@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh, J.@mdashHeard.
2. The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 29-08-1996 passed by the VII Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Appeal No. 108-A/1991 whereby affirming the finding recorded by the III Civil Judge, Class-II, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 113-A/1988, the appeal was dismissed.
3. The appeal is admitted on the following questions of law:
1) Whether the Court below rightly decreed the suit filed by the respondents despite the fact that there was a compromise between the parties as per Ex. D-1 dated 12-10-1983 resulting in withdrawal in Civil Appeal No. 21-A/82?
2) Whether the respondents are estopped by their conduct in pursuing the suit?
4. Brief facts are that the appellant/defendant had instituted a suit against one Mohanlal for specific performance of contract of sale of agricultural land. The trial Court did not grant any relief of specific performance of contract but ordered refund of the amount paid in advance. The appellant/defendant herein, who was the plaintiff in the earlier suit, preferred First Appeal before the IV Additional District Judge, Bilaspur i.e. Civil Appeal No. 21- A/1982. On 12.10.1983, a compromise was filed by the parties. Ramnain Shukla and Mohanlal were present in the Court, their statements were recorded and the appellate Court passed the following order:
U;k;k/kh''k_
5. Thereafter, respondent -Mohanlal filed a suit on 12.04.88 for declaration of title, permanent injunction and possession of the suit property on the ground that although he had executed a sale deed of the suit land in favour of the appellant/defendant herein on 12.8.1983 yet an agreement was executed between the parties on the same day whereunder only a part of the consideration i.e. Rs. 1500/- was paid to him and the remaining consideration was not paid. Respondent Mohanlal prayed for a declaration of title, recovery of possession and permanent injunction against Ramnain Shukla.
6. The Trial Judge decreed the suit in favour of the respondent/plaintiff Mohanlal and held that the registered sale deed dated 12.8.1983 of the suit land for a consideration of Rs. 3000/- was without consideration and nominal and restrained the appellant/defendant herein from alienating the suit property. It also granted relief of possession of the suit land in favour of the respondent Mohanlal.
7. Aggrieved by the said judgment appellant/defendant Ramnain Shukla preferred appeal No. 108-A/1991 before the VII Additional District Judge, Bilaspur wherein the judgment and decree passed by the Court below was affirmed while dismissing the appeal. It appears that Mohanlal died, during pendency of the first appeal and his legal representatives i.e. the respondents Nos. 1 (b) to (f) were brought on record. Respondent No. 1 (a) Shyambai i.e. widow of Mohanlal also died during pendency of the second appeal.
8. Shri S.K. Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant contended that in the earlier suit for specific performance of the contract, Mohanlal had during pendency of the first appeal filed a compromise whereunder he had made a statement on oath before the appellate Court that he had executed a registered sale deed of the suit land in favour of Ramnain Shukla. In this view of the matter, respondent was estopped from filing a fresh suit on the ground that the sale deed was nominal.
9. No one had appeared for the respondents No. 1(a) to (f).
10. In Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. The State of Orissa 1956 SC 346, the Apex Court has in paragraph 8 observed as under:
(8) The plea of estoppel is sought to be founded on the compromise decree, Ex. ''O'' passed by the Patna High Court on 2-5- 1945, in F.A. No. 15 of 1941. The compromise decree is utilised in the first place as creating an estoppel by judgment. In - In re South American and Mexican Co., Ex parte Bank of England (1895) 1 Ch 37 (C), it has been held that a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. Upholding the judgment of Vaughan Williams, J. Lord Herschell said at page 50:
The truth is, a judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end.
And I think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action.
11. A perusal of the order dated 12.10.1983 passed in Civil Appeal No. 21-A/82 clearly goes to show that respondent/plaintiff Mohanlal had made a clear admission on oath before the appellate Court that he had executed a registered sale deed of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff Ramnain Shukla and on these premises, the appeal was dismissed and the litigation for specific performance of contract of sale came to an end. After 4+ years the present suit was filed on 12.4.1988. In view of the compromise arrived at between the parties upon a clear admission of transfer of title of the suit land in favour of the appellant/defendant by execution of the registered sale deed by Mohanlal in Civil Appeal No. 21-A/1982, Mohanlal was estopped from filing a fresh suit on the ground that the sale deed was nominal and that he had not received the full consideration.
12. It is thus clear that the compromise decree passed in Civil Appeal No. 21-A of 1982 precludes the respondents/plaintiffs from reasserting the question of transfer of title through the sale deed dated 12.08.1983 in a subsequent suit. In this view of the matter, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below is clearly erroneous and is liable to be set aside. First substantial question of law is thus answered in the negative and question No.2 is answered in the affirmative in favour of the appellant/defendant.
13. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 108-A/91 as also the judgment and decree passed by the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Class-II, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 113-A/81 are set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
A decree be drawn accordingly.
