it became necessary for the Legislature to make their intention clear; therefore, they substituted the said entry by a later entry specifically excluding mosquito coils and mosquito repellants; they also added the words "and the like", used for non-agricultural or non-horticultural purposes; therefore, the entire object of the substituted provision was to exclude mosquito repellant from the ambit of the word "insecticide", if it was used for non-agricultural or non-horticultural purposes.

139. As noted hereinabove "mosquito repellents in any form" was excluded from the ambit of Entry 20, by the amendment made on 23.10.2005 with retrospective effect from 01.09.2005. The amendment was necessitated in view of the Judgment of the Tribunal, in Kumar Agencies and Amitha Agencies, that mosquito repellents were insecticides. The basis of these judgments was removed by the Legislature, by way of the aforesaid amendment, making it clear that mosquito repellents were not "insecticides" as referred to in Entry 20. While the legislature cannot declare any decision of a court of law to be void or of no effect, it can pass an amending Act to remedy the defects pointed out by a court of law or on coming to know of it aliunde. In other words, a court''s decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. State of T.N. v. State of Kerala, (2014) 12 SCC 696, at page 772 The cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity of the Act or the proceedings is sometimes removed by re-enacting a valid and legal taxing provision. Sometimes the legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected, and by legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon courts. The legislature may follow any one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective after the change of the law. (Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, (2014) 4 SCC 583, at page 602, Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd v. Broach Borough Municipality, AIR 1970 SC 192.

140. A competent legislature can always validate a law which has been declared by courts to be invalid, provided the infirmities and vitiating factors noticed in the declaratory judgment are removed or cured. If in the light of such validating and curative exercise made by the legislature-granting legislative competence-the earlier judgment becomes irrelevant and unenforceable, that cannot be called an impermissible legislative overruling of the judicial decision. All that the legislature does is to usher in a valid law in the light of which the earlier judgment becomes irrelevant. Ujagar Prints v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 516, State of Karnataka v. Pro Lab, (2015) 8 SCC 557 Once the circumstances are altered by legislation, it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the Court which becomes ineffective after the change of the law. (Ujagar Prints (supra); Pro Lab (supra)). The object of such an enactment is to remove and rectify the defect in phraseology or lacuna of other nature, which has been found by the Court to be vitiated by an infirmity. Its aim is to effectuate and carry out the object for which the earlier principal Act had been enacted. Such an amending Act to make "small repairs" is a permissible mode of legislation and is frequently resorted to in fiscal enactments. Pro Lab, (2015) 8 SCC 557, Krishnamurthi & Co. v. State of Madras, (1973) 2 SCR 54.

141. The question whether the subject goods, (none of which are "mosquito repellents in any form"), were insecticides/pesticides or not did not arise for consideration in any of the aforesaid judgments wherein the goods involved were mosquito repellents. It was not necessary for the Legislature, therefore, to clarify what was not declared by Courts/Tribunal to be insecticides/pesticides. Existence of an illegal act, proceedings or rule or legislation is the sine-quo-non for any validating legislation to validate the same. There can be no validation of what has yet to be done, suffered or enacted. Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra, (2014) 4 SCC 583, at page 602.

142. The petitioners claim that the subject goods kill insects and are not repellants. Hawley''s Condensed Chemical Dictionary defines the word ''repellant'' as "a substance that causes an insect or animal to turn away from it or reject it as food" repellants may be in the form of gases (olfactory), liquids, or solids (gustatory); a Paper published by Literati Journal of Pharmaceutical Drug Deliver Technologies 01(02) 2015, 08-13, on "A Review on Plant based Mosquito Repellants" states that "a repellant is defined as any chemical volatile substance that induces arthropods to move in the opposite direction from its source thereby preventing man and vector contact''; The International Journal of Research and Development in Pharmacy and Life Sciences - Vol.4 No.5, pp 1760 - 1765 Article on Plants Having Mosquito Repellant Activity states that an ethnobotanical Survey defines mosquito repellant as a substance applied to skin, clothing, or other surfaces which discourages insects (and arthropods in general) from landing or climbing on that surface; there is also mosquito repellant products available based on sound production, particularly ultrasound (inaudibly high frequency sounds); the Paper on Advances in Plant Biopesticides by Dwijendra Singh, has dealt with the nature of repellant and insect killer; and states that, sometimes, a given insecticide may act as an insecticide or as a repellent depending on the concentration; and the major difference between the two is that a repellent does not kill insects but keeps them away by exuding pungent vapours or exhibiting slightly toxic effects.

143. As noted hereinabove, exclusion of "mosquito repellants" from Entry 20 can be traced to the fact that the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal had treated mosquito repellants as "Insecticides". The legislature, in its wisdom, has excluded mosquito repellants in any form from its ambit. Thereby the Entry has been confined to agriculture/plant protection products only. It is not applicable to the assessee''s products.

144. The contention that the words following (excluding mosquito repellents in any form) reflect the intention of the legislature to include all other forms (house hold or agriculture) of insecticides which may have the propensity to kill, immaterial of its mixture with the other ingredients (kerosene, propellant gas to name a few) which goes into the manufacture of such goods, is not tenable. It is wholly unnecessary for us to dwell on the distinction, if any, between insect killers and insect repellents as the pesticides/insecticides referred to in Entry 20 are those used for plant protection, and not "household insecticides".

XVII. Effect Of An Exclusion Clause In An Entry:-

145. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that what was excluded from Entry 20 is ''mosquito repellant'' which is a household insecticide; the exclusion clause expands the genus of various items enumerated in the said entry; and when Entry 20 was amended to specifically exclude mosquito repellents, there was nothing that prevented the legislature from specifying that the Entry was applicable only to goods used for agricultural/horticultural purposes, and not for items used for house-hold purposes.

146. In Allen v. Emmerson, [1944] K.B. 362 it was held:-

"No theatre or other place of public entertainment (other than such places of entertainment as are now subject to the provisions of the Barro-in-Furnacess Corporation Act, 1868, Section 164, and which last mentioned places are to continue subject to the provisions of that Act) shall be opened or used unless the same shall first have been licensed;"

Are the words "theatre or other place of public entertainment" in section 33 of the Act of 1872 to be read subject to the ejusdem generis rule or not? We are satisfied, on the one hand, that, if they have to be read subject to the restriction of this rule, a fun fair of the kind involved in this case is not a kind of "public entertainment" of the same genus as a theatre. We are not, however, of opinion that the ejusdem generis rule applies to the words in question, and this for the following, among other, reasons:-

(a) Words excepting a species from a genus are meaningless unless the species in question prima facie falls within the genus. "All hats other than top hats" makes sense. "All top hats other than bowler hats" does not: nor does "all hats and other articles except gloves" if "other articles" is to be construed ejusdem generis with "hats". Now, the places covered by section 164 of the Act of 1868 - the places "excepted"

(b) No case was cited to us in which a genus has been held to be constituted, not by the enumeration of a number of classes followed by the words "and other", but by the mention of a single class (in this case theatres) followed by those words.

(c) The tendency of the more modern authorities is to attenuate the application of the ejusdem generis rule....."

(emphasis supplied)

147. The Supreme Court in Indian Aluminium Company Ltd., v. Asst. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), (2001) 121 STC 510 (SC) while interpreting Entries No.11 and 67 which deals with "petroleum products", held that the very fact that there is an exclusion clause, means that, but for the said exclusion, aviation fuel, LPG., etc., would be included in the said entries.

148. It is no doubt true that an "exclusion clause" is used in an Entry to exclude the goods referred to in the "exclusion clause" from the ambit of the Entry and, but for the exclusion, the goods mentioned in the exclusion clause would have fallen within the ambit of the Entry. As noted hereinabove, the exclusion clause in Entry 20 was necessitated as the Tribunal had earlier held that mosquito repellents were insecticides/pesticides falling within the ambit of Entry 78 of Schedule I to the APGST Act (similar to Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act). It is to remove the basis of the judgments of the Tribunal was the exclusion clause inserted. The words "in any form" refer to all kinds of mosquito repellents be it in the form of coils, mats or liquids. The Legislature has, thereby, made it clear that mosquito repellents in any form were not pesticides/insecticides falling within the ambit of Entry 20. That does not, however, mean that the subject goods are "insecticides"/"pesticides" falling within the ambit of Entry 20.

XVIII. Are Two Views of Entry 20 Possible Necessitating The One Which Favours The Assessee To Be Adopted?

149. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that insect killers, being insecticides, fall under Entry 20 of Schedule IV to the VAT Act; even if the product is conceivably classifiable both under Entry 20 as well as the residuary entry, benefit should be given to the assessee of Entry 20; and in Mauri Yeast India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P, [2008] 14 VST 259 (SC) the Supreme Court held that it is a settled principle of law that, when two views are possible, one which favours the assessee should be adopted".

150. The subject goods are not pesticides/insecticides used for plant protection which alone fall within the ambit of Entry 20 of the IV Schedule. The petitioners contention that it is classifiable also under Entry 20, even if it were to fall under the residuary entry, does not therefore merit acceptance. "Household insecticides" do not fall under Entry 20, and are liable to tax only under the residuary entry in Schedule V of the VAT Act.

151. It is submitted, on behalf of the petitioners, that this Court, in Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd., (2012) 56 VST 1 held that Lizol (floor cleaner) and Harpic (toilette cleaner) are insecticides and pesticides, and are duly classifiable under Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act; the said order was passed relying on various dictionary definitions of the term "pesticides" and "insecticides" applying the test of trade parlance, this Court held that what was a key guiding factor to classification was how the said product was perceived by consumers, trade and industry; Lizol and Harpic (used for cleaning bathrooms) are viewed in the market as disinfectants i.e. solutions that kill germs; since germs are also included within the scope of the term "pest", the said goods could be classified as pesticides; the subject goods are perceived by consumers as pesticides i.e. products that kill pests like cockroaches, ants, rats, mosquitoes, flies etc; the Gauhati High Court has taken an identical view, in Reckitt Benckiser India Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 56 VST 1 with respect to the same goods sold by the same assessee, that Lizol and Harpic were disinfectant fluids that had the capacity to kill bacteria and germs, and were duly classifiable as pesticides; the Karnataka High Court, in Godrej Consumer Products Ltd., examined a similar issue on the classification of pest killing products under a similar Entry under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 which excluded mosquito repellents from coverage; the Karnataka High Court answered the substantial question of law in favour of the Petitioner holding that ''what is excluded from the ambit of "insecticide" is mosquito repellants, and not mosquito killers, and "Hit Rat" are for killing rodents and "Hit Chalk" are meant for killing crawling insects''; the first part of Entry 20 of the IV Schedule to VAT Act, is identical to Entry 18 which was construed by the Supreme Court in Bombay Chemicals Pvt. Ltd.; the suggested restrictive interpretation is contrary to the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court; and applying the said ratio, to the facts of the present case, the subject goods, capable of killing cockroaches, mosquitos, houseflies, etc., are classifiable as ''insecticides'' under Entry 20.

152. In Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd, (2012) 56 VST 1 the attention of this Court was not drawn to Entry 100(140) of Schedule IV and, consequently, that all forms of pesticides/insecticides did not fall under Entry 20. The question whether pesticides/insecticides falling under Entry 20 are only those which are used for plant protection was also not examined therein. A judgment is a precedent binding on a co-ordinate bench only for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows therefrom. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid''s theorems nor as provisions of a Statute and that too taken out of their context. Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, (1985) 1 SCC 345, CCE v. Alnoori Tobacco Products, (2004) 6 SCC 186, London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, 1951 AC 737, Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., (1970) 2 ALL.E.R 294, Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham, 1971 (1) WLR 1062, British Railways Board v. Herrington, 1972 (2) WLR 537 The decision of a Court is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio, and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Mistra Hegde, AIR 1968 SC 647, Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 In any event it is not even the petitioner''s case that the subject goods are disinfectants/toilet cleaners/bathroom cleaners. Reliance placed on Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd. is therefore misplaced.

153. Item 18 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 read as "insecticides, pesticides, weedicides and fungicides". The question which fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, in Bombay Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., was whether the subject goods, which were disinfectants, fell within the ambit of the said entry. The Supreme Court held that a "disinfectant" was defined in Webster Comprehensive Dictionary "as a substance used to disinfect or to destroy the germs of infectious and contagious diseases" disinfectant destroyed bacteria, fungi, viruses and protozoans; it was therefore a killing agent; a disinfectant which was used for killing, would be broadly covered in the word ''pesticide''; disinfectants may be of two types; one to disinfect and other to destroy the germs; the former may not be covered in the expression ''pesticide'', but those products which are used for killing insects by use of substances such as high boiling tar acid have the same characteristic as a ''pesticide''; where the entries are descriptive of the category of goods, they have certain characteristics; therefore, when a question arises whether particular goods are covered in any category or not, it has to be examined whether it satisfies the characteristic which go to make it a good of that category, and whether in trade circle it is understood as such; if they are goods of technical nature, then whether it technically falls in the one or the other category; and once it is found that the particular goods satisfy the test, then the issue which arises for consideration is whether it should be construed broadly or narrowly. While Item 18, the scope of which fell for consideration in Bombay Chemical Pvt Ltd, is no doubt similar to the first limb of Entry 20 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act, when the first limb of Entry 20 is read along with the second limb applying the common parlance test, it is evident that only pesticides and insecticides used for plant protection would fall within the ambit of the said entry, and not all kinds of pesticides and disinfectants. Even otherwise neither did any Entry, similar to Entry 100 (140) of the IV Schedule fall for consideration nor was the scope of any such entry examined along with Item 18 of the I Schedule to the Central Excise Act. Reliance placed on Bombay Chemical Pvt. Ltd. is, therefore, misplaced.

154. In Godrej Consumer Products Limited, Entry 23 of the Third Schedule to the Karnataka VAT Act read as under:

"23. Chemical fertilizers, Chemical Fertilizer mixtures, bio-fertilizers, micro nutrients, gypsum, plant growth promoters and regulators; rodenticides, fungicides, weedicides and herbicides; insecticides or pesticides but excluding phenyl, liquid toilet cleaners, floor cleaners, mosquito coils, mosquito repellants and the, like used for non-agricultural or non-horticultural purposes".

"5. Insecticides, pesticides, rodenticides, fungicides, weedicides, herbicides, plant regulators and plant growth nutrients excluding copper sulphate".

XIX. Conclusion:

157. Viewed from any angle, we find no infirmity either in the impugned orders of assessment, or the orders of the VAT appellate Tribunal which are subjected to challenge in the present proceedings by way of revision. All the Writ Petitions and the TREVCs fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand dismissed.