J.C. Gupta, J.@mdashBy means of this writ petition the petitioner, who is a Member of Rajya Sabha, has prayed for issuing a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the First Information Reports of the following cases :
1. Case Crime No. 481 /2000 under Sections 395/397/376 and 342, I.P.C. P.S. Kotwali Nagar, district Etah.
2. Case Crime No. 482/2000 under Sections 323/342 and 506, I.P.C. P.S. Kotwali Nagar, district Etah.
3. Case Crime No. 484/2000 under Sections 504 and 506, I.P.C. P.S. Kotwali Nagar, district Etah.
2. It is not necessary to narrate in detail the averments made in the writ petition and it would be suffice to state that the aforesaid three First Information Reports have been challenged on the grounds that they do not disclose that the petitioner is guilty of any offence; that the medical report contradicts the version given in the F.I.R.; and that they have been lodged for an ulterior motive and on political consideration. Though in the writ petition a ground was also taken that deletion of Section 438, Cr.P.C. in State of U.P. is wholly arbitrary and illegal but at the time of hearing learned counsel for the petitioner did not press this ground.
3. First of all we take up the foremost issue as to whether or not the aforesaid First Information Reports disclose commission of cognizable offences. As far as First Information Report of Case Crime No. 481/2000 is concerned the same was lodged on 31-7- 2000 by respondent No. 3 Smt. Durga Bharti. A perusal of the same leaves no room of doubt that commission of offences of dacoity, forcible abduction and rape are clearly disclosed therein. Once there is a disclosure of commission of cognizable offences, police has a statutory authority to investigate into the allegations made in the First Information Report. The position of law with regard to the powers of High Court in the matter of quashing of First Information Report is now well settled. In the case of
We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in rarest of rare cases, that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice.
4. The above observations were again reiterated in the case of
5. In a recent decision in
6. In
7. Almost to the same effect was the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of
8. The question regarding the Court''s power to interfere in the matter of investigation had come up for consideration even before the Privy Council in the case of
Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of inquiry. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved u/s 491, Criminal Procedure Code, to give direction in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case, as the present, however, the Court''s functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then xxxxx
9. It is thus an established principle of law that a great care has to be taken by the High Court while examining the question of quashing of First Information Report and while embarking to scrutinize the F.I.R. for deciding whether the case falls within the category "rarest of rare" to stop investigation, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations made in the F.I.R. disclose a cognizable offence and at that stage it is not open for the Court to examine the pros and cons of the allegations nor they could be weighed in a sensitive balance.
10. Keeping in mind the above legal position, we have carefully examined and scrutinized the allegations made in all the First Information Reports quashing of which has been sought in this writ petition and we are of the view that the First Information Reports in question do disclose commission of cognizable offences and as such the police is vested with a statutory authority to investigate those allegations.
11. It was argued by petitioner''s counsel with all vehemence at his command that the First Information Reports have been lodged mala fide under political pressure as the petitioner is a thorn in the success of ruling party i.e. Bhartiya Janata Party. It, was pointed out that the petitioner was earlier associated with Bhartiya Janata Party and had won Parliamentary Elections from Mathura and Farrukhabad thrice but somehow he could not bring change in the ideology of Bhartiya Janata Party and hence he disassociated himself from the said party. In the last General Elections held in the year 1999 the petitioner openly and strongly opposed Bhartiya Janata Party and complained and canvassed against the ruling B.J.P. in U.P. which greatly affected the achievement of B.J.P. in Uttar Pradesh as its total seats came down to almost half in comparison to the previous General Election. The top brass of B.J.P. wanted to take revenge for their defeat and in order to fulfil their ill designs and ulterior motive they got a golden chance inducing Smt. Durga Bharti as an instrument for lodging a totally false F.I.R. against the petitioner. By means of an amendment application the District Magistrate and S.S.P. of Etah have also been impleaded as respondents.
12. It is well settled that burden to prove allegation of mala fides lies heavily on the person who makes it and unless necessary particulars of the charges making out a prima facie case of mala fides are given in the pleadings of writ petition, the Court will be fully justified in not giving any credence or weight to the same and refuse to act upon them. Allegations of mala fides should be clear and specific and not vague and ambiguous. In the present case the allegations of mala fide made against the District Magistrate and the S.S.P. Etah are neither specific nor clear it could be prima facie shown that Smt. Durga Bharti is a toy in the hands of ruling party. In the absence of pleadings being specific, clear and unambiguous with regard to the allegations of mala fides and necessary particulars of charges being missing, we find ourselves unable to carry on investigation into those allegations in view of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of
13. A reference to following observations of Apex Court in the case of
14. In the present case from the facts pleaded it cannot be reasonably inferred that Smt. Durga Bharti has played role of a puppet in the hands of political leaders of Bhartiya Janata Party. By means of supplementary affidavit the petitioner has filed copy of First Information Report of Case No. 499/2000 registered u/s 364/ 342/376/384 and 506 I.P.C. of one Savitri Devi daughter of Kali Charan. This report has been registered on 14-8-2000 at P.S. Kotwali Nagar, District Etah. From the perusal of this report it appears that this report was addressed to Chief Minister and under his order the same was registered. On the basis of this, it was argued by the petitioner''s counsel that the fact that the said F.I.R. has been registered under the order of the Chief Minister would show that the ruling party is taking an active interest against the petitioner. First of all, we may point out that this F.I.R. is dated 14-8-2000 i.e. much after the registration of the present First Information Reports. This Court in this writ petition is not called upon to scrutinize the First Information Report lodged by Smt. Savitri Devi. At any rate merely for the reason that a complaint is sent to the Chief Minister by a poor, helpless and exploited lady demanding justice and in turn the complaint is sent back to the concerned police station for necessary action, it would not be sufficient to draw an inference that the Chief Minister was himself personally interested in damaging the image of the person named as an accused in the complaint. The matter was still left in the discretion of the investigating agency to find out the truth of the allegations made in the complaint.
15. On a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that there is hardly any cogent material to convince us that the F.I.R.s, quashing of which has been sought in the present petition, were lodged at behest of the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party or the district administration to vindicate political vengeance.
16. It was then submitted by the petitioner''s counsel that the first F.I.R. is motivated and is a tissue of concocted and totally imaginary facts inasmuch as Smt. Durga Bharti had been removed by the petitioner from the post of principal of Degree College only two days prior to the date of lodging of F.I.R. of case crime No. 481/2000 on account of her immoral and illegal activities. Learned Advocate General who argued the case on behalf of the State with all dexterity and with great dedication submitted before the Court that in the set of facts of present case the question of mala fide of the first informant is of no relevance at this stage of the proceedings. He urged that it is for the Investigating Officer to find out whether the allegations made in the F.I.R. are true and supported by attending circumstances and other material and a moving inquiry into the said question should not be undertaken by this Court in writ jurisdiction. He argued that if during investigation the complaint which has been made by Smt. Durga Bharti against the petitioner is found to be correct and the offences alleged are prima facie made out, the petitioner will have to face his prosecution in a Court of law and therefore, at this stage it is of no consequence that the first informant is a person who was inimical to the petitioner. If the ingredients which establish commission of offence exist then investigation cannot be stopped merely for the reason that some animus is alleged against the first informant. In support of his submission, the learned Advocate General placed reliance on two decisions of the Apex Court in the case of
17. The consistent view of the Apex Court seems to be that when an F.I.R. is lodged at the police station disclosing commission of cognizable offences, the allegations made therein are to be investigated and the allegations of mala fides of the informer would be of secondary importance. It is for the officer making investigation to arrive at the conclusion on the basis of material collected during investigation whether or not the report has been lodged against the accused with ulterior motive. It is the material collected during investigation which decides the fate of the person named as an accused in the F.I.R. It was submitted by the learned Advocate General that the so-called dismissal of complainant from the post of Principal was not in accordance with law and therefore, it could be that Smt. Durga Bharti was not prepared to leave the office of Principal and therefore, this may have enraged the petitioner as he could not have swallowed that a lady who had been under his thumb and umbrella throughout would flout the order of the ''Supreme Head'' of the Kingdom which he was ruling. Therefore, there was nothing unnatural or improbable that the petitioner decided to nip in the bud the heat before it could generate fire and in order to achieve his evil designs and to demonstrate before others not to raise their eye brows against him, the petitioner with the aid and help of his confederates abducted Smt. Bharti using his muscle power and then wrongfully confined and raped her. It was further pointed out that even during pathological examination of the vaginal smear of Smt. Durga Bharti dead sperms were found which prima facie supports the first informant''s version of rape.
18. On a careful analysis of the entire facts and circumstances and having regard to the allegations made in the First Information Reports, we do not found any sufficient ground to quash the reports and stop investigation.
19. Lastly, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even if this Court has some doubts regarding quashing of the First Information Reports and is of the view that investigation should proceed, a question still arises for consideration as to whether the arrest of the petitioner is necessary for completion of investigation and in support of his submission learned counsel for the petitioner invited the attention of the Court to Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which runs as under:
157. Procedure for investigation : (1) If, from information received or otherwise, as officer in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered u/s 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and if, necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender :
Provided that -
(a) When information as to the commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot;
(b) if it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case.
(2) In each of the cases mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to Sub-section (1), the officer in charge of the police station shall state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that sub-section, and, in the case mentioned in Clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated.
20. It was argued that registration of an F.I.R. of the cognizable offence does not ipso facto empowers the Investigating Officer to cause the arrest of the person named as an accused in the first information report. Emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the words "if necessary" used in Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it was argued that whether arrest is necessary or not is a question which has to be objectively tested and if in a given case it is found that there is no justification for the arrest of the accused, this Court has ample power to stay the arrest of the person accused of an offence in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, until completion of investigation and submission of charge sheet in Court, to protect the Fundamental Right of Liberty as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. It was argued that a definite procedure for investigation and arrest has been laid down in the Cr.P.C. and therefore, that procedure has to be followed in a fair, just and reasonable manner. In support of his submission reliance was placed by the petitioner''s counsel on two decisions of the Supreme Court in
21. As far as case of Gurbaksh Singh (supra) is concerned, entirely different question was there for consideration before the Apex Court. The Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 438, Cr.P.C., which provides a provision for anticipatory ball and after examining the matter in detail the Apex Court concluded that the High Court or the Court of Session should be left free to exercise their jurisdiction u/s 438 by a wise and careful use of their discretion rather than by divesting them of their discretion which the legislature has conferred upon them, by laying down inflexible rules of general application. We find absolutely no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the principles which apply to the grant of anticipatory bail should apply equally while considering the question of necessity of arrest of an accused during investigation particularly when in State of U.P. Section 438 has been deleted. In para 7 of the report of Gurbaksh Singh''s case the Supreme Court itself observed "police custody is an inevitable concomitant of arrest for non-bailable offences.
22. Coming to the decision of Joginder Kumar''s case (supra) much of time was devoted by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his argument regarding justification of arrest on the basis of following observations made in that decision :
No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the Police Officer to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing. The justification for the exercise of it is quite another. The Police Officer must be able to justify the arrest apart from his power to do so. Arrest and detention in police lock-up of a person can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person. It would be prudent for a Police Officer in the interest of protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in his own interest that no arrest should be made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fides of a complaint and a reasonable belief both as to the person''s complicity and even so as to the need to effect arrest. Denying a person of his liberty is a serious matter. The recommendations of the Police Commission merely reflect the constitutional concomitants of the fundamental right to personal liberty and freedom. A person is not liable to arrest merely on the suspicion of complicity in an offence. There must be some reasonable justification in the opinion of the Officer effecting the arrest that such arrest is necessary and justified. Except in heinous offences, an arrest must be avoided if a police officer issues notice to person to attend the Station House and not to leave station without permission would do. Then, there is the right to have someone informed. That right of the arrested person, upon request, to have someone informed and to consult privately with a lawyer was recognised by Section 56(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 in England. These rights are inherent in Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution and require to be recognised and scrupulously protected. For effective enforcement of these fundamental rights, the Supreme Court issued the following requirements :
(1) An arrested person being held in custody is entitled, if he so requests to have one friend relative or other person who is known to him or likely to take an interest in his welfare (to be) told as far as is practicable that he has been arrested and where he is being detained.
(2) The Police Officer shall inform the arrested person when he is brought to the police station of this right.
(3) An entry shall be required to be made in the Diary as to who was informed of the arrest. These protections from power must be held to flow from Articles. 21 and 22(1) and enforced strictly.
23. It shall be the duty of the Magistrate, before whom the arrested person is produced, to satisfy himself that these requirements have been complied with. The above requirements shall be followed in all cases of arrest till legal provisions are made in this behalf. These requirements shall be in addition to the rights of the arrested persons found in the various Police Manuals.
24. This decision came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Satpal v. State of U.P. XL (2000) ACC 75 and the Full Bench was of the view that the above observations were made in peculiar set and circumstances of that particular case and they could not be universally applied.
25. The said decision again came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of V.S. Krishnan and another Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 2148 of 2000 decided on May 25th 2000. Hon''ble R.K. Dash, J. delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench closely examined the matter and observed as under :-
A person accused of commission of a cognizable offence cannot ask the Court to restrain the police from arresting him. If materials are forthcoming after some investigation showing his involvement and in the opinion of the police officer there is need to effect arrest, no fault can be found with him in so doing. The Court sitting within four walls cannot visualize the situation which necessitated the police officer to arrest the accused. In the course of hearing, a submission was made at the Bar that in view of what has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Joginder Kumar (supra) that except in heinous offences, arrest must be avoided, there is implied prohibition on the police to exercise the power of arrest in respect of other non-bailable offences. We are unable to accept such contention. The aforesaid decision was rendered in a different fact situation. The petitioner, an Advocate was called by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad to his office in connection with inquiry in some cases. On his appearance, he was taken to Mussoorie and detained in the police station. His brother along with other relatives went to the said police station and found the police to have taken him to some undisclosed destination. Under these circumstances, the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed before the Apex Court. Pursuant to the notice issued by the Court, Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad appeared and denied accusation of illegal detention and stated that the help of the petitioner was sought to detect some crimes. The question, therefore, was whether the petitioner was really detained by the police and if so what was the reason for detention. While dealing with the said question. Their Lordships made a passing observation that except in heinous offences, arrest must be avoided.
It was further observed :
A reading of the said decision what appears to us that no argument was advanced nor attention of the Court was drawn with regard to the necessity of arrest of a person involved in the offence which has impact on the society. In our opinion besides the nature and gravity of the crime and seriousness of the offence, its social impact is also a circumstance to take decision about the need of arrest.
26. In the same case, Hon''ble S.R. Singh, J. in a separate but concurring judgment observed as under :
We are of the considered view that normally the Courts should not interfere with the process of investigation much less with the power of the police to arrest a person accused of a cognizable offence except in rarest of rare cases and on proof of fact that the police would not act ''reasonably'' and ''honestly'' and would rather act mala in se or in bad faith. No interim order staying investigation and arrest should be granted during the stage of criminal investigation except in a case where ''manifest injustice'' cries for the order of the Court or where some ''grossly iniquitous act'' is going to be perpetrated and any delay would result in the fate accompli of a monstrosity or except where, on facts pleaded and proved, the Court is satisfied that the police officer will not be fair and reasonable in exercise of his power of arrest under the Code. Barring these situations and the like, the High Court should refrain itself from intervening in the matter at the pre-arrest stage and rather leave it to experienced judgment of the concerned police officer as to whether or not arrest, in the fact situation of a given case, is needed keeping in view the gravity of the offence; likelihood of any adverse impact on law and order, safety of the accused himself; likelihood of the accused absconding and evading the process of law; criminal antecedent, if any, of the accused; need to prevent repetition of the crimes; need to secure or preserve evidence relating to the offence or to obtain such evidence from the suspect by questioning him etc.
27. We have also closely gone through the aforesaid decision of
28. In
29. Learned Advocate General argued that necessity of an accused may also arise under the provisions of Sections 170 and 173, Cr.P.C. and the words ''if necessary'' occurring in Section 157, Cr.P.C. cannot be read dehors the other provisions of the Cr.P.C. It is well settled principle that in deciding the true scope and effect of the words used in a particular provision, the Court must examine the scheme of the Act and the context in which they have been used. According to Halsbury the words should be construed in the light of their context rather than what may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from the context.
30. If we examine the Scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure it will appear that Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes the contingencies in which any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant has the power to arrest. Clause (a) of Section 41 empowers the police to cause the arrest of any person who has been concerned in any cognizable offence, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been so concerned.
31. u/s 156(1) police has been empowered with the statutory authority to investigate any cognizable offence even without any order from judicial authority.
32. Section 157 to Section 173 prescribes the procedure for investigation. Section 170 lays down that if upon an investigation it appears to the police officer that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground exists against the accused of his being involved in the commission of offence, the investigating officer shall forward a report and the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence and try the accused or commit him for trial. Section 173(2) of the Code lays down that on completion of investigation the officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody u/s 170.
33. A combined reading of Section 154 to Section 176 of Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code would show that investigation under this chapter consists of the steps of proceeding to the spot, investigating the facts and circumstances of the case, taking measures for discovery and arrest of the alleged offender, examining persons, acquainted with the circumstances of the case, searching and seizing any material and ultimately submitting a report u/s 173 of the Code, if in the opinion of the investigating officer the accused should be tried.
34. Therefore, there is no basis for giving a narrower construction to the words'' if necessary occurring in Section 157, Cr.P.C. as has been canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner before us. On finding material and evidence which in the opinion of the Investigating Officer is sufficient to send the accused to stand his trial, it is not only obligatory on him to submit a report to that effect to the concerned Magistrate but also to forward the accused under custody. If upon arrest accused applies for bail and succeeds in obtaining favourable order and is released, the Investigating agency is required to make a note to that effect while submitting report u/s 173(2), Cr.P.C. The object underlying these provisions appears to be that it is the duty of the investigating agency to secure availability of accused before the concerned Court competent to try the offence.
35. It is of common experience that there is a great deal of exploitation of fair sex in our country. Innocence, poverty, helplessness, social insecurity, incapacity to fight for their rights (both physical and mental), customary and social obligations, inherent inhibition of slavery etc. are some of the factors responsible for this malady. A helpless woman requires an extraordinary and hilarious courage to expose a man of his sins who is having control or authority over her. Crime graph indicates that on account of socio-economic conditions prevailing in our country, crimes against women in general and rape in particular are on the increase.
36. It was observed by the Apex Court in
37. It was lastly submitted by the petitioner''s counsel that the petitioner is a respectable person being a sitting member of Rajya Sabha and there are no chances of his absconding, therefore, his liberty may be protected by staying his arrest until the Court concerned takes cognizance. No person howsoever, high he may be in status and position, is above law. Under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure the Investigating Officer is empowered to cause the arrest of the petitioner during investigation of the First Information Reports quashing of which has been sought in this writ petition, and the genuineness and bona fides of the allegations of the First Information Reports have been verified by the Investigating Officer who in this particular case is a very Senior Police Officer. In such a situation to stall or foreclose the legal procedure of arrest will amount to miscarriage of justice and will send wrong signals and message to the society at large. We, therefore, do not find any sufficient ground for staying the arrest of the petitioner during investigation.
38. Learned Advocate General further pointed out that the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court, moving an application u/s 438, Cr.P.C. and has secured an order in his favour after giving an undertaking that he would surrender before the Court concerned, yet instead of surrendering before the Court of concerned Magistrate at Etah, the petitioner has approached this Court by means of this writ petition. According to the Advocate General the petitioner cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold together. We find substance in this submission. A perusal of the order of the Delhi High Court dated 9-8-2000 whose copy has been annexed with the supplementary affidavit indicates that the petitioner wanted to submit to the jurisdiction of the concerned Court and acting on petitioner''s undertaking the Hon''ble Judge of Delhi High Court ordered :
The petitioner who wants to submit to the jurisdiction of the concerned Court and also join investigation in the case needs protection to do so. To enable him to submit to jurisdiction of the concerned Court I direct that in the event the petitioner is sought to be arrested in F.I.R. 481 of 2000 police station, Kotwali City, Etah, he shall be released on bail upon his furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 10,000/- and one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the arresting Officer. He shall deposit his passport with the Investigating Officer and shall join investigation as and when called for. He shall not leave the country without permission of the Court. He shall not intimidate witnesses nor in any manner be a hindrance in the investigation. Any observation made in this order shall not be taken to be expression of opinion on merits. This order will remain in force till 29th August, 2000.
39. It would thus appear that the petitioner succeeded in obtaining an order of anticipatory bail from Delhi High Court on the undertaking that he would surrender before the concerned Court. He was to surrender before 29th August, 2000 but instead of doing so he has preferred this writ petition for quashing of the F.I.Rs. with an interim prayer of staying his arrest till the submission of charge sheet. The petitioner is thus also guilty of not coming before this Court with clean hands.
40. For the reasons stated above, we find no merits in this writ petition either for quashing the First Information Reports or for staying the arrest of the petitioner until completion of investigation and submission of charge sheet.
41. It is made clear that any observations made in this order shall not be construed to mean expression of opinion on merits of the case.
42. Writ petition accordingly is dismissed.
