Ramaswami, C.J.@mdashIn Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 348 of 1958 the petitioner is a limited Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and carrying on agricultural operations for the cultivation and production of sugarcane, wheat, paddy and other crops. By a notification No. III/D1-1001/57-13354, dated the 29th July, 1957, the Government of Bihar referred a dispute between the petitioner and the workmen u/s 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act 14 of 1947) for the adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal at Patna.
The proceeding before the Tribunal was numbered as Reference Case No. 17 of 1957. On the 7th September, 1957, opposite parties Nos. 2 to 13 fifed a complaint before the Industrial Tribunal u/s 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, praying for certain reliefs. This application u/s 33A was numbered as Miscellaneous Case No. 82 of 1957, and the Industrial Tribunal Bihar, after having registered the application issued a notice to the petitioner to show cause why the reliefs prayed for by the workmen should not be granted.
The petitioner showed cause before the Industrial Tribunal and contended that the reference itself, namely, Reference Case No. 17 of 1957, was ultra vires and illegal and that the Tribunal had also no jurisdiction to act u/s 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The contention of the petitioner was that the petitioner was carrying on agricultural operations and the term "industrial disputes" in Act 14 of 1947 does not cover a dispute between the employer and workmen in agriculture.
The argument was rejected by the Industrial Tribunal which held that the State Government had the jurisdiction to make a reference of the dispute u/s 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The argument of the petitioner is that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal is erroneous and a writ may be granted under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification of the State Government dated the 29th July, 1957, u/s 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and also for quashing the proceedings in Reference Case No. 17 of 1957 and also Miscellaneous Case No. 82 of 1957 u/s 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act.
2. Cause has been shown by the State of Bihar and other opposite parties to whom notice of the rule was ordered to be given.
3. The question of law arising in this case is whether the agricultural operations of the petitioner Company would fall within the definition of "industry" in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Act 14 of 1947).
4. On behalf of the petitioner learned Counsel addressed the argument that the sole occupation of the petitioner was cultivation and production of rice, wheat, sugarcane and other crops and it cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioner was engaged in any business, trade or manufacture, nor can it be said that any of the employees was so engaged. Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines an industry to mean
"any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen".
The definition is wide and comprehensive and it is not shown on behalf of the petitioner that there is anything in the context of the, Act for cutting down the plain and natural meaning of the language of the definition. In the popular and nontechnical sense an industry means an undertaking where capital and labour co-operate with each other for the purpose of producing wealth in the shape of goods, machines, tools, etc., and for making profits. Normally speaking there must be investment of capital, there must be relationship of employer and employee and there must be the motive of profit making.
But it is not essential that all these elements should be present for the application of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act (Act 14 of 1947). It was suggested on behalf of the petitioner that there was a uniform legislative practice in this regard; and if Parliament had intended to include agriculture in the definition of industry, it should have been expressly so stated in the Act. I am unable to accept this argument as right. There is no uniform legislative practice with regard to the definition of the word "industry".
Reference was made on petitioner''s behalf to Sub-section (19) of Section 3 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act (Bombay Act XI of 1947) and it was pointed out that Sub-section (19) of Section 3 of that Act defined "industry" as expressly including agriculture and agricultural operations. But in the Australian Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904, the definition is different. Section 4 of that Act defines an "industrial dispute" as meaning
"a dispute in relation to industrial matters .... .......... extending beyond the limits of any one State, including disputes in relation to employment upon State railways, or to employment in industries carried on by or under the control of the Commonwealth or a State or any public authority constituted under the Commonwealth or a State; but it does not include a dispute relating to employment in any agricultural, viticultural, horticultural, or dairying pursuit."
The term "industry" is defined in the same Act as meaning
"business, trade, manufacture, undertaking, calling, service, or employment, on land or water. In which persons are employed for pay, hire, advantage or reward, excepting only persons engaged in domestic service, and persons engaged in agricultural, viticultural, horticultural, or dairying pursuits."
It is therefore, manifest that there is no uniform legislative practice in this matter and hardly any significance can be attached to the omission of the word "agriculture" in the definition of "industry" in Section 2(j) of Act 14 of 1947. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to define fully the expression "industry" or to enumerate all the characteristic elements of an industry, as observed by Higgins, J. in the Municipal Employees'' case, 26 Com-W L R 574 at p. 591:
"It is not necessary for us, in order to determine whether this dispute (a dispute between street cleaners, street lighters, etc., and their employer, the municipality) is an industrial dispute, to define fully "industrial dispute" to enumerate even all the characteristics, the full connotation of an industrial dispute; and more than it is necessary for us to define what is a dog when we determine that a certain animal is a dog. To my mind, a great deal of time is wasted and harm done by the premature efforts of Courts to define exhaustively expression of common speech."
In
It was pointed out by Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. that neither investment of capital nor profit making motive is an essential element in the modern-conception of industry. In the present case the Tribunal has found that the petitioner owns 4,400 bighas of land and carried on cultivation of those lands by employing .358 permanent workers in addition to a large number of temporary or casual workers. It appears that a large amount of capital to the extent of Rs. 10,00,000/- has been invested by the petitioner and sugarcane produced by the petitioner is sold to Motipur Sugar Factory.
The balance-sheets of the Company, exhibits 4 (a) and 4 (b), and the general profit and loss account, exhibit 4, were also produced before the Industrial Tribunal to show that the petitioner had Invested capital in the business and there was motive of profit making. On behalf of the petitioner it was argued that the provisions with regard to "lay-off" in Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be applied to agricultural establishments.
There is no substance in this argument because Section 25A itself says that the provisions of this chapter will not apply to industrial establishments in which less than fifty workmen on an average per working day are employed or to industrial establishments which are of a seasonal character or in which work Is performed only intermittently. Section 25A reads as fellows :
"25A. (1) Sections 25C to 25E inclusive shall riot apply :
(a) to industrial establishments in which less than fifty workmen on an average per working day have been employed in the preceding calendar month: or
(b) to industrial establishments which are of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently.
(2) If a question arises whether an industrial establishment is of a seasonal character or whether work is performed therein only intermittently, the decision of the appropriate Government thereon shall he final.
Explanation -- In this section and in Sections 25C, 25D and 25E. ''industrial establishment'' means :
(i) a factory as defined in Clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948; or
(ii) a mine as defined in Clause (j) of Section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952; or
(iii) a plantation as defined in Clause (f) of Section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951."
It is manifest that the explanation to Section 25A itself contemplates that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act will be applicable to a plantation as defined in Clause (f) of Section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951.
5. In my opinion learned Counsel for the petitioner has been unable to make good his point and I hold that the agricultural operations carried on by the petitioner Company in this case would fall within the definition of "industry" in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Act 14 of 1947).
6. I hold that no case has been made out by the petitioner for grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. The application accordingly fails and must be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
7. In Miscellaneous Judicial Cases Nos. 237, 287, 497, 498 and 499 of 1958 the material facts are of similar character and the same question of law is involved. For the reasons already given I hold that these applications also have no merit and must be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Choudhary, J.
8. I agree.
