Devinder Gupta, J.@mdashThese appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment since common question of law about the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain and decide a suit arises for determination. All the appeals, other than Regular Second Appeal No. 8 of 1983 Yash Paul and Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. arise out of a common judgment but separate decrees passed on March 30, 1985 by District Judge, Hamirpur, allowing the appeal of Respondent-State of Himachal Pradesh and thereby reversing the judgment and decree in each of the case passed by the trial Court decreeing the suit of Plaintiffs-Appellants.
2. Regular Second Appeal No. 8 of 1983 arises out of judgment and decree passed on October 14, 1982 by District Judge, Hamirpur, allowing the appeal of Respondent-state of Himachal Pradesh and thereby reversing the judgment and decree passed on November 8, 1978 by Sub-Judge First Class, Hamirpur, decreeing the suit of Plaintiffs-Appellants.
3. As the pleadings in the suits, out of which the aforementioned appeals have arisen, are almost similar in nature and the evidence led is also similar and further the question of law for determination is also the same, therefore, it would be suffice if reference is made to the pleadings in Civil Suit No. 167 of 1977, out of which Regular Second Appeal No. 79 of 1985 Dalip Singh and Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. has arisen.
4. Dalip Singh and Ors. -Plaintiffs claimed a decree for declaration to the effect that they alongwith proforma defendants were owners in cultivating possession of the suit property since the time of their fore-fathers and the orders passed by Revenue Officer, Hamirpur, showing the land to have vested in Gram Panchayat, Jalari, in the year 1962 under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 (Punjab Act No. 18 of 1961)(hereinafter called as the Punjab Act) and Subsequent mutation attested by the Revenue Officer, Hamirpur, showing the land to have vested in the State of Himachal Pradesh under the Himachal Pradesh Village Common Lands Vesting and Utilisation Act, 1974 (Act No. 18 of 1974)(hereinafter called as the Himachal Act), were illegal, void, inoperative and ineffective on their rights and the orders of allotment of part of such land in favour of some of the allottees conferred no right, title or interest on them and as a consequential relief Plaintiffs claimed and prayed for decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the State of Himachal Pradesh from obtaining possession of the suit property from them and delivering its possession to the allottees and from interfering with their possession. It was averred that the suit land constituted Shamlat Patti owned by Plaintiffs and proforma defendants and was so recorded in the revenue records on coming into force of the Punjab Act However, in the column of cultiovation, Plaintiffs and proforma defendants were shown to be in separate possession according to their shares defined in the revenue records. The entire suit land was agricultural and was being utilised by the proprietors. In the year 1962 by an order passed by Revenue Officer, Hamirpur, the land was shown in the revenue records to have vested in Gram Panchayat, Jalari. Despite this order, the Plaintiffs and proforma defendants continued to remain in its occupation. It was averred that as Plaintiffs and proforma defendants have been in continuous occupation of the suit property since the time of their fore-fathers according to their respective shares recorded in the revenue records and as their possession was being shown separately and the suit land was also assessed to land revenue, therefore, there was no question of the same vesting in the Gram Panchayat under the provisions of the Punjab Act. The order passed by the Revenue Officer was challenged as being illegal, void and without jurisdiction After the area, where the land is situate, stood merged in Himachal Pradesh and on repeal of the Punjab Act by the Himachal Act, the Revenue Officer, Hamirpur, on December 10, 1975 attested mutation No. 185 showing the land to have vested in the State of Himachal Pradesh which order of attestation of mutation was also challenged as being void and without jurisdiction and ineffective and inoperative against their rights. It was alleged that the mutation was attested without any notice to the Plaintiffs and behind their back It is further pleaded that despite such entries in the revenue records, Plaintiffs continued to be in occupation of the property as before but taking undue advantage of the wrong entries some orders were passed by the State of Himachal Pradesh allotting certain portions of land to some of the individuals and on that basis the revenue authorities intended to take possession of the property by delivering its possession to the allottees. Since the Plaintiffs felt that their rights to hold the property as owner were jeopardised, therefore, they filed the suit claiming decree for declaration and injunction.
5. The State of Himachal Pradesh contested the suit. It was admitted that the suit land, prior to coming into force of the Punjab Act, was Shamlat Patti in the joint ownership of Plaintiffs and proforma defendants but it was denied that they were in possession of separate specific portions according to their shares However, it was stated that Plaintiffs and proforma defendants were in joint occupation of the suit land which was being utilised for common purposes only. It was claimed that the suit land stood vested in the Gram Panchayat under the provisions of the Punjab Act and on coming into force of the Himachal Act it stood vested in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The orders passed by the Revenue Officers after coming into force of the Punjab Act and Himachal Act, respectively, were in consonance with law and no objection was taken by the Plaintiffs or the proforma defendants when the mutations were attested in public gathering It was stated that it was within the jurisdiction of the State of Himachal Pradesh to have made an order of allotment. A preliminary objection was raised about the jurisdiction of the civil court to try and entertain the suit in view of provisions of Section 10 of Himachal Act.
6. The trial Court held that the suit land had not vested in the State Government under the provisions of Himachal Act since no enquiry, as contemplated under Rule 9 of the Himachal Pradesh Village Common Lands Vesting and Utilisation Rules, 1975 (hereinafter called as the rules), framed u/s 30 of the Himachal Act, had been conducted by the Collector. The Plaintiffs were held to be in possession and no part of the suit land was found to be in possession of the allottees. It was further held that Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. On these findings, the trial Court granted decree to the Plaintiffs to the effect that they were owners-in-possession. As a consequential relief, the trial Court granted temporary injunction restraining defendants No. 1 and 3 to 5 from interfering with the ownership of the Plaintiffs till the enquiry, as contemplated in Rule 9 of the rules, was completed by the Collector and action taken under Sub-section (5) of Section 3 to dispossess the Plaintiffs-Feeling aggrieved, the State of Himachal Pradesh carried the matter in appeal The lower appellate Court, as stated above, disposed of the appeals by a common judgment holding that the Civil Court''s jurisdiction was not barred u/s 10 of Himachal Act and it was not necessary for the Collector to hold an enquiry under Rule 9 of the rules, since the suit was held to be maintainable in a Civil Court, it further held that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove that the land was Shamlat deh being assessed to land revenue and not in individual cultivating possession of the co-sharers, therefore, it allowed the appeal of State of Himachal Pradesh by reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit of the Plaintiffs-Appellants. Feeling aggrieved, the Plaintiffs have now preferred the present appeal.
7. It is contended on behalf of the Appellants that on proper construction of the pleadings of the parties and the provisions of the Himachal Act, jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain and decide the suit of the nature is not barred, inasmuch as neither it was pleaded nor it has been proved on record by the defendants that any order has been passed by the Collector or the State Government under the provisions of the Act so as to attract the bar of jurisdiction contemplated by Section 10 of the Act. Another submission made on behalf of the Appellants was that the Plaintiffs-Appellants were found to be in actual possession of the property by the trial Court which findings were not reversed by the lower appellate Court. It was not shown by the defendants, irrespective of the orders passed by the Revenue Officer, that the Plaintiffs were ejected from the suit land in accordance with law, therefore, even on the basis of their settled possession, at least, decree for injunction ought to have been passed restraining the State of Himachal Pradesh or any other person from interfering with their possession. To refute these arguments, it has been contended by the learned Assistant Advocate General that under the provisions of Himachal Act there is automatic vestment of the land in the state by virtue of provisions of Section 3 and since the title vests in the State, the Plaintiffs cannot be granted any decree and it was for the Plaintiffs to have raised the dispute before the Collector and invited findings on the question whether the land was of such a category which could not have vested in the State and since no dispute was ever raised before him, there was no question of the Collector deciding the same under Rule 9 of the rules. The bar of jurisdiction created u/s 10 was absolute and finality was attached to the orders of the Collector and as such no interference is called for in the impugned judgment and decree.
8. The property, which is the subject matter of litigation, is located within tehsil Hamirpur, which was a part of State of Punjab, prior to its merger with Himachal Pradesh in the year 1966 on the promulgation of Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966. The Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953 (Punjab Act No. 1 of 1954) was enacted with a view to regulate the rights in Shamlat and Abadi Deh lands. The object of which was, as can be found from the statements of objects and reasons published in the Punjab Gazette, Extraordinary, dated 6th April, 1953, in the following words:
When the villages were originally founded it is believed that the shamlat was really meant for the use of all the inhabitants of the village. At present the position is that all the shamlat is the property of the proprietary body of a village and the rights of non-proprietors are in the shape of grants for certain purposes. Though the non-proprietary classes also presumably settled in villages with the founders thereof and have been rendering essential services to the proprietary body in matters relating to farm operations, they do not enjoy equal rights in the shamlat lands and they are not the proprietors of the sites under their houses even in the abadis.
It seems that in the course of time conditions to the detriment of Harijans and other similar non-proprietary classes have come into vogue. They feel their position insecure in so far as enjoyment of essential rights in the shamlat lands is concerned. They should have proprietary rights in sites of their residential houses. Discontentment over this matter has been expressed by the members of these classes. Government consider that these conditions should no longer exist. It is with a view to giving these classes of residents in villages an opportunity to live with security and self-respect that the proposed legislation is being undertaken.
9. Section 3 of this Act provided for the vesting of the rights in Panchayat and in non-proprietors with respect to shamlat deh of village on and from the appointed day. Section 8 provided that no Civil Court shall have any jurisdiction over any matter arising out of the operation of the said Act. To overcome certain difficulties, which had cropped-up, Act No. 1 of 1954 was repealed and substituted by Punjab Act No. 18 of 1961. Section 3 of 1961 Act defined the land to which the Act was made applicable and Section 4 thereof provided for the vesting of the rights in Panchayats and non-proprietors. Similar bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court was provided in Section 13 of the said Act. After the merger of parts of Punjab in Himachal Pradesh, Himachal Act No. 18 of 1974, was enacted, which received the assent of Governor on April 9, 1974 and was published in the Rajpatra on August 29, 1974 The object of passing this Act was to provide for vesting of village common lands within the State of Himachal Pradesh, in the State and for utilisation thereof as per the provisions of the Act, which is apparent from the reading of Section 8 of the Act. It says that an area not less than 50% out of the lands vested in the State under the Act shall be utilised for grazing and other common purposes of the inhabitants of an estate and the remaining for allotment to landless persons or other persons, whose holding is less than one acre. The provision with regard to vestment of land is contained in Section 3 of Himachal Act, which reads as under:
3. Vesting of right in the State Government--(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any agreement, instrument, custom or usage or any decree or order of any Court or other authority, all rights, title and interests including the contingent interests, if any, of the landowner in the lands in any estate:
(a) vested in a Panchayat u/s 4 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961) as in force in the areas added to Himachal Pradesh u/s 5 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966) except lands used or reserved for the benefit of village community including streets, lanes, playgrounds, schools, drinking water or ponds within abadi deh or gorah deh;
(b) described in the revenue records as shamlat tarat, pattis, pannas and thola and not used according to revenue records for the benefit of the village community or a part thereof or for common purposes of the village in the areas added to Himachal Pradesh u/s 5 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966); and
(c) described in the revenue records as shamlat, shamlat deh, shamlat taraf, shamlat chak and patti in the areas comprised in Himachal Pradesh, immediately before first November, 1966;
shall stand extinguished and all such rights, title and interests shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances.
(2) The provisions of Sub-section (1) of this section shall not apply to lands described in Clauses (b) and (c) of that sub-section if, before the date of commencement of this Act:
(a) partition of such lands is made by the individual co sharers through a process of law by a competent Court or authority;
(b) transfer of such lands is made by the landowner by way of sale, gift or exchange;
(c) such land built upon by an inhabitant by raising a residential house or cow-shed.
(3) The State Government shall be liable to pay and the landowners whose rights have been extinguished under Sub-section (1) of this Section shall be entitled to receive, the amount in lieu thereof, at the following rates:
(i) for the land reserved for grazing and other common purposes under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 8, five times the annual land revenue including rates and cesses chargeable thereon; and
(ii) for the remaining land, fifteen times the annual land revenue including rates and cesses chargeable thereon:
Provided that where the land vested in the State Government under this Act is not assessed to land revenue, the same shall be construed to be assessed as on similar land in the estate and if not available in the estate then in the adjoining estate or estates, as the case may be.
(4) The amount paid to a Panchayat u/s 7 shall be deemed to be the Sabha Fund and shall be utilised for such purposes as are mentioned in Section 40 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1968, (19 of 1970).
(5) The Collector may, by order in writing, at any time after the land vested in the State Government, direct the landowners to deliver possession thereof within 10 days from the service of the order to such person as may be specified in the order.
(6) If the landowners refuse or fail without reasonable cause to
comply with the order made under Sub-section (5), the Collector may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.
10. The reading of the above-quoted section makes it clear that all rights, title and interest of the land-owners in the land in any estate, which vested in a Panchayat, u/s 4 of the Punjab Act, except the land used or reserved for the benefit of village community and also the land described in the revenue records as shamlat taraf, pattis, pannas and thola and not used for the benefit of village community shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances. There is an exception to certain lands not vesting in the State for which provision is made in sub-Section (2 of Section 3 of the Himachal Act. This vestment of land is automatic and once the land is vested in the State, the Collector, by virtue of Sub-section (5) of Section 3 is empowered to call upon the land-owners to deliver possession thereof after a notice has been duly served ten days prior to the date. On failure of the land-owner to comply with this order, the Collector is empowered to take possession by forte on the strength of powers vested in Sub-section (6) of Section 3. A duty is enjoined upon the Collector by virtue of Rule 9, which has been framed u/s 13 of the Act to decide a dispute raised before him regarding entry of land vested in the State after a summary enquiry in accordance with the procedure as applicable for the Revenue Officers.
11. Neither in the pleadings, nor in the evidence before the trial Court it has been shown that the Plaintiffs did raise any dispute before the Collector so as to enable him to take any decision thereupon. It is obvious that there was no occasion for the Plaintiffs to have raised such a dispute as no notice is shown to have ever been issued under Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act calling upon them to deliver possession of the property deemed to have vested u/s 3 of the Act Occasion would have arisen for the land-owners to raise dispute as contemplated under Rule 9 had they been called upon to deliver possession to the State. There is nothing on the record of the trial Court to show that the Collector has passed any order under the provisions of the Act so as to attract the bar of jurisdiction contained in Section 10, which reads as under:
10. Bar of Jurisdiction--Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no order made by the Collector, or the State Government or any officer authorised by it, as the case may be, shall be called in question by any court or before any officer or authority.
12. Defendants had challenged the jurisdiction of civil court to entertain and decide the suit. It was for the defendants to have placed on record by way of evidence material showing that either the Collector or the State had made an order under the provisions of the Act so as to attract the bar of jurisdiction contained in Section 10.
13. Section 9 of the CPC gives jurisdiction to a civil court to try all suits of a civil nature excepting those which are expressly or impliedly barred by any other law. It is a settled proposition of law that an exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court is not to be readily inferred and every presumption should be made in favour of existence of jurisdiction rather than its exclusion. A statute which ousts the jurisdiction of civil court is required to be strictly construed and the burden is always on the party, who so contends, to prove the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court and once such a contention is raised, it has to be determined in the light of the words used in the statute and scheme of its relevant provisions with their object and purpose. On a review of its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court in
(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court''s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.
Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.
(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act is ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals.
(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies.
(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.
(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.
14. The learned Assistant Advocate General by placing reliance upon two judgments of the Supreme Court in
44. We are of the opinion that all inquiries with regard to vesting of a particular piece of land in the State Government can be conducted by the Collector under Rule 9 quoted above. The scheme which is envisaged is that vestment contemplated by the impugned Act is immediate u/s 3. Under Rule 8, Form C, which prescribes the Form of Tehsil Register of demarcation of Shamlat land, entries are required to be made in the said Register Under Sub-section (5) of Section 3 it is provided that the Collector may, by order in writing, at any time after the land has vested in the State Government, direct the landowners to deliver possession thereof within ten days from the service of the order to such person as may be specified in the order. Now, before the Collector proceeds under Sub-section (5) of Section 3, there is a scope of dispute arising regarding entry of land having been vested in the State Government. There fore, it is clear that the enquiry contemplated by Rule 9 should be started before action under Sub-section (5) of Section 3 is taken. The result, therefore, is that after vesting contemplated by Section 3 of the Act is presumed to have taken place, the Collector is bound to enquire into and consider the disputes relating to this vestment. This enquiry is of a summary nature and is required to be conducted by the Collector in accordance with the procedure prescribed in rules made under the Punjab Land Revenue act, 1887. Section 9 of the impugned Act provides for an appeal against the order passed by the Collector in such an enquiry. This appeal lies to the State Government. It would be only after the matter is finally settled, through appeal or otherwise, that proceedings contemplated by Sub-section (5) of Section 3 with regard to taking of the possession can be undertaken, because till then it would not be clear whether a particular piece of land has legally vested in the State Government or not.
45. We may revert to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 3, which is already referred to above. So far as this Sub-section (2) is concerned, the Collector shall have to ascertain whether a particular case falls within any of its three Clause (a), (b) and (c). It would be only thereafter that it can be ascertained whether the land which is said to be covered by the provisions of Sub-section (2) legally vests in the State Government or not. It need not be emphasised that if as a result of the enquiry, conducted by the Collector under Rule 9, it is found that a particular piece of land does not fall within the definition of the word ''land'', as given in Clause (f) of Section 3, as explained by us in this judgment, or that provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 apply to such land, the Collector will have to arrive at a conclusion that that land does not legally vest in the State Government.
15. The scheme of the Himachal Act, as analysed by the Full Bench in Gram Panchayat Khunyara''s, case (supra), envisages that the enquiry contemplated by Rule 9 should be started before action under Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Himachal Act is taken and it would be only after the matter is finally settled through appeal or otherwise that proceedings contemplated by the abovementioned provisions of law with regard to taking of possession could be undertaken because till then it would not be clear whether a particular piece of land has or has not legally vested in the State Government. The Full Bench also found that the Collector was also bound to ascertain whether a particular case falls within any of the three exceptions enumerated in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of Himachal Act and it would be only thereafter that it could be ascertained whether the land which is said to be covered by the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of Himachal Act and it would be only thereafter that it could be ascertained whether the land which is said to be covered by the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 legally vests in the State or not. As observed by the Full Bench in Gram Panchayat Khunyara''s case (supra) and as is apparent from the reading of the Himachal Act, there is an adequate remedy provided for what the Civil Courts would normally do in suits, namely, whether particular land has or has not vested in the State Government The Act also provides for the remedy to carry the matter in appeal against an order passed by the Collector. In these circumstances, it can be said that the Himachal Act gives a finality to the orders passed by the Collector or the State Government and jurisdiction of Civil Court is ousted to entertain and decide a suit of the nature but, as observed above, Section 10 of the Himachal Act does not exclude those cases where it is shown that provisions of a particular Act have not been complied with or that the Collector or the State Government has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The primary relief claimed by the Plaintiffs with regard to declaration of their rights as owners cannot be gone into in view of the jurisdictional bar created u/s 10 of the Act for which appropriate forum would be the Collector as observed in Gram Panchayat Khunyara''s case. The Civil Court''s jurisdiction to entertain and decide a suit for grant of a decree for prohibitory injunction founded upon settled possession is not ousted by any of the provisions of the Act.
16. The trial Court did record a finding that the Plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property which finding were not reversed by the lower appellate Court. It proceeded only on legal questions without having entered into the merits of the claim about possession. Perusal of the copies of entries in revenue records till the date when mutation was entered and attested showing the land to have vested in the State would reveal that the Plaintiffs were shown to be in possession of the suit property.
17. In all the cases in hand it has nowhere been shown by the State of Himachal Pradesh before the trial Court that the Collector had initiated any proceedings as contemplated in Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act read with Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the rules against the Plaintiffs or that the Plaintiffs were dispossessed from the suit property in accordance with the provisions of law. The only evidence produced on record of the trial Court was that after coming into force of the Himachal Act the mutation was entered and attested showing the land to have vested in the State. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 read with Rule 4 of the rules contemplates mutation of land in favour of the State Government only after the possession has been taken in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act from the land-owner(8). It is only after the possession is taken and the mutation is attested that statements are required to be prepared of such land in Form ''A'' for the purpose of Section 8 of the Act so as to enable the State Government to utilise the same. In the cases in hand, instead of initiating proceedings for obtaining possession the first step which was taken was attestation of mutation, which could not have been done without following the procedure laid down in Sub-section (5) of Section 3 read with Rule 3 of the Rules. In view of this discussion, it has to be held that the Plaintiffs continued to be in possession of the disputed property. The relief of grant of decree for prohibitory injunction could be said to be founded upon the allegations of settled possession and as such is based upon a separate cause of action.
18. It is a settled law that where a person is in settled possession of the property even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. This proposition of law, as laid down in Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy 51 IA 293 was approved by the Supreme Court in
19. In view of what has been said above, there is no manner of doubt that Plaintiffs are entitled at least to have their possession protected by a decree for prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession otherwise than in accordance with law.
20. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court in all the appeals is quashed and set aside. Suit of the Plaintiffs-Appellants is partly decreed by granting them decree for prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession over the suit property in any manner whatsoever, otherwise than in due course of law. As the remaining part of the reliefs claimed in the suit founded upon a cause of action has been held to be exclusively within the purview of Collector as per the decision of Gram Panchayat Khunyara''s, case (supra), therefore, it is made clear that the decree passed in favour of Plaintiffs will not preclude the State of Himachal Pradesh from initiating proceedings as contemplated under Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of Himachal Act. As and when such proceedings are initiated by serving a statutory notice of ten days upon the Plaintiffs, it shall be open for them to raise all such disputes as were raised by them in the civil suit or which are otherwise available to them in law before the Collector by pointing out that the land is of such a nature which has not lawfully vested in the State or that the same is exempted from such vestment and falls in either of the three categories mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Himachal Act. Such dispute, as and when raised, will be decided by the Collector in accordance with law.
21. It is further made clear that if and when Plaintiffs are dispossessed in accordance with law, it will be open for the allottees to apply to the Collector for being put in possession of the property.
22. Costs will be borne by the respective parties. Interim relief granted in each appeal, if any, is vacated.
