Nagendra Rai, J.@mdashThe tenants-Petitioners have filed the present revision application against the judgment and decree dated. 29th May,
1993, passed by the Munsif 1st Court, Darbhanga, in Eviction Suit No. 30/85, decreeing the landlords opposite parties'' suit for eviction.
2. The Plaintiffs-opposite parties filed the suit for eviction against the Defendants-Petitioners from the suit premises described in Schedule 2 of the
plaint on the ground of personal necessity.
3. The Plaintiffs'' case, in brief, is that Mahabir Prasad Khetan, father of Plaintiff''s 2nd party and grand father of Plaintiff''s first party, was the
owner of the property described in Schedule 1 of the plaint. He executed a registered deed of gift on 9-11-1984 in favour of Plaintiff''s first party
with regard to Schedule 1 property and put them in possession. Jugal Kishore Khetan, Plaintiff second party being the father of Plaintiff 1st party
was looking after the suit property on behalf of his sons. Mahabir Pd. Khetan had let out a portion of Schedule 1 property to the Defendants,
described in Schedule 2 of the plaint on a monthly rental of Rs. 265/-for carrying on a business of handloom cloths. They used to pay the rent
regularly to Mahabir Prasad Khetan and then to the Plaintiff second party from November, 1984 to July, 1985. Thereafter the Plaintiffs first party
asked the tenants to vacate the suit premises as they required the same to start their own business for their livelihood. On the request of the tenants
six months time was granted to vacate the premises, even then they did not vacate the same, hence the suit.
4. The Defendants appeared and contested the suit. Their stand is that the suit property did not exclusively belong to Mahabir Prasad Khetan, on
the other hand, it belongs to his wife Indra Devi and the other brothers of the Plaintiff second party are claiming interest in the said property.
According to them, the entire ground-floor of the premises in question was let out by Indra Devi to Haji Nasiruddin, husband of Petitioner No. 1,
on a monthly rental of Rs. 110/- and the rent receipts were granted by her through her husband Mahabir Prasad Khetan. On earlier occasion, on
the ground of personal necessity of the Plaintiff second party, half of the premises, which was let out to Haji Nasiruddin, was vacated by him in the
year 1979 and possession was given to opp. second party. However, the rental remained the same. Plaintiff No. 4 started a business in the
aforesaid vacated portion in the name and style of Khetan Textile, which is still running. However, after execution of the deed of gift by Mahabir
Prasad Khetan in favour of Plaintiffs first party, the name of the aforesaid firm was changed from Khetan Textile to Vijay Textile. According to
them, the monthly rental was enhanced later on to Rs. 265/-. The Defendants denied the ground of personal necessity as asserted by the Plaintiffs.
According to them, Plaintiff No. 1, who is the eldest son of Plaintiff opposite second party, is aged 14 years and other are minors and school going
children and as such the Plaintiffs did not require the suit premises reasonably and in good faith for starting a business.
5. As the suit was for eviction on the ground of personal necessity it was tried according to the procedure laid down u/s 14 of the Bihar Buildings
(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is to be mentioned that during trial the Defendants filed a petition on
30th September, 1992 (Ext. E) that they had vacated the suit premises on 1-11-1989. Both the parties adduced oral and documentary evidence
and the trial courts held that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the landlords-ppp. parties required the suit
premises reasonably and in good faith for starting the business. The trial court disbelieved the story set up by the Defendants that they had
delivered the possession of the suit premises on 1-11-1989.
6. Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners raised two points-firstly, that the finding of the trial court that the Plaintiffs required the suit
premises reasonably and in good faith for starting business is not sustainable in law for the reason that the Plaintiffs neither pleaded in the plaint nor
adduced any evidence to show as to the nature of the business which they intend to start nor they have brought any material on the record to show
that they have means and capacity to start business and, in that view of the matter, on the evidence on the record, it cannot be said that the
requirement of the Plaintiffs, in the present case, is reasonable and bonafide. Secondly, that the trial court has not considered the question of partial
eviction, as it was enjoined to consider it in view of the proviso to Section 11(1)(c) of the Act.
7. Learned Counsel appearing for the opposite parties, on the other hand, contended that the court below having considered the pleadings and the
evidence on the record has come to a categorical and definite finding about the reasonable and bonafide need of the Plaintiff and this Court should
not interfere with the same especially when the said finding is a finding of fact and there is nothing on the record to show, that the said finding is
contrary to law. He also contended that in the facts and circumstances of this case the court below has rightly not considered the question of partial
eviction in terms of proviso to Section 11(1)(c) of the Act.
8. The present revision application has been filed u/s 14(8) of the Act which empowers the court to see as to whether the judgment is according to
law or not. No doubt, the power u/s 14(8) of the Act is wider than the power u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the same can not be
equated with the power of appeal. This Court can only interfere with the order of eviction if it comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the
court below is not according to law.
9. So far as the first question is concerned, a landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction only if he proves that the building is required reasonably
and in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any other person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. In other
words, the requirement of the landlord should be honest and convincing to reason Only a desire or wish on the part of the landlord to require the
premises will not meet the requirement of Section 11(1)(c) of the Act. There should be an element of need on the part of the landlord and a fanciful
claim on his part could not be a ground for eviction. However, this does not mean that the landlord has to prove that he is in dire need of the
building or the requirement should not be interpreted in such a way as to make it impossible for a landlord to get a decree for eviction. The court
has to take a reasonable approach in deciding the said question. In what circumstances the requirement of a building will be said to be reasonable
and in good faith is difficult to define, it depends upon the facts of each case which has to be decided by the court keeping in view the materials
placed on behalf of the parties. It is equally difficult to lay down the elements or grounds on the basis of which it can be inferred that the
requirement of the landlord is held to be reasonable and bonafide one.
10. In a case of requirement of a building for starting a business, the court has to consider many relevant factors in determining the question as to
whether the requirement is reasonable and in good faith? The nature of business, means to start a business, location of the building, nonavailability
of other suitable accommodation or other means of livelihood are some of the elements which have an important bearing in deciding the said
question. However, it is made clear that the aforesaid elements are not conclusive in the sense that prove and disprove of the same would be a
deciding factor in coming to the conclusion as to reasonable and bonafide requirement of the landlord. This has to be judged in the light of other
facts and circumstances of the case.
11. In the present case, learned Counsel for the Petitioners while elaborating his submission contended that in the plaint the landlords have only
asserted that they required the suit premises reasonably and in good faith for starting a business. The nature of the business has neither been stated
in the pleadings nor in the evidence. On the other hand, some of the Plaintiffs'' witnesses have stated that the Plaintiffs have not decided about the
nature of business which they intend to start. There is also no evidence on the record to show that they have means to start a business. In view of
such discrepant nature of materials on the record, the finding of the court below regarding reasonable and bonafide requirement is contrary to law.
12. The question which falls for consideration is as to whether it is necessary to state the nature of the business in the plaint when a. suit is filed for
eviction on the ground that the building is required by the Plaintiffs for starting a business. The object of the pleading is not to punish the parties but
to intimate the parties about the cases of each other and to enable the court to determine the question in controversy between the parties. The
pleading is required to be construed liberally and the court has to consider its substance and not its form. The law requires that the plaint should
contain a statement in concise form of the material facts on which the Plaintiff relies for his claim. In other words, the essential part of the facts has
to be pleaded in the plaint. There is no requirement either to state the evidence by which the Plaintiff wants to prove his case or to state the law.
Even if a plea is not raised in the plaint but the parties during the trial knew the case of each other and led evidence in support of their plea, then the
claim of the parties cannot be defeated on the ground of the absence of the plea in the pleading. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt.
Kalawati Tripathi and Others Vs. Smt. Damayanti Devi and Another summarised the law on this point in the following words:
Generally the parties should not be allowed to travel beyond their pleading. However, pleadings should be construed liberally and the court should
not adopt a pedantic approach. If the substance of the essential material facts for grant of relief is stated in the pleading the Court should not throw
away the same on the ground of defective form or the deficiency in the pleading. Even if the plea is not raised in the pleading even then a claim of
the party cannot be defeated, if the parties knew the respective cases of each other on the said plea and led evidence in support of their cases.
13. In the present case the Plaintiffs, in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the plaint, have stated their need, which is as follows:
Para 11. That the Plaintiffs have got no other means of livelihood and want to start a business of their own in the Schedule II premises which is a fit
and suitable side for business and has no building other than this for the said purpose and also that the Plaintiffs have no means to hire another
building of the similar site and as such require the disputed house for bonafide purpose.
Para 12. That the Plaintiffs require the Schedule II property for their personal necessity and the Defendants are deliberately avoiding to vacate the
same in-spite of the fact that other building for carrying on the business may be available to the Defendants.
14. From perusal of the aforesaid two paragraphs it is clear that the Plaintiffs have asserted that they have got no other means for their livelihood
and want to start business of their own in the said building, which is fit and suitable for business and except that they have no other building for the
business. The said statements in the plaint fulfil the requirement of pleading and non-mentioning the exact nature of business will not be a ground to
non-suit the Plaintiffs The details as to the nature of the business and the other relevant things are the maters of evidence. However, in this case
even at the stage of evidence the Plaintiffs have not stated about the exact nature of business which they intend to start. In the evidence they have
made only a general statement that they want to start a business in the suit premises. It further appears that opposite party No. 2 has been
examined as P.W. 20 and he has stated in his evidence that he has not as yet decided about the nature of the business to be started in the suit
building. Thus, from the materials on the record it is evident that except a vague statement that the Plaintiffs intended to start a business there is no
evidence on the record as to the nature of the business to be started, means of the Plaintiffs to start a business and other relevant points.
15. Whether on the basis of the aforesaid materials it could be said that the Plaintiffs have proved their reasonable and bonafide requirement. The
answer is No. The omission of the aforesaid details in the pleading as well as in the evidence would cause prejudice to the tenant. He would not be
in a position to lead evidence to show lack of bonafide and good faith on the part of the Plaintiffs in requiring the building for his own occupation or
for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by him. In such a situation, it would be also difficult to the court to judge
whether the requirement of the Plaintiff is bonafide and in good faith or not. In the facts of this case, even if it is accepted that the omission to
mention the exact nature of the business in the plaint would not be a fatal to the Plaintiffs, the omission of the other details in the evidence, as
mentioned above, clearly shows lack of reasonableness and good faith on the part of the Plaintiff in requiring the suit building. The trial court has
lost sight of these relevant considerations and has decreed the suit only on the ground that the Plaintiffs required it for starting a business. In my
view, the requirement of the Plaintiffs in this case is only a fanciful claim and the evidence on. the record is lacking to prove the reasonable and
bonafide requirement of the Plaintiffs.
16. As I have held above that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the building is required reasonably and in good faith, it is not necessary to
decide the question of partial eviction raised on behalf of the Petitioners.
17. Before concluding the order, I may mention that the learned Counsel for the landlord-opp. party stated that the tenants have filed a petition in
the court below that they have vacated the premises and as such the present revision application is not maintainable, I am unable to agree with this
contention. The landlords denied the aforesaid assertion of the tenants in the court below and the court below having accepted the stand of the
landlords in this regard has held that the tenants-Petitioners have not vacated the premises. The said finding has not been challenged before me.
18. In the result, the application is allowed and the judgment and decree of the court below is set aside. However, there shall be no order as to
costs.