T. Nandakumar Singh, J.@mdashThe petitioner is the father of the detenu, Md. Shahid Ahamed @ Abaskhan. By this writ petition, the detention order dated 08.12.2009 issued by the District Magistrate, Thoubal, in exercise of power conferred upon him by sub section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act (NSA), 1980 read with Government of Manipur, Home Department Notification No. 17(1)/49/80H(PI) dated 10.11.2009 for detaining the detenu until further order, the order of the State Government dated 15.12.2009 for approving the detention order dated 08.12.2009 and also the order of the State Government for confirming the detention order and thereby fixing the period of detention for 12 months from the date of detention; had been put to challenge.
2. Heard Mr. S. Jayanta, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. O. Kiranjit, learned counsel for the petitioner and also Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned GA appearing for respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 as well as Mr. C. Kamal, learned CGSC appearing for respondent No.1.
3. Before adverting to the question involved in the present writ petition, a brief fact of the matter is noted. The detenu is a Constable in the Manipur Police Department. After completing training he was posted at the District Headquarter, Tamenglong, Manipur and was employed as a member of the escort of the S.P., Tamenglong, Manipur. On 30.11.2009 the detenu left Tamenglong Police Headquarter, Manipur for his home, with prior permission of the S.P., Tamenglong, for medical treatment of his injured left leg. On 01.12.2009 at about 1.30 p.m. the detenu was arrested by a team of CDO, Thoubal Manipur while he was going to Kshetri Leikai to consult a local Maiba (Physiotherapist); and his Identity Card was also seized by them. Thereafter the detenu was handed over to the Officerincharge of Thoubal Police Station. On the strength of the report lodged by a member of the CDO, Thoubal, a criminal case under FIR No.231 (12)72009 of Thoubal Police Station under Sections 17 and 20 of the UA (P) Act, 1967 was registered. In connection with the said FIR case, the detenu was produced before the learned CJM, Thoubal, who remanded the detenu to Police Custody up to 08.12.2009.
4. While the detenu was in Police Custody in connection with the said FIR case he was detained under NSA vide impugned order dated 08.12.2009 issued by the District Magistrate, Thoubal. The District Magistrate, Thoubal under his letter being No. Cril.NSA Case No.29/09 furnished the grounds of detention and copies of the documents which form the ground of detention to the detenu. Under the said letter of the District Magistrate, Thoubal dated 08.12.2009, the detenu had been informed and afforded earliest opportunity of making representation against the detention order to the State Government as well as the Central Government and the Detaining Authority; and also that in case of representation to the Central Government, it should be addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs (Department of Internal Security), North Block, New Delhi. The detenu filed representation dated 18.12.2009 through the Superintendent, Central Jail, Sajiwa against the detention order to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Internal Security, North Block, New Delhi. In that representation dated 18.12.2009 the detenu had taken many grounds and reasons for setting aside/revocation of the detention order dated 08.12.2009 (impugned detention order) issued by the District Magistrate, Thoubal. Nowhere in the representation the detenu petitioner took the plea that he could not file effective representation against the detention order because of nonfurnishing of documents or failure to understand the case against him for detaining under the NSA. The detenu had been informed that his representation to the Central Government had been rejected by the Central Government on 13.01.2010 vide wireless message being F. No.II/15023/211/2009NSA dated 14.01.2010 and a copy of it was also furnished to the detenu. For easy reference the said wireless message dated 14.01.2010 for rejecting the representation of the detenu to the Central Government is quoted hereunder:
"F.No.II/15023/211/2009NSA
Dated 14.01.2010
Reference representation of the detenu Md. Shahid Ahamad @ Abaskhan S/o. Md. Jabar against the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate Thoubal on 08.12.2009 under NSA1980(.) The representation was duly considered by the Central Government (.) Request of the detenu for revocation of the detention order passed against him has not repeat not been acceded to by the Central Government (.) Kindly information the detenu accordingly (.) Matter most urgent (.)"
5. By the said message 14.01.2010 of the Central Government, the detenu has been informed and made to understand that his representation dated 18.12.2009 to the Central Government had been rejected. After rejection of the representation dated 18.12.2009, remedies open, amongst others, to the detenu are (1) to challenge the impugned detention order, approval and confirmation orders by approaching this Court by invoking writ jurisdiction, (2) to file fresh representation to the State Government, i.e appropriate Government to revoke or modify the detention order at an early date in exercise of power conferred by proviso to Section 13 of the NSA and (3) to file fresh representation to the Central Government for revocation or modification of the detention order in exercise of power conferred under Section 14 of the NSA. In other words, in case of rejection of the representation of the detenu dated 18.12. 2009 by the Central Government, remedy left open to the detenu is to take recourse to one of the remedies indicated above and not the writ petition challenging the said order of the Central Government rejecting the representation dated 18.12.2009 intimated to the detenu under the said Wireless Message dated 14.01.2010 inasmuch as the detenu is really aggrieved by the impugned detention order under the NS A. The detenu could file fresh representation to the Central Government; and quashing of the said rejection order in a writ petition shall not result quashing of the detention order.
6. It is the case of the detenu that since copy of the order of the Central Government rejecting his representation dated 18.12.2009, even though informed to him by the said Wireless Message dated 14.01.2010, was not furnished, it cannot be said that the representation dated 18.12.2009 had been rejected. It is further case of the detenu that only when the very copy of the said order of the Central Government rejecting his representation dated 18.12.2009 is furnished, it could be said that the reprsentation had been rejected and mere information that his representation had been rejected by the said message dated 14.01.2010, cannot be an order for rejection of the representation dated 18.12.2009 and, therefore, the right of the detenu guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India had been violated inasmuch as the representation of the detenu dated 18.12.2009 to the Central Government cannot be said to have been rejected by the Central Government.
7. Mr. S. Jayanta, learned senior counsel appearing for the detenu, regarding this point, had placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in State of West Bengal Vs. M.P. Mondal & Anr.: (2001) 8 SCC 443. Mr. Jayanta, learned senior counsel, strenuously contended that only when copy of the order of Central Government rejecting the representation of the detenu dated 18.12.2009 would be furnished to the detenu, it can be said that the said representation had been rejected; and mere information that the said representation had been rejected is not the manner provided under the law to inform the detenu that his representation dated 18.12.2009 had been rejected by the Central Government.
8. For deciding the above ground taken by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the detenu for assailing the impugned detention, approval and confirmation orders that representation dated 18.12.2009 filed by the detenu to the Central Government shall be treated in the eye of law pending in the given case and as a result right of the detenu guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India had been violated, we may refer to the decisions of the Apex Court in (1) State of Punjab Vs. Amar Singh Harika: AIR 1966 SC1313, (2) Tagin Litin Vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh: (1996) 5 SCC 83, (3) Bachhittar Singh Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1963 SC 395, (4) State of West Bengal Vs. M.P. Mondal & Anr.: (2001) 8 SCC 443, (5) Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Qimat Rai Gupta & Ors.: (2007) 7 SCC 309 & (6) Union of India & Anr. Vs. Kartick Chandra Mondal & Anr.: (2010) 2 SCC 422.
9. It is well settled in law that ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the fact of that case and the case is only an authority for what it actually decides. It is also equally well settled that a little difference in fact or additional fact may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.
10. In Ambika Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat: (1987) 1 SCC 213 (vide SCC p.221, para 18) the Apex Court observed:
"18.......The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from k."
In Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.: (2003) 2 SCC 111 (vide SCC p. 130, para 59) Apex Court observed:
"59.......It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision."
11. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. N.R. Vairamani: (2004) 8 SCC 579, a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment, the Apex Court also observed: (SCC pp.58485, paras 912).
"9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid''s theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dck Co. Ltd. Vs. Horton (AC at p.761) 1951 AC 737 Lord MacDermott observed (All ER p. 14CD).
"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the Ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge,....."
10. In Home Office Vs. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. (1970) 2 ALL ER 294 (HL) ALL ER p.297 gh) Lord Reid Said, ''Lord Atkin''s speech......is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances''. Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. Vs. Sandham(No.2),(1971)2ALLER1267 observed: (ALL ER p. 127 d) ''One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russel, L.J. as if it were an Act of parliament''.
And, in Herrington Vs. British Railways Board Lord Morris (1972) 1 ALL ER 749 (HL (E)) said (ALL ERp.761 c)
"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case."
11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:
"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.
Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."
12. No doubt, the doctrine of preventive power of the Administrative/Executive authority, constitutionally validate preventive process for the maintenance of public order, security of the State, national security, defence of India and relations of India with the foreign power. The Apex Court in Amir Shad Khan Vs. L. Hmingliana & Ors.: (1991) 4 SCC 39 held that:
"The law of preventive detention is harsh to the person detained and, therefore, there can be no doubt that it must be strictly construed. Article 22 (3) (b) denies to a person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention the protection of clauses (1) and (2) of the said article. Clause (4) thereof enjoins that the preventive detention law must conform to the limitations set out there under. Clause (5) of Article 22 reads as under:
"22.(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order."
(Ref: para 3 of the SCC in Amir Shad Khan''s case (supra))."
13. In Amar Singh Harika''s case (supra) the respondent Amar Singh Harika, who was an Assistant Director, Civil Supplies, in the Patiala and East Punjab States Union, was dismissed from service by an order purported to have been passed on the 3rd June 1949; this order was, however, communicated to him by the Chief Secretary, Pepsu Government, only on 2nd and 3rd January 1953. In that factual context, the Apex Court (Constitution Bench) held that ''mere passing of an order of dismissal is not effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. Para 11 of the AIR in Amar Singh Harika''s case (supra) read as follows:
"11. The first question which has been raised before us by Mr. Bishan Narain is that though the respondent came to know about the order of his dismissal for the first time on the 28th May 1951, the said order must be deemed to have taken effect as from the 3rd June 1949 when it was actually passed.
The High Court has rejected this contention; but Mr. Bishan Narain contends that the view taken by the High Court is erroneous in law. We are not impressed by Mr. Bishan Narain''s argument. It is plain that the mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. If the appointment authority passed an order of dismissal, but does not communicate it to the officer concerned, theoretically it is possible that unlike in the case of a judicial order pronounced in Court, the authority may change its mind and decide to modify its order. It may be that in some case, the authority may feel that the ends of justice would be met by demoting the officer concerned rather than dismissing him. An order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept with itself, cannot be said to take effect unless the officer concerned knows about the said order and it is otherwise communicated to all the parties concerned. If it is held that the mere passing of the order of dismissal has the effect of terminating the services of the officer concerned, various complications may arise. If before receiving the order of dismissal, the officer has exercised his power and jurisdiction to take decisions or do acts within his authority and power, would those acts and decisions be rendered invalid after it is known that an order of dismissal had already been passed against him ? Would the officer concerned be entitled to his salary for the period between the date when the order was passed and the date when it was communicated to him ? These and other complications would inevitably arise if it is held that the order of dismissal takes effect as soon as it is passed, though it may be communicated to the officer concerned several days thereafter. It is true that in the present case, the respondent had been suspended during the material period; but that does not change the position that if the officer concerned is not suspended during the period of enquiry, complications of the kind already indicated would definitely arise. We are, therefore, reluctant to hold that an order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it will take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. When a public officer is removed from service, his successor would have to take charge of the said office; and except in cases where the officer concerned has already been suspended, difficulties would arise if it is held that an officer who is actually working and holding charge of his office, can be said to be effectively removed from his office by the mere passing of an order by the appropriate authority. In our opinion, therefore, the order of dismissal passed against the respondent on the 3rd June 1949 could not be said to have taken effect until the respondent came to know about it on the 28th May 1951."
14. The relevant fact of the case in Tagin Litin''s case (supra) was that the Deputy Commissioner passed an order on 31.01.1994 for issuing appointment order for appointing Mr. Ojom Libang (writ petitioner) as Head Gaonburah and wireless message was sent to the Addl. Deputy Commissioner, Yingkiong on 15.02.1994 directing him to inform Mr. Ojom Libang of the approval of his name for Head Gaonburaah. Before informing Mr. Ojom Libang of the said order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 31.01.1994 for issuing appointment order for appointing him as Head Gaonburah, another wireless message dated 19.04.1994 was sent to the Addl. Deputy Commissioner that Mr. Tagin Litin and Mr. Ojom Libang had been appointed as Head Gaonburah and 2nd Head Gaonburah respectively of Simong village. The said order was communicated to Mr. Ojom Libang; Mr. Ojom Libang approached the Gauhati High Court by filing writ petition being WP(C) No.2035 of 1994 which was disposed of by the Gauhati High Court by judgment and order dated 27.09.1994 herein and where under the High Court held that on 31.01.1994 an order had been passed by the Deputy Commissioner for issuance of an appointment order regarding appointment of the writ petitioner, Mr. Ojom Libang as Head Gaonburah of Simong village and that writ petitioner was holding civil post, he cannot be removed from the same without affording an opportunity. Against that order of the Gauhati High Court, Mr. Tagin Litin filed Civil Appeal No.8247 of 1996 before the Apex Court. The Apex Court held that uncommunicated order of appointment is ineffective inasmuch as the said order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 31.01.1994 was not communicated to the writ petitioner, Ojom Libang and, accordingly, allowed the appeal. Paras 14 and 15 of the SCC in Tagin Litin''s case (supra) read as follows:
"14. As noticed earlier, in the instant case the Deputy Commissioner, who was the competent authority under the Regulation, had passed an order on 31.01.1994 approving the appointment of the petitioner and Shri Atteng Sitiek as Head Gaonburah and Second Head Gaonburah of Simong village and had directed that the appointment order be issued. Thereafter the WT message dated 15.2.1994 was sent to the Additional Deputy Commissioner to inform the petitioner and Shri Atteng Sitek about the approval of their appointment as Head Gaonburah and Second Head Gaonburah of Simong village from 31.1.1994. WT message dated 8.3.1994, which was subsequently sent from the office of the Deputy Commissioner to the Additional Deputy Commissioner records that no formal order for appointment of the petitioner and Shri Atteng Sitek had been issued from the office since no such order was issued earlier in other cases also and that the only correspondence regarding the same was the WT message dated 15.2.1994 addressed by the Deputy Commissioner to the Additional Deputy Commissioner, In view of the said statement in WT message dated 8.3.1994, the WT message dated 15.2.1994 has to be treated as the order regarding appointment of the petitioner as Head Gaonburah of Simong village. Conditions (a) and (b) aforementioned for appointment on a post or office were, therefore, satisfied in the present case. The only question is whether condition (c) had been satisfied before the passing of the order dated 19.4.1994 whereby Tagin Litin was appointed as Head Gaonburah and the petitioner was appointed as Second Head Gaonburah of Simong village. In this context, it may be stated that by the WT message dated 8.3.1994 it was directed that the appointment of the petitioner and Shri Atteng Sitek as per WT message dated 15.2.1994 be kept in abeyance for the time being.
15. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether the said order of appointment as contained in the WT message dated 15.2.1994 had become effective by having been communicated to the petitioner prior to 8.3.1994. It is no doubt true that by WT message dated 15.2.1994 the Additional Deputy Commissioner was directed to inform the petitioner about approval of his appointment as Head Gaonburah from 31.1.1994. There is, however, nothing to show that the said order was actually communicated by the Additional Deputy Commissioner to the petitioner. In paragraph 13 of the writ petition filed before the High Court the petitioner had asserted that the petitioner was informed about the said appointment by WT message dated 15.2.1994. But in the affidavit in opposition of Shri Rakhal Chandra Deb Nam filed on behalf of the State of Arunachal Pradesh, the Deputy Commissioner and the Additional Deputy Commissioner, in reply to the said assertion in paragraph 13 of the writ petition it has been denied that the petitioner was informed about his appointment as Head Gaonburah. In the said affidavit in opposition, it is stated that on 5.2.1994 the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Viang Kiong had addressed a letter to the Deputy Commissioner stating the relevant facts and also indicating the rival claims of the petitioner and Tagin Litin for the post of Head Gaonburah and sought for necessary advice for a fair selection tor the post of Head Gaonburah and sought for necessary and Tagin Litin for the post of Head Gaonburah and that on the receipt of the above letter the Deputy Commissioner decided to keep in abeyance the process of consideration of the case of Tagin Litin and to review the issue of a free and fair selection for appointment to the post of Head Gaonburah and thereafter WT message dated 8.3.1994 was sent by the Deputy Commissioner to the Additional Deputy Commissioner to keep in abeyance the appointment of the petitioner and Shri Atteng Sitek. The WT message dated 8.3.1994 also lends support to the said assertion in the said message makes a mention of the fact that the Additional Deputy Commissioner had given a suggestion for keeping the appointment of the petitioner and Shri Atteng Sitek in abeyance for the time being and the said suggestion had been accepted by the Deputy Commissioner. This would indicate that prior to issuance of WT message dated 8.3.1994 the information regarding appointment of the petitioner as Head Gaonburah as contained in WT message dated 15.2.1994 was not communicated to the petitioner. There is no question of any such communication being made to him after 8.3.1994 because in WT message dated 3.3.1994 there was a clear direction that the said appointment be kept in abeyance. In these circumstances it must be held that prior to the issuance of the order dated 19.4.1994, there was no communication of the order dated 15.2.1994 to the petitioner with regard to his appointment as Head Gaonburah of Simong village. In the absence of any such communication, the said order of appointment had not come into effect and the order dated 19.4.1994, whereby Tagin Litin was appointed as Head Gaonburah and the petitioner was appointed as Second Head Gaonburah cannot be regarded as an order for removal of the petitioner as Head Gaonburah. The impugned judgment of the High Court setting aside the order dated 19.4.1994 regarding appointment of Tagin Litin as Head Gaonburah and the petitioner as Second Head Gaonburah and directing that the petitioner should be treated as Head Gaonburah by virtue of WT message dated 15.2.1994 cannot, therefore, be upheld and has to be set aside."
15. The fact in the case of M.P. Mondal & Anr''s case (supra) is that on 11.3.1998, the Joint Secretary issued a memorandum to the Chief Engineer, directing him to allow the contractor to deposit at the rate of Rs. 1.10 lakhs per day for six months with effect from 16.12.1997 subject to the condition that he would pay at the original contracted rate after six months and dues will be paid in 10 equal instalments. The very Joint Secretary issued another memorandum dated 11.3.1998, permitting him to deposit bid money with effect from 16.12.1997 and further ordering that the Toll Collector would be liable to continue to deposit bid money at the rate of Rs.2,90,000/ per day. In that context the Apex Court held that the memorandum remaining in file and never communicated to the respondent, i.e. earlier memorandum dated 11.3.1998 allowing him to deposit at the rate of Rs. 1.10 lakhs per day which remain in the file has no legal effect or force or authority.
16. The Apex Court in Qimat Rai Gupta''s case (supra) held that an order ordinarily is presumed to have been made when it is signed; it is required to be communicated where communication thereof is a necessary ingredient for bringing an end result to a status or to provide a person an opportunity to take recourse to law if he is aggrieved thereby. Paras 17,18,19,20,21 and 22 of the SCC in Qimat Rai Gupta''s case (supra) read as follows:
"17. When an order is passed by a high ranking authority appointed by the Central Government, the law presumes that it would act bona fide. Misuse of power in a situation of this nature, in our opinion, should not be readily inferred. It is difficult to comprehend that while fixing a period of limitation, parliament did not visualise the possibility of abuse of power on the part of the statutory authority. It advisedly chose the word "made" and not "communicated". They, in ordinary parlance, carry different meanings.
18. Even if a statute requires strict interpretation, words thereto would not be added.
19. The word "made" is past and past participle of the word "make" which means "cause to exist or come about; bring about or perform:" (See Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edn.)
20. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar''s Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn., p.2822, it is stated:
"Made. A receiving order or other order of Court is ''made'' on the day it is pronounced, not when it is drawn up. (Manning, In re (1885) 30 Ch D.480 (CA). See also Pancham Vs. Jhinguri: ILR(1882)4A11278.
The word ''made'' in this rule might refer to the proclamation of sale as well as the announcement of the sale, as it says that it shall be made and published in the manner provided by Rule 54(1). The word ''made'' cannot be taken to include the preparation of proclamation of sale. Seshagiri Aiyar Vs. Valambal Ammal: AIR 1952 Mad 377, AIR at p.381. [Order 21 Rule 54 (1) CPC(5 of 1908)]
An order by a Chancery Judge in Chambers is ''made'' not when it is pronounced, but when it is signed and entered, or otherwise perfected (Heatley Vs. Newton: (1881) 19 Ch D 326 (CA)."
21. The meaning of a word, it is trite, would depend upon its text and context. It will also depend upon the purport and object it seeks to achieve. With a view to understand the proper meaning of the said word, we may notice the decisions cited at the Bar.
22. In Surendra Singh: AIR 1954 SC 194 a threeJudge Bench of this Court while considering the provisions of Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 opining that a judgment being a declaration of the mind of the Court as it is at the time of pronouncement, made a distinction between a civil case and a criminal case, stating: (AIR p. 196, para 10)
"10. In our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of these sections is the final decision of the Court intimated to the parties to the world at large by formal pronouncement'' or ''delivery'' in open Court. It is a judicial act which must be performed in ajudicial way. Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of the thing must be there: that can neither be blurred nor left to inference and conjecture nor can it be vauge. All the rest the manner in which it is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated, the signing and the sealing, all the rules designed to secure certainty about its content and matter can be cured; but not the hard core namely, the formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way in open Court. The exact way in which this is done does not matter. In some Courts the judgment is delivered orally or read out, in some only the operative portion is pronounced, in some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given number of days for inspection."
In view of the fact that in that case one of the Judges expired before signing of the judgment prepared by the Brother Judge, it was held therein that the same did not constitute a judgment of the Division Bench." 17. From the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases discussed above, it is clear that the order made, remained in the file and not communicated to the concerned authority will not be an effective order in the eye of law. An order would be effective only when communicated to the concerned person and communication of the order is a necessary ingredient for bringing an end result to a statute or to provide a person a liberty to take recourse to law, if he is aggrieved by the authorities. If the concerned statute provides for furnishing a copy of the order it is to be furnished. The main purpose of communicating the order is to make the order effective and also to provide the concerned person an opportunity to take recourse to law if he is aggrieved thereby. According to the principles of casus omisus addition of word to the statute by the Court is impermissible. Nowhere in the National Security Act, 1980 it is provided that in case of rejection of the representation filed by the detenu against a detention order, a copy of the order for rejection shall be furnished to the detenu. It is also equally well settled that the detenu is to be informed of the order for rejection of his representation for bringing an end result to the reprsentation and to provide the detenu an opportunity to take recourse to law if he is aggrieved thereby.
18. As discussed above, if the detenu is aggrieved by the rejection of his representation to the Central Government against the detenu order, the detenu is to take recourse to appropriate remedy in the manner discussed above. Here, we reiterate that what is to be challenged by the detenu is not the rejection order of his representation to the Central Government against the detention order but what is to be challenged is the detention order for certain reasons which would be different from case to case. Communication of the rejection of the representation, to the Central Government or to the State Government to the detenu is only to intimate that his/her representation had been rejected for bringing an end result to the representation and also to provide an opportunity to take recourse to appropriate remedy if he is aggrieved thereby.
19. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and also the Code of Civil Procedure prescribed when, how and under what circumstances copies of the judgment are to be made available. For example, Order 20, Rule 6 B CPC provides when a judgment is pronounced copies of the judgment shall be made available to the parties immediately after pronouncement of the judgment for preferring an appeal on payment of such charge as may be specified in the rules made by the High Court, hi civil cases, appeal is to be preferred against the decree or/order to the higher authority and also under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 revision and appeal are to be filed against the judgment and sentence or/judgment and order. In the present case in hand, for the reasons discussed above, it is clear that in the case of rejection of representation dated 18.12.2009 to the Central Government against the detention order, the remedy left open to the detenu is not the writ petition for challenging the order of Central Government for rejecting the representation dated 18.12.2009; and, therefore, nonfurnishing of copy for rejection of representation by the Central Government may not cause any prejudice to the detenu in taking recourse to remedy in one of the manners mentioned above for challenging the impugned detention order, approval order and confirmation order. Therefore, we are not in a position to convince ourselves that failure on the part of the Central Government to furnish copy of the order for rejection of the representation dated 18.12.2009, after informing the order of the Central Government that his representation had been rejected by furnishing copy of the wireless message indicated above, will violate the right of the detenu guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India.
For the foregoing reasons this writ petition is devoid of merit, accordingly dismissed.
