Rajiv Sharma, J.@mdashThis revision petition is directed against the judgment dated 16.12.2013 passed by the Appellate Authority (II) Sirmaur
District at Nahan in Rent Appeal No. 14-N/14 of 2012. ""Key facts"" necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that respondents-landlords
(hereinafter referred to as the ""landlords"" for convenience sake) filed petition u/s 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 for
the eviction of petitioner-tenant (hereinafter referred to as the ""tenant"" for convenience sake) from the disputed shop. The shop is located in Khasra
No. 278 of Mohal Dhabon, Mohalla Telian, Katcha Tank, Nahan. It was let out to tenant 28 years ago on monthly rent of Rs. 400/- besides other
charges. It was let out for commercial purpose. Tenant is using the same as grocery shop. Eviction was sought by the landlords on the ground that
tenant was in arrears of rent and the premises were required bona fide for major repairs and alterations and for their own personal bona fide use
and occupation. They intended to dismantle the partition wall between the aforesaid two shops in possession of tenant and another tenant Jagat
Ram Chauhan in order to make a big hall for running tuition classes. Other shop is located adjacent to the two shops. They have claimed to be
educated ladies and intended to run tuition classes to enhance their income.
2. The petition was resisted by the tenant. Tenant has denied that tenant is in arrears of rent. According to him, disputed shop is not required by the
landlords on account of bona fide requirement. According to him, landlords intended to evict him. The disputed shop abuts the main road and there
is a lot of traffic on the road causing noise and air pollution. According to him, the partition wall can be removed without evicting him from the
shop.
3. Landlord filed rejoinder to the reply filed by the tenant. Issues were framed by the Rent Controller on 23.9.2010. He partly allowed the petition
and ordered eviction of the tenant from demised premises on the ground of bona fide requirement. Tenant preferred an appeal against the order
dated 31.8.2012 before the Appellate Authority (II), Sirmaur District at Nahan. Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on 16.12.2013. Hence,
the present petition.
4. Tenancy has not been disputed by the tenant. PW-1 Sneh Kashyap has proved site plan Ex. PW-1/A. He has put his signatures on the site plan.
As per site plan, three shops are located in the ground floor. Landlord intended to dismantle the partition wall and make a big hall as depicted in
the proposed ground floor plan. He has denied the suggestion that partition wall can be removed without evicting the premises by the tenant.
5. PW-2 Avinash Partap has led her evidence by way of affidavit Ex. RW-2/A. According to her, shop is required for running a coaching centre to
increase the utility of the premises. She was living with her daughter.
6. Tenant has led his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. RW-1/A. According to him, petition has been filed to pressurize him to vacate the premises.
It is also averred in the affidavit that landlords have very good income and they do not require the premises bona fide.
7. RW-2 Kuldeep Chauhan has also tendered his affidavit Ex. RW-2/A. Site plan Ex. RW-1/B does not bear signatures of Kuldeep Chauhan.
There is no date mentioned in the site plan. The original copy of the site plan was also not produced before the trial Court.
8. It has come in the evidence of tenant that landlords are giving tuition to the students for the last so many years. They are charging Rs. 100/- per
student upto primary level. It has also come on record that 15-20 students come to take tuition from the landlords. Government High School,
Cantt., D.A.V. School, DIET School and Rathi Academy are located in the vicinity of the shops.
9. Smt. Avinash Pratap is getting pension of Rs. 20-25,000/- per month. It has come on record that Nishi Kamini is only getting salary of Rs.
5,000/-. She has to look after two children. Case of the tenant before the Courts below was that wall can be removed without evicting the tenant.
However, it has also come in the statement of RW-1 Jagat Ram (in Rent Petition No. 2/2 of 2010) that the hall cannot be constructed without
removing the partition wall. There is some dispute with regard to width of wall, but it is not material. Landlords have duly proved that they require
the demised premises bona fide for enhancing their income by constructing a big hall for taking tuition classes after carrying out repairs, which
cannot be undertaken without evicting the tenant.
10. It is for the landlord to choose the nature of business and place of business and the tenant cannot dictate the landlords. It has also come on
record that the landlords can generate income of Rs. 8,000/- per month by running tuition classes. It is also proved on record that structure is
pucca and is in good habitation condition. Landlords have duly proved that premises are required for personal use and occupation and the
alteration cannot be carried out without the eviction of tenant from the demised premises.
11. Mr. Bimal Gupta has also argued that landlords have not got the permission from the Municipal Council to make repairs. Building permission is
not condition precedent seeking eviction of the tenant in order to make any repairs, which cannot be carried out without the eviction of tenant.
12. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Mrs. Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar Vs. M/s. Traders and Agencies and another, have held that
landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. Their Lordships have further held that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what
manner he should live. Their Lordships have held as under:
20. As regards the ''Olympus'' flat the evidence discloses, and it is not in dispute, that Eknath left that flat in October, 1972, and since then only
Sridhar and his family members have been staying in that flat. It is a two bed room flat having an area of 1100 sq. ft. Sridhar has a wife and two
children and the family of the appellant also consists of four persons. In the suit for eviction filed by the landlady of that flat a partial decree has
been passed and Eknath has been ordered to hand over half the portion of that flat. Both Eknath and landlady have challenged the said partial
decree and their respective appeals are pending before the Appellate Court. In this context the Courts had to consider whether it can be said that
the appellant and Eknath are having suitable alternative accommodation and, therefore, the appellant''s claim that she requires the suit premises for
her occupation is not reasonable and bona fide. The Appellate Bench and the High Court considered the possibility of Eknath going back to that
flat and occupying it along with Sridhar and also the possibility that in case the landlady''s appeal is dismissed and Eknath''s appeal is allowed the
flat, in its entirely, will become available to Eknath and on that basis held that the appellant''s claim that she requires the suit premises reasonably
and bona fide is not true. As pointed out by this Court it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best
judge of residential requirement. If the landlord desires to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property occupied by his as a tenant
or on any other basis either insecure or inconvenient it is not for the Courts to dictate him to continue to occupy such premises. Though Eknath
continues to be the tenant of the ''Olympus'' flat, as a matter of fact, it is being occupied exclusively by Sridhar and his family since October 1972.
For this reason and also for the reason that because of the partial decree passed against him Eknath is now entitled to occupy the area of 550 sq.
ft. only, it is difficult to appreciate how the Appellate Bench and the High Court could record a finding that the ''Olympus'' flat is readily available to
the appellant''s husband and that the said accommodation will be quite sufficient and suitable for the appellant and her family.
13. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, , their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court have held that once the Court is satisfied
of the bonafides of the need of the landlord for the premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing
out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court and the Court would permit
the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the Court
would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be
accepted by the landlord to satisfy his need. Their Lordships have held as under:
13. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean ''in good faith : genuine''. The word ''genuine'' means ''natural: not spurious : real :
pure : sincere''. In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whitley define bona fide to mean ''good faith, without fraud or deceit''. Thus the term bona fide or
genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by ''requires'' is much more higher than
in mere desire. The phrase ''required bona fide'' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken
note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction
with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the
family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need
of landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts
should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the
need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on
the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the Court
drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid
of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the Court is satisfied of the
bona fides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of
more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court. The Court would permit the landlord
to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the Court would not in
such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the
landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities
of life. An approach either too liberal or two conservative or pedantic must be guarded against.
14. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinary and Co., have held that the landlord is the
best judge of his own requirement for residential or business purposes and has complete freedom in the matter. Their Lordships have held as
under:
10. The learned single Judge of the High Court while formulating first substantial question of law proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff-landlord
admitted that there were number of plots, shops and houses in his possession. We have been taken through the judgments of the Court below and
we do not find any such admission. It is true that the plaintiff-landlord in his evidence stated that there were number of other shops and houses
belonging to him but he made a categorical statement that his said houses and shops were not vacant and that suit premises is suitable for his
business purpose. It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got
complete freedom in the matter. [See. Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan, ]. In the case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant
from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted.
15. In M.L. Prabhakar Vs. Rajiv Singal, , their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court have held that the suitability of the alternative
accommodation has to be determined on the basis of convenience of the landlord and the members of his family, as well as the totality of their
circumstances, including their professions, vocation, lifestyle, habits and background. Their Lordships have further held that the alternative
accommodation must be suitable in the sense of size also and the landlord''s family cannot be forced to split up. Their Lordships have held as
under:
8. It is thus to be seen that the suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the landlord and his family members and on the basis of the totality
of the circumstances including their profession, vocation, style of living, habits and background.
16. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Siddalingamma and Another Vs. Mamtha Shenoy, have held that the law does not demand
that landlord be prevented from living in comfort in his own house and be forced to live in inadequate premises in order that tenant''s occupancy of
tenancy premises may be protected. Their Lordships have held as under:
9. Rent Control Legislation generally leans in favour of tenant: it is only the provision for seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of bond fide
requirement of landlord for his own occupation or use of the tenanted accommodation which treats the landlord with some sympathy. In Shiv
Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, , this Court has held that a bond fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere, honest desire in
contra-distinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any
member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts, by placing
himself in the place of the landlord, is, whether in the given facts proved by material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be
natural, real, sincere, honest? If the answer be in the positive the need is bona fide. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a
practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. If the
landlord wishes live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself and dwell into lesser
premises so as to protect the tenant''s continued occupation in tenancy premises. In Deena Nath Vs. Pooran Lal , this Court has held that bona
fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in
actual need so as to convince the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire.
17. In Joginder Pal Vs. Naval Kishore Behal, , their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court have held that the expression ""for his own use
covers the requirement not only of the landlord but also of his normal ""emanations"". Their Lordships have held as under:
24. We are of the opinion that the expression for his own use as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be narrowly construed. The
expression must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning. The requirement is not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that
the landlord must for himself require the accommodation and to fulfil the requirement he must himself physically occupy the premises. The
requirement of a member of the family or of a person on whom the landlord is dependant or who is dependent on the landlord can be considered
to be the requirement of the landlord for his own use. In the several decided cases referred to hereinabove we have found the pari materia
provisions being interpreted so as to include the requirement of the wife, husband, sister, children including son, daughter, a widowed daughter and
her son, nephew, coparceners, members of family and dependants and kith and kin in the requirement of landlord as ""his"" or ""his own'' requirement
and user. Keeping in view the social or socio religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular Section of society or a particular region, to
which the landlord belongs, it may be obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically
independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such
requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. If the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person other than the landlord
himself the Court shall with circumspection inquire: (i) whether the requirement of such person can be considered to be the requirement of the
landlord, and (ii) whether there is a close inter-relation or identity nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of
the first query. Applying the above said tests to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the tenancy premises are required for the office of the
landlord''s son who is a chartered accountant. It is the moral obligation of the landlord to. settle his son well in his life and to contribute his best to
see him economically independent. The landlord is not going to let out the premises to his son and though the son would run his office in the
premises the possession would continue with the landlord and in a sense the actual occupation by the son would be the occupation by the landlord
himself. It is the landlord who requires the premises for his son and in substance the user would be by landlord for his son''s office. The case
squarely falls within the scope of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act.
18. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Savitri Sahay Vs. Sachidanand Prasad, have held that the landlord can choose either or any
of two or more tenanted premises and the choice of landlord not to be questioned by tenant. Their Lordships have held as under:
9. The next question which, however, arises is whether the conclusion of the High Court that the findings of the trial Court were perverse can be
said to be correct. Under normal circumstances if a landlord during the trial gets vacant possession of some other premises which are equally
suitable and chooses to let them out on higher rent then it may be arguable that the need of the landlord, made out in the eviction petition, was not
reasonable or in good faith. However, as seen above, the said Act provides specifically, in explanation II, that even though a landlord may have
two or more premises which have been let out, it is for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him or her and the tenant could
not question such-preference. In this case, the appellant had indicated a preference for the flat occupied by the respondent. She had given a reason
why she preferred this flat. She was an old lady. She therefore could not climb to the first floor and thus the two flats on the first floor were not
suitable to her. The other flat on the southern side of this building faced a road which was a very busy road and would therefore be noisy. This
particular flat faced the bungalow in which she has been residing for so many years and also faced an open piece of land belonging to her husband.
The trial Court accepts these reasons. The High Court has merely set aside the decree on the ground that the appellant had chosen not to occupy
the three other flats which became available in the same building. In our view, explanation II to Section 11(1)(c) permitted the landlord to ignore
other premises and to prefer a particular premise. The appellant having made a preference cannot be forced to occupy other premises which may
become available. Further the appellant was not required to keep those premises vacant because her eviction suit was pending, nor was there any
duty cast on the appellant, under any provision of law, to offer those other premises to the respondent. If the respondent had so desired, he could
have offered to vacate the flat preferred by the landlady and move into one of those other premises. If the appellant had refused to accept such an
offer, it possibly could have been said that the landlady was merely seeking to get vacant possession in order to get higher rents. In that case it
could have been inferred that the need of the appellant was not genuine and/or in good faith. No such case has been made out. In view of the
specific provision in the said Act the reasoning of the High Court cannot be sustained.
19. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court have again reiterated in Akhileshwar Kumar and Others Vs. Mustaqim and Others, that once
the landlord proves his bonafides to the objective satisfaction of the Court of facts, the choice of accommodation which would satisfy his
requirement should be left to landlord''s subjective choice and the Court cannot impose its own choice. Their Lordships have held as under:
4. So is the case with the availability of alternative accommodation, as opined by the High Court. There is a shop in respect of which a suit for
eviction was filed to satisfy the need of plaintiff No. 2, The suit was compromised and the shop was got vacated. The shop is meant for the
business of plaintiff No. 2. There is yet another shop constructed by the father of the plaintiffs which is situated over a septic tank but the same is
almost inaccessible inasmuch as there is a deep ditch in front of the shop and that is why it is lying vacant and unutilized. Once it has been proved
by a landlord that the suit accommodation is required bona fide by him for his own purpose and such satisfaction withstands the test of objective
assessment by the Court of facts then, choosing of the accommodation which would be reasonable to satisfy such requirement has to be left to the
subjective choice of the needy. The Court cannot thrust upon its own choice on the needy. Of course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably
and not whimsically. The alternative accommodation which have prevailed with the High Court are either not available to the plaintiff No, l or not
suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is. The approach of the High Court that an accommodation got vacated to satisfy the need of
plaintiff No. 2, who too is an educated unemployed, should be diverted or can be considered as relevant alternative accommodation to satisfy the
requirement of plaintiff No. 1, another educated unemployed brother, cannot be countenanced. So also considering a shop situated over a septic
tank and inaccessible on account of a ditch in front of the shop and hence lying vacant cannot be considered a suitable alternative to the suit shop
which is situated in a marketing complex, is easily accessible and has been purchased by the plaintiffs to satisfy the felt need of one of them.
20. The Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Pratap Rai Tanwani and Another Vs. Uttam Chand and Another, have explained the term
bona fide requirement"". Their Lordships have held as under:
12. One of the grounds for eviction contemplated by all the rent control legislations, which otherwise generally lean heavily in favour of the tenants,
is the need of the owner landlord to have his own premises, residential or non-residential, for his own use or his own occupation. The expressions
employed by different legislations may vary such as ""bona fide requirement"", ""genuine need"", ""requires reasonably and in good faith"", and so on.
Whatever be the expression employed, the underlying legislative intent is one and that has been demonstrated in several judicial pronouncements of
which we would like to refer to only three.
14. In Gulabbai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra, reiterating the view taken in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, it was held that the words ""reasonable
requirement"" undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and
need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire.
15. Recently, in Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, this Court in a detailed judgment, dealing with this aspect, analysed the concept of
bona fide requirement and said that the requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome Of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction
with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant refers to a state of mind prevailing with the landlord. The only way of peeping into the mind of the
landlord is an exercise undertaken by the judge of facts by placing himself in the armchair of the landlord and then posing a question to himself-
whether in the given facts, substantiated by the landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the
answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. We do not think that we can usefully add anything to the exposition of law of requirement for self-
occupation than what has been already stated in the three precedents.
21. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Kailash Chand and Another Vs. Dharam Das, while interpreting the provisions of H.P.
Urban Rent Control, Act, 1987 have held that Courts not to ordinarily deny relief to landlord who genuinenely and bona fide requires tenanted
premises for occupation by himself or members of his family. Their Lordships have also explained the terms ""his own occupation"", ""for his own
use"" and ""for occupation by himself"". Their Lordships have held that these phrases are not to be assigned a narrow meaning and these phrases
include requirements of members of family of landlord or those dependent on him. Their Lordships have held as under:
24. The expression ''his own occupation'' as occurring in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section (3) is not to be assigned a narrow meaning. It has
to be read liberally and given a practical meaning. ''His own occupation'' does not mean occupation by the landlord alone and as an individual. The
expressions ""for his own use"" and ""for occupation by himself"" as occurring in two other Rent Control ''Acts, have come up for the consideration of
this Court in Joginder Pal Vs. Naval Kishore Behal, and Dwarkaprasad Vs. Niranjan and Another, . It was held that the requirement of members
of family of the landlord or of the one who is dependent on the landlord, is the landlord''s own requirement. Regard will be had to the social or
socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular Section of society or a particular region to which the landlord belongs, while
interpreting such expressions. The requirement of the family members for residence is certainly the requirement by the landlord for ''his own
occupation''.
25. Undoubtedly, the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 has been enacted for the purpose of providing for the control of rents and
evictions because of paucity of accommodation in urban areas. The Rent Control Legislations, generally aim at preventing rack-renting and
resorting to evictions by unscrupulous and greedy landlords, who take advantage of the shortage in availability of accommodations in cities and
dictate their terms to the tenants and if they do not follow the dictates, subject them to eviction. The Rent Control Legislations are generally heavily
loaded in favour of the tenants and the provision dealing with which the Courts at times lean in favour of the landlords is the one which permits the
landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement for his own occupation, residential or nonresidential. There are weak amongst
the tenants as also amongst the landlords. (See Joginder Pal''s case, supra, paras 9 and 32) Take the case of a landlord knocking the doors of the
Court seeking its assistance for a roof over his head or for a reasonably comfortable living, when he is himself either in a rented accommodation or
squeezing himself and his family members in a limited space, while the tenant protected by the Rent Control Law is comfortably occupying the
premises of the landlord or a part thereof. Provisions like Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Act should be so interpreted as to advance the cause of justice
instructed by the realties of life and practical wisdom. While the tenant needs to be protected, the Courts would not ordinarily deny the relief to the
landlord, who genuinely and bona fide requires the premises in occupation of the tenant for occupation by himself or for the members of his family,
unless they feel convinced that the so-called requirement of the landlord was a ruse for getting rid of an inconvenient tenant or was otherwise mala
fide and did not fall within the four corners of the ground for eviction provided by the law.
22. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment Dinesh Kumar Vs. Yusuf Ali, have held that the landlord is best judge of
his need, however, it should be real, genuine and hot a pretext to evict tenant only for increasing rent. Their Lordships have held as under:
24. There is no prohibition to entertain a second appeal even on question of fact provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of the Courts
below were vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by showing erroneous approach to the matter. (Vide Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu
Singh, ; Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan, ; Smt. Satya Gupta Alias Madhu Gupta Vs. Brijesh Kumar, , Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem
Machinary and Co., ; and Molar Mal (Dead) Through L.Rs. Vs. M/s. Kay Iron Works(P) Ltd., ).
30. The High Court reached the conclusion that the landlord, in spite of the fact that he was owner of the suit premises could not be forced to
continue his business in a shop of negligible area in a ''Gumti'' made on platform on Nalla. Mere continuation of long tenancy could not be a ground
to reject the case of bona fide need.
CMP No. 3117/2014
23. Tenant has also filed this application for leading additional evidence. According to him, landlords added one more storey to the existing
structure. It will not make any difference on the merits of the case, as such, the application is dismissed. Accordingly, in view of the observations
and discussion made hereinabove, there is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. No costs.