1. The appellant is convicted for the offence under Section 306 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and
to pay fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for three months vide judgment in S.C.No.237 of 2008, dated 09.04.2009 passed by
the VI Additional District & Sessions Judge, Medak at Siddipet. Aggrieved by the same, present appeal is filed.
2. Initially A1 to A3 were charged for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. A4
was charged for the offence under Section 302 r/w Section 109 of IPC. A1 to A3 were acquitted for the charge under Section 302 R/W section 34 of
IPC and under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. However, the Court alternatively framed charge under Section 306 of IPC, for which A1 alone
was convicted.
3. The case of the prosecution is that P.W.1 is the father of the deceased. His deceased daughter was married to one Yadagiri (P.W.8) on
15.05.2003 and they lead happy marital life for one year. However, A1 called the deceased on telephone and went to Maddikunta village. One month
thereafter, the appellant/accused called the deceased and asked her to come to Kotilingala temple of Siddipet, but the appellant/accused did not go
there as per his promise. Thereafter, in-laws of the deceased called P.W.1 and informed that she was missing. Having come to know that daughter
was at Kotilingala Temple, they went there and brought the deceased to their house. Thereafter, she stayed there for two or three days and again
went to her matrimonial house. There, the in-laws refused to take the deceased daughter stating that she was having love affair with the accused.
Subsequently, the deceased took divorce from P.W.8 Ydagiri. After divorce, when the accused was asked to marry the deceased, the accused/ A1 to
A3 allegedly demanded an amount of Rs.2.00 lakhs and a motor cycle towards dowry. As P.W.1 expressed that he cannot give the demanded dowry,
A1/accused did not marry her. This issue went to the notice of the naxalites (Annalu). On 01.03.2005, the said naxalites came to the village and
performed the marriage of the deceased with A1 in Hanuman Temple, but P.W.1 was not present on the said day. After marriage, the deceased
stayed in the house of the accused for 27 days and on the 28th day, she was taken to the hospital for pesticide poisoning. Initially, she was taken to
RMP Doctor, who advised to take her to Dubbak Hospital and at the said hospital, she was declared as brought dead.
4. After the death of the deceased, P.W.1 lodged complaint Ex.P1 narrating all the facts and suspected that A1 to A3 forcibly administered poison, for
which reason, the First Information Report was registered under Section 302 of IPC. After conclusion of investigation, the police filed charge sheet
for the offence under Section 302 r/w Section 34 of IPC against A1 to A3 and A4 for instigating A1 to A3 to murder the deceased for the charge
under Section 302 r/w 109 of IPC
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the prosecution case cannot be believed for the reason of there being several discrepancies in
between the statements of witnesses. Though the case was registered for the offence under Section 302 of IPC and the charge sheet was also filed
under Section 302 of IPC, the trial Court came to the conclusion that it was an offence under Section 306 of IPC. He further submits that the very
basis for the prosecution case was that the appellant was calling on telephone. However, as per the evidence of investigating officer, P.W.14, he had
stated that he has not examined the owner of the telephone booth from where the accused called the deceased to go to Kotilingala temple. Further,
the accused has also not examined any one at Kotilingala temple nor did examine one Chakali Srinu who had gone to the village of the former husband
of the deceased along with A1. Since there is no proof that the appellant had nothing to do with calling the deceased after her marriage to P.W.8, the
entire case of the prosecution appears to have been built on the premise of the appellant harassing the deceased.
6. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor submits that the incident of death took place within 28 days of the marriage, for which reason, the
presumption has to be drawn that the said death was on account of the harassment meted out by the accused.
4. As seen from the finding of the learned Sessions Judge, the reason for convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 306 of IPC is that
there was no forcible administration of poison to the deceased, however, for the reason of; i) A1 being a timid person, though he called the deceased
to Kotilingala temple, the accused did not go there; ii) the love affair of the accused with the deceased was within the knowledge of the entire village
and several panchayats were held; iii) after divorce, when the appellant failed to marry, the marriage of the appellant and the deceased was
performed by the naxalites; iv) the only conclusion that could be drawn is that the accused was responsible for suicidal death of the deceased for
harassing and humiliating the deceased.
5. Having given such reasons for the deceased committing suicide, the learned Sessions Judge found that the other accused A2 to A4 had nothing to
do with either the harassment of the deceased or her death, for which reason, A2 to A4 were acquitted. The State did not prefer any appeal against
the acquittal of the accused A2 to A4 or the acquittal of A1 under Section 302 of IPC.
6. As seen from the evidence of P.W.1 and the other witnesses, the marriage of the accused was performed by the naxalites with the deceased.
During said period of stay by the deceased in the house of the accused after marriage, till her death, there is absolutely no interaction by P.W.1, the
father, and P.W.2, mother of the deceased.
7. To attract an offence under Section 306 of IPC, there has to be continuous or serious of acts which led to the deceased committing suicide unable
to bear such harassment. Even according to the investigation, the entire investigation and the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 would go to show that there
was a love affair between the deceased and the accused, however, none of the witnesses including the investigating officer speak anything about the
incident or happenings that have taken place from the date of marriage till the date of death of the deceased.
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal vs Indrajit Kundu and others reported in 2020 (1) ALD (Crl.) 185 (SC), held
as follows:
“12. In the judgment in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chattisgarh 2001 (2) ALD (Crl.) 873 (SC)=(2001) 9 SCC 618, this Court has
considered the scope of Section 306 and the ingredients which are essential for abetment as set out in Section 107 IPC. While interpreting the word
“instigationâ€, it is held in paragraph 20 as under:
“20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an actâ€. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not
necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the
consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the
accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option
except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the
consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.â€
9. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2009) 16 Supreme Court Cases 605, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as
follows:
“16. Speaking for the three-Judge Bench in Ramesh Kumar case [(2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] , R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship
then was) said that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an actâ€. To satisfy the requirement of
“instigationâ€, though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes “instigation†must necessarily and
specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the
accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option
except to commit suicide, in which case, an “instigation†may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending
the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.
17. Thus, to constitute “instigationâ€, a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by
“goading†or “urging forwardâ€. The dictionary meaning of the word “goad†is “a thing that stimulates someone into action; provoke to
action or reaction†(see Concise Oxford English Dictionary); “to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts†(see Oxford Advanced
Learner's Dictionary, 7th Edn.).â€
10. In Praveen Pradhan v. State of Uttaranchal (2012) 9 Supreme Court Cases 7334, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“17. The offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets and not upon the act which is done by the person
who has abetted. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as provided under Section 107 IPC. However, the words uttered in
a fit of anger or omission without any intention cannot be termed as instigation. (Vide: State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh [(1991) 3 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC
(Cri) 513 : AIR 1991 SC 1532] , Surender v. State of Haryana [(2006) 12 SCC 375 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 210] , Kishori Lal v. State of M.P. [(2007)
10 SCC 797 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 701 : AIR 2007 SC 2457] and Sonti Rama Krishna v. Sonti Shanti Sree [(2009) 1 SCC 554 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri)
578].â€
11. As seen from the evidence and also in the light of the aforesaid decisions, to constitute instigation, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that
the accused had in any manner provoked or encouraged the deceased to commit suicide by deliberately indulging in acts compelling the deceased to
commit suicide, vexed with such acts. In the entire case, except stating the background of the case, there is no evidence as to what transpired in those
28 days of marriage, for which reason, the offence under Section 306 of IPC cannot be sustained.
12. For the foregoing discussion, the prosecution has failed to prove an offence under Section 306 of IPC against the accused.
In the result, the judgment of the trial Court in S.C.No.237 of 2008 dated 09.04.2009 is set aside and the accused/A1 is acquitted. Since the accused is
on bail, his bail bonds stand cancelled.
