S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J.@mdashThe true nature and scope of Clause 5(1) of the Bihar Rice and Paddy Procurement (Levy) Order, 1983, with particular reference to its application to licensed wholesale dealers in paddy is the significant common question in this set of eleven Civil Writ Jurisdiction Cases. Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the primal question of law being identical, this judgment will govern all of them.
2. Since the issue herein is primarily one of the construction of Clause 5(1) aforesaid, the circumstances giving rise thereto pale into relative insignificance. Nevertheless, the terra-firma of facts may be briefly taken from Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 204 of 1984 Jai Santoshi Bhandar v. The State of Bihar and Ors. The petitioner firm holds a wholesale dealer''s licence under the provisions of the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1967, and it is averred that it purchases paddy from the cultivators and sells the entire stock thereof to various rice millers within the State of Bihar. Specific case pleaded is that the petitioner firm itself does not convert the paddy purchased by it into rice. The State Government in supersession of the earlier Bihar Rice and Paddy Procurement Order, 1982, have now promulgated and enforced the Bihar Rice and Paddy Procurement (Levy) Order, 1983 (hereinafter to be referred to as the ''Levy Order'') with effect from the 24th of November, 1983. Clauses 3 and 4 of the Levy Order impose a levy on the stock and purchases of rice of licensed millers and licensed wholesale dealers respectively. However, Clause 5(1) is a composite one contemplating a levy on paddy on licensed millers and licensed wholesale dealers. The case set up on behalf of the writ petitioner is that the said Clause 5(1) only imposes the levy on paddy from the licensed wholesale dealers on stocks remaining unconverted into rice within three months or such extension of time as may be given by the Collector. Therefore, it is claimed that no levy can be imposed on the opening stock of paddy on the 24th of November, 1983 and the subsequent acquisition of stocks of the same. On this premise, it is stated that the petitioner had an opening stock of 57 quintals and 32 kilograms of paddy on the 24th of November, 1983 and it had purchased 2156 quintals and 53 kilograms of paddy out of which 1885 quintals arid 500 kilograms of paddy have already been sold and despatched to the rice millers of the State by the 2nd of January, 1984. However, the respondent Additional District Magistrate (Supply), by his memo No. 1448 dated the 23rd of December, 1983, had demanded the delivery of 25 per cent of the stock of paddy held by the petitioner on the 24th of November, 1983 as also a further 25 per cent of all subsequent purchases at the procurement price. Consequently a demand to deliver 482 quintals and 53 kilograms as a levy has been made against the petitioner, and it has been directed that until the said quantity is delivered to the State Food Corporation, no release order will be issued to the petitioner firm. Aggrieved thereby, the present writ petitions have been preferred claiming that under Clause 5 the licensed wholesale dealers are liable to pay levy on the stock pf paddy only if the same is not converted into rice within three months and not otherwise. Therefore, it is prayed that the demand of levy be quashed as unauthorised by Clause 5 of the Levy Order.
3. In the counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents, the broad factual position is not disputed It is admitted that the writ petitioners are licensed wholesale dealers in paddy. However, the firm stand taken is that under Clause 5 of the Levy Order the licensed wholesale dealers are liable to a levy of 25 per cent on the opening stock held on the 24th of November, 1983 and further a levy of 25 per cent on all stocks of paddy received or purchased by the petitioners, thereafter. The categoric stand is that the latter part of Clause 5(1) with regard to paddy stocks remaining unconverted into rice within three months or such extended time thereafter is applicable only to licensed millers and has no relevance whatsoever to licensed wholesale dealers who do not convert paddy into rice at all. It is reiterated categorically that the very question of conversion of paddy into rice does not arise at all in the case of licensed wholesale dealers whose business is simply to purchase, store and sell the stocks of paddy. The demand of levy on the writ petitioners is, therefore, sought to be supported as valid and unexceptional.
4. Having noticed the rival pleadings, it becomes necessary in order to appreciate the rival contentions to have at least a bird''s eye view of the legislative background culminating in the imposition of the levy on paddy both upon the licensed millers and the licensed wholesale dealers by virtue of the composite Clause 5 of the Levy Order. It was stated at the Bar that earlier a levy had been imposed on the manufacture of rice by licensed millers only but there was no such imposition for the raw material of paddy itself. Later, however, till the year 1981 the licensed wholesale dealers were also brought within the net of levy both for rice and paddy as well. A change is then said to have been again brought about by the Control Order of 1982 whereby the licensed wholesale dealers were exempted altogether but the licensed millers were made liable for levy on rice only but not paddy at all.
5. It would thus be manifest that in a fluid situation the legislative provisions of the various Control Orders, which seem to have been frequently superseded, had themselves remained in a flux till the enforcement of the present Levy Order of 1983 with effect from the 24th of November, 1983 and, in particular, Clause 5 thereof. I may notice at the outset that no challenge to the validity of any provisions of the Levy Order was even remotely laid before us and the primary argument raised was with regard to the true construction of Clause 5(1). In fairness to Mr. G. C. Bharuka, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners, I must also notice that with great ability and ingenuity he attempted to take us through the host of legislative changes in the earlier Control Orders issued u/s 3(2)(f) of the Essential Commodities Act. With considerable plausibility we were invited to make a search for the intent of the framers of Clause 5(1) of the present Levy Order in the context of a long and tortuous history of the Control Orders and the shifting sands of policy to either liberalise or exempt, or to enforce with strictitude the levy on rice and paddy, as and when a particular situation so demanded. I am, therefore, wholly disinclined and, indeed, it seems to be impermissible to search for the needle of the legislative intent in the haystack of a plethora of the preceding Levy or Procurement Orders. This is the more so because I find the language of Clause 5(1) not suffering from any such obtuse obscurity and reasonably capable of indicating a single construction (though some more lucidity of draftsmanship was, indeed, possible), which must, therefore, be given its plain meaning rather than entering the thicket of a host of analogous or similar provisions which have been earlier enacted and either repealed or superseded.
6. Since the controversy herein is pointedly focussed on Clause 5 itself, it is apt and necessary to quote the relevant part thereof at the outset. However, since the said clause is in laid in the mosaic of the preceding Clauses 3 and 4, the relevant parts thereof would equally call for notice -
"3. Levy on licensed millers.-- Every licensed miller shall sell to the State Food Corporation at the procurement price 40 per cent of the total quantity of -
(a) each variety of rice conforming to specification owned by him which is held in stock on the date of commencement of this Order;
(b) each variety of rice conforming to specification milled by him every day out of stocks of paddy owned by him; and
(c) each variety of rice conforming to specification purchased or otherwise acquired by him for the purpose of sale from persons other than a licensed miller or a licensed wholesale dealer :
Provided that. ........
Provided that........."
"4. Levy on licensed wholesale dealers.--Every licensed wholesale dealer shall sell to the State Food Corporation at the procurement price 25 per cent of the total quantity of -
(a) each variety of rice conforming to the specification owned by him which is held in stock on the date of commencement of this order;
(b) each variety of rice conforming to specification got milled by him every day out of his stock of paddy; and
(c) each variety of rice conforming to specification purchased or otherwise acquired by him for the purpose of sale from persons other than a licensed miller or a licensed wholesale dealer :
Provided that. .........."
5. Levy on paddy.-- (1) Every licensed miller and licensed wholesale dealer shall sell to the Government at the procurement price 25 per cent for licensed wholesale dealers and 40 per cent for miller of the total quantity of each variety of paddy conforming to specification held in stock on the date of commencement of this Order or received by him thereafter and remaining unconverted into rice within three months or such extended time as the Collector may, in special circumstances, allow :
"Provided, however, that in case of time extended beyond three months, the Collector shall make a report of the order to the Government who may, vary, amend or rescind the order :
Provided, further, that no paddy shall remain unmilled with the millers at the end of the marketing season in which the paddy has been purchased :
Provided, also, that no levy shall be payable on any stock of paddy, purchased or otherwise acquired by him from a licensed Miller or a Licensed Wholesale Dealer, "in respect of which levy in accordance with this sub-clause has been delivered to the Slate Food Corporation.
(2) ......."
7. Now, a larger perspective of Clauses 3 and 5 would indicate that whereas the levy on rice was distinctly and separately imposed on licensed millers and licensed wholesale dealers (vide Clauses 3 and 4 respectively) yet levy on paddy was imposed by the composite Clause 5 mandating so with regard to both the licensed millers and licensed wholesale dealers. That distinction has, perhaps, to be kept sharply in mind throughout in appreciating the whole scope of the argument in the present case. Clause 3 had imposed a levy of 40 per cent on rice in the hands of the licensed millers with regard to the opening stock on the date of the commencement of the Levy Order; with regard to rice milled by him every day out of the stocks of paddy owned; and with regard to rice purchased or otherwise acquired from person other than a licensed miller or a licensed wholesale dealer. As is patent, Clause 3 dealt with rice in the hands of licensed millers and not at all with paddy. Similarly, Clause 4 imposed a levy on rice at the quantum of 25 per cent in the hands of the licensed wholesale dealers with regard to the opening stock on the date of the commencement of the Levy Order; with regard to rice got milled by them every day out of their stock of paddy; and with regard to stocks later on acquired from person other than a licensed miller or a licensed wholesale dealer. This clause again pertained to rice only and did not pertain even remotely to the levy on paddy. However, when it came to impose a levy on paddy, the framers of the Levy Order, for reasons which are obscure, chose to do so by a single composite clause both on the licensed millers and licensed wholesale dealers but with variable conditions. It is the interpretation of this composite clause which raises some intricacy of construction giving rise to what, indeed, is the core question here, namely, whether the ultimate phrase in Sub-clause (1) of Clause 5 -- "and remaining unconverted into rice within three months or such extended time as the Collector may, in special circumstances, allow" --applies exclusively to licensed millers or to both the licensed millers and the licensed wholesale dealers as well.
8. The larger argument first submitted by Mr. G. C. Bharuka, the learned counsel for all the writ petitioners here, with regard to the construction of the clause was that it is in a way a penal provision because its infraction would involve either a departmental penalty or sanction or a prosecution as well. Therefore, it must be construed strictly. On that premise, so it was contended, that the same must, in its entirety, be made applicable to licensed wholesale dealers.
9. I am unable to accept or subscribe to the aforesaid submission. Clause 5 like many or even most of the other clauses of the Levy Order is in line with common run of delegated legislation under the Essential Commodities Act. Indeed, the imposition of a penalty or a liability to prosecution for infraction of the Order under the Essential Commodities Act is a common incident of the Orders providing for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities u/s 3 of the said Act. There is no quarrel with the proposition that penal provisions are to be construed somewhat strictly but this cannot be extended to warrant that the language of statute is not to be given its plain or true meaning or that it must be artificially constructed merely because its infraction would involve a sanction or a penal consequence. I would, therefore, proceed to construe Clause 5 by the well known and settled canons of construction and in the larger context of the Levy Order generally and in particular in relation to the preceding Clauses 3 and 4 to which reference has already been made.
10. The main submission of Mr. G. C. Bharuka herein is that the ultimate phrase of Clause 5(1) is particularly applicable equally to licensed wholesale dealers as it is to licensed millers. It was contended that a licensed wholesale, dealer was not prevented from having the stocks of paddy in his custody milled by any miller and thereafter to sell the same. The rationale in the ultimate phrase of the clause, according to learned counsel, was to prevent hoarding of the paddy not only by the licensed millers but equally by the, licensed wholesale dealers and if they convert the same into rice within three months, they would be exempted altogether from any levy thereon. Lastly it was contended that unless such construction was placed on Clause 5(1), the last and ultimate part thereof would be rendered wholly redundant, which would be contrary to the sound canons of construction.
11. I regret my inability to accede to the aforesaid submission despite its ingenuity and the vehemence with which it was pressed before us. It bears repetition to say that Clause 5 is a composite provision imposing the levy on paddy on two distinct classes of licensed millers and licensed wholesale dealers. That this is so is plainly manifest from the defining Clause 2 and Sub-clauses (f) and (g) thereof, which are in the following terms :
"2. Definition.-- In this order, unless the context otherwise requires -
X X " X X X
(f) ''Licensed Wholesale Dealer'' means a person holding a valid licence as a wholesale dealer under the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1967.
(g) ''Licensed Miller'' means the owner or other person in charge of a rice mill holding a valid licence under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 (Act 21 of 1958) and includes a person or authority which has the ultimate control over the affairs of such mill and when the said affairs are entrusted to a Manager, Managing Director or Managing Agent, such Manager. Managing Director or Managing Agent;
X XX X X
It is manifest from the above that a licensed wholesale dealer and a licensed miller are even licensed under different statutory provisions, namely, the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1967 and the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958. It would follow therefrom and, indeed, it was common ground before us that the form of licences and their conditions with regard to each are widely different and far from being identical. Broadly speaking, a licensed wholesale dealer primarily buys, stores and sells the commodity licensed whereas a licensed miller, as the definition indicates, runs a rice mill for manufacturing or converting paddy into rice. Not only that, Clause 5 imposes a different quantum of levy as well, namely, 25 per cent for licensed wholesale dealer and 40 per cent for the licensed miller. It must, therefore, be held that licensed millers and licensed wholesale dealers are distinct and separate classes though they have been jointly dealt with by the composite Clause 5.
12. Now, once that is so, a fortiori the phrase "remaining unconverted into rice within three months or such extended time as the Collector may, in special circumstances, allow" would be applicable to licensed rice millers and has little or no relevance to licensed wholesale dealers. As has been noticed, it is no obligatory part of the business or licence of the licensed wholesale dealer to convert paddy in stock into rice. On the other hand a licensed miller being the owner of a rice mill and by virtue of the licence primarily carries on the business of converting paddy into rice. There is no obligation whatsoever on a licensed wholesale dealer to convert paddy into rice at all, far from it being within the visualised time-limit of three months. Once that is so, any question of extension of this time by the Collector in special circumstances can obviously have not the remotest relevance to the licence or business of a licensed wholesale dealer. Viewed from the triple aspect, herein there is neither any obligation to convert paddy into rice, nor any suggestion of a period of three months for doing so, and equally no question of seeking any extension of such time from the Collector. It would, therefore, follow hat by the very nature of things this clause is not and, indeed, cannot be made applicable to licensed wholesale dealer. As a necessary corollary it must be held that the same is applicable only to licensed millers to the exclusion of licensed wholesale dealers.
13. In fairness to Mr. Bharuka, I must repel the somewhat tenuous stand that the construction I am inclined to put on clause 5(1) would render the ultimate part thereof redundant. This is not so. Merely because a provision is applicable to one of the two classes, is no warrant for saying that it is rendered redundant. On the view I have taken above, the relevant phrase is clearly and squarely applicable to licensed millers and would have full play with regard to them. It cannot, therefore, even remotely be said that this part of the clause is in any way otiose.
14. Lastly I am inclined to take the view that the construction canvassed on behalf of the writ petitioners would tend to defeat the very object of the framers in imposing a levy on paddy qua licensed wholesale dealers. It was not denied before us that if the stand canvassed on behalf of the petitioners were to be accepted then a licensed wholesale dealer, who may have had the largest of stocks on the date of the enforcement of the Levy Order and had even made massive purchases subsequently, would be out of the net of the levy if the paltry balance were converted into rice. To my mind, that could not possibly be the intent of the framers of the clause when, in terms, they decided to impose levy and separately put the specific conditions and quantum of the levy on each one of the two classes. Such a construction would not only leave a loophole in the law but, indeed, make a gaping void in the net of levy on paddy imposed by the framers, which would virtually render it nugatory in the context of licensed wholesale dealers.
15. To conclude, I would hold that the concluding phrase "remaining unconverted into rice within three months or such extended time as the Collector may, in special circumstances, allow" in clause 5(1) is applicable only to the licensed millers and has no relevance as regards the licensed wholesale dealers.
16. ''Now, once that is so, it is plain that the demand of the respondent Additional District Magistrate (Supply) is in conformity with Clause 5(1) as interpreted above and, therefore, the same is unexceptional. The writ petitions, as a necessary corollary, have to be held as without merit and are, accordingly dismissed hereby. In view of some intricacy of statutory construction, we decline to burden the writ petitioners with costs.
S.K. Choudhuri, J.
I agree.
