Amar Saran and R.N. Misra, JJ.@mdashWe have heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner and learned A.G.A.
2. Learned A.G.A. submits that no useful purpose would be served in calling for a counter-affidavit and keeping the matter pending in the High Court and the petition may be disposed of at this stage itself.
3. A notice dated 19.1.2009 u/s 3 of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act has been challenged by means of this writ petition.
4. The basic contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the said notice is bad in law as it does not contain the general nature of material allegations. Learned A.G.A., however, seeks to counter this contention by stating that it is mentioned in the notice that the Petitioner would resort to abuse and issue threats and commit murders and indulge in marpeet and exploit Harijans ; and that the crime numbers and cases have been mentioned in the notice and also whether the cases had been sent for trial/charge-sheet submitted etc.
5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner drew our attention to two Full Bench decisions in
6. In Ramji Pandey''s case (supra) it has specifically been observed in paragraph 7 of the judgment that although the expression "material allegations" has not been defined by that Act, according to the dictionary meanings, the word "material" means "important and essential," "of significance." The word "allegation" means statement or assertion of facts. Thus, the notice u/s 3(1) should contain the essential assertions of facts in relation to the matters set out in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. It need not refer to any evidence or other particulars or details. The names of witnesses, and persons who may have made the complaint against the person against whom action is proposed to be taken or the time, date and place of the offence committed by the person need not be mentioned in the notice. There is a distinction between the "general nature of material allegations" and "particulars of allegations." In accordance with the former expression, the notice need not give any details of the allegations, instead the requirement of law would be satisfied if the notice contains a general statement of facts which need not contain any details or particulars. In Ramji Pandey''s case, where there were allegations that: (a) the Petitioner was a goonda, (b) his movements were causing alarm, danger and harm to the lives and properties of the persons within the circle of P. S. Sikandarpur and there was reasonable ground for believing that he was engaged in the commission and abetment of offences punishable under Chapters XI, XII and XXII of the Indian Penal Code, and (c) the witnesses were not willing to give evidence against him by reason of apprehension on their part as regards their safety and danger to their persons and personal property. Regarding the aforesaid sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), the material allegations of general nature were that there were various cases pending against the Petitioner and the crime numbers and sections of those cases had been given in the notice and it was mentioned therein whether the Petitioner had been convicted or acquitted in the cases or they were pending. Inspite of mention of the crime numbers and sections and status of those cases, the notice in Ramji Pandey''s case was held not to contain the general nature of material allegations and it was struck down.
7. In the present case also, we find that crime numbers and sections and whether the accused had been charge-sheeted etc. have been mentioned but the assertion of the broad particulars which are required to be mentioned with regard to each of the cases have not been mentioned in the notice. For this reason, we think that the impugned notice dated 19.1.2009 deserves to be set aside.
8. However, the District Magistrate, Jalaun, shall be at liberty to issue a fresh notice in accordance with law.
9. Let a copy of this order be placed before the District Magistrate, Jalaun, who has been issuing similar orders/notices which are being challenged in different writ petitions. He may also peruse the aforesaid two judgments of the Full Benches in Ramji Pandey and Bhim Sen Tyagi, referred to above and in future issue notices in accordance with the present decision and also the earlier decisions of the Full Benches.
10. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner states that the Petitioner has been acquitted in some of the cases to which the notice refers. We think that the Petitioner can always appear and raise these and other objections in case a fresh notice in accordance with law is again issued against the Petitioner by showing cause against the same before the District Magistrate concerned as held by the Division Benches in Ballabh Chaubey v. Addl. District Magistrate (Finance), Mathura 1997 ALJ 1630: 1997 ACR 387 and Jainendra alias Chhotu Singh v. State of U. P. 2007 (1) JIC 668 (All). Subject to the aforesaid observations the writ petition is allowed and the impugned notice dated 19.1.2009 is set aside.
