S. Ravindra Bhat, J.@mdashThe plaintiff seeks decree of possession in respect of first floor premises of C-545 Defence Colony (hereafter "the suit property") with damages and mesne profits.
2. According to the suit averments, the plaintiff acquired ownership of the suit property, through a registered Sale Deed dated 19-07-2002, executed by its then owner, Ms. Bhanu Sangwan. The plaintiff contends that the defendant is a tenant in respect of the suit property consisting of two bedrooms two bathrooms detection and common front terrace. The monthly rent reserved was Rs. 11,000/- besides other charges; the premises were let out to him through a Rent Deed dated 11-11-2001, for a period of 11 months, executed between him and Ms. Bhanu Sangwan. It is contended that after the execution of the sale deed in the plaintiff''s favour, Ms. Bhanu Sangwan, on 29-7-2002 informed the defendant about the fact and requested him to attorn the tenancy in favour of the plaintiff and also called upon him to pay arrears of rent with effect from December 2001, (to the plaintiff).
3. It is contended that the tenancy was created for only 11 months, ending on 10-02002. The plaintiff states that he called upon the defendant, through a notice dated 0708- 2002 to hand over vacant and physical possession of the suit property on or before 10-10-2002. The plaintiff also mentions that he was authorised to collect the rent arrears from December 2001, by Ms. Bhanu Sangwan. It is alleged that the notice was duly served upon the defendant in spite of which he neither paid the arrears of rent nor handed over the property. The plaintiff also mentions about the defendant having filed a suit before this Court, for injunction against Ms. Bhanu Sangwan; the suit was disposed off on a statement that the defendant would not be dispossessed except in accordance with law. It is contended that the defendants authorization to continue in the premises ended on 10-11-2001 and that his continued occupation cannot be supported in law. The plaintiff also states that the defendant is liable to pay Rs. 30,000/- per month towards damages for prolonged unauthorized occupation of the suit premises. The plaintiffs'' application under Order 39 Rule 10 CPC also reiterates the same averments.
4. In the written statement, the defendant does not dispute having come into possession of the suit premises, in the manner alleged by the plaintiff; the rent deed dated 11-11-2001 is not denied. The defendant however, urges that the plaintiff does not have any right, title or interest in the property, and challenges his (the plaintiffs'') right to maintain the present suit for possession and damages.
5. The defendant submits that he is a lawful tenant of Miss Bhanu Sangwan, and that she never conveyed to him at any time about the sale of the property to the plaintiff or to any other person. The defendant also denies that Ms. Bhanu Sangwan ever asked him to attorn in the plaintiff''s favour; it is urged that the latter is a stranger to the property with whom the defendant has no privity of contract. The defendant also alludes to the fact that Ms. Bhanu Sangwan had challenged the Sale Deed dated 19-7-2002, on the basis of which the plaintiff seeks a decree of possession. It is contended that Ms. Bhanu Sangwan''s suit claims cancellation of the sale deed upon which the plaintiff relies; she also seeks a decree for permanent injunction against the plaintiff --in this case --restraining them from creating any other third-party interest.
6. The defendant denies that the rent arrangement or lease whereby he came into possession of the property, ended on 10-11-2002. It is contended that he agreed with Ms. Bhanu Sangwan that the lease would be initially for 11 months but would be continued in perpetuity, on the basis of an oral understanding, according to which the landlady was to execute a lease deed, in writing as and when required to do so.
7. Initially, Ms. Bhanu Sangwan was not a party to the proceedings. The suit had been filed before the court of the Additional District Judge, ("ADJ") as Suit No. 141/2002; that court stayed the suit, on the premise that Ms. Bhanu Sangwan had impeached the sale deed, seeking its cancellation, in Suit No. 1267/2002 on the file of this Court. The suit pending before the ADJ as well as another suit, by M/s Home Developers, (registered as Suit. No. 2051/2003) claiming a decree of specific performance in respect of the suit premises, were transferred to the file of this Court, by order dated 22-1-2007. Ms. Bhanu Sangwan was impleaded as a party defendant in the present suit.
8. In her written statement, Ms. Sangwan does not deny that the plaintiff acquired title to the suit property, as alleged by him. She also supports the plaintiffs'' version about the defendant being a tenant of the property, by virtue of an arrangement recorded in the rent deed of 11-11-2001, for 11 months, which ended on 10-10-2002. She agrees with the plaintiff about having informed the defendant about the transfer of ownership, asking him to attorn to the plaintiff. The written statement also submits that due to pressure from some third parties, who told her that the sale deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff for inadequate consideration, she filed a suit for cancellation of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. During the pendency of the present proceeding, Suit. No. 1267/2002 was permitted to be withdrawn, by virtue of an application filed by Ms. Bhanu Sangwan, i.e. IA No. 6395/20009, by order dated 13-5-2009. An application for recall of that order was made - apparently by M/s Home Developers, who were arrayed as Defendant No. 6, stating that the suit was permitted to be withdrawn behind their back. That application, i.e. IA 8288/2009, was rejected on 7-7-2009.
9. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the court should allow the application under Order 39, Rule 10, CPC and also grant the decree for possession, in the suit, since Ms. Sangwan has admitted to the manner in which the defendant entered into possession. It was submitted that since the defendant has not been able to show any lawful basis for his possession beyond 10-10-2002, except a vague plea of some oral understanding with Ms. Sangwan for continuing the lease - in perpetuity, which is not backed by any document, that argument cannot detract from the basic fact that the authority to occupy the premises, ended on 10-10-2002. It was further argued that even if the plaintiff''s legal notice were to be ignored, the arrangement ended by efflux of time, and the only plea which the defendant could have legitimately fallen back upon could have been an authority conferred to continue in the suit property, through a registered document, which is lacking in this case. It is submitted that even if, for some reason, Ms. Sangwan''s suit was perceived as an impediment earlier, that is no longer the position, and the suit can be decreed in part, on the basis of admission, flowing from the record, as regards possession, and even, as regards the admitted rent amount. It was emphasized, in this respect that Order 12 Rule 6 empowers the court to draw decrees not merely on admissions appearing on the pleadings, but on the basis of anything on the record.
10. The defendants'' counsel reiterates the submission made in the reply to the application, and contends that the withdrawal of her suit by Ms. Sangwan has not, in any manner, altered the circumstances, that she had impeached the sale deed - in the plaintiffs'' favour, and sought for its cancellation. He relies on her statement recorded by the court, in Suit. No 1267/2005 to the effect that she could not have sold a property worth crores of rupees, to the present plaintiff, for only Rs. 45 lakhs; that statement was recorded on 13th September, 2008.
11. The defendants counsel contends that the application, as well as the subsequent developments as between the plaintiff and Ms. Sangwan ought to make no difference, and the court should not pass any adverse orders in this case, in the pending application and the suit, since issues have been framed, and no unambiguous admission entitling the plaintiff to any order, can be ascertained from the record. It is argued that M/s Home Developers had entered into an agreement to sell with Ms. Sangwan, on 24-08-2002, which is the subject matter of the other suit pending on the file of this Court, i.e Suit. No. 959/2002. In that suit, the said plaintiff has clearly stated that the present plaintiff does not have any right title or interest to the suit property; the defendant''s position too, is the same. In these circumstances, granting any orders or decreeing possession, would prejudice the defendant.
12. From the above discussion, it is evident that the defendant does not dispute that Ms. Bhanu Sangwan owned the suit property; he also does not dispute that a sale deed was executed by her in the plaintiff''s favour, or that entered the suit property on a lease arrangement for 11 months, ending on 10th October, 2002. His defence, however, is two fold. First, he contends that the plaintiff does not possess title or interest in the suit property, since Ms. Sangwan impugned the sale deed, by a suit. It is contended in that respect that Ms. Sangwan''s suit was consolidated with the present suit, by order of this Court, which felt that common facts were in issue. Therefore, the withdrawal, on 13-5-2009, of the suit (No. 1267/2002) did not constitute any change in the circumstances, amounting to an admission, entitling the plaintiff to a decree, or orders of the kind sought in the application. Two, it is submitted that in any event, the defendant and Ms. Sangwan had agreed that after the initial lease period ended, the defendant would continue in the premises in perpetuity for which separate written agreements would be registered.
13. The object of Order 12 Rule 6 is to enable expeditious grant of decree, to a plaintiff, in a suit, where the defendant has made any admission in the pleadings or otherwise, orally or in writing. The plaintiff, in such case, need not wait for completion of the trial; he can seek part decree of the suit, to the extent of such admission. The legislative intent of the provision is to curtail the period for determination of disputes and ensure that a decree on admission is passed without any unnecessary hindrance. The expression ''admission'' comprehends admissions by a party in pleadings or otherwise, orally or in writing. The provisions are to be liberally construed. The Court should satisfy itself that all the elements which constitute admission are present, on the record, before issuing a decree. An admission to enable the plaintiff, to relief, should be unambiguous, clear and unconditional. The Supreme Court ruling, in
Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that Order 12 Rule 6 comes under the heading ''admission'' and a judgment on admission could be given only after the opportunity to the other side to explain the admission, if any, made; that such admission should have been made only in the course of the pleadings or else the other side will not have an opportunity to explain such admission, that even though, the provision reads that the Court may at any stage of the suit make such order as it thinks fit effect of admission, if any, can be considered only at the time of trial; that the admission even in pleadings will have to be read along with Order 8 Rule 5(1) of CPC and Court need not necessarily proceed to pass an order or a judgment on the basis of such admission but call upon the party relying upon such admission to prove its case independently, that during pendency of other suits and the nature of contentions raised in the case, it would not be permissible at all to grant the relief before trial as has been done in the present case; that the expression admission'' made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise will have to be read together and the expression ''otherwise'' will have to be interpreted ejusdem generics .
As to the object of the Order 12 Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the Legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that ''where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.'' We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.
The next contention canvassed is that the resolutions or minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, resolution passed thereon and the letter sending the said resolution to the respondent bank cannot amount to a pleading or come within the scope of the rule as such statements are not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. When a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability by an application filed under Order 12 Rule 6 and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, we do not think the trial Court is helpless in refusing to pass a decree. We have adverted to the basis of the claim and the manner in which the trial Court has dealt with the same. When the trial Judge states that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors meeting and the letter sent as well as the pleadings when read together, leads to unambiguous and clear admission with only the extent to which the admission is made is in dispute. And the Court had a duty to decide the same and grant a decree. We think this approach is unexceptionable.
14. A court, considering whether to decree a claim, under Order 12 Rule 6, should consider the written statement as a whole; the decree on admission cannot be claimed as a matter of course, since it is discretionary, and the court has to base its exercise of discretion on sound principles. Here, the defendant does not deny having executed the lease deed; he does not also deny that the lease period ended in October 2002 in terms of the rent deed, by Clause 4. In the circumstances, the lease ended by efflux of time.
15. The defendant''s plea is that the plaintiff''s predecessor agreed to sell the suit property to Home Developers. In support, it is contended that the plaintiff''s predecessor, Ms. Sangwan impeached the sale deed in his favour, after duly executing it. The defendant has not set up any substantive claim in regard, nor sought cancellation of the sale deed; concededly, the period of limitation to enforce such a claim has ended. Home Developers has of course filed a separate suit; the defendant''s written statement does not show facially any connection with that concern. During the course of proceedings, in the suit, the defendant admitted the plaintiff''s notice, dated 20-11-2002; that document was also marked in evidence. It is a matter of record that Ms. Sangwan withdrew the suit, on 13-05-2009, questioning the registered sale deed, whereby the plaintiff acquired ownership of the suit property. The certified copy of that deed is on the record; it has been marked as an exhibit, in the suit. The defendant also does not rely on any written document conferring lawful authority upon him, to continue in the premises, beyond 10-10-2002. His allegation in the written statement about the lease being in perpetuity, after that date, based on an oral understanding, is untenable; in the absence of any written document, which has to be registered, the ending of the arrangement by efflux of time, meant that the defendant cannot plausibly argue that he has authority to continue in the premises. Here too, the defendant''s plea has to be seen from the standpoint of reason; assuming that such an oral arrangement existed, the period for its enforcement, through suit for specific performance, ended three years later; the defendant concededly has not filed any suit in that regard.
16. In view of the above circumstances, the court is of the opinion that the written statement contains unambiguous admissions about the lawful tenancy of the defendant having expired on 10-10-2002; there has been no extension of the lease arrangement, which ended by efflux of time, and the plaintiff sent notices asking the defendant to vacate the premises. The plaintiff, is, in this Court''s view, clearly entitled to the decree of possession it seeks.
17. As far as the relief of the direction to pay Rs. 1.1 lakh, and Rs. 30,000/- per month are concerned, the above reasons would also be, to some extent, dispositive of the application. The defendant does not deny that under the lease arrangement, he had to pay Rs. 11,000/- per month. He however, denies that he was in arrears of rent. This aspect touches on the plaintiff''s claim to a decree for Rs. 1.1 lakhs. As far as damages are concerned, like in the case of the authority to continue, in the suit premises, the defendant merely reiterates the averments in the written statement, and is silent whether any amount was paid to the plaintiff; he does not assert that he paid any amount, during the intervening period, to Ms. Sangwan, the previous owner. This, in the court''s opinion, amounts to an admission that the defendant has not paid any amount, so far, to the plaintiff, whose registered sale conferring ownership, is a matter of record. In the circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree to the extent of the last rent amount paid, i.e Rs. 11,000/- per month, for the period November 2002, till date.
18. IA 1814/2002 is accordingly partly allowed. Let a decree for possession in terms of Para 18 (a) of the suit, be drawn. The defendant is allowed time till 30-11-2009 to vacate the suit property, and hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the said premises, to the plaintiff. The claim for mesne profits/ damages is partly allowed, to the extent of Rs. 11,99,000/- (Rupees eleven lakhs, ninety nine thousand only) being the amount of Rs. 11,000/- per month, for the period November, 2002 to November, 2009. Let a decree, for the said amount, be drawn, subject to the plaintiff depositing differential court fee.
CS (OS) No. 959/2008 & IA Nos. 13602/2008, 13603/2008
The suit along with the applications shall be listed before the Joint Registrar, on 3rd November, 2009, for further proceedings.
