Chief Regional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr Vs Raj Ginning Industries

2. Respondent/Complainant filed Consumer Complaint No. 44 of 2007 before the State Commission stating therein, that he is running an industry and has purchased 5(five) insurance policies for total worth of Rs. 2 cores from the appellants. On 28.1.2007 suddenly a fire took place in the factory premises of the respondent and stock worth Rs. 80 lakhs was destroyed. The appellants were duly informed and respondent submitted its claim.

3. Appellants sent a voucher of Rs. 21,76,245/- with covering letter dated 1.6.2007 which amount was not acceptable to the respondent. Accordingly, consumer complaint was filed praying that appellants be directed to pay a sum of Rs. 40,63,971/-.

4. The complaint was contested by the appellants.

5. The State Commission assessed the total loss as Rs. 29,92,623/- and deducted a sum of Rs. 21,76,421/- already paid to the respondent. Therefore, it ordered the appellants to pay a sum of Rs. 8,16,202/- with 9% interest from the date of complaint till payment. In addition, appellants were directed to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- being cost of the complaint.

6. Hence, the present appeal.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties on application for condonation of delay.

8. The grounds on which condonation of delay has been sought are, that due to the whole process of perusing, opining, decision making and drafting, it consumed time and thus delay has occurred.

9. In support, learned counsel for appellants relied upon a decision of Hon''ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Jagbir Singh, Civil Appeal No. 36435 of 201, decided on April 16, 2015).

10. On the other hand, it is contended by learned counsel for respondent, that grounds stated in application for condonation of delay do not show any sufficient ground. The delay has been caused due to negligent acts of the officials of appellants.

11. Learned counsel for respondent has relied upon a decision of Supreme Court in "Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC)."

12. The impugned order was passed on 31.7.2014 and copy of same was received by the appellants on 29.8.2014. It is appellants case, that order of State Commission along with opinion was sent to the appellants company''s office at Ahmedabad on 5.9.2014. Thereafter, on 12.9.2014 it was decided to prefer an appeal before this Commission and file was sent to Regional Office at Delhi and was received on 18.9.2014. Finally, the matter was entrusted to the panel counsel in Delhi, in November, 2014. Since, certain documents were in regional language, translation of same was got done and file was sent back of the Regional Office in Delhi, on 9.1.2015. Thereafter, appeal has been filed on 13.2.2015.

13. It is well settled that "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay in each case is a question of fact.

14. In Ram Lal and Ors. v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed;

"It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay.

This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."

"We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.

The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987)2 SCC 107, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106".

"24. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under;

"29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts'' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner sub-serves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest."

The Court further observed;

"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.

In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.

32. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs".

"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras".

"6. It is trite that discretion to condone delay has to be exercised judiciously, based on facts and circumstances of each case. ''Sufficient cause'' cannot be construed liberally if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides are attributable to the party, praying for exercise of such discretion in its favour. It is equally well settled that when a statute provides for a particular period of limitation, it has to be applied with all its rigor. An unlimited limitation leads to a sense of uncertainty and, therefore, limitation prevents deprivation of what one may have acquired. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, III (2002) SLT 232 = II (2002) CCR 88 (SC) = (2002) 4 SCC 578, the Hon''ble Supreme court has observed that judicially engrafted principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay and Ors. v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., (1992) 1 SCC 225."

20. No order as to cost.

Appeal dismissed.