D.R. Deshmukh, J.@mdashThis is the tenant''s second appeal. The suit for eviction of the appellant/defendant from the accommodation let out solely for residential purpose on the ground of bonafide requirement for residence as also for non-residence was decreed by the IInd Civil Judge Class II, Raipur by judgment dated 17-12-1999 in Civil Suit No. 551-A/1998, which has been affirmed by the IInd Additional District Judge, Raipur in Civil Appeal No. 3-A/2000 by judgment and decree dated 30-11-2000.
2. It is not disputed that the suit accommodation situated in Chirhuldih, Ward No. 35 at Amapara, Raipur was let out to the appellant/defendant solely for residential purpose. Respondent No. 1 is the mother of respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It was pleaded by them that they were the owners of the suit accommodation, which was let out to the appellant/defendant at a rent of Rs. 400/- per month for residential purposes. In Paragraph 6 of the plaint, it was averred by the respondents/plaintiffs as under:
6.
3. The appellant/defendant did not specifically deny that the plaintiffs were the owner of the suit accommodation or the fact of non-availability of alternative accommodation pleaded by the respondents/plaintiffs. It was denied that the respondents/plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for the residence as also for starting business of respondent No. 3.
4. The Trial Court granted a decree for eviction of the appellant/defendant on the ground that the respondents/plaintiffs had proved that they required the suit accommodation bonafide for the residential as well as non-residential need of respondent No. 3, Shridhar. In Civil Appeal No. 3-A/2000, the Lower Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.
5. The following substantial questions of law arise for determination of this appeal:
(i) Whether the accommodation which was let out primarily for residential purpose could be got evicted for the composite need, i.e., for residential as well as non-residential requirement?
(ii) Whether in the absence of proof of ownership of the plaintiffs of the aforesaid accommodation a decree for eviction could be passed against the tenant u/s 12(1)(e) of the M.P./C.G. Accommodation Control Act, 1961?
6. Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned Counsel for the appellant/defendant urged that the respondents/plaintiffs had failed to prove that Shridhar, for whose bonafide requirement the eviction was sought, was the owner of the suit accommodation. It was also argued that since in Paragraph 6 of the plaint, the eviction of the appellant/defendant from the suit accommodation let out solely for residential purpose was sought for a composite need, i.e., residential as well as non-residential, a decree u/s 12(1)(e) of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth ''the Act'') could not be passed against the appellant/defendant because Section 12(1)(e) of the Act did not permit eviction of a tenant from an accommodation let out solely for residential purpose on the ground of non-residential requirement. Reliance was placed on
7. On the other hand, Shri Ashish Surana, learned Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed reliance on
8. Having considered rival submissions, I have perused the record. Undisputedly, the suit accommodation was let out solely for residential purpose. Therefore, in the present case, there is no question of splitting of the tenancy. An accommodation let out solely for residential purpose could be got evicted if the landlord avers and proves the requirement for residence u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act. The first question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether the respondents/plaintiffs have proved that they require the suit accommodation bonafide for the residence of respondent/plaintiff No. 3.
9. In order that a decree for eviction of a tenant u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act from an accommodation let out solely for residential purpose can be passed, the landlord must aver and prove that:
(a) he is the owner of the suit accommodation,
(b) he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned, and
(c) the accommodation let out for residential purpose is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or any member of his family if he is the owner thereof.
10. In a case where the accommodation is let out for residential use and the landlord in addition to the bonafide requirement for residence also avers the requirement of a portion of the accommodation for non-residential use, the Court would be required to ascertain the predominant purpose for which the landlord requires the accommodation. If it finds that under the garb of the requirement for residential use, the predominant purpose for which the landlord requires the accommodation is non-residential, it would refuse to grant eviction u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act. However, upon sifting the evidence carefully, if it is established that the predominant purpose for which the accommodation was sought to be evicted was residential and on a small portion of the accommodation is required by the landlord for non-residential use, then it would grant a decree for eviction u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act. In fact, in a situation like the present one, where the accommodation was let out solely for residence, the landlord, while pleading bonafide requirement for residence was not at all required to plead and prove requirement of a small portion of the accommodation for non-residential use. In such circumstances, Courts should bear in mind the nature of pleadings in mafussil Courts and try to ascertain the predominant purpose for which the landlord required the accommodation. The facts and circumstances in each case would have to be sifted carefully by the Court. The size of the accommodation, the use for which it was let out, the use for which it is required, size of the portion of the accommodation which the landlord intends to use for a purpose other than for which the accommodation was let out would be some of the relevant factors which the Courts has to consider in such a case.
11. As regards ownership of the respondents/plaintiffs over the suit accommodation, in Paragraph 1 of the plaint, it was specifically pleaded that the respondents/plaintiffs were the owner of the suit accommodation. In reply to this, the appellant/defendant in Paragraph 1 of the written statement did not deny the said fact. The appellant/defendant also did not place any material before the Court to show that the respondents/plaintiffs were not the owner of the suit accommodation. Therefore, the question whether the respondents/plaintiffs were the owners of the suit accommodation was not in issue. Similarly, non-availability of an alternative accommodation to the respondents/plaintiffs for the residence of respondent No. 3, Shridhar was also not in issue.
12. The pleadings contained in Paragraph 6 of the plaint, quoted above in Paragraph 2, clearly show that respondent/plaintiff No. 3, Shridhar required the suit accommodation primarily for his residence and also for starting his business in front portion of the accommodation. Ashok Kumar Patil, defendant''s witness No. 2 had admitted that respondent No. 3, Shridhar was unemployed and did not carry on any business. Laxman Rao Meshram, defendant''s witness No. 1, besides admitting the above fact, had further admitted that respondent No. 3, Shridhar was residing in Charoda with his mother and sister and did not have any separate accommodation to live. The testimony of Shridhar (P.W. 3) that he needed the suit accommodation for residence as also for starting his business is, thus, wholly unrebutted. It is true that the respondents/plaintiffs did not aver the nature of business which Shridhar wanted to do, but, in the present case, such a question would be wholly immaterial because what has to be judged is whether the requirement of the suit accommodation by the respondents/plaintiffs for the residence of respondent No. 3, Shridhar was bonafide or not. The size of the suit accommodation was very small as reflected by the plaint map. Shridhar was an unemployed person. He had no house of his own and was living with his mother and sister in Charoda. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances, an inference can safely be drawn that Shridhar predominantly required the suit accommodation for his residence and thereafter would have thought of starting some small business in a portion thereof. The fact that the respondents/plaintiffs did not aver and prove the exact nature of business which respondent No. 3, Shridhar intended to commence in the suit accommodation would, thus, not come in the way of granting a decree for eviction u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act because for granting such a decree, the facts quoted above in Paragraph 9, which were required to be averred and proved, were established. The case of Shankar Lal v. Babulal and Ors. (supra) is, therefore, of no avail to the appellant/defendant. I am of the considered opinion that both the Courts below have, on proper appreciation of evidence, held that respondent No. 3, Shridhar required the suit accommodation bonafide for residence.
13. The case of Prem Naryan Barchhiha v. Hakimuddin Saifi (supra), relied on by learned Counsel for the appellant/defendant also does not help the appellant/defendant since the question of splitting of the tenancy, which was solely for residential purpose does not arise here and Section 12(1)(e) of the Act does not bar passing of a decree for eviction where the landlord, besides establishing that he requires the suit accommodation for his residence, also avers and proves that after eviction, in a small portion of the accommodation he would also start his business. In Prem Naryan Barchhiha v. Hakimuddin Saifi (supra), it was held that while seeking eviction of a tenant from an accommodation let out for non-residential purpose, it was not necessary for the landlord to aver and prove that the residential accommodation in his possession was not suitable for non-residential use. It was held that to read such a requirement in Section 12(1)(e) of the Act would amount to doing violence to the language of the clause nay rewriting the clause which is far beyond the principle of iron out the creases and is clearly impermissible. In the present case, the respondents/plaintiffs have proved satisfactorily all the conditions required for eviction of a tenant u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act. Therefore, the mere fact that respondent No. 3, Shridhar intended to start his business in a part of the accommodation would in no way create a hurdle for granting a decree for eviction of the tenant u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act. The case of Sheela and Ors. v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash (supra), cited by learned Counsel for the appellant/defendant also does not help the appellant/defendant in any manner because the appellant/defendant did not aver that the respondents/plaintiffs were not the owners of the suit accommodation.
14. In Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court had observed in Paragraph 21 as under:
21. There is nothing in the M.P. Act to bar an eviction from a building if a non-residential accommodation is genuinely required not only for non-residential use but also a portion of it bonafide for personal residence. We are clearly of opinion that the compromise decree in this case is a lawful decree of eviction founded on permissible statutory ground and there are sufficient materials to show that the Trial Court applied its mind and was satisfied that a valid decree under the M.P. Act could be passed.
15. In Jagitkumar v. Jagdeeshchandra (supra), also, it was held by the High Curt of Madhya Pradesh as under:
9. It is thus clear that even though it is established that a landlord requires a part of an accommodation let out and that requirement is for the purpose for which the accommodation was let out, a landlord becomes entitled to seek eviction from the entire accommodation, provided the other conditions specified in Clause (e) or (f) of Section 12 (1) of the Act are satisfied.
16. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan and Ors. (supra) as also by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Jagitkumar v. Jagdeeshchandra (supra), applies with full force to the present case. The respondents/plaintiffs have averred and proved that they required the suit accommodation bona fide for the residence of respondent No. 3, Shridhar. It is an admitted fact that the respondents/plaintiffs are the owners of the suit accommodation. Non-availability of an alternative accommodation is also not in dispute. I accordingly hold that merely because the respondents/plaintiffs have averred and proved that in a small portion of the suit accommodation respondent No. 3, Shridhar would start some business, it would not create a bar for granting a decree for eviction of the appellant/defendant u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act when the respondents/plaintiffs have averred and proved the bonafide requirement of respondent No. 3, Shridhar as contemplated u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act. Thus, the Courts below have rightly granted a decree for eviction u/s 12(1)(e) of the Act. Both the substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant/defendant.
17. The appeal has no merit and is dismissed. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs.
