1. By this writ petition, the petitioner challenged the order of suspension dated 18.5.2009 (Annexure C to the writ petition) and subsequent review order extending the suspension dated 31.10.2009. (Annexure F to the writ petition) and 11.5.2011 (Annexure R/2 to the counter affidavit of respondent No.1).
2. I have heard Mr. Ratan Datta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. D.C. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2.
3. The petitioner while working asan Executive Engineer under the State Pollution Control Board (''the Board'') was arrested in connection with the criminal case of abatement to suicide of his wife on 15.5.2009 and was taken to custody. Considering his involvement in criminal case and consequent detention in custody by order dated 18.5.2009 (Annexure C to the writ petition), he was placed under suspension with effect from the date of arrest, i.e., 15.5.2009 in terms of subrule (2) of rule 10 of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 (''the Rules''). He was released from custody, on bail, on 9.7.2009.
4. The case of the petitioner is that he informed his release to the Chairman of the Board on the date of his release itself and that subsequently he made representation praying for revocation of the suspension order. But the Board after 90 days reviewed the order of suspension on 31.10.2009 beyond the scope of subrule (6) of rule 10 of the Rules and, therefore, the order dated 31.10.2009 was illegal and violative of the legal provisions and liable to be interfered with. It is the further case of the petitioner that the respondentauthority while did not consider his representation again extended the period of suspension by order dated 11.5.2011 (R/2 to the counter affidavit) and that was made after 180 days of the extended period of suspension and that order is also liable to be interfered with. Since the respondents violated the provisions prescribed under Rule 10 of the Rules, the order of suspension so made and reviewed by the respondents should be interfered, set aside and quashed.
5. The case of the respondents is that subrules (6) and (7) of rule 10 of the Rules are not applicable to the petitioner since those rules were not made applicable to the State of Tripura by notification of the State Government and, therefore, the petitioner cannot claim benefit by applying those rules in his case. The further case of the respondents is that the petitioner initially made the communication of his release on bail only on 29.9.2009 and the information given to the Chairman of the Board cannot be treated as an official communication and hence, the first review held on 31.10.2009 should be treated as within 90 days and as such does not deserve interference. The second review was no doubt made sometime after the lapse of 180 days, but since it was an inherent power of the appointing authority to place a person under suspension, the court should not ordinarily interfere in it. If the suspension order is revoked at this stage, it will send a wrong message to the society and the people will be highly demoralized.
6. Admittedly, the petitioner was arrested on an allegation that he has abated his married wife to commit suicide and he was put to custody on 15.5.2009. By order dated 18.5.2009 (Annexure C to the writ petition) he was placed under suspension with effect from 15.5.2009 (date of arrest) as per subrule (2) of rule 10 of the Rules and he is still under suspension. The crux of the petitioner''s case is that the review for extension of suspension period was not made within the statutory period as prescribed in subrules (6) and (7) of rule 10 of the Rules and, therefore, the orders passed should not be quashed. Let us reproduce here the subrules (6) and (7) of the rule 10 of the Rules which run, thus :
"(6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension (before expiry of ninety days from the effective date of suspension on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent review shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time.)
(7) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under subrule (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days :
Provided that no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under subrule (2), if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of ninety days of suspension and the ninety days period in such case will count from the date the Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later."
7. Mr. Roy Barman and Mr. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the respondents argued that subrules (6) and (7) of rule 10 of the Rules have been introduced by amendment long after the CCS (CCA) Rules were adopted by the State Government and there is no subsequent notification of the State Government adopting the amended provision of subrules (6) and (7) and, therefore, the petitioner cannot claim the benefits. On the other hand, Mr. Datta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the respondents adopted the amended rules by necessary implication since they have twice reviewed the suspension order as per the provisions of subrules (6) and (7) and, therefore, they cannot now take the plea that the said rules were not adopted by the State Government. In fact, I find that the respondents reviewed the suspension, order twice on 31.10.2009 and 11.5.2011 and thereby made abundantly clear that the amended rule has been taken into effect by the State respondents and hence, I find no merit in the submission of the learned counsel of the respondents.
8. Since the first suspension order was made on 18.5.2009 with effect from 15.5.2009, the review of the suspension according to the Rules, reproduced above, was to be made within ninety days. But the first review order was made only on 31.10.2009 which means it was after a lapse of ninety days. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the release order of the petitioner from Jail was informed only on 29.9.2009 when the petitioner made the representation (Annexure D to the writ petition) but on the contrary, the contention of the petitioner is that release order was brought to the notice of the Chairman of the Board on the very date of release and to that effect a certificate was issued by the Chairman of the Board (Annexure K to the writ petition). The Chairman of the Board has clearly stated that the petitioner on being released on bail intimated him over telephone about his release in the evening of the date of release itself. This communication though was made over telephone may be termed as sufficient in terms of the provision as prescribed in proviso to subrule (7) of rule 10 of the Rules. There is nothing in the Rules that the information must be given in writing. While the information was given to the Chairman of the Board who was the appointing authority and ordered his suspension and reviewed the suspension, in my considered opinion, the information to the Chairman of the Board was sufficient information to the respondent authority regarding his release on bail and, therefore, the limitation shall run from the date of his release itself, i.e., from 9.7.2009 and, therefore, the order dated 31.10.2009 reviewing extension of the period of suspension was in violation of the provision prescribed in the Rules. The subsequent extension of the suspension order made on 11.5.2011 is admittedly after 180 days and it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that since it is an inherent power, the order should not be disturbed. In support of his contention, Mr. Roy Barman referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 800. In that reported case, the Apex Court has held that the authority entitled to appoint the public servant is entitled to suspend him pending departmental inquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding which may eventually result in a departmental inquiry against him. There is no doubt about the law explained by the Apex Court in the said judgment. The question raised in this writ case is about the review of suspension and violation of the time frame thereof prescribed in the Rules. This decision of the Apex Court was given in the year 1968 whereas the amendment to the Rules made in the years 2004 and 2007. The ratio of that decision is not applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the case. The next decision referred to by the learned counsel is of Pawan Kumar v. State of Mizoram, 2010 (6) GLJ 436. The factual aspect of that case is not similar to that of the fact of the present case and, therefore, the ratio of that decision cannot be applied in this case. Here, the point raised is that the time limit prescribed for review of the suspension order has been violated and such issue was not the subjectmatter of that decision. So, the ratio of that case is not applicable. The next decision referred to by the learned counsel is the case of U.P. Rajya Kris hi Utpadan Mandi v. Sanjiv Ranjan, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 483 wherein the Apex Court has held that whether the employees should or should not continue in their office during the period of inquiry is a matter to be assessed by the authority concerned and ordinarily, the court should not interfere with the order of suspension unless they are passed mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employees with the misconduct in question. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court is not applicable is this case since here, the question raised as already stated earlier is noncompliance of the time limit prescribed in the Rules. The question of authority to place an employee under suspension is not at all an issue challenged. Here, the question is that the authority failed to exercise its power and jurisdiction according to law. So, this decision is also not in the help of the respondents. The next decision referred to by the learned counsel is the case of V.P. Gidronia v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, (1970) 1 SCC 362 wherein the Apex Court laid down the same principle as reported in the case of U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi (supra) and the ratio of the decision cannot be applied in the facts of this case.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the case of Union of India v. Dipak Mali, AIR 2010 SCW 158 wherein the Apex Court in similar circumstances held that the suspension that has expired after 90 days cannot be revived by subsequent review. This court in Single Bench in the case of Jinnah Abdur Rahim v. State of Assam and Others, 2002 (3) GLT 4981 was pleased to set aside the order of suspension considering that the petitioner was under suspension for more than four and half years. The ratio of that decision is not applicable in the fact of this case.
10. In the case in hand, the petitioner was arrested in connection with a criminal case of abatement to suicide of his wife which was not directly connected with the discharge of his official duty. However, he was rightly placed under suspension and it is on record that there were some other departmental proceedings also initiated against him and in one of such proceedings, he was awarded with minor punishment. But that does not ipso facto authorize the authority to keep the petitioner under suspension for an uncertain period. No doubt, it is the prerogative of the authority to put a person under suspension but that must be done according to the procedure prescribed by law. While the respondents have given effect to the amended subrules (6) and (7) of rule 10 of the Rules, they are under absolute obligation to do the things according to the time prescribed by law and after the lapse of statutory period, extension of suspension was beyond jurisdiction and, therefore, liable to be interfered with.
11. Accordingly, the order dated 31.10.2009 (Annexure F to the writ petition) and order dated 11.5.2011 (Annexure R/2 to the counter affidavit) are set aside and quashed.
1. (2002) 3 GLR 264
12. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in normal duty with immediate effect.
13. The writ petition accordingly stands disposed off.
