Mukundakam Sharma, C.J.@mdashThis appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 4th October, 2006, passed by the learned Single Judge upholding the action of the respondents in issuing the transfer order dated 11th March, 2006.
2. The appellant joined the Indian Iron and Steel Company (IISCO for short) on 10th June, 1991 as a Management Trainee. The offer of appointment was annexed as Annexure R-5 to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent. In the aforesaid offer of appointment it was stated that he has been selected as Management Trainee (Administration) and has been posted to IISCO. It was also stated that the other terms and conditions of his appointment are the ones which are attached with the said offer of appointment. In Clause-3.1 of the Terms and Conditions of Appointment it was stipulated as follows:
3.1 ...You will have to undergo an intensive training for a period of 12 months to learn about the technical, managerial and administrative aspects of your job including on the job training under the company''s Training Scheme....
The other stipulation which is incorporated therein and is relevant for the purpose of our discussion is as follows:
3.2 After successful completion of training you will be entrusted with the independent job responsibilities as a regular Executive in the company''s Managerial Cadre.
In Clause 6.2 his liability to transfer is stipulated as follows:
6.2 Your services are liable to be transferred to any of the Steel Plants/Units/Subsidiaries of Steel Authority of India Ltd., or any of the Steel Plants/Units in Public Sector at any time and in that case the contract of your employment shall stand transferred and assigned to that Subsidiary/Plant/Unit, as the case may be, upon the same terms and conditions as contained in this offer of appointment and the same would be applicable to you as if the said offer of appointment was issued to you by that Subsidiary/Plant/Unit.
3. The appellant accepted the aforesaid terms and conditions of his appointment and joined IISCO. On 19th August, 1991 he requested for change of department from Personnel to Marketing, which was accepted. But even then on the same date i.e. on 19th August, 1991 he submitted his resignation on personal grounds, which he withdrew immediately on the same date. Thereafter he was posted in the Marketing Department and was transferred to New Delhi. Keeping in mind the organisational requirements and exigencies of service, on 28th December, 1992 the appellant was transferred to Batala as Sales Executive with full transfer benefits. However, from the second week of September, 1994, the appellant did not report for duty without any information, consequent upon which the respondent sent a letter to him on 31st October, 1994 directing him to report for duty. He was also directed to report at Burnpur Hospital for medical treatment if he had any medical problem, but he failed to do so. Later, when the Batala branch was closed down by the respondents, the appellant was transferred to Chandigarh in February, 1995. On 1st September. 1996 the appellant with other officials was sent to Nathpa site, near Bhabha Nagar, about 350 kilometers from Chandigarh for urgent official work. Thereafter the petitioner was transferred administratively to Burnpur Stockyard on 9th June, 1996. However, as the appellant did not join his duties at Burnpur his services were terminated, which order was later revoked on 10th February, 1998 treating the period from 30th January, 1997 to 9th February, 1998 as dies non and he was posted at Burnpur Stockyard. Thereafter, on his request he was transferred to New Delhi and was posted in the Stockyard of IISCO.
4. In February, 2006 IISCO was merged with Steel Authority of India Limited and all employees in the Sales Department of IISCO throughout India were transferred to the Central Marketing Organisation and were posted at the same station, except the appellant who was transferred to Burnpur in the month of March, 2006. The said transfer order dated 11th March, 2006 by which the appellant was transferred to Burnpur as Manager (Civil Maintenance) was challenged by the appellant by filing a writ petition before the learned Single Judge of this Court.
5. In the writ petition, the main prayer of the appellant was for quashing of the said order of transfer. Prayers made in the writ petition are extracted herein- below for reference:
(a) A writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the illegal and malafide transfer order dated March 11, 2006 transferring the petitioner to Burnpur.
(b) A writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to post the petitioner in any branch/office of ISCO-Steel Plant of Steel Authority of India at Delhi.
(c) Directions to the respondents to pay the cost of this writ petition in favor of the petitioner.
6. A bare reading of the aforesaid prayers would indicate that the appellant challenged the transfer order as illegal on the ground that the appellant could not have been transferred to Burnpur, and that the respondents should be directed to post the appellant in any branch/office of IISCO-Steel Plant of Steel Authority of India at Delhi. While issuing notice in the writ petition and the stay application a submission of the counsel for the appellant was recorded as follows:
...It is submitted by the counsel that the appellant is only claiming for continuing in Delhi till the end of the academic session in March-April, 2007....
7. One of the submissions made before the learned Single Judge was to the effect that as the appellant was pursuing his MBA from the Faculty of Management Studies, University of Delhi with the permission of the respondents, he may be allowed to remain in Delhi till the end of the academic session in March-April, 2007. The learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition by a speaking order dated 4th October, 2006 observed that the appellant could have availed the study leave for completing his MBA.
8. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 4th October, 2006, the present appeal was filed by the appellant in this Court. At the time of entertaining the appeal, the submission of the counsel for the respondents was recorded to the effect that study leave shall be granted to the appellant to finish off his MBA Course from Delhi University, without prejudice to the pleas of the appellant that the impugned order was not warranted. We are informed that the appellant has since completed his MBA course. Thereafter, the matter was listed for final hearing upon which we have heard the learned Counsel for the parties who have also taken us through the relevant documents, which we have perused.
9. Mainly two contentions have been advanced by the counsel appearing for the appellant. The first submission is that the respondents have served both the orders of transfer dated 11th March, 2006 and the relieving order dated 19th April, 2006 on 20th April, 2006 in the same envelope whereas both the letters were issued after a gap of about 40 days, which itself proves and establishes mala fides on the part of the respondents. The next grievance is that the appellant was appointed as Management Trainee (Administration) and has been allotted Sales Department and that all along he has been kept in the Sales Department and, Therefore, the respondents could not have changed his Department/service conditions from Sales Department to Civil Maintenance Department, as both the aforesaid Departments are completely independent cadres having independent identity.
10. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondents while refuting the aforesaid submissions of the counsel for the appellant, has drawn our attention to the terms and conditions of appointment of the appellant in support of the contention that the appellant has an open transfer liability. Counsel for the respondents has also pointed out that the appellant was transferred from the Personnel Department to the Marketing Department on his own request, which could be done only because he had a transfer liability. It was further submitted that being appointed as a regular executive in the company''s Managerial Cadre, he not only had a transfer liability, but in addition also had a transfer liability to all the branches as per the terms and conditions of his appointment.
11. In the light of the aforesaid submissions of counsel for the parties we may now proceed to determine the issues which are raised before us.
12. So far as the issue with regard to the service of transfer order and the relieving order on the same day is concerned, we do not find any reason to hold that the aforesaid action on the part of the respondents in any manner establishes any mala fides against the appellant. Neither any mala fides as against any particular individual or officer is alleged by the appellant nor any such person is made a party.
13. In order to prove mala fides there must be specific, cogent statements alleging mala fides. The Supreme Court in the case of
14. We have also analysed the second contention that the appellant could not have been sent to the Engineering Department as Manager (Civil Maintenance). The stipulations in his terms and conditions of appointment, which are reproduced hereinabove, clearly establish that he could be transferred in the managerial cadre to any of the steel plants/units/subsidiaries of the Steel Authority of India Limited or any of the steel plants/units in the public sector at any time. The appellant was also given training in technical, managerial and administrative aspects of his job under the company''s training scheme. He was entrusted with independent job responsibilities as regular executive in the company''s managerial cadre. Therefore it cannot be said that the appellant was posted in a particular department or branch. The aforesaid conclusion is also fortified by the fact that it was on the request of the the appellant that he was transferred from Personnel Department to Marketing Department on 19th August, 1991. The reason for placing the services of the appellant at Batala is also given which is found to be justified and also in the administrative exigencies of service. IISCO was merged with the SAIL as IISCO was declared a sick company. Resultantly the Marketing Department of IISCO was also closed and for organisational requirements and in the exigencies of service, the appellant, being a Civil Engineer and having received training in technical department also, was transferred to Burnpur in Civil Maintenance Department. It is the settled position that transfer is an incidence of service and that the respondents, in terms of the terms and conditions of the appointment of the appellant, could transfer and utilise his services wherever they thought fit based on the exigencies of service. In fact the "Other Conditions" of the terms and conditions start with the clause that the appellant will be liable to serve in any part of India. The appellant himself has stated before the learned Single Judge that he may be allowed to stay in Delhi till the academic session of 2006-2007 was over. The said period has now expired. As the appellant was posted in Delhi for quite a long period, it cannot be said that the aforesaid order of transfer is in any manner illegal, without jurisdiction or in any manner mala fide.
15. The learned Single Judge has also referred to various decisions of the Supreme Court which clearly lay down the exact position, as to who should be transferred and posted where, is a matter for the administrative authority to decide. There are umpteen number of decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court reiterating that the transfer of an employee being a part of the service conditions is not normally required to be interfered by the Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, unless an order of transfer is shown to be an out come of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provision prohibiting any such transfer. Reference in this regard can be made to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of
5. ...It is by now well settled and often reiterated by this Court that no government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted for ever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable post from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary to in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they are the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the management, as against such orders passed in the interest of the administrative exigencies of the service concerned....
(Also see
16. Even in the cases where one of the spouse is posted at a particular station the other cannot as a matter of right claim posting at the same station. Reference in this regard can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
5. There can be no doubt that ordinarily and as far as practicable the husband and wife who are both employed should be posted at the same station even if their employers be different. The desirability of such a course is obvious. However, this does not mean that their place of posting should invariably be one of their choice even though their preference may be taken into account while making the decision in accordance with administrative needs. In the case of all- India services, the hardship resulting from the two being posted at different stations may be unavoidable at times particularly when they belong to different services and one of them cannot be transferred to the place of other''s posting.
While choosing the career and a particular service, the couple has to bear in mind this factor and be prepared to face such a hardship if the administrative needs and transfer policy do not permit the posting of both at one place without sacrifice of the requirement of the administration and the needs of other employees.
17. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decisions, we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.
