Savitri Seth Vs Parshottam Dass

Delhi High Court 18 Sep 2014 C.R.P No. 736/1986 (2014) 09 DEL CK 0216
Bench: Single Bench
Result Published
Acts Referenced

Judgement Snapshot

Case Number

C.R.P No. 736/1986

Hon'ble Bench

Valmiki J. Mehta, J

Advocates

Girish Aggarwal and Vaibhav Jain, Advocate for the Appellant; Yashvardhan, Advocate for the Respondent

Final Decision

Allowed

Acts Referred
  • Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) - Order 41 Rule 27, Order 6 Rule 17, Order 7 Rule 7, 151
  • Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 14(1)(e), 25-B(8)

Judgement Text

Translate:

Valmiki J Mehta, J.@mdashThis petition u/s 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') is filed by the landlords against the impugned judgment of the Additional Rent Controller dated 6.5.1986 by which the Additional Rent Controller while finding all the aspects in favour of the petitioners i.e existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the petitioners being owners, the premises being let out for residential purposes, the petitioners not having any other alternative suitable accommodation, and that the petitioners required the premises bonafidely for their residence and family members, yet, dismissed the eviction petition filed u/s 14(1)(e) of the Act on the sole ground that eviction petition is only filed for a part of the tenanted premises inasmuch as one room of the tenancy has been illegally/forcibly taken possession of by the petitioners. Therefore, it is clear that though there is a finding on all aspects in favour of the petitioners with respect to the ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, eviction petition was dismissed allegedly and only on account of petitioners seeking partial eviction. This aspect of alleged partial eviction on which the eviction petition was dismissed, has however now achieved finality in terms of the judgment dated 25.10.2012 passed by Ms. Snigdha Sarvaria, Civil Judge, Central V, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi whereby the civil suit for possession filed by the respondent/tenant with respect to one room allegedly forcibly taken by the petitioners has been dismissed. Therefore, once the suit is dismissed, and the judgment dated 25.10.2012 has admittedly achieved finality, there does not remain any issue with respect to the partial eviction.

2. Really therefore what has to be decided is the cross objections which have been filed by the respondent/tenant and an application under Order XLI Rule 27 read with Order VII Rule 7 and Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the CPC 1908 (CPC) which is allegedly filed by the respondent/tenant for additional evidence with respect to the subsequent events being CM No. 4097/98.

3. Let me first turn to the ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and then examine them as to whether any case is made out as per the cross objections or that the judgment of the Additional Rent Controller on these aspects should be sustained. In a petition for bonafide necessity u/s 14(1)(e) of the Act, the following ingredients are required to be established by the landlords:-

(i) Petitioners are the owners/landlords of the tenanted premises.

(ii) Premises are let out for residential purposes.

(iii) Petitioners/landlords require the premises bonafidely for use of themselves and their family members, and

(iv) Petitioners have no other alternative suitable accommodation.

4. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the ingredient of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act with respect to letting purpose being for residential purpose, has now become immaterial in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, which holds that even if premises are let out for a commercial purpose, a bonafide necessity eviction petition u/s 14(1)(e) of the Act can be filed in Delhi. We have therefore to see existence of only three other ingredients u/s 14(1)(e) of the Act.

5. The first ingredient with respect to the petitioners being the owners/landlords of the premises has been held in favour of the petitioners by the Additional Rent Controller because there was no dispute with respect to this aspect and is noted in para 15 of the impugned judgment of the Additional Rent Controller.

6. So far as the family members of the petitioners are concerned, I may at this stage note that when the eviction petition was filed in the year 1979 i.e 35 years ago petitioner no.1 in the eviction petition Sh. Kanahya Lal Seth was alive. He was the landlord and when he expired during the pendency of the eviction petition, his legal heirs were brought on record as petitioners. Learned Additional Rent Controller has therefore not considered the need of the deceased petitioner Sh. Kanahya Lal Seth. I would however like to note that Supreme Court in the case of Kamleshwar Prasad Vs. Pradumanju Agarwal (dead) by LR''s., has held that the subsequent event of the death of the landlord during the pendency of the petition, and who wanted to start a business from the tenanted premises, is not sufficient to dislodge the bonafide need established by him earlier. Further, the Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Ramesh Kumar Vs. Kesho Ram, has observed that the normal rule is that the issue of bonafide need of the landlord has to be considered as on the date of filing of the eviction petition and only cautious cognizance should be taken of subsequent events. Subsequent events must be such which completely and totally wipe away the cause of action and therefore only such events can become subsequent events vide Gaya Prasad Vs. Sh. Pradeep Srivastava, wherein the Supreme Court held that where the need is for the son to carry on business from the tenanted premises from which eviction is sought, the petition cannot be dismissed if the son takes up some job as he is not expected to remain idle for decades during which the litigation goes on.

6(i) The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court are very relevant because litigation in this country sometimes takes a long period of time, and the present case is one such example and which is now pending for 35 years, therefore surely it is not conceivable that in 35 years there would be no deaths or changes in the family members because of marriages of daughters and so on. Therefore, the length of the case has been held by the Supreme Court not to be held to be of disadvantage to the landlords.

(ii) Consequently, in view of this position of law I refuse to entertain and consider the CM No. 4097/1998 filed under Order XLI Rule 27 read with Order VII Rule 7 and Order VI Rule 17 CPC which I accordingly dismiss and in which the case of the respondent/tenant is that the petitioners have in fact shifted to some other accommodation. Surely landlords cannot keep on causing misery to themselves in an insufficient accommodation for decades of pendency of litigation, and thus in the facts of the present case where the eviction petition had been dismissed only on the ground of alleged partial eviction, and otherwise the landlords would have got the possession decades back, the eviction petition must be decided as per the facts existing in 1979 when the petition was filed. In my opinion, even if petitioners have shifted to some other accommodation, and which of course is not established till yet, that cannot mean that the need is totally wiped away and, the ratios of the judgment of the Supreme Court stated above will squarely apply that this Court will only take cautious cognizance of subsequent events by refusing to allow this case of the year 1979 once again to go to trial after 35 years of pendency. If I allow the application under Order XLI Rule 27 read with Order VII Rule 7 and Order VI Rule 17, then, it would be a grave travesty of justice because a bonafide necessity eviction petition can otherwise never be decided.

7. In view of the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to by this Court above, the judgments which are cited on behalf of the respondent cannot apply in the facts of the present case. It is trite that subsequent events may be taken note of, however, it is not routinely that subsequent events are automatically and simply taken note of but whether they are or/are not to be taken note of depends upon facts of each case. The judgments which have been cited on behalf of the respondent/tenant with respect to the subsequent events being considered are the judgments in the cases of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor and General Traders, ; Gulabbai Vs. Nalin Narsi Vohra and others, and Seshambal (dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and Others, and though there is no dispute to the proposition of law that subsequent events can be considered as stated therein, however, it is only certain subsequent events that can be considered and that too depending on facts of each case, but the facts of the present case are such that they squarely fall within the ratio of the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Kamleshwar Prasad, Ramesh Kumar and Gaya Prasad (supra) and hence the judgments relied upon by the respondents cannot be applied in the facts of the present case.

8(i) The family members of the petitioners originally comprised of the late petitioner Sh. Kanahya Lal Seth , his wife/widow, who was the petitioner no.1 in this Court when this petition was filed, but who has also unfortunately expired during the pendency of the petition. Thus observations made qua the death of the original landlord Sh. Kanahya Lal will apply equally with respect to the issue of death of Smt. Savitri Seth.

(ii) The other family members were Sh. Praveen Seth the son and Smt. Madhu Mehra, the daughter. It may also be noted that besides the need of Sh. Praveen Seth who was the married son and whose need was to be considered in the eviction petition, the touching part is that today''s factual position is that Mr. Praveen Seth who had two sons, these two sons have in fact got married and they even have their own children. Nothing thus can be more disturbing about the continued tenancy and the long time taken in litigation, then the facts of the present case.

(iii) The daughter Smt. Madhu Mehra has also got married and is having children and she would be required to have a room as a guest room.

(iv) In a way therefore if we had to very strictly look at the issue of bonafide necessity as of today, and not on the date of filing of the petition, the issue will be basically the requirement for Mr. Praveen Seth his wife and his married sons who are said to be staying with him (though which is disputed by the respondent-tenant).

(v) In the eviction petition the need for the residence of the two brothers of late Kanahya Lal namely Sh. Brij Nath Seth and Sh. Bhagwan Seth was projected but this Court is informed that both Sh. Brij Nath Seth and Sh. Bhagwan Seth, have already expired during the pendency of the petition.

(vi) Therefore, in sum and substance, really the need will have to be the need of Sh. Praveen Seth and his wife and the need of his married sons with their children and the need for a guest room and so on.

(vii) The present case is therefore not a case where the complete need is wiped out, and therefore, notice of subsequent events need not be taken as held in the ratios of the above cited cases of the Supreme Court especially Gaya Prasad''s (supra) case.

9. The facts which have been proved on record in the present case are that the petitioners had one room on the ground floor and one room on the first floor of the premises. There was a room in the basement in which there was no light and air and consequently the room in basement has been rightly held not being capable of being used as a bedroom by the Additional Rent Controller. Once there are only two bedrooms, those two bedrooms are clearly insufficient for the need of Sh. Praveen Seth and his family though in the facts of the present case it is averred by the respondent that a disputed fact exists as to whether the sons of Sh. Praveen Seth are or are not living with him. Considering that delay in disposal caused by the respondent/tenant has resulted in such a state of affairs, and also applying the ratios of the judgment of the Supreme Court above and especially in the case of Kamleshwar Prasad (supra), in my opinion, this Court cannot keep on examining and re-examining the change in the family members of the petitioner and in the peculiar facts of this case I would consider the need of the petitioners only as on the date of the filing of the petition. Once I consider the need of the petitioners only on the date of filing of the petition, it becomes clear that the family members of the petitioner consist of Sh. Kanahya Lal Seth , his wife namely Smt. Savitri Seth, his married son Sh. Praveen Seth, his two unmarried brothers who are living with Sh. Kanahya Lal as part of his family Sh. Brij Nath Seth and Sh. Bhagwan Seth (ration card proved as Ex.AW1/6 and AW1/7 for these brothers to be family members of the petitioners) and an unmarried daughter Smt. Madhu Mehra. At best the case of the respondent is that in addition to the two bedrooms, the petitioners have one room in the basement as also another store room, but even taking them into account, in my opinion such accommodation being two bedrooms, one room in the basement and another store room are clearly insufficient for the family members of the petitioners.

10. At the conclusion of this judgment, I would like at the cost of repetition to state that it is in view of the peculiar facts of the present case which have been found in the present case, that the Supreme Court had in similar case laid down the ratios in the cases of Kamleshwar Prasad, Ramesh Kumar and Gaya Prasad (supra) that the issue of bonafide necessity eviction petition should ordinarily be considered only on the date of filing of the eviction petition, and therefore I feel in the peculiar facts of the present case, such ratios categorically apply. I refuse to consider subsequent events because it would put premium on the actions of the tenant in unfairly contesting bonafide necessity eviction petition and also of unfortunately the long time which litigation takes in this country.

11. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed. Eviction is ordered of the respondent from the tenanted premises comprising of one room and one kitchen on the first floor of the property bearing Municipal no.2409, Chhipiwara Kalan, Jama Masjid, Delhi-110006 and more specifically shown in red colour in the site plan attached with the eviction petition. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

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