Batra Steels Vs The Commissioner of Sales Tax and Others

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

(1) (ORAL).-THIS petition is filed under article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 7th December, i993, 9th December, 1993 and 15th January, 1994 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal, Sales Tax in appeal Nos. 886, 887 in the assessment years 1988-89 and in the review petition No. 80193 arising out of appeal Nos. 886-887. Brief facts necessary to dispose of this petition are recapitulated as under :-

(2) The proceedings in this case where initiated on 15-5-1992, when the petitioner was called to cause appearance and produce evidence in support of the returns filed. On these dates of hearing, the petitioner did not appear before the Assessing Authority. and thereafter he appeared on 15-6-92 only to get the hearing adjourned as some of the required statutory forms could not be received. The Assessing Authority again on the request of the petitioner adjourned the case and observed that no further opportunity shall be granted.

(3) On 18-8-92, the petitioner produced 69 ST-35 forms before the Assessing Authority but still failed to produce books o; accounts and other documents required for the purposes of assessment On the request of the petitioner, the case was adjourned to 2-9-92. Again on 2-9-92, on the ground of non-availability of his advocate, the petitioner sought an adjournment. The case was adjourned till 17-12-1992 on the requests of the petitioner. Even on the adjourned hearing of 17-12-92, no books of account or documents were produced before the Assessing Authority, an'''' again case was adjourned to 23-12-92. The petitioner failed t'' appear even on 23-12-92.

(4) The assessing authority again issued show cause notice dated 15-1-93 which was served on the petitioner but the petitioner again did not appear before the Assessing Authority. In these circumstances, the Assessing Authority was virtually left with no option but to proceed with the assessment ex-parte against the petitioner, The assessing authority had given unusual indulgence and accommodation to the petitioner but even then the petitioner failed to produce relevant records and documents.

(5) Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application under Rule i 36(6) read with Section 43(5) of the Act, before respondent No. 5 and stated that the factory is still closed. The application was verified on 29-12-93. It ^ rather curious that though the factory was closed but even than the petitioner could produce the sales tax forms before the tribunal at the time of hearing of the review application on 4-1-94. This circumstance obviously casts doubts on the credibility and trustworthiness of the petitioner or a version.

(6) The assessment returns of the petitioner revealed that the sales were to the tune of Rs. 3;38,65,447.67. The Assessing Authority after taking into consideration various facts and circumstances, increased the total sales of the petitioner by 25 per cent and fixed the figures of sales at Rs. 4,23,33,188.95, out of this 10 per cent share is treated as inter state sale. On this amount, sales tax at the rate of 18 per cent under the Central Sales Tax and interest on tax amount is charged. On 90 per cent balance amount, the local tax at the rate of 10 per cent is, charged and interest on tax amount is charged. On the basis of the aforesaid calculation, the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 26,46,649 within 15 days by the order dated 5-3-1993.

(7) It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner himself acquiesced to the order of the learned appellate Tribunal. He only prayed before the tribunal that he may be given some more time to comply with the conditions imposed in the order by the learned Appellate Tribunal.

(8) The learned counsel torn the respondent also placed on record the order dated 5th January, 1994 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal en the application of the petitioner. This order reveals that the tribunal reviewed its own order and the petitioner who was initially directed to pay Rs. 2.5 lakh, but the petitioner was directed to pay only Rs. 1 lakh by this order.

(9) The petitioner by an application dated 18th January, 1994, again sought extension of time for compliance of the order till 28th February, 1994. On this application again, the learned Appellate Tribunal extended the time for compliance till 28th February, 1994.

(10) The petitioner once again moved an application for extension of .time for compliance of order dated 21st January, 1994 and in this application, he prayed that the time be extended up to 31st March, l''994. This application was decided on 7th February, 1994. The Tribunal observed as under :-

I have head the learned counsel for the parties, Although there is no ground for further extension of time, yet, in the interest of justice last and final opportunity is granted for compliance of the order dated 8th February 1994. The compliance of my order be "shown to the First Appellate Authority on 9th February, 1994".

(11) The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the order of the tribunal was in fact, not challenged but the petitioner only sought further time/extension for compliance of the order and now the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the said order. He further submitted that the petitioner has withheld all these vital facts and averments from the Court and only on the .ground of suppression of material facts alone, this position deserves to be dismissed.

(12) Now, the question arises whether in the facts and circumstances of this case. any interference by the court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution would be justified?

(13) Law seems to be well settled that powers under 227 of the Constitution of India should be exercised sparingly and in only extraordinary circumstances. It Would be appropriate to have the historical perspective of courts powers under Article 227 of the Constitution.

(14) Under Article 227 the High Court has the power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals in the territory with respect to which it exercises jurisdiction. This power of superintendence, is both Judicial and administrative.

(15) The material part of Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, except that the power of superintendence has been extended by the article also to the Tribunals. The preponderance of judicial opinion in India was that Section 107 of the 1915 Act which was similar in terms to Section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861. The power of judicial superintendence of the High Court are, apart from and, independently of the provisions of other laws, conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court, Section 107 was virtually reproduced in the Government of India Act 1935 as Section 224 with however, a sub Section (2) providing that nothing in the section should be construed as giving the High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior Court which was not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. Section 224 has teen reproduced with certain modifications in Articles 227.

(16) It would be appropriate to reproduce Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 in order to have proper perception of the historical background of incorporating Article 227 in the Constitution. These Sections are accordingly reproduced hereinbelow :-

Government of India Act, 1915 Section 107 Each of the High Courts has superintendence over all courts for the time being subject to its appellate jurisdiction, and may do any of the following things, that is to say :- (a) call for returns; (b) direct die transfer of any suit or appeal from any such court any other court of equal or superior jurisdiction: (c) make and issue, general rules and prescribe forms law regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; (d) prescribe forms in which books entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts; and (c) settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff, attorneys and ail clerks and officers of courts: Provided that such rules, forms and tables shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of any [law] for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval... in the case of the high court at Calcutta, of the Governor-General in Council and in other cases of the local government.

Government of India Act, 1935 Section 224(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts in India for the time being subject to its appellate jurisdiction, and may do any of the following things, that is to say,- (a) call for returns; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts: (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the Officers of any such course, and (d) settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff, attorneys, and all clerks and officers of courts : Provided that. such rules, forms and tables shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to a High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior court which is not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. Article 227 of the Constitution of India reads as under: "227. Power of superintendence over all Courts by the High Court.-(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may- (a) call for returns from such Courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such Courts: and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such Courts. (3) The High Court, may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such Courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein: Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this a; dele shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers or superintendence over any Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

(17) The Indian High Courts. Federal Court and the Supreme Court have consistently taken the view that powers of superintendence must be exercised very sparingly in extraordinary circumstances where non-interference may lead to grave miscarriage of justice. An over all view of cases since 1883 to 1994 is briefly reflected herein under.

(18) More than a century ago, the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath and others 1883 I L R Vii 341, (1) Bombay Series, have laid down parameters for the exercise of similar powers as that of Article 227 of the Constitution by that High Court. Their Lordships provided adequate guidance and parameters which remain fully relevant even after more than a century. They are reproduced as under:--

(1)The visitatorial of superintending power of the High Court is so necessary, and almost indispensable, that it is not to be wholly excluded even by a clause in a Statute withdrawing cases under the Statute from its control. When such a Statute has been made a mere pretext, or has been wholly misapplied, the case will be treated as one not really arising under the Statute, but on an evasion or perversion of the Statute and, as such, subject to the general control of the Court. (2) The Court, having called up the record or proceedings of a subordinate court, will itself investigate the facts on which jurisdiction has been assumed or declined on which it depends whether the subordinate court could or could not legally deal with the matter in question, either at all, or on the principle to which it has referred the case; or according to which its mode of enquiry, or of action, may or may not have been in contradiction, rather than obedience, to the rules of procedure or the principles implied in them, to such a material extent as to defeat the purpose of the law. (3J If the court finds that the external conditions of jurisdiction, of investigation, and of command, have been satisfied by the inferior court, it will not substitute its own appreciation of evidence or its own judgment thereon, for the determination of the inferior court, in any matter committed by the legislature to the discretion of such court. (4) Where an. appeal is provided, the court will not interfere by any peremptory order with the ordinary course of adjudication, save in cases where in a defeat of the law and a grave wrong are manifest, and are irremediable by the regular procedure. (5) Where a decree or order of a subordinate court is declared by the law to be, for its. own purposes, final or conclusive, through in its nature provisional, as subject to displacement by the decree in another more formal suit, the court will have regard to the intention of the legislature that promptness and certainty" should,, in such cases be in some measure accepted in stead of juridical perfection. It will rectify the proceedings of the inferior court where the extrinsic conditions of its legal activity '' have plainly been infringed; but where the alleged or apparent error consists in a misappreciation of evidence, or misconstruction of the law, intrinsic to the inquiry and decision, it will respect the intended finality, and will intervene peremptorily only when it is manifest that by the ordinary and prescribed method, an adequate remedy or the intended remedy cannot be (6) The court will in all cases, regard its exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction as discretional and subject to considerations of the importance of the particular case, or of the principle involved in it. of delay on the part of an applicant, and of his merits with respect to the case in which the interference of the court is sought. Should other special causes appear for or against the court''s intervention, due weight is to be given to them, regard being always had to the principles already enunciated. (7) The court will "''sedulously abstain" from making any order or refusing to make it on grounds the appreciation of which is exclusively assigned by law to some other authority, provided the legal competence be exercised in good faith on matters that may reasonably be understood as within its lawful range."

(19) The Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in Madhusudhan Vs. Shyam Dass, has held as under: : The powers of revision under Article 227 can be invoked in case of grave dereliction of duty for which no other remedy is available and which will have serious consequences if not remedied." In Partap Singh Kairon Vs. Gurmej Singh, the Court held that,

"(20)The power of superintending control conferred by Article 227 is similar to the control exercised by the courts of King''s Bench over the inferior courts of England under the Common law. According to Blacktone, the Court of King''s Bench was entitled to a. general superintendence over all subordinate courts for the purpose of keeping them within the bounds of their authority and of preventing usurpation. In order to achieve this object the King''s Bench was at liberty to remove their proceedings to be determined by it, to prohibit their progress below and to enforce in inferior, tribunals the due exercise of those judicial or ministerial powers which had been vested in them, by restraining their excesses and quickening their negligence and obviating their denial of justice. The power which was exercised by the court of King''s Bench was a branch of the power of the King of England, while the power which has been conferred on the High Courts in this country by Article 227 is a branch of the sovereign power of the people as vested in them by the Constitution of a democratic Republic. (21) The nature and extent of the power of superintendence has come up for consideration in a large number of American cases and has been admirably described in 51 Lra 33 , where an annotator observes as follows: - "The power of superintending control is an extraordinary power. It is hampered by no specific rules or means for its exercise. It is so general and comprehensive that its complete and full extent and use have practically hitherto not been fully and completely known and exemplified. It is unlimited being bounded only by the exigencies which call for its exercise. As new instances of these occur, it will be found able to cope with them. And, if required the tribunals having authority to exercise it will, by virtue of it. possess the power to invent, frame and formulate new and additional means, writs and processes whereby it may be exerted." The Constitutional supervisory power is indefinite in character but unlimited in extent and is designed. to prevent and correct errors and abuses, to authorise the superior court to examine any question which it deems of sufficient importance for examination and decision (Brunner Mercantile Co. v. Rodgin (1912) 130 La. 358 (R); to control summarily the course of litigation in the inferior courts, to prevent an injustice being done through a mistake of law, or a willful disregard of it (State ex rel. Helena v. Helen.: Water Works Co.) (1911) 43 Mont. 169 (S), to remedy manifest wrongs or tyrannical or arbitrary acts, to meet emergencies, and to promote the harmonious working of our courts. It is in the nature of a summary appeal (State ex rel. North American L. Ins. Co. v. District Court. (1984) 97 Mont. 523(T), and is meant to "emancipate" the court from the restraints imposed on it by the rules of procedure, the only restraint on the exercise of such power being its own sound discretion (Item Co. v. Nu-Grape Bottling Co. (1926 ) La. 631; 107 Sc 471 (U). This power is not limited by forms of procedure and the court will look at the substance of the right sought to be vindicated and the need for speedy relief, rather than to the form in which such relief is sought [Thomas v. Doughty (1927) 163 La. 213] (V). In the exercise of its supervisory power the could is concerned in the prevention of abuses or illegal "act regardless of title amount involved, and in the prevention of extended and needless litigation (Sta exrel. Regis v. District Court (1936) 102 Mont. 74 . (W); Keiffe v. La. Sails Realty Co. (1927) 16 J La. 824: 53 Alr 82 (X). It is directed primarily to inferior tribunals, and its relation to litigants is only incidental [State ex rel. Red River Brick Corporation v. District Court (1912) 24 Nd 28: 138 N.W. 988 (Y)]. Jt should be resorted to most sparingly and only in appropriate cases, Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee, ; Waryam Singh and Another Vs. Amarnath and Another, ; Shivsingh Vs. Harjiram and Another, , in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority, Waryam Singh and Another Vs. Amarnath and Another, , or where real injustice would be done if the court could not interfere under Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee, or where a tribunal does not act in accordance with the manner prescribed by law or exceeds its authority'' or acts arbitrarily or capriciously or transgresses the bounds of its authority Shivsingh Vs. Harjiram and Another, . It should not be exercised lightly or when other and ordinary remedies are adequate and complete. It should be invoked promptly and employed sparingly and only in extreme cases when the ends of justice imperatively demand it and when grave hardship will follow a refusal to exercise it. It will be used to prevent irreparable mischief, great extraordinary or exceptional hardship, and great burdens in the form of expenses (Re-Louis A.M. Phelan 274 N.W. 411) (Z3). The superior court has the right in its supervisory capacity to direct the inferior court to proceed so as finally to settles the rights of the parties as expeditiously as possible : Union Bank and Trust Co. of Helena v. State Bank of Townsend 103 Mont. 260 (Z4). The superintending power has been exercised in cases where the ruling of title lower court was merely erroneous (State v. Grimm 243 N.W. 763) (Z5) but not in cases when the matter was one within the discretion of ''the trial court, unless the discretion was exercised in '' defiance of recognised judicial principles. (22) title Court will be justified in prohibiting inferior courts in all cases where (1) they are threatening to proceed, or are proceeding, in a latter of which they have no jurisdiction, and there is no remedy through an. application to an intermediate court: and (2) where they, although possessing jurisdiction, are exercising or about to exercise it erroneously, and great injustice and irreparable injury would result lo the applicant if they should do so, and there exists no other adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise (Duffin v. Field (1925) 208 Ky. 543:271 S.W. 596) (Z6). "It is the settled law of this jurisdiction" observed the court in State ex rel. Spinazza v. District Court (1929) 83 Mont. 511 (Z7). "that the writ to supervisory control will issue only when a ruling, order, or decision of an inferior court, within its jurisdiction, (1) is erroneous; (2) is arbitrary or tyrannical; (3) does gross injustice to the petitioner; (4) may result in irreparable injury to the petitioner: (5) and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than by issuance of the writ". (23) In Pickus v. Perry. (1931) 59 S.D. 350(Z8) the court said: "The existence of this power partakes of the nature of an ultimate safeguard to be availed of, not as an instrument of routine procedure, but in extraordinary and unusual situations where customary remedial procedure is in adequate and resort must be had to some such high power for the public good or for the prevention of gross injustice and irreparable injury. The very nature of the power, its scope and lack of limitation, impose upon the court to which it is in trusted a most serious responsibility to make a prudent and a sparing use of it, and to employ it in those cases only where the exercise of a sound judicial discretion clearly indicates a necessity for its use." Again, the court said: "The exercise of the power of superintending control is always a matter of discretion, never a matter of absolute right, and it is the clear weight of authority that the power would not ordinarily be exercised as a substitute for appellate jurisdiction, or where other remedy exists, excepting only in those cases where the other remedy is so slow. difficult, or inadequate that to compel resort thereto amounts to a denial of justice. (24) The general principles governing the exercise of the power of superintending control were admirably summarised in Re Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. (1910) 153 Wis. 282 (Z9) where the court said : "That this jurisdiction is not to be exercised upon light occasion, but only upon some grave exigency; that the writs by which it is exercised will not be used to perform the ordinary functions of an appeal or writ of error; that the duty of the court below must be plain: its refusal to proceed within the line of such duty or, on the other hand, its intent to proceed in violation of such duty, must be clear the results must be not only prejudicial, but must involve extraordinary hardships; the remedy by appeal or writ of error must be utterly inadequate; and the application torn the exercise of the power of superintending control must be speedy and prompt."

(20) Following American and English law, our courts have also taken the similar view. In Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee, and Shivsingh Vs. Harjiram and Another, the Courts have taken the view that power under Article 227 should be resorted to most sparingly and only in appropriate cases.

(21) Article 227 undoubtedly furnishes the High Court with the requisite authority in an appropriate case to substitute its own order in place of or to vary an unjustifiable order of any tribunal exercising authority within its territorial jurisdiction. The High Court is invested with judicial superintendence over the acts or decisions of not only those courts which are under its appellate jurisdiction but also of tribunals over which it has no administrative control but which are functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.

(22) The High Court as the highest court in a State and as the custodian of justice therein is invested with a special jurisdiction to see that the courts and tribunals functioning within its jurisdiction do act within the bounds of their authority and that they act in the manner required by law and do not exceed their authority or act arbitrarily or capriciously, and where they transgress their due bounds, it is the duty of the High Court to set them right and undo the wrong, of course remembering always that this extraordinary power is to be exercised most sparingly and with requisite care and circumspection.

(23) In Sukhbir Narain (Dead) by Lrs Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court would not be justified in interfering under Article 227 of the Constitution of India unless there was a manifest error on the face of the order.

(24) The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Santosh Kumar and Others Vs. The King, has laid down that interference under Article 227 of the Constitution should be rare and the court should only act in cases where their would be grave miscarriage of justice, if the court did not interfere.

(25) In Prem Narayan and Another Vs. Prabhoo Dayal, the Division Bench of the said High Court observed that the power of superintendence given to the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is an extra ordinary power and is meant to use in grave and exceptional cases to prevent miscarriage of justice. By its very nature it is discretionary and is not available to a litigant as of right, and consequently this Court never interferes in the supervisory jurisdiction if substantial justice has been done.

(26) In Faqir Chand Anant Ram Vs. Gopi Chand and Others, it has been held that :

"THE powers of judicial interference under Article 227 with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature are not greater than those under Article 226. Under the latter Article the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record, but under Article 227 the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. Moreover, power under Article 227 is always to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases, and is clearly not meant for correcting mere errors of fact or even of law. Where it has not been shown that the Officers concerned have in any way travelled beyond the scope of their jurisdiction or have erroneously refused to perform their duty imposed upon them by law then even if their orders are erroneous, that would not by itself warrant correction of the error under Article 227 of the Constitution."

(27) In Ved Parkash Sawhney Vs. R.A. Wania and Another, it has been held that Article 227 of the Constitution confers on the High Court the power of general superintendence to be exercised in its judicial discretion and the object of keeping all Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and seeing that they perform their legal duty in a legal manner. Where the cause ''of justice is seriously jeopardised, the exercise of this power may take the shape of constitutional obligation.

(28) In Mehboob Alam and Another Vs. Smt. Nasira Begum and Others, the court observed that every decision, if found to be erroneous, is bound to cause some difficulty or hardship to a party in the conduct of his case, but that would hardly be a relevant consideration for entertaining a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution, while another remedy is open to the petitioner. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227 is to be sparingly used in appropriate case where the court is convinced that gross injustice would otherwise be perpetrated, in case the High Court does not interfere in the exercise of its extraordinary powers under Art. 227.

(29) The High Court rejected the petition on the ground that the court was convinced that no extraordinary situation, calling for interference of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has arisen.

(30) The Full Bench of five Hon''ble Judges of Patna High Court: in Surendra Singh and others v. State of Bihar and others 1991 Cri. L.J. 3040,(12) held that it would indeed require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

(31) In Waryam Singh and Another Vs. Amarnath and Another, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court laid down that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.

(32) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat Vs. Ramgiri Gosavi and Another, held, that power of superintendence over tribunals vested in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not greater than the power under Article 226 and it is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. The High Court will not review the discretion of the Authority judicially exercised, but it may; interfere if the exercise of the discretion is capricious or perverse or ultra vires. The High Court may refuse to interfere under Article 227 unless there is grave miscarriage of justice. The court cannot interfere merely because it might take a different view of the facts and exercise the discretion differently.

(33) Similarly, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shaik Mohammed Umar Saheb Vs. Kaleskar Hasham Karimsab and Others, have held that in the proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of superintendence of'' the High Court is confined to seeing that the trial court has not transgressed the limits imposed by the Act. The High Court does not sit in appeal under these proceedings.

(34) In Maruti Bala Raut Vs. Dashrath Babu Wathare and Others, , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the High Court while exercising its powers under Article 227 was not entitled to discuss the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the evidence as to who was in possession of ''.he land. That was a matter for the revenue authorities, and the High Court would not be justified in discussing the evidence in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution.

(35) Learned counsel for the respondent also invited my attention to the leading case of AIR 1975 1297 (SC) . In this case, their Lordships of Supreme Court have held as under:

"IT would, Therefore, be seen that the High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction, under Art. 227, interfere with findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or tribunal. Its function, is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and reappreciating it. What Morris. LJ" said in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal 1952 1 All Er 122 in regard to the scope and ambit of certiorari jurisdiction under Art. 227. That jurisdiction cannot be exercised: ''as the clock of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bung up an order or decision for rehearing of the basis raised in the proceedings."

"IF an error of fact, even though apparent on the face'' of the record, cannot be corrected by means of a writ of certiorari it should follow a portion that it is not subject to correction by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 227. The power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a court of appeal. The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Art, 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate court or tribunal final on facts."

(36) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Miss Maneck Gustedji Burjarji Vs. Sarafazali Nawabali Mirza, has .reiterated the position and mentioned that it would not be proper for the High Court to entertain the application under Article 227 against a decree passed by a subordinate court when the procedural law allows an appeal against it. The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is an extraordinary jurisdiction which is to be exercised sparingly and in appropriate cases and it is not to be exercised as if it were an appellate jurisdiction or as if it gave unfettered and unrestricted power to the High Court to do whatever it liked. The same view was taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court.

(37) In S.P. Deshmukh Vs. Shah Nihal Chand Waghajibai Gujarati, the view has been reiterated and the Court mentioned that under Article 227, the High Court lies a narrow jurisdiction.

(38) Similarly in India Pipe Fitting Co. Vs. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and Another, , the court held as under:

"THE limitation of the High Court while exercising power under Art. 227 of the Constitution is well settled. Power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions of facts however erroneous those may be."

(39) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sukhbir Narain (Dead) by Lrs Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, have held that High Court would not be justified in interfering in Article 227 of the Constitution unless there was any error apparent on the face of the order.

(40) Similarly, in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Guram, also their lordships came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction under Article 227 must be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases while relying on the observation in AIR 1975 1297 (SC) where their lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the High Court in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a Court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court would not be justified to correct errors of facts by examining and reappreciating evidence.

(41) The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Murlidhar Air 1963 S.C. 404, (24) has held that in proceedings under Article 226 and 227, the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent tribunal in a departmental enquiry so that if the High Court has purported to re-appreciate the evidence for itself that would be outside its jurisdiction. However, if it is shown that the impugned findings recorded by the administrative tribunal are not supported by any evidence, the High Court would be justified in setting aside the said findings.

(42) In Mani Nariman Daruwala and Bharucha v. Phiroz N. Bhatena and others Air 1991 S.C. 1494,(25) the Supreme Court has held that in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of an inferior court or tribunal if there as no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal who has come, or in other words it is a finding which was perverse in law. Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with inc findings of fact under Article 227 of the Constitution.

(43) In Shyam Kishore and others Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another, the Court observed that resort to the proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 should be there in certain cases and the departmental instructions may not always be followed. Resort under Articles 226 and 227 should be discouraged when there is an alternative remedy. A more satisfactory solution is available on the terms of the statute itself. The construction of the Section approved by us above vests in the appellate authority a power to deal with the appeal otherwise than by way of final disposal even if the disputed tax is not paid.

(44) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in two recent cases have taken the similar view that power under Article 227 of the Constitution must be exercised very sparingly in exceptional cases M. Sarkaria vs. Vitaldas. (1994) Supp. I Scc 614 (27) and in N.M. Engineer and Others Vs. Narendra Singh Virdi and Another, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while reversing the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the N. M. Engineer''s case (supra) opined that :

"WE are clearly of the opinion, that there was no justification for interference in this case with the conclusions of facts by the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. We arc also unable to agree with the High Court that there was anything so grossly wrong and unjust or shocking the court''s ''conscience'' that it was absolutely necessary in the interest of justice for the High Court to step in under Article 227 of the Constitution. Counsel for both sides took us through the reasonings given by the High Court as well as by the courts below and we are unable to hold that the High Court was at all correct in exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with the decisions of the .courts below. In our opinion the High Court arrogated to itself the powers of a court of appeal, winch it did not possess under the law, and has exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution."

After going through almost all the celebrated judicial pronouncements of courts from 1883 to 1994, it can be safely concluded that court''s power under Article 227 of the Constitution should be exercised very sparingly in exceptional cases. Courts would be justified in interfering under Article 227 in cases of following categories :-

(A)To keep all the courts and tribunals within bounds of their authority and preventing usurpation of jurisdiction which is otherwise not vested in those courts or tribunals;

(B)The power of judica1 superintendence must be exercised in extraordinary circumstances where noninterference may lead to grave miscarriage of justice;

(C)The High Court would be justified in exercising jurisdiction under Article 227. where the order passed by the tribunal or court below demonstrates total dereliction of duty or is manifestly erroneous leading to grave injustice. . ''

(D)The Court would be justified in exercising its power where no other remedy is available to the petitioner and non-interference would lead to serious consequences and grave injustice.

(C)Judicial superintendence under Article 227 cannot be exercised for correcting the errors or upsetting the conclusions of the courts or tribunals. Courts would be justified in exercising jurisdication where the order is so grossly wrong, unjust and shocking to the court''s conscience. In other words, noninterference would perpetuate gross injustice.

The power of judicial superintendence is extremely important, vital and indispensable for propel functioning of rule of law and upholding the cause of justice.

(45) When the facts of the present case are examined in the light of the settled position of law which has been crystallized by various authoritative and celebrated judicial pronouncements, the conclusion becomes irresistible. In this case, the impugned order is eminently just, fair and equitable and any interference by this court would be contrary to all parameters and the principles of law.

(46) Looking to the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, I am not inclined to exercise my extraordinary jurisdication of judicial superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution in the instant case.

(47) This petition being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed with costs. The costs is quantified as Rs. 2,000.