R.D. Kothari, J.@mdashBy way of present petition, the petitioners have challenged the judgment and order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jamnagar, in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2006 dated 22-11-2006 and the judgment and order passed by the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Jamnagar in Misc. Civil Application No. 39 of 2005 dated 12-1-2006 and also the Execution Application No. 1 of 2005 filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 before the Executing Court. Following prayers are made in this petition:
(A) The Hon''ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari quashing and setting aside the judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jamnagar in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2006 dated 22-11-2006 and the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Jamnagar in Misc. Civil Application No. 39 of 2005 dated 12-1-2004 and quash the award dated 17-8-2004 passed by Shri P.J. Budhabhatti and declare that the award is a nullity, not authorised by law and not in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and not enforceable or executable under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act;
(B) The Hon''ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and prohibition restraining the learned District Judge, Jamnagar from executing the so-called award dated 17-8-2004 passed by Shri P.J. Budhabhatti and quash and set aside the said execution;
(C) The Hon''ble Court be pleased to issue interim injunction restraining the respondents from executing or implementing the award dated 17-8-2004 in execution proceedings being Special Execution Petition No. 1 of 2005 filed before the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Jamnagar, during pendency and final hearing of this Special Civil Application; and
(D)---------------------.
2. Few relevant facts are thus:
2.1. Respondent No. 9 herein passed an award on 17-8-2004. The arbitrator is said to have been requested on 22-4-2002 to resolve the dispute amongst me parties regarding business of M/s. Coronation Motors and allied concerns. The oral request to resolve the dispute was said to have been made by one Niranjanbhai G. Trivedi (Respondent No. 4 herein). The arbitrator referred the parties as Part "A" and Part "B". The parties referred in Part "A" are:
(1) Niranjan G. Trivedi,
(2) Harit R. Trivedi,
(3) Kailash R. Trivedi,
(4) Kartik R. Trivedi,
(5) Smt. Sarojiniben R. Trivedi,
(6) Bipinchandra V. Doshi, and
(7) Smt. Smitaben B. Doshi.
Part-B refers the following parties:
(1) Prataprai G. Trivedi,
(2) Smt. Dhanvidya P. Trivedi, and
(3) Chandrashekhar P. Trivedi.
2.2. The say of the arbitrator is that on behalf of parties to Part-A, Niranjanbhai Trivedi had requested the arbitrator to resolve the dispute and the said request was accepted by Chandrashekhar P. Trivedi for the parties to Part-B. The arbitrator, after hearing the parties, had passed Final Award, which reads as under:
(I) Party-A is ordered to pay Party-B Rs. 21 Lacs with interest @ 6% P.A. from 24-8-2002 to 17-8-2004. It is also ordered that Party-A shall pay interest @ 18% P.A. to Party-B on Rs. 21 Lacs from the date of this Award i.e. 17-8-2004 till the total payment is made.
(II) Party-A is also ordered to transfer the property of M/s. Coronation Motors, Jamnagar situated at Ranjit Road, Jamnagar along with the Super Structure, standing thereon in the name of Shri P.G. Trivedi as Party-B, free and clear, within 30 days from the date of this Award.
(III) Party-A is also ordered to pay Rs. 20 Lacs being the value of 500 sq.ft. of the property - building of M/s. Coronation Motors, Jamnagar to Party-B within 30 days of the date of Award i.e. 17-8-2004.
(IV) In the circumstances of the matter the parties are ordered to bear their own costs of this proceedings.
(V) The stamp duty applicable shall be borne by Party-B as and when the Award is put in execution.
2.3. It appears that the present petitioners had filed Misc. Civil Application No. 39 of 2005 before the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Jamnagar for setting aside the Award. In the said application, the present respondents had moved an application under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. praying to reject the petitioners'' application. The learned trial Court was pleased to grant the prayer of the respondents by order dated 12-1-2006. The petitioners had preferred Misc. Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2006 before the District Court, Jamnagar. The learned Additional District Judge by judgment and order dated 22-11-2006 was pleased to dismiss the appeal. Hence, the present petition.
2.4. During the pendency of the petition, the present respondents filed execution application being Special Execution Application No. 1 of 2005 in the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Jamnagar.
3. Heard learned Advocate Shri Sunit Shah for learned Advocate Mr. A.R. Thacker for the petitioners, learned Advocate Mr. Nirav C. Thakkar for respondent Nos. 1.1 to 1.10, 2, 3, 5 to 8, and learned Advocate Ms. K.J. Brahmbhatt for respondent No. 4.
4. After briefly referring the facts of the case, learned Advocate Shri Shah for the petitioners has submitted that the facts and circumstances of the case would clearly show that respondent No. 9 was approached by the parties for resolution of their family dispute. The present petitioners are not family members of the respondents. Shri Shah has pointed out that there are five different partnership firms. The present petitioners are partners in only one of the firms. That passing of award qua the firm wherein the present petitioners are parties is bad and illegal. It was submitted that the award qua the petitioners is nullity and as the award is nullity in the eye of law, nullity can be set up at any stage of the proceedings and in any forum. In support of his submission, learned Advocate Shri Shah has drawn attention to few relevant case-laws, reference to which will be made hereinafter.
5. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Nirav C. Thakkar for the respondents has drawn attention of the Court to Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act. It was pointed out that special period of limitation for challenging the award passed by the arbitrator is provided under the Arbitration Act and the said special period of limitation would prevail. The learned Advocate has drawn attention to Sec. 34(2) of the Arbitration Act. It was pointed out that Sec. 34(2) takes into consideration all and every nature of objections against the award passed by the arbitrator. That such objection ought to be raised within three months from the date of passing of an award. In case of sufficient cause made out by the party, Court may grant extension to such party, however, said extension is limited to the period of 30 days. That it is not permissible for the Court to entertain the plea in the nature of setting aside award after expiry of period of limitation as prescribed under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act. In this regard, learned Advocate has drawn attention to relevant case-laws, reference to which may be made after referring the reply by the learned Advocate for the petitioners.
6. Replying the submissions made by the learned Advocate for the respondents, learned Advocate Shri Shah submitted that the principal objection raised on the ground of limitation is misconceived. It was submitted that statutory period of limitation only bars the remedy. It does not extinguish the right. Since, the right survives, the petitioners can agitate their plea which is based on nullity. It was submitted that there is distinction between illegal and void award. In the present case, foundational facts or jurisdictional facts qua the petitioners are absent, and therefore, the prescribed period of limitation would not be applicable to those cases. Shri Shah has also drawn attention to Secs. 73 and 76 of the Arbitration Act. It was submitted that enforcement of award against the petitioners is shocking to one''s conscience, and therefore, bar of limitation and such other impediments would not come in the way of the petitioners.
7. During the course of hearing, learned Advocate Mr. Dattani for respondent No. 9 has made available a copy of the proceedings that had taken place before respondent No. 9-Arbitrator.
8. In the present case, it appears that respondent No. 9 was requested on 22-8-2002 for resolution of dispute. Respondent No. 9 had informed the parties to remain present on the next date i.e. on 23-8-2002 along with details and documents. It appears that Niranjanbhai Trivedi, who was conducting the proceedings on behalf of the partnership firm, had requested respondent No. 9 on behalf of Party-A to resolve the dispute. On the other hand, Mr. Chandrashekhar Trivedi on behalf of Party-B had agreed for resolution of the dispute through respondent No. 9. It also appears from the record that in the present case Trivedi family runs business in the name of M/s. Coronation Motors through five different partnership firms. They run their business at Rajkot, Jamnagar and Porbandar. The present petitioners are partners only in one of the Firms i.e. M/s. Coronation Motors Automobile Division. It is the say of the petitioners that they had never referred their "dispute" to respondent No. 9. That the dispute was amongst members of Trivedi family. That resolution of their dispute if involves the present petitioners, then consent of the present petitioners ought to have been obtained. In fact, what appears herein is the question - Did there exist any "dispute" involving the present petitioners amongst the partners, that needs to be resolved through arbitrator or Court?" Unlike that, what emerges is "dispute" amongst the members of Trivedi Family.
9. Learned Advocate Mr. Nirav Thakkar for the respondents in this regard has drawn attention to the communication received by respondent No. 9 from the petitioners. Referring and relying upon the same, it was submitted that the petitioners were very much aware about reference and resolution of the dispute by respondent No. 9. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, say of the petitioners that arbitration proceedings have proceeded in absence of/without their consent and knowledge, ought not to be believed.
10. Learned Advocate Mr. Nirav Thakkar invited attention of the Court to the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of
12. As far as the language of Sec. 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are ''but not thereafter'' used in the proviso to sub-sec. (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore, bar the application of Sec. 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase ''but not thereafter'' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
13. Apart from the language, ''express exclusion'' may follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law. "Even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sees. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation."
14. Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Sec. 34 to challenge and award is absolute and unextendable by Court under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives the need "to minimise the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process". This objective has found expression in Sec. 5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in no uncertain terms:
"5. Extent of judicial intervention. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part".
11. Learned Advocate Mr. Nirav Thakkar drew attention to Sec. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It reads thus:
34 : Application for setting aside arbitral award:
(1) -----------------
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if -
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that -
(i) -----------------
(ii) -------------------
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case;
It was submitted that widely worded provisions for setting aside award takes care of all nature of objections that may possibly be raised by the party. The party, who does not avail of the opportunity to file objections as prescribed under the Arbitration Act or fails to raise objections within the time prescribed under the Act, cannot be heard on complaint about the consequences flowing from his inaction or negligence.
12. Learned Advocate Mr. Nirav Thakkar in this regard invited attention of the Court to the decision in the case of
13. There is considerable force in the submissions of learned Advocate Mr. Nirav Thakkar. Plea is well taken. However, the facts of the case do not help the respondents, in the sense, that though the plea raised by the petitioners can be said to be technical, it has to be conceded that the facts of the case show that the essential condition to attract Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act does not exist in the present case. In other words, stage of setting aside the award has not reached, though the award is passed. To put it simply,- one of the essential conditions that can be culled out from Sec. 34 is a person complaining against the award or arbitration proceedings, is a party to that proceedings. How far Sec. 34 would apply to the person in whose way the award does come, but he is not a party to the agreement, is the question herein. In State of Goa v. Western Builder''s case (supra), party had sought exclusion of time that had lost in proceeding in wrong forum, i.e. Section 14 of the Limitation Act was invoked. It would appear that in that case reference of dispute to the arbitrator by the parties was not in dispute. Therein, question arose, as after passing an award by the arbitrator, aggrieved party, i.e. State, had filed an application before the Court making the award "rule of the Court". The application was filed under a belief that Arbitration Act of 1940 applies. A contention was raised that Arbitration Act, 1996 applies. It was pointed out in the objections that award can be executed as a decree and unlike old Act, it is not necessary to make award "Rule of the Court". Thereafter, the State had applied before the District Court along with application under Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. That application came to be dismissed by the District Court and by learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court. It is against that the State had preferred an appeal before Supreme Court. Dismissing the appeal, it was held by the Supreme Court that Sees. 5 and 14 of Limitation Act are inapplicable, as special provision as to the Limitation is made in the Act.
14. If it had been a case that one of the members of Trivedi Family had come forward complaining against the award and such member is as late in complaining against award as petitioner herein, then the matter would have been different. The members of Trivedi Family cannot agitate even non-receipt of proper notice, outside the scope of Sec. 34. In this regard, learned Advocate Shri Shah for the petitioners has rightly drawn attention to the fact that foundational facts or jurisdictional facts do not exist in the present case. It was submitted that in respect of present proceedings, i.e. arbitration proceedings, at least four facts can be said to be foundational facts viz. (i) A dispute, (ii) Agreement to refer the dispute, (iii) Reference to arbitration for resolution of dispute, and (iv) Adjudication by arbitrator.
15. It is the say of the petitioners that the petitioners had never agreed to refer the dispute to the arbitrator. In fact, existence of dispute qua the present petitioners is also not clear. As to the existence of dispute, reference to the notes of the arbitrator would suggest that Niranjanbhai Trivedi had requested respondent No. 9 to resolve "family dispute". Respondent No. 9 claims that "I know all the members of Trivedi family personally and has family relations with Trivedi family for past more than three decades----------". Niranjanbhai in his statement to arbitrator says that "--------because all these matters are family problems, in this regard I do not want to involve any third party from outside-----------". He further says, "---------Whole family has shown/put confidence in me for all these years and has given me power of attorney-------". Again, he says "whatever I am doing is for the benefit of the family-------. So peace may prevail amongst (in) the family".
16. In the present case, barring the petitioners, all other members of Trivedi Family are partners in all the five partnership firms. It appears from the statement of Niranjanbhai that need for arbitration has arisen, as new generation has come up in the family. The communication to which the learned Advocate Mr. Nirav Thakkar for the respondents has drawn attention goes to show that the petitioners were aware of passing of the award by respondent No. 9. This communication can successfully be pressed into service only if the petitioners are otherwise agreeable to the award passed by the arbitrator. In the facts of the present case, non-reference of "dispute" by the petitioners to the arbitrator does not attract Sec. 34 of the Act.
17. In this regard, learned Advocate Shri Shah has drawn attention to Sec. 19 of the Partnership Act. Under Sec. 19(2)(a) of the said Act, no partner has an implied authority to submit a dispute relating to the business of firm to an arbitrator. Section 19(2)(a) of the Act helps the submissions of the learned Advocate for the petitioners.
18. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act provides for agreement. Though Sec. 7(3) provides that the agreement should be in writing, much depends on the conduct/wishes of the parties. In the context of facts of the present case, it can be said that if the petitioners have no objection and if they wishes to accept the award passed by the arbitrator, then even in absence of any written agreement, award can be validly enforced. Under Sec. 7, agreement is to be in writing, but more important is intention of parties. Written agreement may also be subject of dispute. Further, under Sec. 7, "certain disputes", - in contrast to all the disputes, may also be referred to arbitrator. Thus, in the present case, dispute qua the family members of Trivedi family only ought to have been referred, - rather, said dispute only appears to have been referred, to the arbitrator. Non-reference of "dispute" by the present petitioners is not possible to dispute/disbelieve. Hence, in the facts of the present case, the petitioners cannot be bound by the award. Learned Advocate Shri Shah has rightly invited attention of the Court to Paras 68 to 75 of the decision in the case of
68. A ''jurisdictional fact'' is one on existence of which depends jurisdiction of a Court, Tribunal or an Authority. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the Court or Tribunal cannot act. If an inferior Court or Tribunal wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, a writ of certiorari lies. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of jurisdictional fact, a subordinate Court or an inferior Tribunal cannot confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not possess.
69. The Counsel referred to a recent decision of this Court in
74. A ''jurisdictional fact'' is a fact which must exist before a Court, Tribunal or an Authority assumes jurisdiction over a particular matter. A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non-existence of which depends jurisdiction of a Court, a Tribunal or an authority. It is the fact upon which an administrative agency''s power to act depends. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the Court, authority or officer cannot act. If a Court or authority wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, the order can be questioned by a writ of certiorari. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of such jurisdictional fact, no authority can confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses.
It was further observed:
76. The existence of jurisdictional fact is thus sine qua non or condition precedent for the exercise of power by a Court of limited jurisdiction.
70. Drawing the distinction between ''jurisdictional fact'' and ''adjudicatory fact'', the Court stated : (Arun Kumar case, SCC p. 761, Para 84)
84.......... it is clear that existence of ''jurisdictional fact'' is sine qua non for the exercise of power. If the jurisdictional fact exists, the authority can proceed with the case and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. Once the authority has jurisdiction in the matter on existence of ''jurisdictional fact'', it can decide the ''fact in issue'' or ''adjudicatory fact''. A wrong decision on ''fact in issue'' or on ''adjudicatory fact'' would not make the decision of the authority without jurisdiction or vulnerable provided essential or fundamental fact as to existence of jurisdiction is present.
The principle was reiterated in
71. The learned Counsel for the workmen, on the other hand, supported the view taken by the Courts below. He submitted that the issues sought to be raised by the Company are mixed issues of law and fact. It is the allegation of the workmen that they had not voluntarily accepted the scheme but they were compelled to accept it under duress and coercion. Moreover, it is their case in the claim petitions that they were not paid full amount even under the scheme. They, therefore, did not cease to be workmen of the Company and the relationship of master and servant between the" parties continued. If it is so, an action not allowing them to work would amount to termination of service or removal from employment. In that eventuality, remedy under Sec. 31 of the Act is available and accordingly they had filed claim petitions. The question will have to be decided by the Labour Court on the evidence adduced by the parties and the issue as to maintainability cannot be decided in isolation and as preliminary issue as suggested by the Company.
72. It was also submitted that this Court has held that statutory Tribunals must decide all issues raised by the parties. This is particularly true to industrial disputes. Strong reliance was placed on
1.....There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that Tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill-afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Art. 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must, therefore, ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all Tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Art. 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special Tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues."
(Emphasis supplied)
73. Reference was also made to
74. The attention of the Court was also invited to
75. In our considered opinion, in the present case, it cannot be said that the Courts below have committed any error of jurisdiction in not deciding the issue as to the maintainability of claim-petitions as preliminary issue. It is well settled, that generally, all issues arising in a suit or proceeding should be tried together and a judgment should be pronounced on those issues. Before more than hundred years, the Privy Council in Tarakant v. Puddomoney, 1866 (10) MIA 476, favoured this approach. Speaking for the Judicial Committee, Lord Turner stated:
.....The Courts below, in appealable cases, by forbearing from deciding on all the issues joined, not infrequently oblige this Committee to recommend that a cause be remanded which might otherwise be finally decided on appeal. This is certainly a serious evil to the parties litigant, as it may involve the expense of a second appeal as well as that of another hearing below. It is much to be desired, therefore, that in appealable cases the Courts below should, as far as may be practicable, pronounce their opinions on all the important points.
(Emphasis supplied)
The above principle has been consistently followed.
19. In the present case, different facet of existence of jurisdictional facts compare to the above quoted case, is in issue. In the present case, essential facts that would confer jurisdiction upon the arbitrator qua the present petitioners are lacking. Therefore, award can be said to be nullity qua the petitioners. Hence, non-raising of objections within the period of limitation as prescribed under Sec. 34 of the Act would not come in the way of the petitioners. To hold otherwise would mean that parties, who had not intended to refer the dispute to the arbitrator and have, in fact, not referred the dispute to the arbitrator, will still bind by the award passed by the arbitrator because parties have failed to raise objection within the time prescribed by the Act. This view would be contrary to the spirit and intention of arbitration proceedings.
20. The case of Popular Construction Co., (supra) relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondents is possible to be distinguished. In that case, Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act was tried to press into service. Relying on Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, said plea was rejected. The petitioners herein do not press into service Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, nor the petitioners pray for condonation of delay, as provided under the Limitation Act and under Sec. 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.
21. In support of the above, reference may be made to the submissions of learned Advocate for respondent No. 4-Niranjanbhai Trivedi. Learned Advocate Ms. K.J. Brahmbhatt drew attention to the affidavit filed by Niranjanbhai dated 8-7-2008 in the present petition. Niranjanbhai asserts that he has not made any reference to respondent No. 9, nor he had given any authority to respondent No. 9. It was submitted that this affidavit has remained uncontroverted. Respondent No. 4 has filed affidavit supporting the case of the petitioners. Taking of such stand by respondent No. 4 gives room to the other side to urge that the present petition is filed to help the members of Trivedi family. It is possible.
22. It was submitted by the learned Advocate for respondents that the question sought to be raised by the petitioners can more appropriately be considered in the suit. It was asserted that this Court, i.e. writ Court, ought not to be reduced to subordinate trial Court. That question does fall within the domain of "private dispute" and not within the domain of "public dispute". That being so, writ remedy is not a proper course. Further, the disputed question ought not to be allowed to be agitated in writ proceedings. This submission, in the facts of the present case, is not possible to accept. Non-reference of "dispute" by the petitioners is undisputed. Had it been a matter of dispute, then this objection would have perhaps weighed with the Court. It is not the say of the respondents that having referred the dispute to the arbitrator, the petitioners now turn around and have come forward to raise all available disputes. As to the dispute relating to private dispute, it was submitted that enforcement and execution of an award in coercive manner through the process of the Court, in the facts of the present case, takes out the case from the domain of "private dispute". The submission is not properly formulated, however, it has potential to be developed on that line. Then differentiating principles (Say, for instance, disputed question of facts, dispute of private nature v/s public nature, availability of other remedy etc.) between writ remedy and remedy through ordinary Civil Court ought not to be placed at such high or unaccessible pedestal that it cannot accommodate the facts of the case and principles remain good in theory only. After all, - as this case illustrates,- facts of the case follow principle and not vice versa. Granting of relief under writ remedy is permissible. In view of the above discussion, present petition is allowed. The award dated 17-8-2004 passed by respondent No. 9, so far as present petitioners are concerned, is declared to be unenforceable. Special Execution Petition No. 1 of 2005 filed by the present respondents before the Executing Court qua present petitioners stands dismissed. However, Special Execution Petition No. 1 of 2005 may proceed against other parties in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute to the above extent. No costs.
