Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.@mdashRespondent No. 1 / landlord filed an eviction petition against the petitioner /tenant and his brother, respondent No. 2 u/s 14(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (h) and (j) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred to as, ''the said Act'') in respect of two rooms in premises bearing Ward No. 1, Main Baburpur Road, East Rohtas Nagar, Shahdara, Delhi. The premises were stated to be let out at a monthly rent of Rs.36/- exclusive of other charges in the year 1962. There is no written Rent Deed.
2. The petitioner was alleged to be running a flour mill in one room without the consent of the landlord and the second room was alleged to be unlawfully sublet or assigned to respondent No. 2 herein wherein shop was being run under the name and style of Anand Dupatta Centre. The petitioner was stated to be recovering from respondent No. 2 a sum of Rs.500/- per month. Allegations were also made about damage to the premises. The rent was stated to be in arrears despite demand notice served. A further plea was raised that the premises had been let out for residential purposes, which was being misused. The petitioner was stated to have acquired an alternative residential accommodation.
3. The petitioner contested the eviction proceedings even denying that respondent No. 1 was the landlord and inter alias that the tenanted premises consisted of one shop bearing private No. 14 in the said property. The petitioner''s case was that the premises were let out for commercial use and were in his occupation.
4. The parties led the evidence and in terms of an order dated 15.01.2005 of the Additional Rent Controller (hereinafter to be referred to as, ''ARC''), respondent No. 1 succeeded in the eviction proceedings.
5. The ARC found that the landlord-tenant relationship was established and the rate of rent was Rs.36/- per month in respect of the two rooms. The petitioner was held to be in arrears of rent and despite the legal notice being served on him, the arrears of rent were not cleared. It may be clarified that while the stand of the petitioner was that he was the tenant in respect of private room No. 14, the ARC found him to be tenant in respect of both private room Nos. 14 and 15. Since it was the first default, the benefit of Section 14(2) of the said Act was given to the petitioner.
6. Insofar as the allegation of sub-letting was concerned, the same were found against respondent No. 1 and, thus, it was held that respondent No. 1 was not entitled to eviction on grounds of Section 14(1)(b) of the said Act. However, insofar as the allegation of change of user was found to be correct in respect of shop No. 15 and, thus, the case was held to be made out u/s 14(1)(c) of the said Act. Similarly, it was found that neither the petitioner nor his family members had been residing in the premises for a long period of time and, thus, the ground u/s 14(1)(d) of the said Act was also made out.
7. The position is the same in respect of the ground u/s 14(1)(h) of the said Act. The petitioner was found to have admitted that he was already residing at his own residence and, thus, again the finding was reached in favor of respondent No. 1. However, no case was found to be made out for causing substantial damages to the premises in question.
8. The petitioner aggrieved by the same filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal and in terms of the impugned order dated 04.08.2006 of the Additional Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter to be referred to as, ''the Tribunal''), the appeal has been dismissed. The petitioner has now filed the present proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
9. The jurisdiction of this Court in exercise of the aforesaid powers does not extend to re-appreciation of the evidence on record. The present proceedings are not one of second appeal even on question of law. The said Act as it originally stood provided for a first appeal on both law and facts to the Tribunal u/s 38 of the said Act and a second appeal laid to this Court on a question of law. In 1988, a conscious decision was taken to delete the provisions of Section 39 of the said Act and confined the appeal u/s 38 of the said Act only to a question of law. This would show that the conscious intent of the Legislature was to limit the scope of scrutiny.
10. Despite the aforesaid position, learned senior counsel for the petitioner contends that the failure of respondent No. 1 to enter in the witness box should be fatal so far as the eviction proceedings are concerned and reliance has been placed in this behalf on the judgment of the Apex Court in
120. Parties to civil suit, and their wives or husbands. Husband or wife of person under criminal trial. ?- In all civil proceedings the parties to the suit, and the husband or wife of any party to the suit, shall be competent witnesses. In criminal proceedings amongst any person, the husband or wife of such person, respectively, shall be a competent witness.
11. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner, however, contends that the Court of the ARC enjoys the power of a civil court in view of Rule 23 of Chapter VII of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1958 as also Section 38(3) of the said Act, which reads as under:
38. Appeal to the Tribunal
3. For the purposes of holding any inquiry or discharging any duty under this Act, the Controller may:
(a) after giving not less than twenty-four hours'' notice in writing, enter and inspect or authorise any officer subordinate to him to enter and inspect any premises at any time between sunrise and sunset; or (b) by written order, require any person to produce for his inspection all such accounts, books or other documents relevant to the enquiry at such time and at such place as may be specified in the order.
12. There is no doubt that the Tribunal has the trappings of a civil court for certain purposes as set out herein-before, but it cannot be said that the testimony of the husband of respondent No. 1 in the absence of the testimony of respondent No. 1 would result in a situation where the petition is liable to be thrown out on that ground. I, thus, find no merit in this plea.
13. The second plea urged is arising out of the stand of the petitioner that he was a tenant only in respect of one room. The appellate court, in fact, found that the whole property had been let out for residential purposes and in view of the evidence on record, but was being used for commercial purposes. The petitioner nor any of his family members were residing in the premises.
14. Respondent No. 1 had, in fact, filed a cross appeal on account of the rejection of certain grounds and even those grounds have been found in favor of respondent No. 1 with the result that the eviction petition had been decreed in respect of the grievance made of sub-letting u/s 14(1)(b) of the said Act. 15. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show or really urge any patent error or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by the appellate court, which could give rise to any intervention by this Court. The attempt to read evidence and draw different conclusions from the testimonies already on record is not something, which is permissible.
16. The last plea of learned senior counsel for the petitioner arises from the direction of the Tribunal calling upon the petitioner and respondent No. 2 to explain as to why a complaint be not filed against them u/s 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter to be referred to as, ''Cr.P.C.''). The Tribunal has proceeded to do so on account of the fact that in the written statement filed intentionally, the correctness of the site plan was denied alleging that one of the shops was not part of the tenanted premises. Even while on entering the witness box, false testimony in this behalf was led.
17. In my considered view, no grievance can be made in this behalf as it is high-time that parties giving false testimony before the Court are dealt with in accordance with law. A tendency is found to take false pleas and depose falsely only with the object of delaying the result which is likely to follow. In most cases, ultimately the party does not bear the consequences of such false testimony other than the same being rejected. The Tribunal, in the present case, had decided to proceed further as a protracted trial resulted on account of such false plea delaying the matter for about 10 years.
18. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has already borne the consequences of the prevarication resulting in the eviction order as also the tenant being burdened with the liability to pay mesne profits for which enquiry has been directed. A further plea is raised by learned senior counsel that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings and try the proceedings u/s 340 of the Cr.P.C. In this behalf, learned senior counsel referred to the judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in
19. Learned senior counsel also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in
20. The last judgment referred to in this context is in
21. I am unable to accept the plea of learned senior counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner and respondent No. 2 not only took up false plea in the written statement, but also stated so on affidavit. Further in terms of the impugned order, the trial court has only called upon the two parties to explain as to why a complaint be not filed before the competent court.
22. For all the aforesaid reasons, I find no merit in the petition.
23. Dismissed.
