S.B. Sinha, J.@mdashThis application is directed against the orders dated 7.2.1982 passed by the respondent no. 3 as contained in Annexure 2, the order dated 25.11.1985 passed by the respondent no. 2 as contained in Annexure 3 and as also the order dated 26.8.1986 passed by the respondent no. 1 as contained in Annexure 5 to the writ application. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass.
2. It appears that the respondent nos. 4 and 5 claiming themselves to be the members of scheduled tribes filed an application before the respondent no. 3 purported to be u/s 46 (4A) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act for restoration of the lands comprised within plot nos. 44 and 45 appertaining to khata no. 33 measuring 6.35 acres of land situated in village Tanr Mohanpur, P.S. Jaridih in the District of Giridih. The said application was registered as Land Restoration Case No. 5 of 1981-82.
3. As it appears from paragraphs 5 of the writ application the petitioner in his show cause alleged as follows :--
That on being noticed, the petitioner filed his show cause claiming valid right, title, interest and possession over 7.76 acres of lands of plot no. 44 under khata no. 33 on the following set of facts amongst others :--
(a) That the respondents had parted with the possession of the land before 1950 and had put one Pritam Singh in possession thereof after taking full consideration amount.
(b) That Pritam Singh came and continued in possession thereof without any kind of hindrance or objections by the respondents, who ultimately executed a registered deed of relinquishment on 6.8.1962 acknowledging the title and possession of Pritam Singh over 2.26 acres of lands.
(c) That the said Pritam Singh being in possession of the lands in his own right, title and interest, sold the same to one Banshi Lal Gupta.
(d) That Banshi Lal Gupta subsequently sold and transferred the same in favour of the petitioner by virtue of two sale deeds dated 10.8.1962 and 1.9.1962.
(e) That as such the petitioner come and continued in possession thereof in his own right, title and interest ever since the year 1962 to the knowledge of all concerned and also constructed his residential house, well and various other structures thereon.
(f) That the petitioner is also mutated with respect thereto and is duly paying the rent to the State Government against the grant of proper rent receipts.
(g) That, as such, the claim for restoration besides being illegal was hopelessly barred by limitation.
4. It appears that by reason of the impugned order dated 7.2.1982 (Annexure 1), the respondent no. 3 allowed the said application. According to the petitioner, after he acquired the said lands from one Sri Banshi Lal Gupta he transferred a portion of the same to different persons and thus the petitioner as also his transferees being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order dated 7.2.1982 preferred three different appeals. Two of the appeals including the appeal of the petitioner being Appeal Nos. 20/82 and 19/82 were preferred before the Additional Collector, Giridih and Appeal no. 61/82 was preferred before the Deputy Commissioner, Giridih by Hari Shankar Choubey, Prayag Choubey, Sheo Shankar Choubey, Premchand Dubey and Smt. Gautam Devi. However, Appeal no. 61/82 was dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner, Giridih by an order dated 3.2 1983.
5. It appears that thereafter the Deputy Commissioner directed the Additional Collector, Giridih to dismiss the appeal preferred by the petitioner as also by one of his transferees being Appeal no. 19/82 and Appeal no. 20/82. The Additional Collector, Giridih did not follow the direction of the respondent no. 2. The respondent no. 2 thereafter withdrew the said Appeals no. 19/81 and 20/82 to his own court and by an order dated 25.11.1985 (Annexure 3) dismissed the said appeals.
6. The petitioner preferred a revision application before the respondent no. 1 as against the said order and in the memo of revision categorically pointed out the mala fide action on the part of the respondent no. 2 in withdrawing the said appeals and dismissing the same by reason of the impugned order as contained in Annexure 3 to the writ application.
7. The respondent no. 1, however, in terms of his order dated 26.8.1986 as contained in Annexure 5 to the writ application dismissed the said revision application.
8. Mr. P.K. Prasad, the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner raised a short question in support of this application. The Learned Counsel contended that from the facts as mentioned hereinbefore, it is evident that the recorded tenants relinquished their right, title and interest in favour of Pritam Singh, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner in the year 1962 and in view of the fact that the restoration application u/s 46 (4A) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act was filed in the year 1981, the same was barred under the law of limitation.
9. Mr. C.A. Topno, the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent nos. 4 and 5, on the other hand, drew my attention to the Bihar Schedule Area Regulation 1969 and submitted that as by reason of the provisions thereof inter alia Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was amended, as a result whereof a period of limitation of 30 years had been provided in respect of immovable properties belonging to a member of the scheduled tribes as specified in Part III of the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950, the period of limitation must be held to be 30 years.
10. The Learned Counsel further submitted that the provisions of Section 46 (4A)of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act as also the Bihar Schedule Area Regulation, 1969 are beneficent legislation so far as the members of the scheduled tribes are concerned and thus, the provisions of the Bihar Schedule Area Regulation, 1969 are required to be construed liberally.
11. The Bihar Schedule Area Regulation, 1969 (Bihar Regulation No. 1/69) was framed to make certain provisions and to amend certain laws in the State of Bihar for the peace and good Government were framed in terms of Vth Schedule of the Constitution of India.
12. It is, therefore, clear that any amendment carried out by reason of the provisions of the said Regulation, 1969 including the amendment in Article 65 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, would apply only in relation to such causes of action which arose within the scheduled area of the State of Bihar.
13. The District of Giridih is not a scheduled area and in that view of the matter, the provisions of the Bihar Schedule Area Regulation, 1969 will have no application whatsoever in the instant case.
14. Section 46 (4A) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act reads as follows :--
(4A) (a). The Deputy Commissioner may, of his own motion or on an application filed before him by occupancy-raiyat who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes, for annulling the transfer on the ground that the transfer was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), held an inquiry in the prescribed manner to determine if the transfer has been made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1):
Provided that no such application be entertained by the Deputy Commissioner unless it is filed by the occupancy-tenant within a period of twelve years from the date of transfer of his holding or any portion thereof:
Provided further that before passing any order under clause (b) or clause (c) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner shall give the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity to be heard in the matter.
(b) If after holding the inquiry referred to in clause (a) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner finds that there was no contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1) in making such transfer, he shall reject the application and may award such costs to the transferee to be paid by the transferor as he may in the circumstances of the case deem fit.
(c) If after the inquiry referred to in clause (a) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner finds that such transfer was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), be shall annul the transfer and eject the transferee from such holding or portion thereof, as the case may be, and put the transferor in possession thereof :
Provided that if the transferee has constructed any building or structure, such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed :
Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure of building on such holding or portion thereof before commencement of the Chotanagpur Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1969 (President''s Act 4 of 1969) he may, notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, validate such a transfer made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), if the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion of a holding, as the case may be, of the equivalent value, in the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Deputy Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor,
The said provision had been inserted in the Parent Act by reason of Chotanagpur Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Bihar Act no. 11/76), the proviso appended to clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 46 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act provides for the period of limitation mentioned which provisions will, therefore, apply in the instant case and thus, evidently, the period of limitation provided for under the provisions of Bihar Schedule Area Regulation, 1969, cannot have any application whatsoever.
15. In this view of the matter, It cannot be said that the period of limitation for filing an application u/s 46 (4A) of the said Act will be 30 years and not 12 years.
16. It is true that the provisions of a beneficent legislation should be construed liberally but that does not mean that the court will interpret the said provisions in such a way so as to over-step the legislative object. It is now well known that a statute is required to be construed liberally.
17. As in the instant case, admittedly, the alleged transfer which is sought to be annuled on the ground that the same was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 46 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act took place in the year 1962; in terms of the proviso appended to Section 46(4A) thereof, the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain an application, if the same was not filed by the occupancy tenant within a period of 12 years from the date of transfer of his holding or any portion thereof.
18. There cannot, thus, be any doubt whatsoever that the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner is barred to entertain such an application if the transfer sought to be annuled took place more than 12 years prior to filing of such an application. The word ''entertainment'' mean "admitted for hearing or enquiry". What is, thus prohibited is initiation of any proceeding to be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner for the purpose of finding out as to whether any transfer has been made in violation of the provisions of Section 46 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act or not.
19. In such a situation, it must be held that upon expiry of the period of limitation, the Deputy Commissioner will have no jurisdiction whatsoever to make enquiry with regard to an allegation that immovable property has been transferred by a member of the scheduled tribes in contravention of the provisions of Section 46 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. In this view of the matter evidently the application filed by the respondent nos. 4 and 5 was barred under the law of limitation.
20. For the view I have taken, it is not necessary to consider the other contentions raised at the bar. In the result, this application is allowed and the impugned orders as contained in Annexures 2, 3 and 5 are set aside. Let a writ of certiorari be issued accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.
