@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
1. This order will dispose of the application of the plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking the following relief:-
"a) an adinterim order of injunction restraining defendants from selling and/or transferring and/or alienating and/or creating any third party interest and/or encumbering and/or dis-investing and/or disposing off and/or exercising any rights in relation to the assets particularly the shares held by the defendant No.2 in the other companies as detailed in Annexure `C'' to this application till the resolutions passed in the EGM now scheduled to be held on 8th July, 2000 or any adjourned date/s thereafter are given effect to pursuant to the orders passed by the Division Bench in Appeal bearing No. FAO (OS) 64 of 2000 and FAO (OS) 180 of 2000."
The facts in short relevant for deciding this application are:-
2. That the plaintiff claims to be the sole beneficiary of the trust known as Manisha Benefit Trust of which defendant No.1 is the sole trustee and its corpus comprises of 11% shares of defendant No.2 company. 49% shares of this company are held by certain companies which can be collectively called as Charat Ram Group of Companies and 40% shares are held by defendant No.1. The trust was established in 1991 in which the settler had handed over a sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the trustee. From out of these funds 11% shareholding of defendant No. 2 was acquired for the trust. The objects of the trust are the receipt of income, dividends, interest and donations, etc. which are to be given to the beneficiary, namely, the plaintiff. Defendant No.1 was nominated the sole trustee of this trust. The trust is stated to be for a period of 99 years or such earlier period as may be determined by the trustee. The trust is stated to be irrevocable and defendant No.1 has been empowered to nominate a trustee in his stead.
3. A notice dated 17th May, 1999 was issued by defendant No. 2 informing the shareholders that an extra ordinary general meeting of the company would be held on 10th June, 1999 to consider certain resolutions for appointment of directors. This notice was sent on the requisition received from certain shareholders of the 2nd defendant company. The plaintiff''s case was that the proposed resolutions were in the interest of defendant No. 2 company as well as in the interest of the plaintiff trust who is the ultimate and sole beneficiary in respect of shares held by the trust in defendant No. 2 company. As the plaintiff apprehended that interest of defendant No. 1 was adverse to and/or in conflict with the interest of the trust as well as the interest of the plaintiff, the sole beneficiary of the trust, the plaintiff filed this suit for declaration, prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction directing defendant No.1 to give proxy in favor of plaintiff''s representative for attending, voting etc. in the extra ordinary general meeting of defendant No. 2 convened for 10th June, 1999 or any adjourned date and also to give power of attorney in favor of plaintiff''s representatives to attend all further shareholders meeting of defendant No. 2. The reliefs claimed in the suit were as under:-
"a) pass a decree of declaration declaring that the Trustee being the Defendant No.1 is bound to act in the interest of the plaintiff beneficiary of the Trust and is bound under law to follow the advice/instructions of the plaintiff beneficiary as provided under law and it be further declared that all decisions/acts taken/done by such Trustee which are inconsistent/contrary to such advice/instructions of the beneficiary being the plaintiff herein are null, bad, void, unlawful, illegal and to no effect and purpose whatsoever and shall not bind the plaintiff in any manner whatsoever;
b) pass an order of injunction against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff restraining the defendant No.1, its agents, representatives/proxies/attorneys not to vote against the proposed resolutions contained in notice of meeting dated May 17, 1999 (Annexure-C) in the EGM of Shareholders scheduled to be held on June 10, 1999 and/or any other date to which the said meeting is adjourned or to give proxy in favor of plaintiff''s representative for attending voting etc. in the Extra Ordinary General Meeting of defendant No.2 convened for June 10, 1999 or any adjourned date and also to give power of attorney in favor of plaintiff''s representative to attend all further shareholders meeting of defendant No. 2;
c) a decree of mandatory injunction in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant No.1, directing the defendant No.1 to transfer 10,846 equity shares held by Manisha Benefit Trust in the name of defendant No.1 as its Trustee in defendant No.2 Company in favor of the plaintiff and a further mandatory injunction against the defendant No. 2 to record/register transfer of shares in favor of the plaintiff."
4. The reliefs were claimed on the basis that defendant No.1 being only a trustee was bound to comply with all the reasonable directions of the beneficiary which would include giving directions on how to vote. It was alleged that u/s 56 of the Indian Trust Act the beneficiary is entitled to have the intention of the author of the trust specifically executed to the extent of beneficiary''s interest and he can require the trustee to transfer the trust property to him or to such person as he may direct. It was, Therefore, the contention of the plaintiff in the suit that as the plaintiff, beneficiary of the trust, wanted to exercise its right to vote in the extra ordinary general meeting of the company in a particular manner, defendant No.1 could be given a direction to vote only in that manner and in no other.
5. The plaintiff had also filed an application being IA. No. 9803/99 for a direction to defendant No.1 to deposit the original share scrips of 10846 equity shares of the trust and for an injunction restraining him from exercising any voting rights whatsoever in respect of those shares in the meetings of the shareholders of defendant No.2. This application was dismissed by the Court with costs on December 24, 1999. Being aggrieved by that order, the plaintiff has already filed an appeal which is now pending before the Division Bench of this Court.
6. plaintiff had also moved an application under Order XII, Rule 6 CPC contending that admittedly the plaintiff was the sole beneficiary of the trust and defendant No.1 was its sole trustee and u/s 56 of the Indian Trust Act the trustee was bound to comply with the directions of the beneficiary and as defendant No.1 had not denied that he was the sole trustee of the trust of which plaintiff was the beneficiary, the Court should pass a judgment on those admitted facts against the defendants. By the same order dated 24th December, 1999 the Court dismissed this application as well as it was of the view that it was not appropriate to pass a judgment at that stage in the facts and circumstances of the case and the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC was not maintainable. Appeal against this order is also pending before the Division Bench of this Court.
7. In appeal against the aforesaid orders, the Division Bench on 21st February, 2000 passed an adinterim order of injunction restraining the first defendant from exercising voting rights in respect of 10,846 shares of the trust in the second respondent company till the appeal was decided. Liberty was granted to the parties to apply before this Court for permission to exercise or have exercised voting rights as and when the occasion arose.
8. An extra ordinary general meeting of defendant No.2 company was scheduled to be held on 22nd June, 2000. Defendant No.1 moved an application on or about 31st May, 2000 in this Court for allowing defendant No.1 to exercise the voting rights in respect of 10,846 shares in his absolute discretion at the extra ordinary general meeting of defendant No. 2, if held. When these applications came up for hearing before this Court on 16th June, 2000, the following order was passed:-
"IA. No. 5977/2000 in S. No. 1279/99
I have heard Mr. Anil B. Diwan, the learned senior counsel for the plaintiff and Mr. Madan Bhatia, the learned senor counsel for applicant first defendant. The applicant first defendant has prayed for following reliefs:-
(a) Issue ad-interim injunction staying for the time being the holding of extraordinary general meeting of defendant No.2 company scheduled to be held on 22.6.2000 and direct the defendant No.2 to adjourn/postpone the proposed Extraordinary General Meeting till the disposal of IA.No.5019/2000 and CM. No. 691/2000; and
(b) pass ex-parte order in terms of prayer (a) above.
In view of the discussion, the applicant first defendant seeks leave to withdraw this application. Leave is granted.
I.A. disposed of accordingly.
IA. No. 5019/2000
The applicant first defendant has prayed for the following reliefs:
(a) allow the defendant No.1 to exercise the voting rights with respect to 10,846 shares in this absolute discretion at the Extraordinary General Meeting of defendant No. 2, if held.
I have heard Mr. Anil B. Diwan, the learned senior counsel for plaintiff and Mr. Madan Bhatia, the learned senior counsel for applicant first defendant.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances, the meeting scheduled to be held on 22.6.2000 shall go on.
Justice J.K. Mehra, a retired Judge of this Court shall preside over the meeting and the company shall render all assistance and cooperation to the learned Judge presiding over the meeting. The remuneration of the Hon''ble Judge at the first instance will be Rs. 20,000/- and this is subject to the orders of the Division Bench in the appeal as to who is to bear the expenses. This will in no way affect the rights of applicant first defendant as the Chairman of the company. This will be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties before the Division Bench in the appeal. The meeting shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The applicant first defendant shall be entitled to exercise his voting rights and that shall be kept separate by the learned Judge presiding over the meeting and the learned Judge shall submit its report to the Division Bench in respect of the proceedings of the meeting.
The learned senior counsel for defendant No.1 and the learned counsel for defendant No.2 state that defendants would not disinvest the shares in other companies held by second defendant till 4.7.2000. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 shall carry on business as usual.
Post on 5th July, 2000.
DASTI. June 16, 2000 (K. RAMAMOORTHY) SSB VACATION JUDGE"
9. Thus it is seen that the Court by this order while permitting defendant No.1 to exercise voting rights in respect of 10,846 shares also directed that the votes cast by defendant No.1 would be kept separate by the Chairman of the meeting and the report would be submitted to the Division Bench of this Court in respect of the proceedings of the meeting. Though, no relief in any of the two applications was claimed by any of the parties to the suit regarding disinvestment by defendant No.2 of the shares held by it in other companies, a statement was made by counsel for both the defendants that till 4th July, 2000 these defendants will not disinvest the shares in other companies held by second defendant and shall carry on their business as usual.
In the meantime, one Mr. P.K. Chopra, one of the directors of the second defendant, filed a suit in the District Courts against defendant No.2 company for a declaration and permanent injunction and in that suit the Court of the Additional District Judge on 14th June, 2000 passed an order restraining the holding of the extra ordinary general meeting proposed to be held on 22nd June, 2000 till further orders in that suit. Thus it is to be seen that this order was in direct conflict with the orders passed by this Court appointing a Chairman of the meeting proposed to be held on 22nd June, 2000. This was brought to the notice of the Court on 22nd June, 2000 and the Court, Therefore, on that day directed that the Chairman shall hold the extra ordinary general meeting of the company on 29th June, 2000 and stayed the orders passed on 14th June, 2000 by the Additional District Judge in the suit filed by Mr. P. K. Chopra.
10. It is in this background that the Court has to consider whether the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction restraining defendant No.2 from selling and/or transferring and/or alienating and/or dis-investing or disposing of any of its assets more particularly the shares held by it in other companies and detailed in Annexure-C to the application till the resolutions passed in the extra ordinary general meeting were given effect to.
11. It is the contention of Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, that the Division Bench of this Court in appeal filed against the order dated 24th December, 1999 has prima facie held that Section 56 of the Indian Trust Act gives a right to the beneficiary to require the trustee to transfer the trust property to him or to such person as he may direct and once the beneficiary has exercised that right, the trustee cannot be permitted to use the trust property for his personal benefit. He, Therefore, submits that in view of this clear findings of the Division Bench, defendant No.2 cannot be permitted to disinvest the shares which it holds in other companies so as to frustrate the suit of the plaintiff. It is argued that the assets of the company are sought to be frittered away and in case defendant No.2 succeeds in dis-investing the shares, the value of the shares of the second defendant company would come down resulting in damage to the plaintiff who holds 11% shares in that company. He, Therefore, submits that to preserve the property, the plaintiff is entitled to an order of restraint against the defendants.
12. Before I discuss the merits of the case, it may be mentioned here that S/Sh. Deepak C. Shriram, Luv D. Shriram and Kush D. Shriram had earlier filed a suit being Suit No. 911/99 for a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants in that suit including defendants 1 and 2 in the present case from appointing and/or considering appointment of Additional Directors by the Board of Directors of the second defendant company. By order dated 5th May, 1999 the Court held that suit to be barred by Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act and rejected the plaint. An appeal being RFA. (OS). No. 32/99 against that order was filed and the Division Bench on 21st July, 1999 while disposing of the appeal gave liberty to the plaintiffs in that suit to file appropriate proceedings and apply for appropriate reliefs, as permissible in law, in respect of the property of the company. In that suit, an application was also filed for restraining the second defendant from disposing of the investments of the company and restraining them from disposing of and/or alienating and/or transferring and/or encumbering the assets of the second respondent. The Court while disposing of the appeal did not pass any order relating to disinvestment but recorded the statement of learned counsel for the company that the Annual General Meeting of the company would be held by December 31, 1999 and the company will not encumber or dispose of its assets except to disinvest the shares held by it till one month from 21st July, 1999.
13. By virtue of the order dated 21st July, 1999 passed in R.F.A. (OS). No. 32/99 giving liberty to S/Sh. Deepak C. Shriram, Luv D. Shriram and Kush D. Shriram to file appropriate proceedings and apply for appropriate reliefs, as permissible in law, in respect of the property of the company, the aforesaid persons filed another suit being Suit No.1749/99 against the defendants in this suit and certain other defendants for an injunction restraining them from in any manner selling and/or transferring and/or alienating and/or creating third party rights and/or encumbering and/or disposing of and/or exercising any rights in relation to the assets of the second defendant company and in particular the voting rights in shares held by defendant No.1 in various companies mentioned in Annexure-C to the application. One of the persons who had filed earlier suits, namely, Mr. Kush D. Shriram is also a Director of the plaintiff company. This suit was filed under Order I Rule 8 CPC and the Court, Therefore, directed the publication of notice under Order I Rule 8 CPC in the Statesman to all the persons interested in the subject matter of that suit.
14. On publication of notice Order 1 Rule 8 CPC, the plaintiff company passed a Resolution in the meeting of its Board of Directors on 11th August, 1999 resolving that the company was desirous of the aforesaid three persons representing the interest of the company as well in that suit and to take such other further action as may be necessary in the suit or in any proceedings including the review, appeal, etc. in connection with or arising out of the said Suit No.1749/99. The Resolution passed on 11th August, 1999 by the Board of Directors of the plaintiff company reads as under:-
"RESOLVED that the company through any one of Dr. Charat Ramji, Chairman, Shri Siddharth Shriram or Shri R.B. Sharma, singly, do file an appropriate affidavit in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Suit No.1749 of 1999, inter alia, stating that the company is desirous of the plaintiff representing their interest in the said suit or any proceedings including review, appeal, etc. in connection with or arising out of the said Suit No.1749 of 1999."
15. Being so authorised by the plaintiff company, an affidavit was filed by Mr. R. P. Sharma stating, inter alia, that the plaintiffs in that case were authorised to represent the interest of the company as well, as the company had the same interest as the plaintiffs in that suit.
16. While hearing arguments on the injunction application and maintainability of that suit, the Court by order dated 26th May, 2000 held that the suit was barred by Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act and the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief either in the applications or the suit and rejected the plaint. An appeal against that order is also pending before the Division Bench of this Court.
17. A perusal of the aforesaid proceedings pending in this Court clearly disclose that the plaintiff was aware about other suits filed by S/Sh. Deepak C. Shriram, Luv D. Shriram and Kush D. Shriram in which they had claimed an injunction restraining the defendants from in any manner selling and/or transferring and/or alienating and/or creating third party rights and/or encumbering or disposing of the assets of the second defendant company. As already stated above, no injunction was granted by the Court and in fact the plaint was rejected. Even in Appeal filed against the order rejecting plaint, an application was made for the grant of similar relief, however, no relief was granted even by the Appellate Court.
18. Under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested and the Court may direct that one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested. Where the Court gives permission or direction to one or more persons to sue on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested in the subject-matter of litigation, the Court shall give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons so interested, either by personal service, or where, by reason of the number of persons or any other cause, such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct. Though, no formal order was passed by the Court permitting the plaintiffs in that suit, namely, S/Sh. Deepak C. Shriram, Luv D. Shriram and Kush D. Shriram to sue for the benefit of all persons so interested in the subject matter of litigation, yet the Court directed the notice of the institution of the suit to be published in the Statesman to all persons interested in the subject matter of the suit. Under Order 1 Rule 8(6) CPC, a decree passed in a suit under this Rule is binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit was instituted, or defended as the case may be. It is, Therefore, clear that the order passed in that suit rejecting the plaint and not granting any relief and interlocutory application will be binding on all persons for whose benefit the suit was filed.
19. A plain reading of the affidavit filed by the plaintiff company in that suit clearly show that the plaintiff was not only interested in the subject matter of litigation in that suit but it had also filed an affidavit stating that it had the same interest as the plaintiffs in that suit. It has been argued by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that as no permission was granted by the Court to the plaintiffs in that suit to sue in a representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 the provisions of sub-Rule (6) of Rule 8 of Order 1 of the Code will not be attracted and the order rejecting the plaint passed in that suit will not be binding upon the plaintiff. Technically Mr. Shanti Bhushan may be correct to argue that as the permission had not been granted, the order may not be binding upon the plaintiff, however, in my view, the plaintiff cannot wriggle out of the findings of the Court in that suit nor it can plead ignorance of earlier proceedings.
20. Even assuming that the contentions of Mr. Shanti Bhushan are correct that the order passed in the earlier suit rejecting the plaint is not binding upon the plaintiff, in my view, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff at least to disclose to this Court in its application for the grant of ad-interim relief restraining defendant No.2 from dis-investing its assets that in an earlier suit filed by S/Sh. Deepak C. Shriram, Luv D. Shriram and Kush D. Shriram no interim relief was granted by the Court in a similar application and in fact the plaint was rejected. There is substance in the contention of Mr. Bhatia and Mr. Chandhiok that in case all these facts were disclosed in IA.No.5019/2000 on 16th June, 2000, the counsel would not have made a statement in Court that the defendants would not disinvest the shares in other companies held by 2nd defendant company till 4th July, 2000. The plaintiff cannot plead or claim ignorance about the earlier litigation as not only it had filed an affidavit supporting the plaintiffs in the earlier suit but one of the plaintiffs in those suits, namely, Mr. Kush D. Shriram is also a Director of the plaintiff company. The Court also cannot ignore the fact that the plaintiff company was all along supporting the plaintiffs in Suit No.1749/2000 and an application seeking relief similar to the relief sought in the present case was not only filed in the suit but is also now pending before the Division Bench. The plaintiff appears to have deliberately not disclosed the filing of Suit No.1749/99 seeking relief similar to the relief sought in the present application. A person who seeks equitable relief from the Court must come to the Court with clean hands and disclose all facts which are relevant to the case. In my view, not only that the plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands but it also has suppressed material facts from the Court inasmuch as it has not disclosed about the pendency of the earlier litigation in its application seeking restraint against the 2nd defendant from dis-investing the shares. On this ground alone, in my view, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief in this application.
21. Even on merits, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief in this application. In the suit filed by the plaintiff, the reliefs claimed are 1) a decree of declaration declaring that defendant No.1 is bound to act in the interest of the plaintiffs beneficiary and is bound under law to follow the instructions of the plaintiff; 2) a decree of injunction restraining defendant No.1 from voting against the proposed resolutions contained in the notice of the meeting dated 17th May, 1999 scheduled to be held on 10th June, 1999; and 3) a decree of mandatory injunction directing defendant No.1 to transfer the shares held by him as trustee of the plaintiff in defendant No. 2 company. An ad-interim relief claimed in the application for injunction filed Along with the suit was to pass an order of mandatory injunction directing defendant No.1 to vote in favor of the resolutions proposed in the extra ordinary general meeting scheduled to be held on 10th June, 1999 and/or any adjourned meeting thereof and also to give power of attorney in favor of the plaintiff''s representative to attend all further shareholders meetings. Another application being IA. No. 9803/99 was filed by the plaintiff almost for the similar relief. Both these applications for injunction were dismissed by the Court on 24th December, 1999. In the suit the plaintiff had not claimed a decree for injunction restraining the defendants from selling and/or transferring and/or alienating and/or creating third party interest and/or encumbering and/or dis-investing and/or disposing of the shares held by 2nd defendant in other companies as detailed in Annexure-C to the application. In case, the plaintiff has not claimed a relief in the main suit, will he be entitled to an order of injunction which is beyond the scope of the suit as is now sought to be done by the plaintiff? The answer has to be in the negative. A party is not entitled to an ad-interim relief which can never be granted to the party while disposing of the suit finally. As the plaintiff has not claimed a decree of injunction restraining the 2nd defendant from dis-investing its shares, in may view, the relief claimed in the present application is clearly beyond the scope of the suit and is not maintainable.
22. Moreover the dispute in the present case is between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. The dispute between the plaintiff and 1st defendant is whether the 1st defendant can exercise rights in respect of these shares independently of any direction given by the plaintiff or the 1st defendant is necessarily to follow the directions given by the plaintiff for purposes of exercising rights in respect of 10,846 shares held by him as a trustee for the plaintiff. The 2nd defendant company is not concerned at all with the dispute between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. There are no allegations whatsoever in the application about mismanagement of the company by the present Board of Directors of the 2nd defendant nor there is any allegation that the assets of the company are being frittered away by the Board of Directors of the 2nd defendant company with a view to cause any loss or prejudice to the plaintiff. In the absence of these allegations, it appears difficult for the Court to restrain the company from carrying on its business in normal course which may include its right to disinvest the shares, if any. The Court will not interfere in the internal management of the company at the instance of a shareholder. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the management is being carried out in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the shareholders or any action of the company is ultra virus the powers of the company. The Courts in the normal course will not interfere in the internal management of the company and restrain it from carrying on its business in normal course. There is already an appeal filed by S/Sh. Deepak C. Shriram; Luv D. Shriram and Kush D. Shriram in which the plaintiff claims to be interested as it has already filed an affidavit before the learned Single Judge that its interest is common with that of the plaintiffs in that suit. An application for similar relief being pending in that case, in my view, it would not be appropriate for this Court to pass any orders in this application granting an injunction in favor of the plaintiff which has not been granted by the Division Bench in any of the two appeals pending before it.
23. For the foregoing reasons, in my view, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief in this application. I am of the considered opinion that this application is an abuse of the process of the Court and the plaintiff having also suppressed material facts from this Court and having not come to the Court with clean hands, is not entitled to any relief in this application. The application is, accordingly, dismissed.
IA. No. 5019/2000
24. On 24th December, 1999 this Court dismissed the application of the plaintiff for an injunction. Against this order, an appeal was preferred. The Division Bench of this Court on 21st February, 2000 while issuing notice in appeal passed the following order in CM. No. 691/2000:-
"Under these circumstances, there will be an ad-interim injunction restraining the Respondent No.1 from exercising voting rights in respect of 10,846 shares of the Trust in IInd Respondent company during the pendency of this appeal without further orders of the Court. Liberty is granted to the parties to apply before the Single Judge for permission to exercise or have exercised voting rights as and when occasion arises. After hearing both sides, the learned Single Judge will decide on each occasion, as to whether voting rights are to be exercised and if so in what manner."
25. On 8th May, 2000 notice u/s 169 of the Companies Act was given by three shareholders of the 2nd defendant company calling upon the company to take steps for calling an extra ordinary general meeting of the company in terms of the provisions of Section 169 of the Companies Act. As the 1st defendant was expecting the extra ordinary general meeting of the company to be held pursuant to this notice, he moved this application for allowing him to exercise the voting rights with respect to 10,846 shares which are subject matter of appeal before the Division Bench, in his absolute discretion at the extra ordinary general meeting of the 2nd defendant, if held. This application was filed in view of the liberty granted by the Division Bench in its order dated 21st February, 2000. By an order passed on 16th June, 2000, the Court permitted the 1st defendant/applicant to exercise his voting rights in respect of these shares with the condition that the votes cast by him shall be kept separate by the Chairman of the meeting who shall submit his report to the Division Bench in respect of the proceedings of the extra ordinary general meeting. The extra ordinary general meeting of the company has already been held and in terms of the order of the Court, defendant No.1 must have exercised his rights of voting in this meeting and the report must have been submitted by the Chairman of the meeting to the Division Bench. As the meeting has already been held, in my view, nothing survives in this application and the effect of voting by 1st defendant in this meeting will have now to be decided only by the Division Bench in terms of the order dated 16th June, 2000 passed by this Court.
26. In my view, Therefore, this application has become infructuous and the same is, accordingly, disposed of.
