D.A. Mehta, J.@mdashThis group of petitions has been heard together as they arise out of common order made by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (the Tribunal) on 21.08.2008 in various applications moved before the Tribunal by different persons. The parties have treated the group of petitions bearing Special Civil Application Nos. 12145 of 2008 to 12149 of 2008 as the main matter considering the fact that all the pleadings and the supporting documents are available in the record of Special Civil Application No. 12145 of 2008 and hence, the facts are taken from the said petition.
2. The petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 12145 of 2008 to 12149 of 2008 is common, namely, Rohini Housing Complex Owners'' Association (hereinafter referred to as ''Rohini''). Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, namely, Raiben wd/o Dhiraji Ugraji, Vihaji Dhiraji and Bachuji Dhiraji are the original land owners of land bearing Block No. 84 of Village Khatraj, Taluka Kalol, Dist. Gandhinagar (hereinafter referred to as ''the land in question''). There are other lands also bearing different block numbers but for the present the same description reference shall suffice. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 shall hereinafter be referred to as ''the original land owners''. Though the petitioner has stated that the land in question is owned and occupied by the petitioner-Rohini, the said fact is contradicted and hence, the ownership and occupation of the petitioner is not accepted for the time being. In fact the basis of the claimed ownership, being various registered sale documents, stated to have been executed by the original land owners in favour of Rohini, are under challenge, there being pending proceedings for cancellation of the said documents before a competent Court.
3. The original land owners moved Taluka Development Officer, Kalol (TDO) on 13/14.04.1982 seeking permission u/s 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (the BLR Code) for putting the agricultural land to non-agricultural use, mainly for purposes of residential use. On 17.04.1982 the TDO vide order No. 202/1982 permitted the change of use of the land in question from agricultural to non-agricultural. Between 13.06.1982 to 17.08.1982 the original land owners executed various registered sale deeds in favour of Rohini. It is an admitted fact that Rohini is an association registered only under the Bombay Non-Trading Corporation Act.
4. The order made by TDO was taken in suo motu revision by the Special Secretary, Revenue Department (Appeals) and vide order dated 29.08.1983, NA permission granted by TDO was cancelled holding that the TDO had no jurisdiction to decide such a NA application. Rohini as well as other persons, including the original land owners, challenged the order of revisional authority by filing various petitions before this High Court. Vide judgment rendered on 03.04.1987 (as reported in 28 (2) GLR 760) the High Court upheld the order made by the Special Secretary by observing as under:
...The Taluka Development Officer, Kalol, therefore, had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications of the petitioner dated 13/14th April 1982 for grant of permission u/s 65 of the Code. The order passed by the Taluka Development Officer dated 19/20th April 1982 granting permission to the petitioners for making non-agricultural use of their lands was, therefore, without authority and wholly void. The Secretary (Appeals) was, therefore, right in concluding that the order passed by the Taluka Development Officer, Kalol granting permission to make non-agricultural use of the lands in question was ab initio void and, therefore, a nullity.
5. The judgment rendered by learned Single Judge was carried in appeal by way of various Letters Patent Appeals and vide order dated 25.06.1992 the following order came to be made by the Division Bench:
Mr. N.D. Nanavati, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4-District Panchayat states, on instructions from the District Development Officer, that the District Panchayat will process N.A. Applications of the appellants treating the N.A. Applications originally filed and as depended to the District Panchayat by the order of the Special Secretary as pending applications and they will be decided on merits and in accordance with the law within three months of the receipt of the writ of this order by the District Panchayat. It will be open to the appellants to furnish further material if they so wish, in support of the N.A. Applications before the Competent Authority. It will equally be open to the Competent Authority to call for necessary further information, if so required, and in case of such requisition, the appellants shall comply with the same.
In view of the aforesaid statement made by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4, the main grievance in these appeals does not survive. However, one apprehension voiced by the learned Counsel for the appellants requires to be noted. It is apprehended that on the basis of the order of the Special Secretary, Section 84(c) proceedings may be initiated against the concerned appellants. This apprehension is obviously misconceived for the simple reason that N.A. Applications are being treated as pending and they are yet to be decided on merits as laid down herein. Consequently, there would remain no occasion for the Mamlatdar to initiate Section 84(c) proceedings against the appellants on the supposition that appellants had dealt with these lands unauthorisedly.
We make it clear that we have not observed anything on merits of the controversy between the parties regarding the question of grant of N.A. Permission, which question will have to be decided by the Competent Authority in accordance with the law. We have also not, therefore, considered on merits the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge and the observations made therein. The question is kept open.
In view of these directions, these appeals are disposed of with no order as to costs in each one of them.
No orders on the Civil Application.
6. It appears that in the meantime, namely, during pendency of the Letters Patent Appeals and after the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge, the original land owners executed an agreement to sell on 09.07.1990 in favour of Maradia Chemicals Limited, who in turn assigned the rights acquired under the said agreement for sale in favour of the present respondent No. 4-Arvind Mills Limited, (hereinafter referred to as ''Arvind''). A supplemental agreement was also executed on 30.04.1992 in favour of Arvind by the original land owners. Arvind is claiming rights over the land in question on the basis of the aforesaid two agreements dated 09.07.1990 and 30.04.1992.
7. After the order made by the Division Bench of this High Court on 25.06.1992 the applications made u/s 65 of the BLR Code came to be rejected by the District Development Officer, Mehsana (DDO) vide order dated 07.12.1992. The said order has attained finality in absence of any challenge.
8. In the meantime, Rohini instituted Civil Suit No. 92 of 1992 before the Civil Court, Kalol seeking protection as to the possession of Rohini qua the land in question as, according to Rohini, the original land owners were trying to sell the land in question despite having executed a registered sale deed in favour of Rohini. A compromise was entered into between the parties and vide order, in the form of consent decree, dated 04.12.1993 the original land owners, as per terms of compromise arrived at between Rohini and original land owners, accepted the rights of Rohini over the land in question.
9. On 08.11.1995 Rohini filed an application u/s 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (the Tenancy Act) before the Deputy Collector and Prant Officer, Mehsana seeking post facto permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act. Prior thereto a similar application under the same provision of the Tenancy Act had already been filed by Rohini on 12.06.1995 before the Collector, Mehsana. Vide order dated 15.11.1995 the Deputy Collector and Prant Officer, Mehsana rejected the application u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act. The said order was challenged by Rohini before the Tribunal. Vide order dated 15.04.1998 the Tribunal remanded the matter to the Deputy Collector and Prant Officer, Mehsana.
10. On 07.10.2008 the Collector, Mehsana rejected the application dated 12.06.1995 moved u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act by Rohini. The said order made by the Collector has attained finality in absence of Rohini having challenged the same.
11. But the Deputy Collector and Prant Officer, Mehsana granted permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act vide order dated 05.08.1999.
12. In the meantime, the Mamlatdar & Agricultural Lands Tribunal (the Mamlatdar) initiated proceedings u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act vide Ganot Revision Case Nos. 84C/Khatraj/787 to 789 of 1994, 791 of 1994, etc. and vide order dated 23.09.1998 dropped the proceedings. The Deputy Collector, Land Reforms (Appeals), Gandhinagar acting u/s 76 of the Tenancy Act vide Ganot/Revision/SR Nos. 350 to 354 of 2000 took the aforesaid order dated 23.09.1998 of the Mamlatdar in suo motu revision, cancelled the said order and remanded the proceedings vide order dated 30.04.2004.
13. It appears that on 14.03.1991 a notification came to be issued and published by the Government of Gujarat, Industries, Mines and Energy Department declaring Khatraj Village area in Khakharia Tappa as falling within backward category-II for development of industries notifying the said area as ''industrial zone''.
14. On 6/7.01.1992 the original land owners obtained permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act for selling the agricultural land in question to Arvind for industrial purposes. On 05.06.1998 Rohini made an application to Deputy Collector and Prant Officer, Mehsana to cancel the permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act granted in favour of Arvind vide order dated 06/07.01.1992. The application was made on the ground of alleged breach of the conditions of the order granting permission. Vide order dated NIL.06.1999 Deputy Collector and Prant Officer, Mehsana allowed the application moved by Rohini and cancelled the permission granted in favour of Arvind u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act without hearing Arvind, as Arvind was not impleaded in the said proceedings.
15. On 06.06.1999 Rohini applied to Deputy Collector and Prant Officer, Mehsana for post facto permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act. Vide order dated 05.08.1999 Prant Officer, Mehsana granted post facto permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act to Rohini, ignoring the earlier order made by the Collector on 07.10.1998 on the same subject matter.
16. On 24.11.1994 the original land owners executed sale deeds in favour of Sakaraji Kalaji Thakore, Nagarji Kalaji Thakore, Bhikhaji Kalaji Thakore, etc. On 06.01.2000 the said persons, who were agriculturists and hence were not required to obtain any permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act, challenged granting of permission to Rohini vide order dated 05.08.1999 by Deputy Collector and Prant Officer, Mehsana u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act.
17. Rohini challenged the order dated 30.04.2004 made by Deputy Collector, Land Reforms (Appeals), Gandhinagar u/s 76 of the Tenancy Act.
18. On 26.07.2004 Arvind applied to Collector, Gandhinagar for extension of period stipulated under permission granted u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act. On 23.02.2005 the Collector, Gandhinagar rejected the application moved by Arvind for extension of time on the ground of pendency of litigations in Civil Court.
19. It appears that Rohini also had sought extension of time stipulated under permission granted u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act but vide order dated 23.02.2005 Collector, Gandhinagar rejected such application for extension on the ground of pendency of litigations before Civil Court.
20. Both Arvind and Rohini went in revision before the Tribunal challenging the orders made by Collector, Gandhinagar refusing extension of time.
21. All these revision applications in relation to various proceedings were taken up by the Tribunal and heard together. Vide impugned order dated 21.08.2008 the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the entire litigation by Rohini was not bona fide and various steps taken by Rohini in collusion with Deputy Collector and Prant Officer, Mehsana as well as Mamlatdar & ALT indicated that fraudulent and collusive orders were made by the said authorities in favour of Rohini, to the detriment of not only Arvind but the State Government. The basis for the aforesaid conclusion of the Tribunal is various orders made on 31.12.1983 u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act by the Mamlatdar & ALT in Ganot Case Nos. 84C/Khatraj/276/278/279/280/284 of 1983 and 294 to 296 of 1983 whereby it was held that the transactions entered into between the original land owners and Rohini were violative of provisions of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act and hence, according to the Tribunal, till the said order subsisted all subsequent proceedings were infructuous and non est in law.
22. Rohini has assailed the impugned order of the Tribunal by originally praying for following reliefs:
6. The petitioner, therefore prays that the Hon''ble Court may be pleased to
(A) Admit the present petition;
(B) Declare that initiation of proceedings u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act by Mamlatdar and ALT by registering Tenancy case No. 84(C)/Khataj/791/94 was illegal and bad in law
ALTERNATIVELY
Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the order dated: 21/08/2008 in TEN/B.A./128/2004 passed by the GRT and the order dated 30/04/2004 in Ganot/Revision/SR/ 350/2000 passed by the DC and confirm the order passed by ALT in tenancy case No. 84(C)/Khatraj/791/94 to the extent that it orders to drop the notice and proceedings initiated u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act;
(C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the present petition, stay the execution and implementation of the order dated 21/08/2008 in TEN/B.A./128/2004 passed by the GRT and the order dated 30/04/2004 in Ganot/Revision/SR/350/2000 passed by the DC;
Subsequently, vide amendment granted on 30.09.2008, following additional relief has been prayed for:
(CC) Declare that proceedings u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act in the year 1983 vide tenancy case No. 84(C)/Khatraj/278 to 284/83 and order thereon dated 31-12-1983, are nullity and have never been acted upon.
23. Learned Counsel assailed the order dated 31.12.1983 made u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act on the ground that the said order is nullity as the same has been made in violation of principles of natural justice, Rohini having never been heard before passing of the said order. It was further submitted that at least latter part of the order was bad in law and hence, to the said extent, namely, restoration of possession of the land in question to the original land owners could not be sustained and the possession of the land in question was continuously with Rohini. A further contention was to the effect that no such order could have been made in light of the observations made by the Division Bench while passing orders in Letters Patent Appeals on 25.06.1992, and if any such order u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act had been made the State Government was duty bound to point out the same to the High Court; that having not pointed out such an order, which was never acted upon, the said order cannot be relied upon by the Tribunal to the detriment of Rohini; that even otherwise as per the terms of consent decree in Civil Suit No. 92 of 1992 possession of Rohini stands protected as against all other claimants to the land in question and, therefore also, to the said extent, the order dated 31.12.1983 made u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act was bad. A further contention was to the effect that subsequent events like making of fresh application u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act, initial rejection, challenge to such rejection, remand by Tribunal, passing of fresh order on 05.08.1999 would all go to indicate that the order dated 31.12.1983 was never in knowledge of anyone and was not acted upon. It was further submitted that an order u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act was an administrative order and it was open to the authority to pass a fresh order subsequently if the facts and circumstances so warrant as held by the Apex Court in the case of
24. Alternatively, it was pleaded that Rohini at least was entitled to succeed on the issue which was held in favour of Rohini by Deputy Collector and Prant Officer, Mehsana whereby permission granted u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act to Arvind was cancelled by the said authority on finding that there was breach of the stipulated conditions.
25. Various judgment were cited in support of the submission that an order made without hearing the party is a nullity and the authorities were required to pass a reasoned order after observing principles of natural justice as well as proposition that an order which is a nullity is non est in law and the same can be so declared at any time in any proceedings and such an order can be ignored by a person against whom the order is so made.
26. The learned Assistant Government Pleader, after narrating the facts and the chronology of events, submitted that Rohini not having challenged the order made on 31.12.1983 u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act could not be permitted to challenge the same in the present proceedings at such a belated stage. It was submitted that the said order made on 31.12.1983 was within the knowledge of Rohini as could be seen from communication dated 21.04.1995 addressed by Shri A.C. Damani, advocate of Rohini, and, therefore, before Rohini challenges the order of 1983 on merits Rohini was required to explain why the said challenge was not raised at an appropriate time. Secondly it was submitted that the reliance on observations made in the order of Division Bench rendered on 25.06.1992 in Letters Patent Appeals was not warranted because a plain reading of the said observations would indicate that the same were in relation to proceedings which may be initiated, namely, fresh initiation of proceedings. However, according learned Assistant Government Pleader, the said observations cannot detract from an order which was already made on 31.12.1983, nor can the observations be read to mean that the High Court had made any observations as to the said order which was never under challenge.
27. It was further submitted that the Deputy Collector and Prant Officer could not have made any order u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act when the Collector had already rejected an application in relation to the same subject land on 07.10.1998. This submission was made on a two fold basis : Firstly that the Deputy Collector and Prant Officer had no jurisdiction, as accepted by him in the order itself, that applications u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act were to be decided only by the Collector as was the practice; and Secondly the Deputy Collector and Prant Officer was aware about the order of rejection made by the Collector on 07.10.1998, as could be seen from the endorsement at the end of the order indicating that a copy of the said order dated 07.10.1998 had been forwarded to the Deputy Collector and Prant Officer by the Collector. In support of the submissions various authorities were cited by the learned Assistant Government Pleader.
28. Learned advocates appearing for the original land owners as well as appearing for the other agriculturists and for Arvind have been heard.
29. In rejoinder, learned Counsel for Rohini reiterated that in so far as Special Civil Application Nos. 12155 of 2008 to 12161 of 2008 are concerned, to the extent it was held that Arvind had committed breach of conditions imposed while granting permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act, Rohini was entitled to succeed.
30. The present controversy can broadly be divided into three parts. The first is the nature of proceedings u/s 65 of the BLR Code. The second is in relation to proceedings u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act, and the third is in relation to proceedings u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act.
31. The object and purpose of enacting the BLR Code is primarily to assess and recover Land Revenue, and incidentally in relation to other matters connected with the Land Revenue Administration. Therefore, the provisions of Section 65 of the BLR Code and the proceedings thereunder will have to be appreciated in this context. The relevant portion of the said Section as is material for the present reads as under:
65. [(1)] Any occupant, of land [assessed or held for the purpose of agriculture] is entitled by himself, his servants, tenants, agents, or other legal representatives, to erect farm-buildings, construct wells or tanks, or make any other improvements, thereon for the better cultivation of the land, or its more convenient.
But, if any occupant [wishes to use his holding or any part thereof for any other purpose] the Collector''s permission shall in the first place be applied for by the 2 * * occupant.
32. A plain reading of the provision indicates that any occupant of land, namely, land which is assessed or held for the purposes of agriculture, is entitled to put up construction as specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 65 of the BLR Code, the requirement being that such construction should be for the better cultivation of the land, or more convenient use of the land for the purposes of agriculture. The subsequent part of the provision which commences with the use of the term ''But'' provides that if any such occupant wishes to use his land or any part thereof ''for any other purpose'' permission from the Collector shall in the first instance be applied for by such occupant. It is not necessary to deal with the procedural part for the present. Suffice it to state that the requirement of seeking the permission from the Collector is primarily for the purposes of ensuring that correct assessment is made and recovery of revenue effected on the basis of the use to which the land is put, whether for the purposes of agriculture or for any other purpose. The assessment and recovery of revenue is dependent upon the nature of the use to which the land is put. The grant or refusal of such permission cannot be determinative of rights of any person.
33. Section 63 of the Tenancy Act falls within Chapter-V which deals with RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS, etc. The said provision has primarily been enacted to put a bar on transfer of land, namely, agricultural land to non-agriculturist. Section 63 of the Tenancy Act imposes an absolute bar as to alienation of an agricultural land in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist. The First Proviso carves out an exception whereby it provides that the Collector or an officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf may grant permission for alienation by any of the modes stipulated on such conditions as may be prescribed. Rule 36 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules, 1956 (the Tenancy Rules) provides for the conditions on which permission for sale, etc. of land under Sections 63 of the Tenancy Act may be granted. The Second Proviso appearing in Sub-section (1) of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act further restricts the scope of permission which can be granted under the First Proviso by stipulating that no such permission shall be granted where land is being sold to a person who is not an agriculturist for agricultural purpose if the annual income of such person from other source exceeds five thousand rupees.
34. Therefore, the scope and intent of the two provisions, one under the BLR Code and the other under the Tenancy Act, are different and operate in different fields. The proceedings relatable to the permission for change of user of a land from agricultural to non-agricultural u/s 65 of the BLR Code would have no material bearing in relation to the proceedings u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act, because once the use of the land is changed from agricultural purpose to non-agricultural purpose there would be no occasion to approach the revenue authorities u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act. However, the converse is not true. Merely because a permission is granted u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act to sell or transfer a piece of land to a non-agriculturist, recipient of such land cannot, as a matter of right, put such land to use for any other purpose, other than agricultural by virtue of such permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act. Acquisition of land by a non-agriculturist may not entitle such a person to change use unless and until the conditions on which permission for transfer of land u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act are shown to be fulfilled. In fact the satisfaction of such condition(s) is a prerequisite for granting permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act.
35. If the authorities find that there is a breach of any of the conditions, upon which permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act had been granted, by virtue of powers vested in the authorities u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act, the revenue authorities are entitled to pass such order as provided by Section 84C of the Tenancy Act. The relevant part of the said provision as is material for the present reads as under:
84C. (1) Where in respect of the transfer or acquisition of any land made on or after the commencement of the Amending Act, 1955, the Mamlatdar suo motu or on the application of any person interested in such land has reason to believe that such transfer or acquisition is or becomes invalid under any of the provisions of this Act, the Mamlatdar shall issue a notice and hold an inquiry as provided for in Section 84B and decide whether the transfer or acquisition is or is not invalid.
(2) If after holding such inquiry, the Mamlatdar comes to a conclusion that the transfer or acquisition of land to be invalid, he shall make an order declaring the transfer or acquisition to be invalid, [unless the parties to such transfer or acquisition give an undertaking in writing that within a period of three months from such date as the Mamlatdar may fix, they shall restore the land alongwith the rights and interest therein to the position in which it was immediately before the transfer or acquisition, and the land is so restored within that period]:
x x x x x
x x x x x
(3) On the declaration made by the Mamlatdar under Sub-section (2),--
(a) the land shall be deemed to vest in the State Government, free from all encumbrances lawfully subsisting thereon on the date of such vesting and shall be disposed of in the manner provided in Sub-section (4); the encumbrances shall be paid out of the occupancy price in the manner provided in Section 32Q for the payment of encumbrances out of the purchase price of the sale of land but the right of the holder of such encumbrances to proceed against the person liable, for the enforcement of his right in any other manner shall not be affected;
36. A plain reading of the provision indicates that the Mamlatdar, either of his own motion or on an application by any interested person, who is interested in such land, has reason to believe that transfer or acquisition of any land is, or becomes, invalid under any of the provisions of the Tenancy Act the Mamlatdar shall issue a notice and hold an inquiry as provided and thereafter decide whether the transfer or acquisition is, or is not, invalid. Under Sub-section (2) it is provided that when the Mamlatdar comes to a conclusion that the transfer or acquisition of land is invalid he shall make a declaratory order declaring such transfer or acquisition to be invalid. The latter part of the said Sub-section carves out an exception providing that even after such declaration if the parties to such transfer or acquisition give an undertaking in writing that within a period of three months from the date fixed by the Mamlatdar the land shall be restored along with rights and interest therein to the position in which the land was immediately before the transfer or acquisition, and the land is so restored within that period, the declaration as to invalidity of the transfer shall not have any effect. Thus, even while making a declaratory order it would be open to the Mamlatdar to fix a date within a period of three months within which the parties to the transfer are given an opportunity to give an undertaking as provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 84C of the Tenancy Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 84C of the Tenancy Act provides that on the declaration made by the Mamlatdar under Sub-section (2) the land shall be deemed to vest in the State Government.
37. Thus, a conjoint reading of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 84C of the Tenancy Act stipulates that after holding an inquiry as provided, if the Mamlatdar comes to the conclusion that a transaction of transfer or acquisition is invalid and makes a declaration to the said effect the land shall be deemed to vest in the State Government upon such declaration being made by the Mamlatdar. The statute further provides that it will be open to the Mamlatdar to provide for fixation of a date within which period (not exceeding three months) the parties may give an undertaking and restore the possession of the land status-quo ante before the transfer or acquisition. For effectuating the requirements of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 84C of the Tenancy Act the Mamlatdar may pass a consolidated order or may pass a separate order in relation to the availability of opportunity of restoration of status-quo ante between the parties. From such an enabling provision which grants an opportunity to the parties to reverse the transaction, it is not possible to read therein any such requirement that the vesting of the land in the State Government is either suspended or is postponed. A fiction has been enacted under Sub-section (3) of Section 84C of the Tenancy Act which says that on the declaration made by the Mamlatdar under Sub-section (2) the land shall be deemed to vest in the State Government. Upon declaration being made the vesting takes place immediately. But if the parties undertake, as provided in the latter part of Sub-section (2) of Section 84C of the Tenancy Act and fulfill the requirements stipulated in the provision by restoring the possession status-quo ante the vesting shall stand reversed, provided actual restoration has taken place within the period stipulated. It is not as if the vesting takes place after the stipulated period or the date fixed by the Mamlatdar, though in practice the revenue authorities may not strictly take possession of the land in question from the transferee or the person who has acquired the land.
38. In light of the aforesaid position in law, it becomes apparent that the transaction in question, namely, transfer of agricultural land by the original land owners in favour of Rohini violated provisions of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act and the authorities were entitled to act u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act. This is all the more so because the permission to change the user of the land in question granted by the TDO u/s 65 of the BLR Code was without jurisdiction and the said position stood confirmed upto point of time the order made by the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeals. Even subsequent thereto when the District Panchayat decided the application through the DDO on 07.12.1992, the original land owners were not granted permission to change the user of the land to any other purpose, other than the purpose of agriculture. The authorities were therefore justified in initiating the action u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act.
39. The order made on 31.12.1983 u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act was therefore perfectly justified and a valid order made in accordance with the provisions of the statute, namely, Tenancy Act. The contention that the said order was a nullity because Rohini was not heard deserves to be stated only to be rejected. A plain reading of the said order itself indicates that it was not as if the Mamlatdar did not take steps to serve the notice and make inquiry as stipulated by Section 84C of the Tenancy Act. The order records that on 28.07.1983 for the first time notices were issued and were forwarded through Talati, Khatraj for effecting service but in absence of the address of Rohini, the notices were returned by the Talati. Thereafter, Mamlatdar made inquiries with the office of the Sub-Registrar, obtained necessary details from Index-A and issued fresh notices on 05.10.1983. These were sought to be served through the peon of the Office of the Mamlatdar. But the office-bearers of Rohini did not accept the said notice. Word ''Sanchalak'' is used by the Mamlatdar in the order u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act made on 31.12.1983. Learned advocate for the petitioner-Rohini sought to make capital out of the said word by submitting that as there was no person acting in the capacity of ''sanchalak'' (the Manager) notices were not accepted. This contention also cannot be countenanced. The order itself records that after the first refusal to accept the notice three more attempts were made by peon to effect service at Ahmedabad but no responsible person of the association accepted the notice nor was the peon informed as to who was handling the affairs of the association. After recording these facts the Mamlatdar has stated that thus service of notice became an impossibility upon refusal of Rohini to accept the notice.
40. The aforesaid averments are duly supported by the rojkam of the office of the Mamlatdar and the statements of one Shri Somabhai Trikambhai Jadav, who was directed by the Mamlatdar to effect service of the notice. The said statement records the dates on which the peon went to Ahmedabad for effecting service and the persons, who were contacted and who refused to accept the notice, have been named.
41. In light of the aforesaid factual position it cannot be stated that there is any violation of principles of natural justice. In the facts of the present case, the authority has taken enough care and acted with due diligence to effect service. If the notices were being sought to be served on a person, who was not authorized to accept the service, such a person while refusing to accept the notice was equally duty bound to inform the authorized office-bearers of the association about such notices and Rohini was duty bound to inquire as regards the same. This is more so in light of the fact that at the relevant point of time there were only seven individuals constituting the association and those seven individuals were the promoters of the association. It is not possible to accept the contention that the persons on whom the notices were sought to be served were not aware as to who was the authorized person to accept the notices. Therefore, if an opportunity is granted and not availed off such a person cannot be permitted subsequently to turn round and make a grievance that there is violation of principles of natural justice. If such a conduct is upheld no proceedings before any authority/forum can ever be completed. The contention of Rohini therefore that the order dated 31.12.1983 made u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act is a nullity due to violation of principles of natural justice does not merit acceptance.
42. At this stage it is also necessary to deal with the contention that the said order could not be challenged by Rohini because Rohini was not aware of any such order having been made. Factually this submission is incorrect as shall become clear from the facts narrated hereinafter. However, before that it is required to be noted that Rohini was aware, as noted hereinbefore, that proceedings u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act have been initiated but Rohini refused to participate in the said proceedings by refusing to accept the notices issued by Mamlatdar. Thereafter it would not lie in mouth of Rohini to say that Rohini was not aware of any such proceedings.
43. As can be seen from communication dated 21.04.1995 addressed by Shri A.C. Damani, advocate of Rohini, to the Mamlatdar, Kalol, Rohini was aware about the proceedings u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act and the order made by the Mamlatdar as recorded in the said communication and, therefore, at least on 21.04.1995, if not earlier, Rohini had derived knowledge about the order dated 31.12.1983 made u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act and ought to have challenged the said order at that point of time without waiting for the matter to culminate upto the stage of Tribunal and thereafter challenge in the present petition only by way of an amendment granted on 30.09.2008.
44. Thereafter, there is an order dated 22.01.1996 made by the Prant Officer, Mehsana in RTS/Appeal/151/95 wherein Rohini is a party in relation to proceedings u/s 108(5) of Bombay Land Revenue Rules wherein also there is a reference to the order made on 31.12.1983 u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act. Therefore, it is apparent that the contention that Rohini was not aware about the order made on 31.12.1983 is factually not only not correct but outright false.
45. The contention that as the order was a nullity it was not necessary to challenge the same also requires to be recorded only to be rejected. Rohini on its own was not competent to decide as to validity or otherwise of the order, more particularly in light of the conduct of Rohini. It is not as if order was on the face of it a nullity, it was not an order made by a person who was not competent to make such an order. It was not an order made in relation to a non-existent person or a dead person and that the authority was aware of such a position. In all such instances, may be, what Rohini contends may have been acceptable. But in the facts of the present case the order was made against Rohini; Rohini was conscious of the proceedings having been initiated; subsequently also, as the record reveals, Rohini was aware that an order had been made and yet Rohini chose to accept the said order and not challenge the same till September 2008. Hence, on this count Rohini cannot succeed.
46. Even otherwise it is equally well established in law that an order remains in operation and is effective till the point of time it is set aside by a competent Court or a forum in appropriate proceedings initiated in accordance with law seeking such a declaration. After referring to various Supreme Court decisions this Court has, in the case of
47. However, even if one examines the order dated 31.12.1983 on merits it becomes clear that the said order is valid and correct in eyes of law and it is not possible to hold that the said order suffers from any such legal infirmity so as to warrant interference. In fact, during course of hearing, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Rohini, accepted as much that the first part of the order, which declares the transaction to be invalid, cannot be faulted with if the Court comes to the conclusion that the challenge as to violation of principles of natural justice fails. Admittedly, there was no permission granted u/s 65 of the BLR Code as on 31.12.1983. The permission granted by TDO was found to be without jurisdiction as held by the authorities and upheld by the High Court. Even subsequent thereto the application was not granted and, therefore, when the sale was effected of an agricultural land in favour of a non-agriculturist without prior permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act the revenue authority was justified in acting under provisions of Section 84C of the Tenancy Act. The reliance on the observations made in the order of the Division Bench on 25.06.1992 in Letters Patent Appeals also cannot carry the case of Rohini any further. The Special Secretary had made an order on 29.08.1983 holding that the order made by TDO on 17.04.1982 was without jurisdiction. The matter was carried by way of writ petition before High Court and before High Court decided the matter on 03.04.1987, confirming the order of the Special Secretary, proceedings had already been initiated and culminated on 31.12.1983 in the order made u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act. Therefore, the observations of the Division Bench that the apprehension that proceedings ''may be initiated'' was misconceived because the applications u/s 65 of the BLR Code were to be treated as pending have to be understood in light of any fresh proceedings that may be initiated after 25.06.1992 (the date of order made by the Division Bench) and the observations cannot obliterate and detract from an order which was already made even before the petitions were filed and/or decided by the High Court.
48. Coming back to the merits of the order dated 31.12.1983. The Mamlatdar has found that there was no valid permission u/s 65 of the BLR Code; the entires made pursuant to the transaction of sale have not been certified; on 19.11.1983 spot inspection reveals that no construction has taken place and the land remains fallow; the purchaser association is not registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925; and for all these reasons there is violation of provisions of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act in absence of any prior permission from the Collector. The latter part of the order first of all states that the sale is illegal and hence, the same is treated to be invalid. The observation that the possession of the land may be restored to the seller within a period of three months is, according to Rohini, bad in law and, therefore, the entire order stands vitiated cannot be accepted. As already noticed hereinbefore a conjoint reading of provisions of Sections 84C(1), (2) and (3) of the Tenancy Act would indicate that the vesting in the State Government is automatic and consequential upon the declaration having been made and an opportunity granted for restoration of status-quo ante, namely an enabling provision, cannot be read to mean that the vesting does not take place. In fact the provision nowhere stipulates that the authority is required to make an order of vesting. Therefore, the impugned order dated 31.12.1983 made by the Mamlatdar does not suffer from any legal infirmity so as to make it bad in law. Hence, on none of the grounds pleaded can this order be successfully assailed by Rohini and the challenge to order dated 31.12.1983 fails in entirety.
49. The next limb of attack by Rohini was based on the subsequent events whereunder Rohini sought post facto permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act and which came to be granted, according to Rohini, by the Deputy Collector vide order dated 05.08.1999 and, therefore, according to Rohini, the order dated 31.12.1983 made u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act would not have no efficacy as Rohini had been granted permission to purchase agricultural land resulting in there being no breach of any provisions of the Tenancy Act. This contention also does not merit acceptance for the reasons that follow hereinafter.
50. The chronology of events noted while recording the facts indicates that on 14.03.1991 the State Government issued notification declaring Khatraj Village area, wherein the land in question falls, as being an industrial zone for the purposes of development of industries as the said area falls within backward Category-II. Subsequent thereto the original land owners obtained permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act on 6/7.01.1992 for selling the agricultural land in question to Arvind for industrial purpose.
51. Rohini moved an application before Collector, Mehsana seeking post facto permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act on 12.06.1995. This was followed by an identical application for the very same subject matter on 08.11.1995 before the Deputy Collector, Mehsana. On 15.11.1995 the Deputy Collector rejected the application dated 08.11.1995 and Rohini carried the matter before the Tribunal. On 15.04.1998 the Tribunal set aside the order made by the Deputy Collector and remanded the matter back for considering any application which may be filed by the original land owners u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act, either individually or jointly with Rohini. It is pertinent to note that the Tribunal in the said order did not restore the application dated 15.11.1995 moved by Rohini before Deputy Collector but directed the Deputy Collector to decide any fresh application which may be moved by the original land owners on their own along with Rohini. In other words, the application moved by Rohini stood exhausted, the Deputy Collector had already dealt with the said application and passed an order and had become functus officio. Therefore, the only eventuality in which the Deputy Collector could have thereafter exercised powers u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act was in case where a fresh application was moved by the original land owners, individually or with Rohini, but not in a case where Rohini alone made an application u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act.
52. In the meantime, admittedly, on 07.10.1998 the Collector rejected the application dated 12.06.1995 by making an order u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act refusing the permission to transfer the land in question in favour of Rohini, a non-agriculturist. The Collector categorically observed that Rohini was not a registered co-operative society and hence, was not entitled to acquire the land. The order made by Collector on 07.10.1998 was, therefore, not an order of rejection which was based on only a technical defect. In the circumstances, even while treating the order u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act as an administrative one as held by the Apex Court in the case of Govindbhai Gordhanbhai Patel and Ors. (supra) the principles of res judicata would come into play because the dismissal of proceedings was on merits and not owing to a technical defect. Therefore, the reliance on the said judgment by Rohini would not carry the case of Rohini any further. This becomes clear from the following observations made by the Apex Court in Paragraph No. 9 and Paragraph Nos. 13 and 14 of the judgment which read as under:
9. Two questions arise for determination in this case : (1) whether the order of the Prant Officer dated December 8, 1958, rendered the aforesaid agreement dated May 16, 1957 impossible of performance and as such void u/s 56 of the Indian Contract Act and (2) whether in view of the aforesaid order of refusal by the Prant Officer, Thana dated December 8, 1958, Additional Collector, Thana, was not competent to grant the sanction and the certificate u/s 63 of the Act and Rule 36 of the Rules....
x x x x x
x x x x x
13. The answer to the second question turns on the answer to two subsidiary questions (i) whether in according or declining to accord permission under the proviso to Section 63 of the Act, the Collector or the officer authorised by the State Government in that behalf acts in an administrative capacity or a judicial or a quasi-judicial capacity and (ii) whether the aforesaid order dated December 8, 1958 passed by the Prant Officer, Thana was one on merits or otherwise. Turning to the question (i), it has to be observed that there is nothing in Section 63 of the Act to indicate that in exercising his jurisdiction under the proviso to Sub-section (1) of the section, the Collector or the authorised officer has to act judicially or in conformity with the recognised judicial norms. There is also nothing in the aforesaid section of the Act requiring the Collector or the authorised officer to determine any question affecting the right of any party. The function which the Collector or the authorised officer discharges under the aforesaid proviso is, therefore, an administrative one and not judicial or quasi-judicial. It will be apposite to advert to a few decisions bearing on the matter. In
14. In regard to question (ii), it may be stated that although the Prant Officer may have been exercising concurrent jurisdiction with the Collector, Thana Prant, he did not pass any orders on the merits of the previous application made by the respondents and endorsed by the appellants seeking permission to sell and purchase the suit property. The order, as already stated, was passed by him on the ground that the intending purchaser had not obtained the certificate required under Rule 36 (f) of the Rules. It is well recognised that the dismissal of a proceeding by an authority not on merits but merely on account of a formal defect will not attract the applicability of the general principles of res judicata and will not debar the authority exercising concurrent jurisdiction from entertaining the subsequent proceedings for the same relief and passing proper orders on merits. (See Putali Mehati v. Tulja ILR (1879) Bom 223 where the rejection of a previous suit for the plaintiff''s omission to produce a certificate of the Collector u/s 6 of the Pensions Act was held not to bar a second suit on the same cause of action, and Pathaperumal v. Murugandi ILR (1895) Mad 466, where rejection of the first suit for recovery of money for plaintiff''s failure to produce succession certificate was held not to bar a second proceeding for the same relief. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the previous order passed by the Prant Officer being merely an administrative order and not having been passed on the merits of the case, it did not, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, impair the power of the Collector to pass the impugned order on the merits of the matter under proviso to Section 63 of the Act on the grant of the requisite certificate under Rule 36 (f) of the Rules.
53. The net result is that the two applications moved by Rohini on 12.06.1995 and 08.11.1995 before the Collector and Deputy Collector respectively came to be rejected by both the authorities and the order made by the Collector on 07.10.1998 was subsequent to the order made by the Tribunal on 15.04.1998. Therefore, only the order of Collector subsisted on merits, there being no other order, and there being no other pending application on the date the Collector made an order.
54. In the aforesaid backdrop of the events one has to appreciate the action of the Deputy Collector in passing a fresh order on 05.08.1999 granting permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act to Rohini. The conduct of Rohini and the Deputy Collector/Prant Officer, Mehsana, who made the order on 05.08.1999 (Annexure-D) is required to be considered a little closely. On 05.06.1998 Rohini moved Prant Officer, Mehsana to cancel the permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act granted in favour of Arvind by orders dated 06/07.01.1992 on the ground of alleged breach of conditions. By order dated NIL.06.1999 the Prant Officer cancelled the said permission without making Arvind party to the proceedings or granting opportunity of hearing to Arvind. Arvind has successfully been able to challenge the said order before the Tribunal. The finding of the Tribunal on this count cannot be faulted and challenge by Rohini to the said part of the order of Tribunal also cannot be upheld, which shall be dealt with a little later while dealing with the said petitions.
55. Rohini thereafter moved a fresh application on 06.06.1999 u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act seeking post facto permission from the Prant Officer, Mehsana for residential purpose. This came to be granted by the said authority vide order dated 05.08.1999. The Tribunal has, by assigning cogent reasons, rightly come to the conclusion that the said authority could not have exercised the said jurisdiction.
56. Section 63 of the Tenancy Act vide First Proviso stipulates that the Collector or an officer authorized by the State Government may grant permission for such transfer on such conditions as may be prescribed. The legislative intent is therefore clear that the powers are vested in the Collector or an officer authorized by the State Government. If the definition of the term ''Collector'' as provided in Section 2(2A), which includes the Assistant or Deputy Collector, performing the duties and exercising powers of the Collector under the BLR Code or any other officer specially empowered by the State Government to perform the functions of the Collector under the Act, is to be read to include the other officers in the term ''Collector'' used in the First Proviso under Sub-section (1) of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act the latter phrase ''or an officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf'' would become redundant. It is not possible to accept the contention on behalf of Rohini that as the term ''Collector'' is an inclusive term a Deputy Collector also has concurrent powers for deciding the application u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act. If this was the intent, the phrase ''or an officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf'' would have no meaning and the Legislature cannot be ascribed with tautology. In fact it only includes an officer who is authorized by the State Government specifically to grant permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act, over and above the Collector. In other words, the definition of the term ''Collector'' by implication and by principles of harmonious interpretation stands excluded and neither an Assistant or Deputy Collector performing the duties and exercising powers of the Collector under the Land Revenue Code or any other officer specially empowered by the State Government to perform the functions of the Collector can exercise the powers granted exclusively to the Collector or an officer authorized by the State Government to exercise powers u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act. This becomes clear from the observations made by the Prant Officer himself while passing the order dated 05.08.1999 when the said authority categorically records that when the earlier application made in 1995 was decided and rejected on 15.11.1995 the office of the Deputy Collector had those powers for exercising them but thereafter all the decisions for permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act are made only by the Collector. So the officer being conscious of the fact that he did not have jurisdiction thereafter falls back upon the definition of the term ''Collector''. The Deputy Collector further tries to justify exercise of powers by referring to the order of remand made by the Tribunal and goes on to state that as the remand is made to the Deputy Collector, if the powers are not exercised it would amount to disobeying the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, order dated 05.08.1999 granting post facto permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act is without jurisdiction in as much as the order has been made by the Deputy Collector without establishing that he was an officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf. In fact the order indicates to the contrary.
57. The order dated 05.08.1999 thereafter tries to justify granting of permission only on the basis of an application moved by Rohini by reproducing and relying only on one part of the order of Tribunal dated 15.04.1998 without referring to the earlier part of the same paragraph, namely Paragraph No. 10 which categorically records as under:
10. It is evident from the above that there is a restriction on sale of agricultural land. So, the person who wants to sell the land has to seek the permission. The contention raised by Shri Pandit that there is no specific provision of Section 63 read with only by the occupant i.e. by the seller and not by the purchaser, is neither valid nor proper and is not accepted. When the prohibition is with regard to the sale of the property the seller has to seek the permission. So, in the instant case, the original occupant of the disputed land has to seek permission u/s 63 of the Act. So far as that point is concerned the order of the Dy. Collector is valid and proper....
58. Despite the direction that the original land owners should make an application either individually or jointly with Rohini the said direction of the Tribunal has been ignored to the said extent by stating that the original land owners are not interested and hence, would not make an application. The direction of the Tribunal was not to the effect that the original land owners should be issued notice and should be heard but the direction was specific that the application must basically come from the original land owners and not only from the purchaser. Therefore, on this count also, the order dated 05.08.1999 has rightly been held by the Tribunal to be bad in law.
59. However, most importantly, the Deputy Collector conveniently lost sight of the fact that on 07.10.1998 the Collector had already rejected the application moved by Rohini on the same subject matter by passing an order on merits and there was no question of entertaining a fresh application in June 1999. As noted hereinbefore, the order dated 07.10.1998 categorically records an endorsement of the copy of the said order to the Prant Officers, Mehsana and, therefore, unless and until the said order, which was made in accordance with law, on merits of the matter, was either set aside or quashed by a competent superior forum in appropriate proceedings, Prant Officer, Mehsana could not have entertained a fresh application from Rohini alone and passed an order in relation to the same subject matter on 05.08.1999 till the point of time the earlier order dated 07.10.1998 made by the Collector was subsisting. Therefore, considering the matter from any angle the order dated 05.08.1999 granting post facto permission u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act in favour of Rohini could not have been made only on the basis of an application moved by Rohini.
60. In fact when one reads entire Sub-section (1) with both the Provisos thereunder, of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act, it becomes clear that the application seeking permission has to be made by the agriculturist and not by the purchaser, a non-agriculturist, namely, a person in whose favour the transaction is being effected. Therefore, Rohini alone could not have made an application and an application only by Rohini could not have been entertained by the authority.
61. The further contention by Rohini that the Tribunal had incorrectly relied upon the notification declaring the land in question to be falling within the industrial zone there being no provision in the statute also cannot be countenanced. Under Rule 36 of the Tenancy Rules Clause-(b) specifically stipulates a case where land is required for the benefit of an industrial undertaking. Therefore, on this count also Rohini cannot succeed.
62. The Consent decree obtained by Rohini in Civil Suit No. 92 of 1992 also cannot be successfully pressed into service so as to deviate from operation of statutory provisions. Parties cannot be permitted to act contrary to statutory law by mutual agreement. Order u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act cannot become invalid in eyes of law only because parties have consented to a position not permitted by law. Hence, the alleged possession in terms of consent decree also cannot assist Rohini; more so when the original land owners have not abided by the said decree by transacting subsequently with Arvind as well as other agriculturists. The consent decree, therefore, cannot displace a prior valid order made u/s 84C of the Tenancy Act.
63. In the circumstances, the challenge by Rohini to the impugned order of Tribunal cannot be accepted on any of the grounds pleaded or urged at the time of hearing. In light of what is stated hereinbefore, it is not necessary to enumerate and deal with various authorities cited on behalf of the parties. Suffice it to state that the relevant principles laid down in the said decisions have been considered.
64. It is necessary to also record that the Tribunal has rightly come to the conclusion that the Collector had rightly refused application for extension of time in case of Rohini. The contention on behalf of Rohini that the Tribunal had wrongly interfered with order dated NIL.06.1999 made by the Deputy Collector but for the same reasons not interfered with the order made by the Collector in application moved by Rohini does not merit acceptance. The two situations cannot be equated. In so far as the order made by Deputy Collector is concerned, Arvind was never made a party and, therefore, was not heard. However, the Collector has equally rejected applications moved both by Rohini and Arvind for extension of time in light of pendency of the litigations and, therefore, there is no infirmity in the impugned order of Tribunal dated 21.08.2008 on this count so as to warrant interference.
65. In the result, Special Civil Application Nos. 12145 of 2008 to 12149 of 2008 are rejected. Interim relief granted earlier stands vacated.
SCA Nos. 12150 of 2008 to 12155 of 2008
66. For the reasons assigned hereinbefore in earlier group of petitions being Special Civil Application Nos. 12145 of 2008 to 12149 of 2008, these petitions are also rejected.
SCA Nos. 12156 of 2008 to 12161 of 2008
67. This group of petitions relates to the order of Tribunal whereby the Tribunal has quashed and set aside the order dated NIL.06.1999 cancelling the permission granted to Arvind u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act on the basis of the application moved by Rohini. The reasoning adopted by the Tribunal cannot be faulted with, the Tribunal having found, as a matter of fact, that Arvind was not made a party nor was granted an opportunity of hearing and, therefore, to the said extent, the order dated NIL.06.1999 made by the Prant Officer, Mehsana cancelling permission granted to Arvind was bad in law.
68. In light of the discussion made in the earlier part of the judgment and order in Special Civil Application Nos. 12145 of 2008 to 12149 of 2008, these petitions are also rejected.
Special Civil Application No. 12162 of 2008
69. For the reasons recorded in the judgment rendered in the main set, this petition is also rejected.
70. Before parting it is necessary to suggest to the State Government to take note of the fact that the order dated 05.08.1999 made u/s 63 of the Tenancy Act by the Deputy Collector and Prant Officer, Mehsana (Shri J.H. Trivedi) is not an order made in accordance with law and in normal course. The entire tone and tenor of the order indicates that the order has been made not on basis of merits but for collateral consideration, in collusion with at least Rohini, which is to the detriment of the State Government. The State Government should, therefore, it is expected, initiate appropriate inquiry in this regard and take necessary action, if warranted. For this purpose, a copy of this judgment and order, shall be forwarded to both, the Chief Secretary and the Secretary, Department of Revenue, Government of Gujarat, by the Registry, through the Office of the Government Pleader.
71. In the result, all the petitions are rejected. NOTICE discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.
72. At this stage learned advocate for the petitioners prays for staying the operation of the judgment and order. In light of the facts which have come on record, the request is rejected.
