R.K. Gulati, J.@mdashThis is a revision filed u/s 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1984 (now called "Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act") hereinafter referred to as "the Act".
2. For the assessment year 1980-81. the assessment was made on best judgment on a turnover of rupees ten lakh against the disclosed turnover of Rs. 1.90,950. The Assessee carried the matter in appeal before the Assistant Commissioner (J) Sales Tax, Varanasi. The appeal was allowed. The assessment order was set aside to be made de novo in accordance with directions in the appellate order. The Assessee preferred a further appeal against the order of remand to the Sales Tax Tribunal, Varanasi. During the pendency of the appeal, the Sales Tax Tribunal by its order dated 29.1.1986 stayed the operation of the order appealed against. The appeal was ultimately dismissed by the Tribunal on 3.9.1986 and with that, the stay order automatically stood discharged. The order of the Sales Tax Tribunal dismissing the appeal, was served on the State Representative on 29.9.1986 and upon the assessing authority on 17.10.1986. The fresh assessment in pursuance of the remand order was made on 6. 6.1987 which was again challenged unsuccessfully in appeal before the Assistant Commissioner (J) who dismissed the appeal. However, in the second appeal, the Sales Tax Tribunal again set aside the re-assessment order for fresh assessment by its order dated 1.5.1989. It is against this order that the present revision has been preferred.
3. It may be observed that one of the questions canvassed before the Appellate Tribunal was that re-assessment order which was passed in remand proceedings, was barred by the time inasmuch as it was not made within the stipulated period of one year of the service of the remand order on the State Representative which, as already stated, was served on 29.9.1986. The Appellate Tribunal repelled that contention and dismissed the appeal so far that point was concerned. It took the view that the period of one year within which the reassessment order could have been made, had to be computed from the date a copy of the order by the Tribunal was received by the assessing authority and not from the date that order was served on the State Representative. It is the correctness of this part of the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal which has been challenged by the Assessee before this Court in this revision.
4. Now Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act says that except as otherwise provided in that section, no order of assessment or re-assessment under any provision of the Act for any assessment year shall be made after the expiration of four years from the end of such year. We are concerned with Sub-sections (4) and (6) of Section 21. Sub-section (4) of that Section provides as under:
If an order of assessment is set aside and the case is remanded for reassessment by any authority under the provisions of this Act or by a competent Court, the order of re-assessment may be made within one year from the date of receipt by the assessing authority of the copy of the order remanding the case, or by December 31, 1982 which ever is later.
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Sub-section (6) of Section 21 says:
Where the proceedings for assessment or re-assessment for any assessment year remains stayed under the order of any Court or authority, the period commencing on the date of stay order and ending with the date of receipt by the assessing authority concerned of the order vacating the stay, shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation provided in this section:
Provided that if in so computing, the period of limitation comes to less than six months, such assessment or re-assessment may be made within six months from the date of receipt by the assessing authority of the order vacating the stay.
5. The learned counsel for the Assessee argued that the Sales Tax Tribunal committed a manifest error of law in taking the view that the period of one year talked of in the provisions extracted above within which re-assessment could be made, was to be reckoned from the date the remand order was served on the assessing authority and not from the date a copy of that order was received by the State Representative. In support of that contention, the learned counsel for the Assessee referred to the provision of Rule 68 of the Rules framed under the Act which at the relevant time, were known as "Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Rules, 1948 (for short "the Rules"). The reference was made in particular to Sub-rules (7) and (9) of that Rule. Placing reliance on Sub-rule (9) of Rule 68 of the Rules, it was also submitted that the legal fiction envisaged thereunder, should be construed in a manner that the receipt of a copy of the order of the Tribunal by the State Representative, was not only a deemed service on the Commissioner but also a deemed service of the order of the Tribunal upon the concerned assessing authority.
6. It may be stated that Rule 68 of the Rules provides for a procedure for disposal of appeal by the appellate authority or the Tribunal. Sub-rule (7) of Rule 68 of the Rules, inter alia, provides that copy of every order u/s 10 (order passed by the Tribunal) shall be delivered to or served on the parties concerned free of charge. It Is pertinent to mention that in an appeal filed before the Sales Tax Tribunal by an Assessee, the Commissioner of Sales Tax is arrayed as a Respondent or an opposite party. Sub-rule (9) of Rule 68 of the Rules contemplates that provisions of Rules 77 and 77A of the Rules shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to service of notice, summons, order, etc. under that rule. There is a proviso attached to that sub-rule which reads:
...Provided that service on the State Representative shall be deemed to be service on the Commissioner.
7. The expressions "assessing authority", "Commissioner" and "State Representative", have been defined under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Section 2(a) of the Act defines the expression "assessing authority" to mean any person appointed by the State Government or the Commissioner to perform all or any of the functions of assessing authority under the Act. By Clause (b) of Section 2 of the Act, the term "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Sales Tax appointed by the State Government and includes an Additional Commissioner, a Joint Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax appointed by the State Government. The definition of the phrase "State Representative" finds mention in Clause (hh) of Rule 2 of the Rules which says as under:
2 (hh). "State Representative" means an officer not below the rank of a Sales Tax Officer authorised in writing by the Commissioner to represent, or argue the cases on behalf of the Commissioner before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) or the Tribunal:
Provided that In the case of temporary absence on leave or otherwise of the State Representative, an officer authorised in writing by the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) or by the Assistant Commissioner (Executive) shall act as the State Representative.
8. The question for consideration is, whether in a given case, service of the order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal on the State Representative is a service on the assessing authority within the meaning of Sub-sections (4) and (6) of Section 21 of the Act read with Sub-rules (7) and (9) of Rule 68 of the Rules and further, whether the impugned re-assessment order passed in pursuance of the remand order was barred by time.
9. On the object of prescribing a limitation. Justice Story in a treatise "conflict of laws" at page 794 (8th Edition) has stated:
...They proceed upon the presumption that claims are extinguished or ought to be held extinguished whenever they are not litigated within the prescribed period. The quicken diligence by making it in some measure equivalent to right. They discourage litigation by burying in some common receptacle all the accumulations of past time which are unexplained and have now from lapse of time become inexplicable. It has been said by John Voet that controversies are limited to a fixed period of time, lest they should be immortal, while men are mortal.
10. In
The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions, equitable considerations are out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide.
11. In
The Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the words "used". If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver.
12. It is apparent from the above that when language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Inconvenience or hardship cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature if such a meaning is clear on the face of statute. The statutory provisions, when clear, cannot be given a meaning different from the obvious one. In such a situation, the courts shall not rewrite a statute and shall not exercise a part of the legislative power which the court does not have.
13. Having said all that, we may now revert to the provisions of subsections (4) and (6) of Section 21 of the Act. On a combined plain reading of those provisions, it is apparent that what is contemplated is that if an order of assessment is set aside and the case is remanded for re-assessment by an authority under the provisions of the Act by a competent court, the order of reassessment may be made within one year from the date of receipt by the assessing authority of the copy of the order remanding the case. Sub-section (6) of Section 21 of the Act is in a nature of a proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act. It excludes some period while computing the period of limitation of one year stipulated under Sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act. According to Sub-section (6) of Section 21 of the Act, where the proceedings for assessment or re-assessment for any assessment year remain stayed under the order of any court or any authority, the period commencing on the date of stay order and ending with the date of receipt by the authority concerned of the order vacating the stay, shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation provided in Section 21 of the Act. These provisions are very definite. The receipt of the remand order or the order vacating the stay must be by the assessing authority. These provisions in no unambiguous term speak of the receipt of the copy of the remand order or the order vacating the stay by the assessing authority. It does not speak of the service of these orders on the State Representative or any other authority. There is no obscurity In the language of Sub-sections (4) and (6) of Section 21 of the Act. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that the provisions in a taxing statute dealing with machinery for assessment are to be construed in terms they are stated in the statutory provisions and the court should not hesitate to give effect to them on consideration of equity or hardship. The court cannot read in or exclude words and cannot make amendment to a statute by addition of words which are not there. It is also a settled principle that when a word or a phrase has been defined in the interpretation clause, prima facie that definition governs whenever that word or phrase is used in the body of statute. However, where the context makes the definition clause inapplicable, a defined word, when used in the body of the statute, may have to be given a meaning different from that contained in the interpretation clause. But where there Is no ambiguity in the language of the Section, as in the present case, there is no scope for giving a different meaning to the expressions "assessing authority". "Commissioner" and the "State Representative" as defined under the Act or the Rules made thereunder.
14. The contention that under Rule 68 of the Rules, copy of every order passed by the Tribunal was required to be served on the concerned party free of charge and the service of the order of the Tribunal should be deemed to be service on the assessing authority, is without any merit. The assessing authority is not a party in the appeal before the Sales Tax Tribunal, although its order may be under challenge before the Tribunal. As already pointed out, in an appeal filed by an Assessee, it is the Commissioner who is the opposite party. Under the proviso to Sub-rule (9) of Rule 68 of the Rules, the service on the State Representative is deemed to be a service on the Commissioner and not on the assessing authority. The Legislature was aware of the expressions "assessing authority", "State Representative" and the "Commissioner". These authorities under the Act have been assigned different functions which they are required to discharge. If it was intended that the service of the order on the "State Representative" should also be a deemed service on the "assessing authority", the Legislature could have provided for it. In absence of any such provision, it cannot be held that the intention of law-makers was that service of an order on the "State Representative" was a service on the "assessing authority" within the meaning of the provisions enacted In Rule 68 of the Rules.
15. Legal fictions are created for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. The legal fiction which has been introduced by the provisions under Rule 68 (9) of the Rules should only be limited to the extent as provided under those provisions and there can be no Justification for extending it. Unless it is clearly provided, it is not permissible to impose a supposition on a supposition of law. It is not permissible to subjoin or tack a fiction upon the fiction. The contention that the fiction envisaged under Sub-rule (9) of Rule 68 of the Rules be projected to mean that the service on the State Representative or the Commissioner was a service upon the assessing authority of the order vacating the stay order or of the order passed by the Tribunal, cannot be accepted.
16. There is no dispute if the limitation for making the re-assessment order in dispute was counted from the date the order of the Tribunal was served on the assessing authority, the re-assessment order was made within time.
17. For what has been stated above, the revision is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
