Sudhir Agarwal, J.@mdashHeard Sri Rahul Sahai, Advocate for the petitioners and Sri Komal Mehrotra, Advocate for respondents. It is
contended that though eviction proceedings were initiated against petitioners on the ground of section 21(1)(b) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation
of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ""Act, 1972""), i.e., the building is in dilapidated condition and requires to be
reconstructed after demolition but the proceedings were initiated by respondents No. 1 to 4 through power of attorney holder, Sri Padam Prakash
and two more persons, namely, Sri Sanjay Prakash and Sri Amit Prakash, both sons of Sri Padam Prakash, who were also impleaded as plaintiffs
No. 5 and 6, though they had no right to the property in dispute.
2. It is said that the entire proceedings in fact were initiated, controlled and persuaded by holder of power of attorney of respondents No. 1 to 4.
Admittedly the respondents No. 1 to 4 were landlords and owner of accommodation in question but the real owners and landlords never come
forward and it is only the holder of power of attorney who has prosecuted entire matter, so much so that, in respect of such matters where the
evidence relating to status and position of landlords and owners was to be seen, there the power of attorney holders have adduced evidence of
their own status and position etc. and the Courts below accepting the same have recorded a finding in favour landlords owners and passed
impugned orders. It is thus contended that entire approach of Courts below in passing impugned orders is patently erroneous and illegal.
3. In order to appreciate the objection and serious contention raised by learned Counsel for the petitioners, it would be apt to have a bird eye view
of brief facts of this case.
4. The dispute relates to House No. 157 Shivaji Marg, Meerut City, which is owned by respondents No. 1 to 4. The respondent No. 1 is the
mother of respondents No. 2, 3 and 4, who are son and daughters. They entered into an ""agreement to self"" of the house in question, on
10.3.1999, with respondents No. 5 and 6. The symbolic possession of property was also given to them with further right to recover rent from
tenants. Respondents No. 1 to 4 as also 5 and 6 instituted eviction proceedings by filing PA Case No. 112 of 1999 vide plaint dated 30.8.1999
alleging that house in question is in dilapidated condition and, therefore, is required to be vacated by petitioners for the purpose of demolition and
new construction. Smt. Pramodini Srivastava, respondent No. 1, herself and in the capacity of holder of power of attorney of respondents No. 2,
3 and 4, vide power of attorney dated 17.12.1998, executed attorney in favour of Padam Prakash son of Raghunandan, as a holder of general
power of attorney in respect of disputed property.
5. The petitioners contested the matter, denied any valid attorney in favour of respondents No. 5 and 6 and any relationship of landlord and tenant
with them, through written statement dated 9.12.1999. It is also said that there was no compliance of Rule 17 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation
of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ""Rules, 1972""). The respondents No. 1 to 4 did not adduce any evidence
either by filing their own affidavits or otherwise and instead an affidavit was filed by Padam Prakash, father of respondents No. 5 and 6, stating that
he is the holder of power of attorney executed by respondents No. 1 to 4 and that a registered agreement to sell dated 10.3.1999 has been
executed in favour of respondents No. 5 and 6 and that the applicants are financially strong having financial capacity to bear expenses to be
incurred in property demolition and reconstruction etc. He filed income tax returns and bank accounts of himself to show sound financial position of
respondents No. 1 to 4.
6. The Small Cause Court, Meerut vide judgment dated 22.2.2002 allowed the application, filed u/s 21(1)(b) of Act, 1972. It had treated affidavit
of Padam Prakash, holder of power of attorney, as affidavit of respondents No. 1 to 4 themselves and considering the same, as also the affidavit of
Smt. Shama Mehra (Architect) and one Vijay Kshetrapal, held that disputed building is in dilapidated condition. Thereafter relying upon affidavit of
holder of power of attorney and his own bank statement, i.e., Padam Prakash, it held that applicants i.e., respondents No. 1 to 4 have enough
financial capacity to bear expenses of demolition and reconstruction and accordingly allowed application. There against petitioners preferred Rent
Control Appeal No. 70 of 2002, which has been dismissed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 4, Meerut vide impugned order dated
10.4.2006, though the operative part of Trial Court''s order has been slightly modified, which, for the purpose of present dispute, is not relevant.
7. It is contended that the owner-landlord did not adduce any evidence whatsoever and on the evidence adduced by power of attorney holder and
that too in respect of himself, the Courts below have allowed application filed u/s 21(1)(b) of Act, 1972, which is patently illegal. An ""agreement to
sale"" does not confer any ownership right and the property continued to be owned by earlier owner. Similarly a holder of power of attorney
represent the owner himself but that does not mean that the status and position of power of attorney, individually, can be looked into as that of the
owner, and this approach of Courts below is patently illegal.
8. The first question which has to be looked into, in this matter, is, as to the effect of execution of an agreement to sell by a power of attorney
holder.
9. Sale of immoveable property is defined in section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the ""Act, 1882""). It says that
sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part promised. The procedure to give effect to sale of
immoveable property is also stated in the aforesaid provision. Section 54 as amended in State of Uttar Pradesh clearly provides that such transfer
can be made only by a registered instrument. Then there is a provision for ""contract of sale"" also and as amended in State of Uttar Pradesh, this
also required to be a registered instrument. Since the sale can be effective only by registered instrument of sale of immoveable property, the
property itself shall pass on to vendee and the sale is complete as soon as the deed is registered and not otherwise.
10. In Vidhyadhar Vs. Manikrao and Another, , after referring to definition of sale in section 54 of Act, 1882, the Court said, that in order to
constitute sale, there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another. A transfer must be of all rights and interest in the property which
are possessed by that person, who is transferring same to another person. The transferor cannot retain any part of his interest or right in that
property or else it would not be a sale. The definition further says that transfer of ownership has to be for a price paid or promised or part paid or
part promised. Price thus constitutes an essential ingredient of transfer of sale. The words ""price paid or promised"" or ""part paid or part promised
indicate that actual payment of whole of price, at the time of execution of sale-deed, is not a sine qua non to the completion of sale. Even if the
whole of price is not paid, but the document is executed, and thereafter registered, if the property is of value of more than Rs. 100/-, the sale
would be complete.
11. Be that as it may, whenever it would be executed, only then one can say that sale is complete and not otherwise.
12. Now I come to the legal status and consequences flowing from document, namely, the agreement for sale or contract for sale.
13. The agreement for sale or contract for sale, by itself is not an instrument giving effect to sale of immoveable property. The title to property
agreed to be sold continued to vests in the vendor, in case of agreement for sale, but in case of sale, title or property vests with purchaser. In other
words an agreement for sale is an executory contract whereas sale is an executed contract. An agreement for sale does not create an interest in the
proposed vendee in the suit property but only creates an enforceable right in parties. An agreement for sale of property, and promise to transfer
the property convey the same meaning and effect in law. A promise to transfer property is an agreement for sale of property.
14. In 1917 (19) BOMLR 179 (Privy Council) the Court considered section 54 of Act, 1882 and said that a contract for sale by virtue of section
54 creates no interest in or charge upon the land.
15. Again in Rupchand Balmukund Aharwala Vs. Jankibai Kanhyalal, the Division Bench of Bombay High Court said that an agreement executed
between the parties to divide property at the expiration of litigation would not create any interest on property under the provisions of section 54 of
Act, 1882. A temporary arrangement with regard to profits during litigation is nothing but a system evolved by parties amongst themselves from
management of, property during litigation, does not mean that it has created any right or interest in property itself. The Court relied on an earlier
decision of Privy Council in 27 CWN 561 (Privy Council) where a document, i.e., a memorandum regarding secession of jointness of parties
making a declaration that from that time forth the parties became entitled to possession and enjoyment of their properties in separate shares and
further providing for execution of further deed effectuating partition would mean that document/memorandum itself did not create or declare or
assign or limit or extinguish any right or interest in the moveable property.
16. In English Law, there is recognition of two classes of ownership, legal and equitable but this has not been recognized in Indian Law. Here the
Legislature has recognized, in its wisdom, only one owner. There has been a catena of authorities including that of Privy Council in AIR 1931 196
(Privy Council) where it was observed that the Indian Law does not recognize legal and equitable estates. The Privy Council referred to and relied
on earlier decisions in J.M. Tagore v. G.M. Tagore (1872) IA (Sup) 47 and Webb vs. Macpherson . The Privy Council further said that by that
law there can be only one owner.
17. It is thus evident that the law as it stand is very clear that contract for sale would not make the purchaser/vendee to be owner in equity of estate
so long as the sale-deed is executed and registered. Mere execution of contract for sale by itself would not create any right or interest in property.
18. In Rambaran Prosad Vs. Ram Mohit Hazra and Others, it was held that a contract for sale does not create any interest in property. A three
Judge Bench of the Court noticed distinction in law as it was prior to enactment of Act, 1882 and thereafter. In para 14 of the judgment, it said,
that in the case of an agreement for sale entered into, prior to passing of Transfer of Property Act, could have resulted in creating an interest in land
itself in favour of purchaser. Thereafter the Court referred to the change resulted with enactment of Act, 1882, and in para 17, said as under:
...a mere contract for sale of immovable property does not create any interest in the immovable property and it therefore follows that the rule of
perpetuity cannot be applied to a covenant of pre-emption even though there is no time limit within which the option has to be exercised.
(Emphasis added)
19. The Court also noticed, when agreement itself recited with that sale-deed would be executed within three years, the purchaser had a right to
sue for specific performance and this by itself mean that agreement for sale does not create any right or interest in property.
20. In Jiwan Das Vs. Narain Das, a Single Judge in paras 10 and 11 of the judgment following Rambaran Prosad (supra) said:
10. ...the law in India does not recognise any such estate. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act in specific terms provides that a contract for
sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to obtain another
document in the form of sale-deed to be registered in accordance with law. In other words, a contract for sale is a right created in personam and
not in estate, No privity in estate can be deduced there from which can bind estate, as is the position in cases of mortgage, charge or lease. Of
course, such personal right created against the vendor to obtain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who obtains
transfer of the property with notice of the agreement of sale.
11. Till, therefore, a decree for specific performance is obtained, the vendor or a purchaser from him is entitled to full enjoyment of the property. In
fact, even if a decree for specific performance of contract is obtained, and no sale-deed is actually executed, it cannot be said that any interest in
the property has passed.
21. In Sujan Charan Lenka and Others Vs. Smt. Pramila Mumari Mohanty and Others, the Court in para 7 of judgment said that a bare contract
for sale of immoveable property does not create any interest in immoveable property. Referring to section 54 of Act, 1882, it says:
7. ...a contract for sale does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to
obtain another document in the form of sale-deed to be registered in accordance with law. In other words, a contract for sale is a right created in
personam and not in estate. No privity in estate can be deduced therefrom which can bind the estate, as is the position in cases of mortgage,
charge or lease. Of course, such personal right created against the vendor to obtain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent
transferee who obtains transfer of the property with notice of the agreement of sale. Till, therefore, a decree for specific performance is obtained,
the vendor or a purchaser from him is entitled to full enjoyment of the property. In fact, even if a decree for specific performance of contract is
obtained, and no sale-deed is actually executed, it cannot be said that any interest in the property has passed.
22. A Division Bench in Dewan and Sons Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Delhi Development Authority, said:
6. In our opinion, the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that as a result of agreement to still dated the 1st May. 1970 in respect of
the properly in question, entered into between the petitioner and M/s. Goodwill India Limited, the petitioner had acquired a ''vested right'' not only
in the property in question bill also to claim a ''No Objection Certificate'' on that basis, is devoid of substance.... In Kanaya Ram and Others Vs.
Rajender Kumar and Others, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that in cases whereafter oral sales mutation of lands was effected in
favour of the transferees even then i.e., after the mutation of properties, no rights accrued in favour of the transferees in respect of such lands as the
purported sales and the subsequent mutation based on those sales did not create any right or title in favour of the transferees as the provisions of
section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act were not complied with-their being no registered sale-deeds. In the present case too the agreement to
sell dated the 1st May, 1970 in the absence of any registered sale-deed by itself would not be sufficient to create any right or title in favour of the
petitioner in respect of the property in question. The registered sale-deed, admittedly, in respect of the property in question, was executed on 13-
2-1990 and thus the petitioners acquired a right and a title in respect of the property in question only after the execution of the registered sale-deed
on 13.2.1990.
(Emphasis added)
23. A person who has contracted to buy land is not the owner of any interest in the land and is, therefore, not competent to apply to set aside an
execution sale of the same land.
24. Section 54 itself says that a contract for sale does not create any interest in or charge upon such property. This is what has been noticed by this
Court in Indira Fruits and General Market, Meerut v. Bijendra Kumar Gupta AIR 1995 All 316.
25. In other words, a person having an agreement for sale in his favour does not get any right in the property except the right of litigation on that
basis. Sometimes it is also described that a contract for sale is merely a document, creating a right to obtain another document.
26. In Imtiaz Ali Vs. Nasim Ahmed, it was said that in absence of a registered sale-deed, nobody can call himself as owner by purchase, on the
basis of agreement for sale and power of attorney executed by alleged vendor in favour of prospective purchaser cum attorney. The agreement for
sale, therefore, by itself does not create any status upon respondents No. 5 and 6 to enter into the shoes of owner of building in dispute.
27. Similarly, the power of attorney executed in favour of Padam Prakash, father of respondents No. 5 and 6 for collecting rent also does not
confer any ownership upon him and he also would not become landlord in his own capacity.
28. In any case, the authorization of collection of rent at the best can be said to be an interest creating in respect to property in dispute but not that
any interest was created in property. Whatever may be the contention, but it cannot go to the extent of claiming that stipulations contained in
agreement for sale went to the extent of creating right and interest of respondents No. 5 and 6 so as to confer upon them any indicia of ownership
of property in dispute or permit them entry into shoes of real owners.
29. Now coming to the second aspect, when the landlords were respondents No. 1 to 4, could bank statement and other financial documents of
Padam Prakash, holder of power of attorney can substitute real owners, for the purpose of determining whether real owners were financially strong
enough to undergo the expenses of demolition and reconstruction. In my view, the documents relating to Padam Prakash were totally irrelevant. He
was only authorized to collect rent from tenants in the building in question as per the case set up by him. The landlords continued to be respondents
No. 1 to 4.
30. The definition of ""landlord"" u/s 3(j) reads as under:
(j) ""landlord"", in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building, were let would be, payable, and includes, except in
Clause (g), the agent or attorney, of such person.
(Emphasis added)
31. The definition of ""landlord"" is inclusive in the sense that it is extended to ""agent"" or ""attorney"" also. But for the words ""agent"" or ""attorney"" of
such person, as stated in section 3(j) of Act, 1972, it may not be doubted that definition of ""landlord"" otherwise refers to the owner of building or a
lessee of the building, who inducts a person as tenant and, therefore, rent is payable to such a person, namely, the owner or lessee (principal). The
term ""rent payable"" means, as a matter of legal right. One can enforce his claim for realization of rent from tenant. The term ""payable"" means
payable in law. ""Payable"" means someone who, in law, has right to receive, and can enforce such right. Such a right undoubtedly shall vest in the
owner of building or co-owner of building. I do not find that qua owner, there can be any two opinions.
32. Next is, there may be a situation where an owner leased out his premises to a person with a further right of sub-lease. In such a case a sub-
lessee would be liable to pay rent to the principal lessee inasmuch as vis-�-vis sub-lessee the principal lessee would stand in the shoes of lessor
and would be entitled to receive rent, therefore, rent would be payable to him. But when sub-lessee leased out premises to anyone else, in that
case he would become a landlord to whom rent is/would be payable.
33. The only expansion and deviation from the normal capacity of landlord as owner, as discussed above, provided by section 3(j) is by extending
the term ""landlord"" to the ""agent"" or ""attorney"" of such person, i.e., the landlord to whom rent is payable.
34. In other words it can be said that a landlord (owner) to whom rent is payable, if has authorized an agent or attorney for the aforesaid purpose
of collection of rent, such agent or attorney qua tenant, would also satisfy the definition of landlord u/s 3(j) of Act, 1972 against all others but not
the real owner.
35. It goes without saying that a definition Clause is applicable whenever the term ""landlord"" has been used in the statute, unless the context
otherwise requires. The context in which the term ""landlord"" has been used can be classified in more than one. The first is in the context of
collection of rent. A rent would be payable in respect to a building to owner of building and he would undoubtedly qualify and satisfy the term
landlord"". Then comes a lessee having right to further lease out the building and qua the person to whom he let out the premise, such sub-lessee
would be ''landlord''. Then comes the third category. If such owner of building has authorized an agent to collect rent, vis-�-vis tenant, such
agent of owner of building would also be a landlord within section 3(j) of Act, 1972. Similar is the position in respect to attorney.
36. Then comes the capacity in which an action can be taken or may be taken against a tenant. Section 21 permits a landlord to move an
application. Where the owner is the landlord the mere fact that subsequently another person has been authorized only to collect rent, that would
not render such authorized person to be a landlord or owner of the premises in dispute to whom the rent is payable. Here the term ""payable"" is in
the context of status of the person vis-�-vis the premises in dispute. Looking to wider perspective of the statute, if a ground to evict tenant as
enumerated in section 21(1) exist, a suit can be filed by owner of premises and he can also get the suit filed through his agent or attorney.
37. The authorization of agent or attorney is to act on behalf of principal. Therefore, it would have to be seen, whether such an agent or attorney
can act on his own without keeping his Principal at forefront. One of the problems which may arise in case, a suit is allowed to be filed only by an
agent or attorney, on the touchstone of fact that though he satisfies the definition of ""landlord"" u/s 3(j), but a complex situation may arise when such
attorney or agent dies during pendency of case. The heirs and legal representatives of such agent or attorney cannot satisfy on their own, definition
of ""landlord"" unless they are also, subsequently, so authorized by landlord, i.e., the owner, to act his/their agent or attorney. The substitution of
heirs or legal representatives of agent or attorney, therefore, cannot be justified since they will have no cause of action or authority to continue to
proceed against tenant. In a Court, a party may act through a recognized agent or attorney, as is provided under Order III, Rule 1, C.P.C. but
here also the context in which this provision is made is different.
38. A second situation may arise when we come to the proceedings u/s 21. Here an application can be filed by a ''landlord'', in case he requires
the building, bona fide, for demolition and new construction, or for occupation by himself or any member of his family. Here the term ""demolition"",
new construction"" and ""occupation"" all refers to the capacity of a person, who, in law, has the status to do so. A demolition of a building shall
result in cessation of relationship of tenant and landlord unless it is a case covered by section 24 of Act, 1972. Moreover, an agent or attorney,
authorised to let out a building and collect rent, cannot be held competent to seek demolition of such building.
39. A building can be demolished under the orders of owner of building, or, if there is a statutory authority and in exercise of its power under some
statute, if such a situation has arisen, vide a statutory order, but not by a stranger. However, such power of demolition or new construction can be
exercised by owner through an agent or attorney but here the agent and attorney do not have their independent status as such, even though, they
may satisfy definition of ""landlord"" but they stand to represent the owner.
40. Therefore, vis-�-vis tenant, the agent or attorney, who satisfies definition of ""landlord"" u/s 3(j), would be a person who holds authority as
agent or attorney, to represent the true owner of property, to do or not to do, or to act or not to act, in a particular manner, as authorized by
owner. The attorney and agent by himself cannot claim to be the owner of property and simultaneously to claim that they satisfy definition of
landlord"".
41. In the context of the words ""occupation by himself or any members of family"" there is a divergence in the opinion; whether these words would
apply to anyone and not confined to only owner of property.
42. One of the earliest decision in this regard is Lakshmi Shanker Misra Vs. I Addl. District Judge and Others, , Hon''ble N.D. Ojha, J. (as His
Lordship then was) observed:
''Landlord'' as defined in section 3(j) of the Act in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building, were let would be
payable and includes, except in Clause (g) the agent or attorney, of such person. In cases where there is a privity of contract between two persons
in pursuance of which rent is payable by one person to the other in respect of a building occupied by him in the capacity of a tenant, the person to
whom rent is payable, in view of the agreement, would be the landlord of the person by whom the rent would be payable irrespective of the fact as
to who was the actual owner of the property. It would be a case covered by the first part of the definition viz., the landlord would be such person
to whom the rent of the building is payable. The position in law would, however, be different of an accommodation falls vacant and the question
arises as to who is the landlord to whom notices as contemplated by Rules 8 and 9 of the rules aforesaid are to be given before passing an order of
allotment. At this stage the second part of the definition would be attracted, viz., the landlord would be the person to whom rent, if the building
were let, would be payable. It may be emphasised that in either event landlord would be such person to whom rent is or would be payable as the
case may be and not the person by whom rent is physically collected on behalf of the landlord would himself become the landlord. Who would be
the person to whom rent, if the building were let, would be payable is the crucial question. It would be the person authorised to let out the building
and to recover rent from the tenants. Normally such person would be the owner of the building. However, if the owner has entered into a contract
with some other person authorising him to let out the vacant building and to recover rent from the tenants either as his agent or attorney it may be
that person who would be called landlord within the definition of the said term under the Act. Similar may be the case when for the time being
either by an order of the Court or by operation of some law the right to let out the building and recover rent from the tenants vests in some person
other than the owner.
(Emphasis added)
43. Then in E.E. Dayal Vs. Smt. Phool Mani Dayal and Another, Hon''ble R.M. Sahai, J. (as His Lordship then was) held that it is difficult to agree
that merely because the respondent was permitted by the trust to collect rent, and, the petitioner started paying rent in view of this communication
received from the Principal Officer of the Trust, the respondent become landlord of the premises. The mere fact that he was paying rent which was
being collected by the respondent on behalf of the Trust, does not mean that she was admitted to be the owner of premises in dispute. The Court
further said that for the purpose of section 21 it cannot be accepted that an attorney or agent who becomes a landlord by virtue of definition clause
can file an application for eviction of tenant on the ground that need of attorney or agent is genuine. What is to be seen u/s 21 is the need of the
landlord-owner. It may be that the landlord may need the premises for his agent or attorney but that would be different in saying that the Act
confers any right on the attorney or agent, himself, to file an application for release of accommodation on the ground that the premises are needed
by them for their own personal use.
44. The next decision is Prem Chandra Pachit v. Second Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others 1978 ARC 394, a decision by Hon''ble
K.C. Agrawal, J. Therein Prem Chandra Pachit was not owner of building. He claimed to have obtained a Theka of building so as to use the same
as lodging house. He filed an application u/s 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972 for eviction of one, Ram Lal, a tenant in the building. An objection was raised
that Prem Chandra Pachit being not an owner of building, was not a landlord so as to get a right to file application u/s 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972. The
Court held that Sri Prem Chandra Pachit being only manager, did not satisfy requirement of section 21(1)(a) which contemplates that an
application can be filed only by a landlord, who needs the accommodation for himself or a member of his family. He (Prem Chandra Pachit) was
not member of family of landlord, i.e., the owner of building.
45. The comes a decision of Apex Court in M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, , a judgment rendered by a three Judges Bench.
The matter had arisen from Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. There, the definition of expression ""landlord"" contained
in section 2(d) of Bihar Statute is a bit similar to section 3(j) of Act, 1972. A provision somewhat similar to section 21 was in section 11 thereof.
The marked distinction in Bihar and U.P. Rent Statute is one explanation in section 11(1)(c), which says that in this Clause the word ""landlord
would not include an agent referred to in Clause (d) of section 2. Despite referring to aforesaid explanation, the stress of Apex Court was that
word ""occupation"" would mean that a person as a matter of right must have the capacity to occupy the building and that must be a person who is
owner of building. The relevant observations may be quoted as under:
Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in section 11(1)(c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his
reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy
the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression landlord in its wide amplitude cannot be treated as a
landlord for the purposes of section 11(1)(c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the sub-section. By restricting the
meaning of expression landlord for the purpose of section 11(1)(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek
eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude
any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can
seek possession for his own use. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the buildings for the benefit of
some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for
whose benefit he holds the building. The second Clause contemplates a situation of trustees and cesti qua trust but when the case is governed by
the first part of sub-clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 11, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord
who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to remain in occupation against the
whole world and not someone who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent collector such as an agent, executor, administrator
or a receiver of the property. For the purposes of section 11(1)(c) the expression landlord could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of
the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person
who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not
entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of
the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot
claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of
the premises for his own occupation. That can be the only reasonable interpretation one can put on the ingredients of sub-clause (c) of section
11(1) which reads: ""Where building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for Ms own occupation...."" Assuming that the
expression ''landlord'' has to be understood with the same connotation as is spelt out by the definition clause, even a rent collector or a receiver of
the property appointed by the Court in bankruptcy proceedings would be able to evict the tenant alleging that wants the building for his own
occupation, a right which he could not have claimed against the real owner. Therefore, the explanation to Clause (d) which cuts down the wide
amplitude of the expression ''landlord'' would unmistakably show that for the purposes of Clause (c) such landlord who in the sense in which the
word ''owner'' is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his
own occupation.
(Emphasis added)
46. Here in the above case, the Court read the explanation to be only classificatory but on principle held that eviction proceeding must be initiated
by a landlord, who is the owner of property.
47. Then comes a decision of learned Single Judge (Hon''ble K.C. Agrawal, J.) in Smt. Sughra Begum v. Sri Ram and others 1983(2) ARC 143.
Following Apex Court''s decision in M.M. Quasim (supra), the Court in paras 8 and 10 said:
8. ...Under section 21 a landlord can move an application for occupation by himself or any member of his family. The fact that only a person who
is entitled to occupy can alone move an application indicates that. one who is not entitled to occupy or has no right to occupy in his own right
cannot apply for release u/s 21. An agent or attorney of an owner of the house may realize the rent of the house in respect of which power is
conferred upon him by the owner to do so and for that purpose he may be considered to be landlord within the meaning of that expression defined
in section 3, but such a person would not be entitled to more an application u/s 21.
10. ...For being entitled to apply u/s 21(1), that person must be entitled to occupy the premises in his own right. The expression ""occupation for
himself or for family members"" has been deliberately used by the legislature to manifest its intention that the landlord alone can seek eviction on the
ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building.
(Emphasis added)
48. In Naseeruddin and others v. Prescribed Authority, Meerut and others 1988(1) ARC 517, Hon''ble R.P. Singh, J., in para 5 of the judgment
also took the view, ""thus an agent or attorney of an owner of a house may realise the rent of house but such a person would not be entitled to
make an application u/s 21(1).
49. The above phrase in section 21(1)(a), in the context of bona fide need of persons, for whose benefit such application can be filed, the definition
of family was given an expansion, in some authorities, namely, Misri Lal v. Special judge (Additional District judge), Gorakhpur and others 1988
(2) ARC 430. Hon''ble R.K. Gulati, J., extended it to the domestic servants of landlord. The Court said, though technically, he may not satisfy the
definition of family, u/s 3(g) of the Act yet it may be included in spirit. Similarly it was extended to mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandchildren
etc.; but in the context of the meaning of the word ""landlord"", who can initiate the proceedings, the position remains slightly complex.
50. In 1996 (28) ALR 201 , Hon''ble Sudhir Narain, J., in para 7 of the judgment observed:
7. ...The word ''landlord'' in the context of section 21(1)(a) will mean only such person who is not only entitled to realise the rent but also has a
right under law to occupy for his personal use and such person alone can file application u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act. Respondent No. 4 is owner and
landlord of the premises in question and if she has authorized her husband to realise the rent, he cannot file an application for release u/s 21(1-A) of
the Act in his own right.
(Emphasis added)
51. In Fakruddin Khan (Decd) through L.Rs. Vs. Xth Addl. District Judge, Kanpur and others, , Hon''ble S.R. Singh, J. following Apex Court''s
decision in M.M. Quasim (supra), in para 8, said:
The term ""landlord"" in section 21(1-A) of the Act connotes landlord in the sense of being the owner of the building.
52. In Furqan Ahmad alias Mana and Another Vs. VIIth A.D.J. and Others, Hon''ble Tarun Agarwala, J., following decisions in Sri Laxkshmi
Shanker Misra (supra); Smt. Sughra Begum (supra) and Naseeruddin (supra) in para 10 of the judgment, said:
10. There is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition as submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. A person who has been authorised to
realize the rent on behalf of the landlord becomes the landlord as contemplated u/s 3(f) of the Act. But the said agent cannot file a release
application for his own need or for his family members u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act inasmuch as he is hot the owner of the premises in question. The
expression ""occupation for himself or for family members"" as provided u/s 21(1) of the Act means that the person must be entitled to occupy the
premises in his own right. Obviously, the agent is not authorized to occupy the premises in his own right. Therefore, the agent could not file an
application for release of the premises for his own personal need.
(Emphasis added)
53. A discordant note, I find in Udai Singh Bhanuvanshi Vs. Kunj Behari Tewari, , wherein Hon''ble A.K. Yog, J., observed that there is no
reason to read the word ""ownership"" in the context of expression ""landlord"" when legislature itself in section 3(j) has not confined itself to the
owner. However, His Lordship further clarified the position by observing that there was a finding in the judgment of Court below in the case before
the Court that Kunj Behari Tewari was authorised to realise rent as ""landlord"". In respect to this finding that he was authorised to realise rent as
landlord, there was no challenge. The Court observed that his status as landlord of accommodation was not challenged earlier and thus cannot be
allowed to be assailed for the first time before this Court. That is how the Court distinguished earlier decisions in Smt. Sughra Begum (supra); Smt.
Ved Rani Dhoan (supra) and M.M. Quasim (supra). Para 20 of the judgment clarifying above observations, reads as under:
20. In the cases of Smt. Sughra Begum, Smt. Ved Rani Viwan and M.M. Quasim (supra), this Court held that an ''agent'' or such other person
cannot maintain release application u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act. The facts of the above cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case in
hand. In the present case in hand. ''Kunj Behari Tewari'', who filed release. application, was authorised to realise rent as ''landlord'' and thus his
status as the owner/landlord of the accommodation as already discussed above, cannot be questioned or assailed in the present proceedings.
(Emphasis added)
54. For the purpose of section 21 this Court finds that when statute says that a landlord can file application, it does not appear that an application
can be filed by a mere agent or attorney or he can substitute the real owner of landlord for the purpose of adducing evidence in his own context
instead of the real owner/landlord. If the tenant has been inducted by owner and he is the landlord it cannot be accepted that his tenancy can be
terminated by an agent or attorney or he can succeed in a proceeding by showing his own status and position instead of the real landlord. When
the statutes says that financial capacity of ""landlord"" has to be seen, it means the person who has inducted tenant in the building. When more than
one person satisfies the definition of landlord, it is the person who has better right and title over property, who would exclude others. The right to
get a building demolished and reconstructed cannot be allowed to be exercised at the instance of a person who has been authorized to collect mere
rent though he has no authority over the building in dispute as such. Here the authority of the person concerned must be more than the mere
collection of rent. I am not equating the word ""landlord'' with ""owner"" as such but it has to be looked into in the context of the matter.
55. The submission, in the manner it is sought to be advanced, I find difficult to accept. The definition of ""landlord"" contained in definition clause
has to be read in the context as discussed above. When somebody is authorised to collect rent, he is merely a collector of rent. The rent though is
payable to him, in view of instructions issued by landlord-owner, to the tenant, that the rent should be paid to such an agent or attorney, and, in that
sense, the agent or attorney may also be included or covered within the definition of ""landlord"", but his status is fortuitous and with the change of
instructions of landlord-owner to tenant, he may/can loose such status at any point of time.
56. There may be another case where an owner has authorised or appointed an agent or attorney to deal with his property in any manner, i.e., let
out by inducting tenant, collect rent and do other such functions as are required ill the facts and circumstances. A tenant inducted by such an agent
or attorney, may not claim his direct relationship of landlord-tenant vis-�-vis the principal landlord, i.e., owner but for such a tenant it is the agent
and attorney who, assumes in its entirety, the capacity of ""landlord"" for all purposes.
57. Therefore, the term ""landlord"", as defined, has to be read in the context and that is how the definition clause also provides. It depends on the
cumulative reading of statutory provisions, the intention, object and import of statute, and the purpose making provision. No universal principle can
be applied hereat.
58. Recently, in the context of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the ""East Punjab Act, 1949"") the question,
whether the term ""landlord"" will include only the owner or others came to be considered in K.D. Dewan Vs. Harbhajan S. Parihar, . There the
definition of ""landlord"" was given in section 2(c), which read as under:
Section 2(c).--''landlord'' means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own
account or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and
includes a tenant who subjects any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title
under a landlord.
59. It is a very wide definition which includes any person having status of various shades. It is in this context, and interpreting definition of
landlord"", in aforesaid statute, the Court in para 7, said:
7. A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the following categories of persons fall within the meaning of landlord: (1) any person for
the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land; (2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any
other person; (3) a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner authorised under the Act and (4) every person from time to time
deriving title under a landlord. Among these four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of ''landlord'';, Mr. Sharma sought to derive
support from the last category. Even so that category refers to a person who derives his title under a landlord and not under an owner of a
premises. For purposes of the said category the transferor of the title referred to therein must fall under any of the categories (1) to (3). To be a
landlord within the meaning of Clause (c) of section 2 a person need not necessarily be the owner; in a vast majority of case an owner will be a
landlord but in many cases a person other than owner may be as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but
a landlord under the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes of the Act the legislature has made a distinction between an
owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is
immaterial for purposes of the Act.
60. The Court also noticed its earlier decision in M.M. Quasim (supra), and in para 11, while distinguishing aforesaid judgment, said, that to
understand the observation in a judgment, it is necessary to look into the factual context and the provision which has fallen for consideration of
Court. It also observed that looking to the wide definition of ""landlord"" u/s 2(c) of East Punjab Act, 1949 and having regard to the width of
language and also the fact that there is no other provision in the Act to restrict its meaning for the purpose of section 13(3)(a) to an owner of
premises alone, there was no reason to confine it to the owners only.
61. The above decisions fortify the view now being taken that a person when would satisfy the term ""landlord"", has to be looked into, in the light of
statutory provisions, and in the context of other provisions of the Act concerned and the relevant facts of the case in hand. No universal principle
can be applied in this regard.
62. In the present case Padam Prakash was a stranger for the purpose of adducing evidence before Courts below. He was though authorized to
collect rent but wherever the statute required evidence in the context of landlord, the evidence has to be adduced in respect of respondents No. 1
to 4 and none else. Admittedly, the income tax return, bank statements etc. which have been considered by Courts below, in order to record a
finding with respect to financial condition in favour of landlord, it has relied on such documents which pertain to Padam Prakash who was a total
stranger in that proceedings and, therefore, in my view the Courts below have decided the matter without having any valid and lawful evidence at
all and, therefore, the impugned judgments suffer serious error of law, inasmuch as the application u/s 21(1)(b) of Act, 1972 has been decided
without any evidence adduced by landlords, i.e., respondents No. 1 to 4.
63. In view of above discussion, the impugned orders cannot sustain. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 22.2.2002 and
10.4.2006 are hereby set aside. No costs.
