Sl.
No.",Document No.,Sy.No.,Extent,Remarks
1.,Doct.No.472/IV/2016,101,231 Acres,
2.,Doct.No.474/IV/2016,20,109 Acres 18 guntas,
3.,Doct.No.475/IV/2016,28,145 Acres 26 guntas,
4.,Doct.No.476/IV/2016,100,207 Acres,
In view of the above orders, the village Miyapur was declared as private property of Khaisaruddin and the same has become final, as there is no",,,,
appeal against the said Order by the State at any point of time.,,,,
It is also submitted that as per the above Sanad given in the year 1880 by Nawab Mohammed Rasheeduddin Khan in favour of his daughter Hazrath,,,,
Quadriunnissa Begum granting Miyapur lands permanently, perpetually and forever to be devolved upon children born to be continued generation after",,,,
generation, clearly established that the maternal grandmother of Nawab Khaisaruddin Khan and mother of Khaisaruddin Khan Rafiunnissa Begum",,,,
and the Firmans issued by the Nizam in the year 1929, 1939 and 1949 confirming that Rafiunnissa Begum and Khaisaruddin Khan are the owners of",,,,
the lands in Miyapur and also clearly established that the lands are not Jagir lands. It is further submitted that basing on the public caution notice,,,,
published in Deccan Chronicle News Paper by the legal representatives of Khaisaruddin Khan stating that they are the owners of the property by,,,,
virtue of the orders of the Board of Revenue, dated 29.12.1976, Land Grabbing Case Nos.21 and 22 of 1994 were filed by Ravindra Cooperative",,,,
Housing Society Limited before the Land Grabbing Court. There was no notice to respondents 1 to 7 therein and due to fraud played by the alleged,,,,
G.P.A. holder, an ex parte order was passed, but the said order was set aside by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.6240 of 1995 along with",,,,
batch of cases in W.P.No.889 of 1995 and batch on 16.04.2003, because the Government was not a party, which is interested party as per Section 8",,,,
of the Land Grabbing Act. It is also submitted that the subject lands are hereditary as per Shariat Law basing on the documents filed by the State in,,,,
the Land Grabbing Cases. It is not sub-grant from Paigah to Khaisaruddin Khan as claimed by the State under Jagir Abolition Regulations, 1948.",,,,
On the other hand, there was clear judgment rendered in O.S.A.No.58 of 2002 and batch, dated 10.06.2003, after the judgment in W.P.No.889 of",,,,
1995 and batch, Division Bench of this Court, has dealt with Miyapur village and the relevant paragraph of which is extracted hereunder:-",,,,
“The law relating to Grown Grants obtaining in the former Nizams’ Dominions is well settled by the several decisions of the former Hyderabad,,,,
High Court as well as the subsequent decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court. The sum and substance of the law declared is that every grant,,,,
made by the Ruler was only for the lifetime of the grantee. On the death of the grantee, the grant reverted to the Crown and it was in the sole",,,,
discretion of the Crown either to re-grant it, or not. It was open to the Crown to re-grant it to the heirs and successors of the previous grantee, or to",,,,
one or more of them, or to total stranger. The grants were of several kinds and were known under different expressions, viz., Jagir, Samsthan,",,,,
Maktha, Inam etc. The fact remains that each one of them was a grant and was governed by the same rule referred to herein above. If the grant was",,,,
of a whole village, it was generally referred to as Jagir or Samsthan; but if the grant pertains only to a certain land in a given village, it was called Inam",,,,
or Maktha as the case may be.,,,,
In the instant case there is nothing on record suggesting that the Crown in its discretion had re-granted the lands in Miyapur village to the heirs and,,,,
successors of previous grantee. Mere assertion that the entire village was the personal property of the predecessors in title of the decree holders,,,,
would not be enough.â€,,,,
It is further submitted that in the above said judgment, this Court held that the lands in Miyapur village are not Jagir lands by virtue of non-grant by the",,,,
Ruler to the Paigah. It also held that the lands in Miyapur are not the Paigah lands. This Court very clearly held that for attracting the lands as Jagir,,,,
land, there must be grant or re-grant or sub-grant and there is clear finding that there is no grant or re-grant with regard to the lands in Miyapur by the",,,,
Ruler. Hence, the lands are not Jagir lands and personal properties of Nawab Khaisaruddin Khan, which were inherited by his legal representatives. It",,,,
is further submitted that the allegations made against the accused in the charge sheet are purely arising out of civil disputes, which have been going on",,,,
between various parties including the petitioners and State since 1976 and the same is pending for final hearing before the Apex Court in,,,,
C.A.Nos.10699 of 2013 and batch. After execution of the G.P.A., the G.P.A. holder had filed SLP (C) No.6510 of 2016 before the Apex Court.",,,,
It is also submitted that on perusal of the charge sheet show that none of the offences alleged against the petitioners stands made out. Instead, it is",,,,
purely a civil dispute which has been pending for a considerable period of time between the parties. A perusal of the complaint and the charge sheet,,,,
would not disclose any of the ingredients of the alleged penal provisions being attracted. He is not complaining of any cheating. It is settled law that,,,,
Sections 419 and 420 get attracted when the cheating has taken place at the inception and not subsequently. In fact, none of the ingredients of the",,,,
offence cheating are applicable to the allegations contained in the complaint and the charge sheet. The vendors in the sale deeds are the Sanad holders,,,,
and they are before the Apex Court against the Government on the question of title dispute. The Sanad holders have sold their sanad rights to the,,,,
purchasers and such a transaction is binding between them and does not in any manner constitute cheating as against the Government. The other,,,,
offences such as Sections 468, 469 and 471 are the offences relating to fabrication of documents. It is not the case of the prosecution that any",,,,
document is fabricated and the only allegation is that six sale deeds were executed by the Sanad holders in favour of the purchasers. It is a different,,,,
thing as to whether these sale deeds would in any manner be helpful to the purchasers in future because these sale deeds are not binding on the,,,,
Government. There is no element of cheating or fabrication of documents involved in the present case. Thus, none of the I.P.C. offences are attracted",,,,
to make the complaint and charge sheet survive a trial of the case. Section 82 of the Registration Act is about false statement, delivering false copies",,,,
or translations, false personation of either a vendor or a purchaser. In support of the above contentions, learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon",,,,
the judgments of the Apex Court in Ahmed Ali Quraishi v. State of U.P. (2020) 13 SCC 435; Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy and others,,,,
(2013) 6 SCC 740 and Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited and another (2006) 6 SCC 736 and also judgment of this Court in Faisal Bin,,,,
Tirial and another v. State of Telangana rep. by it’s Public Prosecutor (2019) 3 ALT (Crl.) 189 (T.S.).,,,,
It is further submitted that there is nothing on record with regard to any mens rea or any act on the part of the petitioners which would amount to the,,,,
offence alleged to have been committed. Salutary principle of law that any act even if erroneous or illegal, would not amount to a actionable criminal",,,,
wrong unless requisite mens rea is established conclusively, squarely applies to the facts of the present case and the impugned C.C. deserves to be",,,,
quashed on this ground alone. In C.K.Jaggar Sharrief v. State (2013) 1 SCC 205, the Apex Court held that mere wrong would not render a wrong",,,,
doer liable for criminal prosecution. In Rajiv Thappar v. Madan Lal Kappor (2013) 3 SCC 330 the Apex Court held that the Courts have power to look,,,,
into the document produced before it and take a view on the question of continuance of criminal prosecution. In the present case the grant of,,,,
‘Sanad’ rights from the ancestors of late Nawab, the undisputed genealogy table and the rights flowing from the ‘sanad’, the registered",,,,
General Power of Attorney Deed and the order of the Board of Revenue and the pendency of civil litigation, clearly establish that there is no criminal",,,,
offence made out as to the title of the said property belonged to the petitioners. The criminal prosecution cannot be used to browbeat the present,,,,
petitioners from enjoyment of land which lawfully belonged to it and neither can it be used to scuttle the legal remedies availed by the petitioners to,,,,
protect its interest. The present criminal prosecution is an abuse of the process of law and has been commenced with a view to prevent the petitioners,,,,
from lawfully proceeding in the civil Court by exerting duress and pressure. It is further submitted that a person cannot be charged for the offence of,,,,
cheating as well as criminal breach of trust simultaneously for the same transaction as ingredients of both offences are mutually exclusive.,,,,
‘Dishonest intention’ at the ‘inception’ of transaction is a prerequisite of the offence of cheating. For criminal breach of trust, there must",,,,
exist a relationship between the parties whereby one party ‘entrusts’ the other party with property and hence, the ‘dishonest intention’",,,,
arises ‘subsequently’. It is also submitted that the complaint dated 25.05.2017 by the District Registrar to the police is that the Sub-Registrar in,,,,
conspiracy with the petitioners and that the petitioners have allowed the registration of documents which amount to sale of the Government land. It is,,,,
settled law that no one can convey better title than what he has. If the petitioners have sold/purchased an inchoate/defective or non-existing Sanad,,,,
rights of its vendors it cannot be said that a crime has been committed by the petitioners or its Directors or vendors or the other purchasers. On one,,,,
hand, the allegation is that the accused sold the Government land and on the other hand the allegation is that requisite stamp duty and registration fees",,,,
have not been paid and the documents are under valued. It is further submitted that these two self contradictory allegations in the complaint would,,,,
demonstrate that the registration of crime itself is mala fide and it is aimed at disabling the petitioners and its purchasers from pursuing their legal,,,,
remedies in the Apex Court. Suffice it to say that without there being committing of any offences the crime has been registered under Sections 419,",,,,
420, 468, 471 and 120-B of I.P.C. As per the law laid down by the Apex Court in State of West Bengal and others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and",,,,
others (1982) 1 SCC 561 an investigation without there being a commission of offence, is liable to be quashed. It is further submitted that it is on",,,,
record of the Sub-Registrar’s Office that during years 2014-2017, as many as 1509 sale deed transactions were registered by the Sub-Registrar",,,,
concerning the lands in Miyapur Village. This fact has come into light from the counter affidavit filed by the State in PIL Case No.184 of 2017. Thus,",,,,
the allegations in the charge sheet are inherently improbable and the charge sheet is liable to be quashed as the impugned prosecution will result in,,,,
substantial and irretrievable injustice to the petitioners.,,,,
Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit that there are specific overt-acts against the petitioners and the contents of the charge sheet prima,,,,
facie establish the offences alleged against them and, therefore, prayed for dismissal all the Criminal Petitions.",,,,
A perusal of the material available on record would show that case in Crime No.366 of 2017 of Kukatpally Police Station, was registered on",,,,
25.05.2017 against the petitioners and others for the offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 468, 471, 120-B of I.P.C. and Section 82 of the",,,,
Registration Act. The allegations in the First Information Report in Crime No.366 of 2017 would show that A-4 therein executed four documents in,,,,
favour of Suvishal Power Generation Limited by transferring the land belongs to the Government in Sy.Nos.20, 28, 100 and 101 of Miyapur Village,",,,,
registered by the Sub-Registrar Office, Kukatpally, vide documents viz. (1) No.472/IV/2016 for Sy.No.101 of Ac.231.00 gts., (2) 474/IV/2016 for",,,,
Sy.No.20 of Ac.109.18 gts., (3) 475/IV/2016 for Sy.No.28, of Ac.145.26 gts., and (4) 476/IV/2016 for Sy.No.100 of Ac.207.00 gts., by violating the",,,,
provisions of the Registration Act and thereby cheated the Government. After conducting investigation, charge sheet has been filed against the",,,,
accused for the offences punishable under Sections 166, 409, 418, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 (B), 109 of I.P.C. and Section 82 of the Registration Act,,",,,,
which was numbered as C.C.No.1070 of 2017 on the file of the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Kukatpally, Hyderabad.",,,,
In Devendra v. State of U.P. (2009) 7 SCC 495, the Apex Court held as under:",,,,
A distinction must be made between a civil wrong and a criminal wrong. When dispute between the parties constitute only a civil wrong and not a",,,,
criminal wrong, the courts would not permit a person to be harassed although no case for taking cognizance of the offence has been made out.""",,,,
In Joseph Salvaraja vs. State of Gujarat and others (2011) 7 SCC 59 Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under:,,,,
Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the Appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the",,,,
same are not made out even prima facie from the Complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge could have still",,,,
examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the Appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge",,,,
sheet, documents etc. or not.",,,,
In our opinion, the matter appears to be purely civil in nature. There appears to be no cheating or a dishonest inducement for the delivery of property",,,,
or breach of trust by the Appellant. The present FIR is an abuse of process of law. The purely civil dispute, is sought to be given a colour of a criminal",,,,
offence to wreak vengeance against the Appellant. It does not meet the strict standard of proof required to sustain a criminal accusation.,,,,
The Appellant cannot be allowed to go through the rigmarole of a criminal prosecution for long number of years, even when admittedly a civil suit has",,,,
already been filed against the Appellant by the Complainant-Respondent No. 4, and is still subjudice. In the said suit, the Appellant is at liberty to",,,,
contest the same on grounds available to him in accordance with law as per the leave granted by Trial Court. It may also be pertinent to mention here,,,,
that the complainant has not been able to show that at any material point of time there was any contract, much less any privity of contract between",,,,
the Appellant and Respondent No. 4 - the Complainant. There was no cause of action to even lodge an FIR against the Appellant as neither the,,,,
Complainant had to receive the money nor he was in any way instrumental to telecast ""GOD TV"" in the central areas of Ahmedabad. He appears to",,,,
be totally a stranger to the same. Appellant's prosecution would only lead to his harassment and humiliation, which cannot be permitted in accordance",,,,
with the principles of law.,,,,
In Mohammed Ibrahim and others vs. State of Bihar and another (2009) 8 SCC 751 Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under:,,,,
“This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to,,,,
matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to",,,,
subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to,,,,
settle civil disputes.â€,,,,
In the instant case also, the record discloses that the question of title of the subject land i.e. “whether the land in Miyapur Village is private land or",,,,
Government land is still pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in C.A. Nos.10699 of 2013 and batchâ€, which is an admitted fact by",,,,
both the parties concerned. Further, the contents of the F.I.R. itself disclose that the Tahsildar, Serilingampally, has filed a Land Grabbing Case",,,,
against the land grabbers in the Special Court of the Land Grabbing. In turn, the Special Court ordered to evict the encroachers from the said land.",,,,
Aggrieved by the said eviction order, the land grabbers have filed W.P.No.1889 of 1998 before the High Court. After disposal of the Writ Petition, the",,,,
land grabbers have approached the Supreme Court by filing SLP Nos.14917 of 2003, 14928 of 2003 and other (16) cases. The Apex Court has",,,,
ordered “status quo†in favour of the Government and all the SLPs are pending for adjudication.,,,,
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to above,,,,
and since the civil disputes are pending between the parties on one hand and the State Government on the other hand, with regard to the ownership of",,,,
the lands in question, I am of the considered view that continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners will be a futile exercise and would",,,,
amount to abuse of the process of Court.,,,,
For the aforementioned reasons, all the Criminal Petitions are allowed and the proceedings initiated against the petitioners in C.C.No.1070 of 2017 on",,,,
the file of the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Kukatpally, Hyderabad, are hereby quashed.",,,,
As a sequel thereto, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Criminal Petition shall stand closed.",,,,
