Mr. Akil Kureshi, J.@mdashIn all these appeals, question of maintainability of Letters Patent Appeals arises. Considering the importance of the issue we have heard learned Advocates appearing for the parties at considerable length. Since the central question is common, though individual facts may differ in each appeal, all the Letters Patent Appeals are being disposed of by this common judgement.
2. Letters Patent Appeals are filed by the Insurance Companies challenging the judgements passed by the Learned Single Judges in First Appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Short question is whether in view of Section 100A of the CPC ("the Code" for short), such appeals are maintainable?
3. Individual facts are somewhat different in each appeal. However, for the purpose of this judgement, it would be sufficient to note the facts arising in Letters Patent Appeal No. 2174/2009.
3.1 Said appeal has been filed by Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited challenging the judgement and order dated 3.3.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in First Appeal No. 746/2009. In the First Appeal the Insurance company had challenged an award dated 18.9.2008 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Narmada in Motor Accident Claims Petition No. 757/2006 by which the Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 3,85,000/- to the claimants to be recovered with 9% interest thereon. The claim petition pertained to vehicular accident which took place on 9.10.2004 in which one person died. Wife of the deceased, his minor children and aged parents therefore, filed the claim petition u/s 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 seeking compensation of Rs. 4 lakhs from the owner and the Insurance Company of the vehicle involved in the accident. Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 3,85,000/-.
4. In other Letters Patent Appeals also, the Insurance Companies are before the Division Bench challenging the judgements passed by the Learned Single Judges in First Appeals filed u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
5. Question is whether such appeals are maintainable in light of Section 100A of the Code which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of the High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgement and decree of such single Judge.
6. Appearing for the Insurance Company, learned Counsel Shri Shalin Mehta submitted that Section 100A of the Code bars Letters Patent Appeals only in cases of First Appeals filed under the Code and not under any other statute. In other words, unless special statute itself expressly prohibits Letters Patent Appeal such appeal would not be barred. He submitted that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not bar Letters Patent Appeal against the judgement of learned Single Judge. Present Letters Patent Appeals are therefore, maintainable.
In this regard heavy reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in case of
(i) What Section 100-A of the CPC as amended by the Amendment Acts of 1999 and 2002 bars further appeal before the Division Bench of this Court against the decision of a Single Judge of this Court in appeals under Sections 96, 100 and 104 of the CPC as explained in Para 12 of this judgment.
(ii) Where a special law provides for appeal against a decision of a single Judge of this Court to a Division Bench of this Court, the provisions of such special law will prevail because Sec. 100-A of the CPC is a part of general law of procedure which does not take away the substantive right of appeal provided by a special law, notwithstanding the non-obstante clause with which Section 100A commences.
6.1 It was further contended that bar of Letters Patent Appeal must be provided under statute concerned. In the present case, since Motor Vehicles Act does not bar Letters Patent Appeal, it must be held to be maintainable.
Reliance in this regard was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. M/s. Hongo India (P) Ltd. and anr. reported in 2009(5) SCC 791 wherein the Apex Court noted with approval observations made in the previous judgement in case of
6.2 It was also contended that in any case, such restriction in Section 100A of the Code itself was introduced by the Amending Act of 2002 with effect from 1.7.2002 and the right of appeal being a vested right, such restriction would apply only in cases of claim petitions filed after 1.7.2002.
Reliance in this regard was placed on a decision of the Apex Court in case of
7. Learned Counsel Shri Hasmukh Thakker also appearing for the Insurance company contended that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is, not a Court within the meaning of the Code and Claims Tribunal does not pass decree but passes an award. Restriction of Section 100A of the Code therefore, would not apply in case of judgement of single Judge passed under the appeals filed u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Reliance in this regard was placed on Division Bench judgement of Rajasthan High Court in case of
7.1 He also relied on decision of the Full Bench of Karnataka High Court in case of Union of India and another v. M/s. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. etc. reported in Air 2004 Kar 1, wherein the Bench held that Motor Accident Claims Tribunals are not Courts subordinate to the High Courts for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code.
7.2 Reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited Napier Town Jabalpur v. Annamma Abrahim and others reported in AIR 1995 Madhya Pradesh 244, wherein it was held that Letters Patent Appeal against the judgement of the Single Judge under the Motor Vehicles Act would be maintainable.
Said case, however, we may notice, was decided prior to amendment in Section 100A of th Code in the year 2002.
8. On the other hand, on behalf of the claimants, learned Advocate Shri H. M. Prachchak, Shri Jayraj Chauhan and Shri MTM Hakim contended that in view of the specific bar u/s 100A of the Code, Letters Patent Appeals against the judgements of Learned Single Judges under the Motor Vehicles Act would not be maintainable. They contended that there is nothing under the Motor Vehicles Act to provide for further appeal.
8.1 It was contended that the Claims Tribunal has all the trappings of a Civil Court as held by series of decisions of various Courts including this Court.
8.2 It was further contended that considering the object for which Section 100A has been enacted, it should be held to be applicable to all the Letters Patent Appeals filed after 1.7.2002 when the amendments were made in Section 100A.
8.3 Heavy reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court in case of
8.4 It was pointed out that similar view has also been taken by the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of
8.5 Similar view was also expressed by the Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in case of
8.6 It was pointed out that Division Bench of this Court in case of Kishanchand Wadhumal and another v. K.M. Satwani Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Ahmedabad (Rural) reported in 1975 GLR 749, in context of Bombay Court Fees Act, observed that award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has to be drawn up in the form of a decree since Claims Tribunals are governed by the provisions of the Code.
8.7 Reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in case of
8.8 Reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in case of
9. Having thus heard learned Advocates appearing for the parties, we may notice relevant statutory provisions before dealing with the contentions.
10. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals comprehensively with claims of compensation for damages suffered in an accident arising out of use of motor vehicles under Chapter XI and XII of the Act. Claims Tribunals are constituted u/s 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
10.1 Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act pertains to application for compensation that can be filed by a person who has sustained the injury or the owner of the property or in case of death resulting from the accident by all or any of the representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorized.
10.2 Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act gives an option to the claimants to seek compensation on the basis of structured formula provided under the Act.
10.3 Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for procedure and powers of Claims Tribunal.
10.4 Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act empowers the Claims Tribunal to award interest while allowing the claim for compensation made under the Act.
10.5 Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for an appeal by an aggrieved person from award of the Claims Tribunal to the High Court. Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act reads as follows:
173. Appeals.-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-Section(2) any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court;
Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court;
Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.
(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.
11. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is well known. Clause 15 empowers the High Courts to entertain appeal by Division Bench against the judgement of the Single Judge of the High Court. Clause 15 reads as follows:-
15. Appeal from the Courts of original jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction:- And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Bombay from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Sec. 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Sec. 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of One Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Sec. 108 of the Government India Act, on or after the first day of February 1929 in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to us. Our heirs or successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.
12. We may notice that upon bifurcation of the State of Gujarat from the State of Bombay, High Court of Gujarat was constituted with effect from 1.5.1960.
13. Section 28 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960 provided inter-alia that from the appointed day i.e. 1.5.1960, there shall be a separate High Court for the State of Gujarat.
13.1 Section 30 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960 provides that High Court of Gujarat shall have all such jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect of territories included in the State of Gujarat as was available in force immediately before the appointed day. Section 30 reads as follows:-
30. The High Court of Gujarat shall have, in respect of any part of the territories included in the State of Gujarat, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, are exercisable in respect of that part of the said territories by the High Court of Bombay.
14. Section 100A of the Code restricts intra-Court appeals in certain circumstances. In the present form, 100A of the Code reads as follows:-
100A. No further appeal in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgement and decree of such single Judge.
14.1 Said provision since the same was introduced in the year 1977, has undergone changes from time to time. With respect to such changes, reference shall be made at a later stage. Suffice it to note that upon the amendment in the year 2002 with effect from 1.7.2002, this Section bars further appeal from the judgement and decree of a single Judge in an appeal from the appellate or even original decree or order.
15. Before undertaking detailed analysis of the above statutory provisions with the aid of several decisions cited before us, we may note that in the case on hand, the situation is where the special statute namely Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 under which the appeals were filed before the Learned Single Judges, neither provides for further appeal to the High Court nor in specific terms restricts any such appeal against the judgement of the single Judge. In other words, with respect to maintainability of further appeal against the judgement of the single Judge, concerned statute is silent. It is in this background the question arises whether the Legislature while enacting Section 100A of the Code intended to restrict such intra-Court appeal.
16. Before dealing with this specific question. we may note that it is by now well settled that when the special statute either permits or restricts any further appeal against the judgement of a single Judge rendered in exercise of appellate powers, such provision in the special enactment would prevail. We may notice one example of each kind
16.1 In the Full Bench decision of this Court in case of Nasik Hing Supplying Company(supra), the Bench was considering the provisions of Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Sub-Section(5) of Section 109 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 in terms provides that:
(5) where an appeal is heard by a single Judge, a further appeal shall lie to a Bench of the High Court.
It was in this background that the Bench found that non-obstante clause with which Section 100A of the Code begins is not in derogation of the express provisions in a special law conferring a substantive right of appeal against the decision of a single Judge of the High Court before a Division Bench of the same Court, because Section 4(1) as well as Sections 96, 100, 104 and 105 of the Code preserves such substantive right of appeal conferred by a special law.
16.2 On the other hand Section 37(3) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 contained a specific bar on Second Appeal from a judgement of the single Judge to the Division Bench. Section 37(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 reads as follows:
37(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.
16.3 Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in case of the
17. Before going further, one issue that needs to be cleared at this stage is the status of the Claims Tribunals and nature of orders passed by such Tribunals in Claim Petitions filed by the claimants.
17.1 In view of decision of Division Bench of this Court in case of Kishanchand Wadhumal and another (supra), we are unable to uphold the contention that since the Claims Tribunals are not the Courts and they pass awards in the Claims Tribunal which are not decrees, restrictions contained in Section 100A of the Code would not apply. The Bench had observed as under:-
2. In a series of decisions of this Court, the Claims Tribunal, when it deals with such compensation matters, has been held to be a Court because the Claims Tribunal is constituted in supersession of the ordinary Courts of the land for this purpose with all the powers of the Court and it has to pronounce a definitive judgment in accordance with law, after proper evidence is led for fastening the liability on the basis of fault. After considering the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, as a Single Judge, I had decided this question on settled principles in Special C.A. No. 1599 of 1969 decided on July 23, 1970, and that view was approved in the decision of the Division Bench, where Patel, J. spoke for the Division Bench for both of us, in F.A. No. 280 of 1968 decided on November 15/16, 1971. Eve the relevant Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules. 1959 hereinafter referred to as ''the Rules'', make a clear provision in rule 306 for a judgment of the Claims Tribunal by enacting that the Claims Tribunal in passing orders, shall record concisely in a judgment the finding on each of the issues framed and its reasons for such finding. Therefore, it is obvious that in such Motor Accident Claims proceedings which result in an award of compensation under Sec. 110D the Claims Tribunal has to pass a formal judgment, in accordance with which a formal award or decree has to be drawn up as required by the provisions of the Code. The Claims Tribunal, being a Court would be governed by the provisions of the Code in that respect. That is why rule 310 even enacts that in so for as these rules make no provision or make insufficient provisions, the Claims Tribunal shall follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 for the trial of suits. It is against such an award of the Claims Tribunal under Sec. 100B that an appeal is provided to this Court under Sec. 100D. Rule 312(3) provides that the provisions of Order 41 and Order 21 in the Code shall mutatis mutandis apply to appeals preferred to the High Court under Sec. 110D. Therefore, there is not only a judgment and formally drawn up award against which an appeal had to be filed but the original decree or the decree in appeal could be executed by invoking the provisions under Order 21 of the Code. Even so far as the insurer is concerned, Sec. 96(1) has therefore provided that if after a certificate of Insurance has been issued under Sec. 95(4) in favor of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under Sec. 95(1)(b), (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy.... the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of the Section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment-debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. Therefore, on both the grounds that the Claims Tribunal is a Court and because of these specific provisions, it is obvious that the Claims Tribunal''s judgment has to be formally embodied in an award like Civil Court''s decree and, therefore, the award has got to be drawn up and to that extent the Tribunal was right in its view.
17.2 This issue was elaborately considered by the Bombay High Court in its Full Bench decision in case of Mohd. Riyazur Rehman Siddiqui (supra), wherein the Bench observed that:
3.1 In the light of the above judgment and consistent view taken by the Courts there can hardly be any doubt that the Tribunal does have trappings of a Court. It satisfies all the tests stated above. In any case, it has power to summon, record statements on oath, compel attendance of the witnesses, determine controversies by a public adjudicatory process and even has the power to punish the defaulters. It can get its award executed in accordance with the law. Besides all these, it is performing duties and functions of administration of justice under the power of the State and in fact under a statute. A this stage itself, we may notice that the Division Bench of this Court in the case of
17.3 Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in case of R.S.R.T.C. and etc. etc. (supra) also observed that though Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a Court as is the term ordinarily understood, it is beyond doubt that such Tribunal has all the trappings of the Court.
18. This brings us to the Central question of applicability of Section 100A to the Code in appeals decided by Single Judges filed u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It would be necessary to take note of different stages through which Section 100A of the Code passed before reaching the present form and the objects and reasons for its enactment. Section 100A was inserted by the Amending Act 1976 with effect from 1.2.1977 in the following form:--
100A. No further appeal in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time-being in force where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeals.
It can thus be seen that at the time of its introduction, Section 100A sought to restrict further appeal to the High Court from decision of single Judge in an appeal from the appellate decree or order. Essentially this provision curtailed a third appeal numerically so speaking.
18.1 Objects and reasons for introduction of said provision reads as under:
Under the Letters Patent appeals lie, in certain cases, against the decision of a single Judge in a Second Appeal. Such appeal, in effect, amounts to a third appeal. For the purpose of minimising delay in the finality of adjudication, it is not desirable to allow more than two appeals. In the circumstances, new Section 100A is being inserted to provide that there should be no further appeal against the decision of a single Judge in a second appeal.
18.2 Thereafter in the year 1999, in view of the recommendations of Justice Malimath Committee, there was a proposal to suitably amend Section 100A with a view to provide that there shall be no further appeal even against the judgement of the single Judge exercising first appellate jurisdiction. Additionally, there was also a proposal to abolish appeal to a Division Bench against the decision and order rendered by a single Judge of the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. However, in view of representations from the Bar Associations, proposal for abolition of appeal against the judgement and order rendered by the single Judge in writ jurisdiction was dropped.
18.3 Eventually, Section 100A was amended by the Amending Act of 2002 with effect from 1.7.2002 as it exists presently. Statement of objects and reasons in the Amending Act, 2002 with respect to above provision provided as under:-
(j) appeals to Division Bench of the High Courts in writs under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution shall be restored. Section 10 of the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1999 abolished appeals against judgments of a Single Judge of the High Court in all cases:-
19. From the above statutory provisions, it can be seen that Section 100A was inserted in the year 1977 to limit certain intra-Court appeals. In its inception, Section 100A restricted further appeal to the High Court against the judgement of a single Judge passed against an appellate judgement of the lower Court. In essence thus, prior to the Amending Act of 2002, Section 100A restricted numerically third appeal to the High Court. However, with a view to further limiting such appellate consideration, Section 100A was further amended and it restricted an intra-Court appeal against the judgement or order of the single Judge rendered in an appeal either from original or appellate decree or order. Simultaneously, proposal to do away with Letters Patent Appeal against the decision of single Judge in writ jurisdiction was dropped taking into account strong resistance from the Bar Associations as also apprehending flooding of litigation before the Supreme Court.
19.1 Thus restrictions as is evident have been introduced to achieve a certain finality to the issues and thereby to provide an end to a litigation by avoiding protracted consideration and reconsideration at appellate and further appellate stages. There is nothing in the said provision or in other provisions pointed out to us to suggest that such restrictions are meant to be applied only to appeals arising under the Code and not under other statutes.
20. As already noted earlier, powers of Letters Patent Appeal are enjoyed by the High Court of Gujarat by virtue of preservation of such powers u/s 30 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960. Said provision preserves all the powers enjoyed previously by the Bombay High Court which would include also power to entertain an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In that view of the matter, the powers enjoyed by the Gujarat High Court to entertain intra-Court appeal against decision of single Judge which are popularly referred to as Letters Patent powers would be governed by the expression "or any other instrument having the force of law or any other law for time being in force" as found in Section 100A of the Code. By virtue of non obstante clause with which the said Section begins, the legislature has made it abundantly clear that any such powers conferred under any Letters Patent or any other instrument having force of law or any other law for time being in force would stand curtailed and abridged to the extent provided therein. In other words, irrespective of such powers, being vested under the Letters Patent or other enactments or statute, same shall nevertheless be restricted by virtue of Section 100A of the Code and no further appeal to the High Court would be available against the decision of single Judge rendered in appeal from appellate or even an original decree or order.
21. As noted, the conclusion that we have arrived at, finds support from several decisions of various High Courts. In case of Mohd. Riyazur Rehman Siddiqui(supra), Full Bench of Bombay High Court held as under:-
86. Thus, we proceed to record and answer propositions of law formulated by us in paragraph 5 of the judgment as follows:-
(a) Upon amendment of Section 100-A of the CPC by Amending Act of 2002 with effect from 1st July, 2002, no Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable against the judgement rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court under the provision of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
(b) Appeal against the judgment of the Learned Single Judge in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 even with the aid of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not maintainable, and in fact, in both these situations the Appellate Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain and decide such an appeal.
21.1 In case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v S. Surya Prakash Reddy and others(supra), five Judges Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court also had an occasion to consider the maintainability of further appeal against the appellate judgement of single Judge u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Majority view was expressed in following terms:--
40. The ratio of these decisions is that the competent legislature can amend and even abolish the Letters Patent. Undisputedly, Section 100-A of the Code is a piece of legislation enacted by the competent legislature, i.e. Parliament. The Non obstante clause contained in Section 100-A of the Code as amended by 2002 Act, has the effect of taking away the right of appeal which may earlier be available either under the Letters Patent or any provision of law, including the Code. The use of the expression "in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force'' in Section 100-A is clearly indicative of the legislature''s intention to bar Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment rendered by a single Bench in an appeal arising from an original or appellate decree or order. The language of Section 100-A does not suggest that the exclusion of the right of appeal available under the Letters Patent is confined only to the matters arising under the Code and not other enactments. Therefore, full effect deserves to be given to legislative intendment enshrined in the non obstante clause contained in Section 100-A and it must be held that an appellate judgment rendered by the single Bench in matters arising out of the Code, as also other enactments, is expressly barred with effect from 1.7.2002.
41. Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for an appeal against an award made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal u/s 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides for an appeal against the award of the reference Court. Section 30 of the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 provides for an appeal against an order made by the Commissioner. Similar provisions are available in other enactments for an appeal against an award or order passed by the competent authority or Court. As per the High Court rules, all such appeals are heard by single Bench. There is no provision in these enactments under which an appeal can be preferred against the judgment rendered by the Singe Bench in a mater arising out of an award or order made by the competent authority or Court. Such appeal could be filed only under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. However, by virtue of non obstante clause contained in Section 100-A, with reference to Letters Patent and all other statutory enactments no appeal can now be maintained under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment rendered by a single Bench in an appeal arising out of these enactments.
42. In view of the above discussion, the question referred to the Larger Bench is answered in the following terms:--
After insertion of amended Section 100-A in the CPC 1908, by Act 22 of 2002, Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable against the judgment rendered by a single Bench in an appeal arising out of a special enactment.
21.2 This view was prevailing so far as Andhra Pradesh High Court is concerned earlier also expressed through three Bench judgement in case of Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi v. Managing Director, A.P. SRTC, (supra). The Bench opined that:-
13. The Supreme Court having held that Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 in no manner effects or restricts the right of an aggrieved individual to file a letters patent appeal observed that "a Letters Patent is the charger under which the High Court is established. The powers given to a High Court under the Letters Patent are akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court. Thus when a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of appeal, against a judgment of a single Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the Letters patent.
14. We have already noticed that the newly incorporated Section 100-A of the Code in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a learned single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained n the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments have the force of law- be it against an original or appellate decree or order heard and decided by a single Judge.
15. In the case on hand, the Motor Vehicles Act itself does not provide for any further appeal against the decree or order passed by a learned single Judge to a Division Bench.
21.3 Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in case of R.S.R.T.C. and etc.etc. v. Vaibhav Kumar and ors. etc.(supra), also expressed the same view in following terms:-
27. The Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta, AIR 2006 SCW 4594, has expounded the legal position with reference to Section 100A in unambiguous terms that where appeal has been decided from an original order by a Single Judge, no further appeal has been provided and that power which used to be there under the Letters Patent of the High Court has been subsequently withdrawn. Applying this ratio, it would be seen that the order/award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is an original order and against that an appeal has been provided before the High Court u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, that is, an appeal from the original order. In this view of the matter, no further appeal (by whatever name called, Letters Patent Appeal or Special Appeal) shall lie to the Division Bench of the same High Court.
28. The decision of this Court in
29. In what we have discussed above, we conclude that the Special Appeal from the judgment and order passed by Single Judge of this Court in an appeal u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the award of the Motor Accident Clams Tribunal, is not maintainable with effect from the cut-off date i.e. 1st July, 2002 in view of Section 100A of the CPC amended by Section 4 of the CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002.
21.4 In case of Kesava Pillai Sreedharan Pillai and etc.(supra), Full Bench of Kerala High Court also came to somewhat similar conclusion. The Bench was considering maintainability of further appeals against the judgement of single Judge of the High Court under the Motor Vehicle Act as well as under the Land Acquisition Act. Observing that there is no justification in limiting the applicability to Section 100-A to the appeals filed under the provisions of the CPC alone, the Bench held that in such cases no further appeal would lie.
22. In view of our interpretation noted earlier and in view of such overwhelming view of different High Courts of the country we have no hesitation in holding that Section 100-A of the Code bars intra-Court appeal even in case of special statute when such a statute is silent on the question of further appeal. In other words, if the statute does not specifically provide for further appeal against the appellate judgement of the single Judge of the High Court, Section 100A of the Code would step in to prohibit any further appeal against such judgement.
22.1 Reference to the five Judge Bench of Karnataka High Court in case of Union of India and another v. M/s. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. etc.(supra), would not further the case of the Insurance company. In the said case, the Bench was not concerned with maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal in cases arising out of Motor Vehicles Act but was considering the question whether Motor Accident Claims Tribunal are Courts subordinate to High Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code. It was in this context that certain observations were made to the effect that Claims Tribunal are not Courts. However, this issue has been elaborately dealt with in the Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court in case of Mohd. Riyazur Rehman Siddiqui(supra), and as noted earlier Division Bench of our High Court in case of Kishanchand Wadhumal and another(supra) also had occasion to deal with this issue. We therefore, do not dilate on this aspect any further.
23. We find it necessary to make further reference to the Full Bench decision in case of Nasik Hing Supplying Company(supra). In the said decision, Bench was considering the maintainability of an appeal against the decision of single Judge of the High Court under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. As noted earlier, Section 109(5) of the said Act provided for a further appeal. Contention however, was raised before the Bench that by virtue of Section 100A of the Code as amended with effect from 1.7.2002, such an appeal would also be barred. It was in this context that the Full Bench held that where a special law provides for appeal against a decision of a single Judge of the Court to a Division Bench, the provisions of such special law will prevail because Section 100-A of the CPC is a part of general law of procedure which does not take away the substantive right of appeal provided by a special law, notwithstanding the non-obstante clause with which Section 100A commences.
23.1 In case on hand, we are not concerned with such a situation where the special statute provides specifically for a further appeal against the judgement of the single Judge exercising appellate powers. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, no such appeal is provided. Decision of the Full Bench in case of Nasik Hing Supplying Company(supra), was rendered in an entirely different background and different statutory provisions. In the said decision, case of Municipal Corporation of Brihanmumbai v. State Bank of India reported in AIR 1999 SC 380 was cited, in which the Apex Court had observed that against the judgement of the single Judge of the High Court rendered in appeal against the decision of Division Bench of Small Causes Court, under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, by virtue of Section 100A of the Code, no further appeal would lie. Referring to the said decision, the Bench observed:-
This decision necessarily proceeds on the principle that in absence of any right of appeal conferred by a special statute, the provisions of Section 100A of the CPC will hold the field to bar any further appeal, notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent or any such general law, but where the special Act itself provides for a further appeal against the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court, such appeal would not be barred by the provisions of Section 100A of the CPC. notwithstanding the non-obstante clause with which the said Section 100A begins.
24. We may recall that Counsel for the appellants placed much reliance on the judgement in case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. M/s. Hongo India (P) Ltd. and anr.(supra). In particular our attention was drawn to observations made in para. 25 of the decision wherein it is stated that when a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of appeal, against a judgment of a Single Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent.
24.1 We may notice that in case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. M/s. Hongo India (P) Ltd. and anr.(supra), the Apex Court was not considering the question of maintainability of intra-Court appeal after amendment in Section 100-A of the Code. The issue before the Court was with respect to High Court''s power to condone delay beyond the period specified in Section 35H of the Central Excise Act and applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 for the purpose of condoning the delay. The above noted observations were made in para. 25 of the judgement while dealing with the reference made to the decision of Apex Court in case of Sharda Devi(supra), It was observed that:--
25. Though the learned Additional Solicitor General heavily relied on the above three-Judge Bench decision in Sharda Devi case, we are of the view that the said decision deals with Letters Patent power of the High Court. There is no dispute that the powers given to a High Court under the Letters Patent are akin to the constitutional powers of the High Court. In such circumstances, when a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of appeal, against a judgment of a Single Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent.
24.2 These observations therefore, must be appreciated in the context in which the same were made. Question of maintainability of intra-Court appeal under special statute in context of amended Section 100A of the Code was not at issue.
24.3 Further, in case of Sharda Devi(supra), the Apex Court was examining the maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal against the judgement and decree of single Judge of the High Court passed in appeal preferred u/s 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was in this background that Apex Court opined that:-
9. A Letters Patent is the charter under which the High Court is established. The powers given to a High Court under the Letters Patent are akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court. Thus when a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of appeal, against a judgment of a single Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent.
24.4 We may notice that the said decision was rendered prior to amendment in Section 100A of the Code with effect from 1.7.2002. The Apex Court was thus not considering scope of amended Section 100A of the Code, which by virtue of the said amendment bars further appeal against the judgement of the single Judge against even an original decree or order. The observation that "the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent" must therefore, be understood in this context. In our view, exclusion contained in Section 100A of the Code would come within the expression "the statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent"
25. This issue can be looked from a slightly different angle also. Right to appeal, it is by now well settled is not an inherent right and flows only from the statute which provides for such a right. In other words, no person has an inherent right to appeal unless it is statutorily provided.
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...Right of appeal which is statutory right can be conditional or qualified. It cannot be said that such a law would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. If the statute does not create any right of appeal, no appeal can be filed. There is a clear distinction between a suit and an appeal. While every person has an inherent right to bring a suit of a civil nature unless the suit is barred by statute. However, in regard to an appeal, position is quite opposite. The right to appeal inheres in no one and, therefore, for maintainability of an appeal there must be authority of law. When such a law authorises filing of appeal, it can impose conditions as well.
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16. The right to prefer an appeal is a right created by Statute. No party can file an appeal against any judgment, decree or order as a matter of course in the absence of a suitable provisions of some law conferring on the party concerned the right to file an appeal against any judgment, decree or order. The right of appeal so conferred on any party may be lost to the party in appropriate cases by the provisions of some law and also by the conduct of the party. The law of limitation may deprive a party of the right he may enjoy to prefer an appeal by virtue of any statutory provisions. Also, in appropriate cases a party may be held to have become disentitled from enforcing the right of appeal which he may otherwise have.
25.1 Motor Vehicles Act admittedly does not provide for any further appeal against the appellate judgement of the single Judge u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Such a right to appeal therefore, can be traced only under the Letters Patent. If by virtue of Section 100A of the Code as amended with effect from 1.7.2002, such a right has been specifically taken away and such debarment of right is express and begins with a non obstante clause, there remains no provision in any statute which would permit aggrieved party to appeal before the High Court itself against the judgement of a single Judge.
26. Having thus concluded in unequivocal terms and finding that by virtue of amendment in Section 100A of the Code with effect from 1.7.2002, Letters Patent Appeal against judgement of Learned Single Judge rendered in appeal u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act would not be maintainable, we need to deal with one last issue before concluding the judgement. We may recall that learned Advocate Shri Shalin Mehta relying on the decision in case of Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry and other (supra), contended that amendment in Section 100A of the Code would apply only in cases where Claims Petitions were filed after 1.7.2002. In the said decision, in para. 23 it was held inter-alia that the right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantial right and that the institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. In the same breath, however, the Apex Court also observed that this vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise."
26.1 In case of Kamal Kumar Dutta and another v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. and others(supra), the Apex Court examined the applicability of Section 100A of the Code as amended with effect from 1.7.2002 to the judgement of the single Judge in appeal u/s 10-F of the Companies Act. The Bench held that Letters Patent Appeal would be barred by virtue of Section 100A of the Code. Dealing with the contention that such exclusion of right to appeal would apply only in cases which arise after the amendment. the Apex Court held and observed as under:-
22 So far as the general proposition of law is concerned that the appeal is a vested right there is no quarrel with the proposition but it is clarified that such right can be taken away by a subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment. Parliament while amending Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, by amending Act 22 of 2002 with effect from 1.7.2002, took away the Letters Patent power of the High Court in the matter of appeal against an order of learned single Judge to the Division Bench. Section 100A of the CPC reads as follows:--
100A. No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single Judge.
23 Therefore, where appeal has been decided from an original order by a single Judge, no further appeal has been provided and that power which used to be there under the Letters Patent of the High Court has been subsequently withdrawn. The present order which has been passed by the CLB and against that appeal has been provided before the High Court u/s 10F of the Act. that is an appeal from the original order. Then in that case no further Letters patent appeal shall lie to the Division Bench of the same High Court. This amendment has taken away the power of the Letters Patent in the matter where learned single Judge hears an appeal from the original order. Original order in the present case was passed by the CLB exercising the power under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act and appeal has been preferred u/s 10F of the Act before the High Court. Learned single Judge having passed an order, no further appeal will lie as the Parliament in its wisdom has taken away its power. Learned Counsel for the respondents invited our attention to a letter from the then Law Minister. That letter cannot override the statutory provision. When the statute is very clear, whatever statement by the Law Minister made in the floor of the House, cannot change the words and intendment which is borne out from the words. The letter of the Law Minister cannot be read to interpret the provisions of Section 100A. The intendment of the Legislature is more than clear in the words and the same has to be given its natural meaning and cannot be subject to any statement made by the Law Minister in any communication. The words speak for itself. It does not require any further interpretation by any statement made in any manner. Therefore, the power of the High Court in exercising Letters patent in a matter where a single Judge has decided the appeal from original order, has been taken away and it cannot be invoked in the present context. There is no two opinion in the matter that when the CLB exercises its power u/s 397 and 398 of the Act, it exercised its quasi-judicial power as original authority. It may not be a Court but it has all the trapping of a Court. Therefore, the CLB while exercising its original jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act passed the order and against that order appeal lies to the learned single Judge of the High Court and thereafter no further appeal could be filed.
27. In view of this decision of Apex Court arising in the context of Section 100A of the Code as amended with effect from 1.7.2002, last contention of the Counsel for the Insurance Company also is turned down.
28. In the result, we hold that Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable. Only on this limited ground, all appeals are dismissed. We have not examined the merits in any of the appeals. We express no opinion with respect to the same.
