M.R. Verma, J.@mdashThis appeal is directed against the judgment dated 11.9.1997 whereby the learned Sessions Judge, Chamba has convicted the Appellant-accused (hereinafter referred to as the ''accused'') u/s 302, IPC and has sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay fine in the sum of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of which he has been directed to undergo further imprisonment for two years.
2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that Nimmo (since deceased) was married to the accused about 8 or 9 years before her death on 20.9.1996. After about two years of their marriage, the accused started beating said Nimmo-while under the influence of liquor and would not provide her maintenance and turned her out of the martrimonial home but the child born out of the wedlock was not given to her. She had to move an application u/s 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to get the child. She had to institute a case claiming maintenance from the accused which ultimately ended in compromise and she started living with the accused. On 25.8.1996, accused returned home at about 10.00 p.m. when he was drunk. His wife Nimmo and their child were sleeping on a cot. The accused pulled Nimmo out of the cot, threw her on the floor, sprinkled kerosene oil on her and then set her on fire as a result of which she suffered serious burn injuries and fell unconscious. After the re-gained consicousness, she sat below a tap and thus threw water on her person. Thereafter she informed Duni Chand (PW-7), uncle of the accused about the incident, Said Duni Chand, his wife Sheela and Bittu, younger brother of the accused took Nimmo to Koti where she was given first aid and was then taken to her parents'' house in village Karori where they reached at 2.00 a.m. Mother of Nimmo, namely, Sumitra (PW-1) brought her to District Hospital, Chamba in an ambulance where she remained admitted till 6.9.1996. After her admission in the hospital, she was medically examined by Dr. D.P. Dogra (PW-14), who on such examination found that the total burns on the person of the deceased were 75% and the injuries so noticed were grievous in nature having been caused within an approximate duration of six hours from the time of examination. He issued the medico-legal certificate (Ext. PN) in this regard. On 26.8.1996 at 5 a.m. Nimmo made a statement u/s 154, Code of Criminal Procedure (Ext. PH) disclosing therein that she was set on fire by her husband. On the basis of this statement, F.I.R. (Ext.PJ) was recorded at Police Station, Sadar, Chamba u/s 307, IPC. On 27.8.1996, Nimmo made another statement (Ext. PB)" before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Chamba, namely, Subhash Nanda (PW-15) disclosing therein that she was set on fire by her husband. On 6.9.1996, she was referred from District Hospital, Chamba to P.G.I. Chandigarh, where she sccumbed to the injuries on 20.9.1996. Post mortem of the dead body of Nimmo deceased was conducted by Dr. Paramjit Singh Mann (PW-17), who prepared and issued the post-mortem report (Ext. PQ). At the time of the post-mortem, he has observed as follows:
1. The body was having rigor morits to the full extent.
2. The body was having burns to the extent of 65% predominantly on the front of the body.
3. There were synging of hair.
4. Palural cavity were full of puss.
5. Lungs were full of puss.
6. The uterus was grossly normal in size.
The cut section of uterine cavity was empty.
3. As per his opinion, Nimmo died due to severe burns leading to septiccaemia and cardio respiratory arrest and that the burn injuries found on her person were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of deceased Nimmo. Consequent upon the deceased succumbing to the burn injuries, the case earlier registered u/s 307, IPC was converted to one u/s 302, IPC. During the course of investigation, the police took in possession one lady shirt smelling kerosene oil, one Chakka stone, blood-stained Dupatta to which some human hairs were found attached and earth having smell of kerosene oil vide memo Ext. PA. Police also took in possession one Kerosene lamp, some pieces of burnt cloth and skin and some earth having smell of kerosene oil vide memo Ext. PB. During the course of investigation, the accused made a disclosure statement (Ext. PD) about a bottle containing some left out quantity of kerosene oil and a Salwar having been kept in the store. Pursuant to the said statement, the accused got recovered the bottle containing some kerosene oil and the Salwar which were taken in possession by the police vide Memo Ext.PC. The Police also obtained a copy of the decision of the Panchayat from the Secretary of the concerned Gram Panchayat vide memo Ext. PE. The police further took in possession a copy of the application u/s 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure moved by the deceased in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba (Ext. PL) alongwith the accompanying affidavit, copy of the statement of the deceased (Ext. PL/1) and a copy of the order dated 1.9.1995 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba (Ext. PL/2). The report "Marg" prepared in the case is Ext. PS. Articles taken in possession by the police from the spot as stated hereinabove were sent by the police to State Forensic Science Laboratory, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla. As per the report (Ext. PK) received from the said Laboratory, the contents of the bottle taken in possession at the instance of the accused were found to be kerosene oil. In the burnt cloths and skin and the soil collected from the place of occurrence, contents of kerosene oil were detected. The hair which were found on the Dupatta were found human hair. In the other articles, contents of kerosene oil or of any other combustible substance was not detected. On completion of the investigation, the Officer Incharge, Police Station, Sadar, Chamba submitted a charge sheet against the accused, who came to be tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Chamba on a charge u/s 302, IPC.
4. To prove the charge against the accused the prosecution examined 18 witnesses.
5. Accused was examined u/s 313, Code of Criminal Procedure wherein he has admitted institution of proceedings by the deceased against him u/s 97, Code of Criminal Procedure for custody of their child and thereby the accused handing over the custody of the child to her. He has further admitted that the decased had made application for grant of maintenance also against him, the proceedings wherein ended in a compromise. Sustaining of burn injuries by the deceased, providing of first aid to her in Koti her having remained admitted in Chamba Hospital and then having been referred to P.G.I. Chandigarh and her death there are other facts which have been admitted by the accused. However, he has denied the case of the prosecution that he sprinkled kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire. His case is that the deceased caught fire from kerosene lamp which fell on her. At that time he had gone out of the room to attend the call of nature and when he returned he saw that the deceased had caught fire and he extinguished the same. The accused however did not lead any defence evidence.
6. The learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of the commission of the offence u/s 302, IPC and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid. Hence this appeal.
7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the accused and the learned Assistant Advocate General for the State and have also gone through the record.
8. There is no dispute that the deceased sustained burn injuries on 25,8,1996 at about 10 a.m. and finally succumbed to those injuries on 20.9.1996 at about 10 a.m. in P.G.I. Chandigarh. The dispute between the parties is as to how the fatal burn injuries were sustained by the deceased. According to the prosecution, the fatal burn injuries were caused by the accused by setting the deceased afire after sprinkling kerosene on her person whereas according to the defence, the deceased caught fire from a kerosene lamp which fell on her in the absence of the accused from the room and on return he found that his wife had caught fire and he extinguished the same. Thus the short question we have to answer is whether the fatal burn injuries sustained by the deceased were accidental or homicidal having been caused by the accused.
9. The case of the prosecution primarily rests on the two dying declarations. Ext. PH and Ext. PP. The dying declaration Ext. PH was recorded by PW-18 Swaroo Ram, ASI on 26.8.1996 at 5.10 a.m. in District Hospital, Chamba. Initially this statement was recorded u/s 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the presence of PW-14, Dr. D.P. Dogra who had certified that Nimmo was fit to make statement and F.I.R. was registered on its basis. However, consequent upon the death of Nimmo on 20.9.1996, it has been treated as a dying declaration.
10. The dying declaration Ext. PP was recorded on 27.8.1996 on the dictation of PW-15 Subhash Nanda, Sub-Divisional Magistrate by his Reader in the presence of PW-14 Dr. D.P. Dogra who certified that Nimmo was in her senses.
11. In case Raj Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh Cr. Appeal No. 18 of 1999, decided on 13.8.1999 while dealing with the question of evidentiary value of a dying declaration, it was held as under:
It is by now well settled that dying declaration is admissible in evidence and can form the basis for conviction, if found to be reliable. While, it is in the nature of an exception to the general rule forbidding hearsay evidence, it is admitted on the premise that ordinarily a dying person will not falsely implicate an innocent person in the commission of a serious crime. This premise, which is based on the maxim "A man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth," is considered strong enough to set off the need that the maker of the statement should state so on oath and be cross-examined by the person who is sought to be implicated. In order that a dying declaration may form the sole basis for conviction without need for independent corroboration, it must be shown that person making it had the opportunity of identifying the person implicated and it is thoroughly reliable and free from blemish. If, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it is found that the maker of the statement was in a fit state of mind and had voluntarily made the statement on the basis of personal knowledge without being influenced by Ors. and the court, on strict scrutiny, finds it to be reliable, there is no rule of law or even of prudence that such a reliable piece of evidence should not be acted upon unless it is corroborated. A dying declaration by itself is an independent piece of evidence and can be acted upon, without seeking any corroboration, if it is found to be otherwise true and reliable.
12. In case
Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible evidence and unless evidence is tested by cross-examination, it is not creditworthy. u/s 32, when a statement is made by a person, as to the cause of death or as to any of the circumstances which result in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person''s death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in writing, made by the deceased to the witness is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. The statement made by the deceased, called the dying declaration, falls in that category provided it has been made by the deceased while in a fit mental condition. A dying declaration made by person on the verge of his death has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is most unlikely to make any untrue statement. The shadow of impending death is by itself the guarantee of the truth of the statement made by the deceased regarding the causes or circumstances leading to his death. A dying declaration, therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct status, as a piece of evidence, coming as it does from the mouth of the deceased victim. Once the statement of the dying person and the evidence of the witnesses testifying to the same passes the test of careful scrutiny of the courts, it becomes a very important and a reliable piece of evidence and if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free from any embellishment such a dying declaration, by itself, can be sufficient for recording conviction even without looking for any corroboration. If there are more than one dying declarations then the court has also to scrutinise all the dying declarations to find out if each one of these passes the test of being trustworthy. The court must further find out whether the different dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars before accepting and relying upon the same...
13. We now proceed to examine the value of the two dying declarations Ext.PH and Ext.PP in the light of the above propositi'' as.
14. The statement Ext. PH was recorded by PW-18 Swaroo Ram, A.S.I. u/s 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 26.8.1996 at 5.10 a.m. in District Hospital, Chamba. On the basis of this statement, F.I.R. Ext. PJ was recorded u/s 307 IPC.
15. PW-18 Swaroo Ram, ASI has stated that on being informed by the duty Constable that there was a burning case in District Hospital, Chamba, he went to the hospital and made an application, Ext. PM to Dr. D.P. Dogra (PW-14) who was attending upon the patient Nimmo, for obtaining his opinion as to whether she was fit to make statement. The opinion given by the said doctor is Ext. PM/1. Opinion Ext. PM/1 given by PW-14 reads as follows:
At present fit to deliver statement.
16. Thereafter, PW-18, Swaroo Ram recorded the statement Ext. PH of Nimmo Devi which bears her thumb impression at Ext. PH/3 and endorsement appended by PW-14 Dr. D.P. Dogra, Ext. PH/2 reads as follows:
Statement given in presence of undersinged.
Sd/-
Dr. D.P. Dogra
26.8.96 5.00 a.m.
17. PW-14 Dr. D.P. Dogra has stated that on 26.8.1996 the deceased was admitted in district hospital, Chamba as a case of burn injuries. He intimated the police telephonically and after sometime police came to" the hospital and moved application Ext. PM to know whether Nimmo was fit to make statement. He certified vide endorsement Ext. PM/1 that she was fit to make statement. He has further stated that police recorded the statement of Nimmo, Ext. PH in his presence and he so certified vide Ext. PH/2 which is signed by him and he had attested the thumb impression Ext. PH/3 of Nimmo on the statement. There is nothing in the statement of PW-18 and PW-14 on the basis of which the fitness of Nimmo to make the statement Ext. PH or its voluntary nature may be suspected.
18. The learned Counsel for the accused has assailed the dying declaration Ext. PH on the grounds that there is possibility of its having been manipulated after deliberations with the mother of the deceased (PW-1) and that Nimmo Devi admittedly spoke in Chambiali whereas Ext. PH has been recorded in Hindi that too by a police officer, therefore, it is a distorted version and is not reliable.
19. A perusal of the statement of PW-1 Sumitra mother of the deceased reveals that there is nothing in the statement from which it may be inferred that she tutored the deceased to make a false statement to implicate the accused. This defence has nowhere been suggested to her in her cross-examination. On the contrary, it was suggested to her that on the fateful night she did not have any talk with the deceased. If so, the statement Ext. PH recorded at 5 a.m. cannot be the outcome of any tutoring. Even otherwise PW-1 Sumitra has no cause to do so. On the contrary in the interest of the child, of the accused and the deceased she could not think of falsely implicating the accused and thereby rendering such child a virtual orphan.
20. It is however admitted by PW-14 that the deceased made her statement in Chambiali but it was recorded by PW-18 in Hindi. PW-18 Swaroo Ram has also stated that Nimmo made her statement in Hindi as well as in local dialect. It has however not been put to this witness that he could not understand Chambiali. He has been in police station, Chamba since 1995. Being an investigating officer, he must have come in contact with local people, most of them being complainants, witnesses and accused persons. Therefore, to deal with matters in his hand as investigating officer, he must have the knowledge of or must be in a position to understand the local dialects. Therefore, in the absence of any suggestion to the contrary and in view of the nature of duties of this witness, it can be safely concluded that though he recorded the statement in Hindi but as per the version given by the deceased in Hindi and Chambiali.
21. In case
10. Assuming that the deceased gave her statement in her own language, the dying declaration would not vitiate merely because it was recorded in a different language. We bear in mind that it is not unusual that courts record evidence in the language of the court even when witnesses depose in their own language. Judicial officers are used to the practice of translating the statements from the language of the parties to the language of the court. Such translation process would not upset either the admissibility of the statement or its reliability, unless there are other reasons to doubt the truth of it.
22. In view of the proposition laid in the case supra, the mere fact that the deceased made the statement Ext. PH in Chambiali, but was recorded in Hindi does not render it unreliable or untrustworthy.
23. The statement Ext. PH, no doubt had been recorded by a police officer u/s 154, Code of Criminal Procedure However, this does not mean that it cannot be treated as dying declaration or cannot be acted upon to convict the accused.
24. In
25. In view of the above discussion, the only conclusion which can be arrived at is that the dying declaration Ext. PH is proved to have been made by the deceased voluntarily while in a fit state of mind. Therefore, it is reliable, trustworthy and can be safely relied upon.
26. The second dying declaration Ext. PP was written by the Reader of PW-15, Subhash Nanda, SDM, Chamba. On the dictation given by said S.D.M. in the presence of PW-14 Dr. D.P. Dogra. PW-14 Subhash Nanda has stated that on 27.8.1996. ASI Swaroo Ram (PW-18) came to his office at about 4.45 p.m. and told him that Nimmo was admitted in the hospital as a case of burn injuries and he should record her statement. Thereupon he went to hospital, called PW-14 Dr. D.P. Dogra and enquired from him if Nimmo was fit to make statement. The doctor opined that she was fit to make statement and was in senses. Thereafter PW-18 was asked to leave the place and he (SDM) declared his identity to Nimmo and informed her that he wanted to record her statement and she should disclose the entire-facts to him. Then she narrated the entire incident to him which he dictated to his Reader who was also present. Since he (SDM) was having pain in his hand, therefore, the statement was got written from the Reader. He has further stated that Ext. PP is the statement which was correctly recorded as per the version given by Nimmo who thumb marked the statement with left thumb. He signed the said statement. He has further stated that Dr. D.P. Dogra (PW-14) recorded certificate Ext. PP/1 about fitness of the deceased to make the statement.
27. PW-14 Dr. D.P. Dogra has stated that on 27.8.1996 (PW-15) SDM had come to the hospital to record statement of Nimmo and had enquired from him whether she was fit to make statement and he told him (SDM) that she was fit to make statement. Thereafter she made a statement to the SDM in his presence which is Ext. PP and he also appended certificate Ext. PP/1 thereto and signed the same.
28. Ext. PP/1 reads as follows:
I Dr. D.P. Dogra identify the patient Nimmo Devi w/o Jarm Singh, who has been admitted as burn case, the statement has given by her in my presence. She is in her senses.
29. The learned Counsel for the accused contended that dying declaration Ext. PP is unreliable for the reasons (i) that the deceased admittedly made the statement in Chambiali but was recorded in Hindi, (ii) that it was not written by the S.D.M himself but by his Reader who has not been examined, (iii) that there are material contradictions in this statement and statement Ext. PH and (iv) that the deceased lived for more than three weeks after the alleged dying declaration.
30. It clearly emerges from the records that the deceased made the second dying declaration in Chambiali but has been recorded in the form of statement Ext.PP in Hindi. Here again there is nothing in the cross-examination of PW-15 Subhash Nanda which may suggest that he did not understand Chambiali or was incapable of correctly translating the Chambiali version in Hindi. As a Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the concerned area he can be legitimately presumed to understand Chambiali. He has explained that he belongs to Kangro and the Chambiali version of the statement of the deceased was translated by him into Hindi. Kangra and Chamba are the adjoining districts and in the absence of challenge in the cross-examination to the ability of PW-15 to correctly translate Chambiali into Hindi, it cannot be doubted that PW-15 had correctly dictated the statement Ext. PP.
31. In the ordinary course an important function like recording of dying declaration on request by the police should be discharged with due care and caution, therefore, Ext. PP ought to have been recorded by PW-15 in his own hand. However, he has explained his inability to record this statement on the ground that he was having pain in his hand, therefore, it was recorded on his dictation by his Reader, who accompanied him to the hospital. In these circumstances, statement Ext. PP cannot be brushed aside as unreliable.
32. The only contradiction which has been pointed out in the Exts. PH and PP is that in the dying declaration Ext. PP, the deceased has stated that when she was set on fire, she fell unconscious and when she regained consciousness she sat under the tap and then took bath. It was thereafter that she was taken to Dr. Kailash at Koti. However, it is not so stated in the dying declaration Ext. PH. Evidently the contradiction pointed out is of insignificant nature and this part of the statement does not directly relate to the "cause of death" or to the circumstances of the transactions which resulted in the death of Nimmo. So far as the ''cause of death'' of Nimmo and the circumstances of the transactions which led to her death as stated in Ext. PH and Ext. PP are concerned, there is no contradiction. Therefore, on the basis of the contention raised for the accused, Ext. PP is not rendered unreliable.
33. The dying declaration Ext.PP was recorded on 27.8.1996 and Nimmo died on 20.9.1996, that is after three weeks of the making of statement Ext. PP. The deceased had sustained serious burn injuries on her body and the total burns were 75% of second degree. As is evident from the Medico-Legal Report Ext. PN read with the statement of PW-14 a person having more than 50% burn injuries rarely survives. The burn injuries on the person of Nimmo Devi, as per his opinion, were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. In view of this medical opinion, it can be safely said that right from the time of sustaining 75% burn injuries the deceased was under the shadow of death and finally succumbed to such injuries. Therefore, mere lapse of longer time between the date of dying declaration and the death will not minimise or destroy the value of the dying declaration. If otherwise reliable, it can be acted upon.
34. The view we have taken is fully supportable on the basis of ratio in case
9. There is no merit in the contention that the Appellant''s wife died long after making the dying declarations and therefore those statements have no value. The contention overlooks the express provision in Section 32 of the Evidence Act. The second paragraph of Sub-section (1) reads as follows:
Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.
No doubt it has been pointed out that when a person is expecting his death to take place shortly he would not be indulging in falsehood. But that does not mean that such a statement loses its value if the person lives for a longer time than expected. The question has to be considered in each case on the facts and circumstances established therein. If there is nothing on record to show that the statement could not have been true or if the other evidence on record corroborates the contents of the statements, the court can certainly accept the same and act upon it, In the present case both courts have discussed the entire evidence on record and found that two dying declarations contained in Exs. 5 and 6 are acceptable.
35. It cannot be lost sight of that we have already found the dying declaration Ext.PH trustworthy and reliable. Ext.PP simply affirms what is stated in Ext.PH. For this reason also contents of Ext. PP as to the cause of death of Nimmo cannot be disbelieved.
36. It is well-settled that once a dying declaration is proved to be trustworthy and reliable, it can be acted upon to convict the accused without any corroboration. However, in this case the prosecution has further relied on circumstantial evidence. First circumstance is the dispute between the deceased and the accused about the custody of their child. Due to maltreatment and beating by the accused when deceased was residing at her mother''s house, the accused forcibly took away their child of two years from the deceased. It was admittedly pursuant to application u/s 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Ext. PL that the custody of the child was restored to the deceased on 1.9.1995.
37. The second instance is the litigation between the deceased and the accused before the panchayat for maintenance at the instance of the deceased on the grounds of beating and neglect which ended in a compromise on the basis of statement of the accused Ext.PE dated 29.2.1996. As per this statement accused agreed to take the deceased to his house on 1.4.1996. He further agreed that thereafter he would not beat or abuse the deceased. It is implicit in the statement Ext. PE that the accused had been beating and abusing the deceased.
38. It was pursuant to the compromise based on Ext. PE that the deceased returned to her matrimonial house. The date fixed for her return is material. It was within five months of her return to the matrimonial house that the deceased was burnt. There is no dispute about the aforesaid litigations between the deceased and the accused. Rather the later has admitted them in his statement u/s 313, Code of Criminal Procedure and thus the circumstances about the past conduct of the accused are firmly established and it can be inferred that the accused had the motive to get rid of the deceased.
39. It undisputably emerges from the record that the accused did not take care to accompany the deceased after she had stained burn injuries to ensure her treatment. He did not come to Chamba Hospital at all. The circumstance is sought to be explained on the ground that the accused had fractured his leg, therefore, could not walk during night. Even if so, he could have come to the hospital on the next day during the day time. This lapse is explained on the ground that on the next day, he was coming to Chamba via Sultanpur, but was arrested by the police. The accused was admittedly apprehended by the police at Sultanpur on 26.8.1996 at 8 p.m. In case he could not walk during night, why he chose night time to got to Chamba is not explained.
40. The last circumstance is the recovery of burnt Salwar of the deceased Ext. PS and bottle containing some quantity of kerosene Ext. P-7 at the instance of accused vide memo Ext. PC on the basis of disclosure statement Ext. PD. In view of the statements of PW-18 Swaroo Ram, Investigating Officer who recorded it and PW-16 Giah Chand and PW-4 Raj Kumar, marginal witness thereof, the making of the statement Ext. PD by the accused is duly proved. The recovery of these articles vide memo Ext. PC is also proved in view of the statements of PW-18 Swaroo Ram and PW-3 Karam Chand.
41. Be it stated that from Koti the deceased was taken to her parental house, where she narrated the occurrence to her mother (PW-1) who has fully corroborated the prosecution version about the circumstances in which the deceased had sustained burn injuries.
42. The above circumstances also lend credibility to the contents of dying declarations Exts. PH and PP and the case of the prosecution.
43. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the accused that in view of the statement of PW-7 Duni Chand, who took the deceased to the doctor at Koti, that injuries were sustained by the deceased because burning lamp fell upon her and the admission of PW-18 Swaroo Ram that as per the doctor, there were burn injuries on the hands of the deceased, it is a case of accidental injuries and the accused deserved to be acquitted.
44. PW-7 Duni Chand who alongwith his wife and Bittu took the deceased to Koti and then to her parents house has stated that on hiss asking Nimmo had told him that she got burnt because the burning kerosene lamp fell on her. He was declared hostile. He is admittedly uncle of the accused and, therefore, can reasonably be expected to make a statement in favour of his nephew, the accused. He has denied knowledge of the earlier strained relations between the deceased and accused, though being uncle of the accused and residing in the close vicinity of the accused, he must have the knowledge of such relations. His denying such knowledge is apparently to favour the accused. Kerosene in a lamp could not have caused 75% burn injuries to a sleeping person because much of the oil would have been consumed by the guilt or the like which was used as the covering. Some damage to the bed ought to have been caused which is not the case here. Therefore PW-7 is an unreliable witness.
45. PW-18 Swaroo Ram has stated that the doctor had mentioned burn injuries in the hand of the accused. However, he has further stated that he did not see any injury nor he found any evidence that the accused sustained burn injuries while extinguishing the fire.
46. The accused in his statement u/s 313, Code of Criminal Procedure has not stated that in the process of extinguishing fire, he had sustained burn injuries. The doctor who might have found any burn injuries on his hand or medical certificate issued in this regard has not been produced in defence. Small burns can be sustained even by a person who sets another person on fire.
47. Thus, we do not find any merit in the contentions raised for the accused. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly relied on the dying declarations and other circumstances in convicting the accused, therefore the impugned conviction and sentence do not call for any interference.
48. As a result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The accused is in jail undergoing the sentence of imprisonment. A copy of this judgment be sent to him for information through the concerned Superintendent, Jail.
