S.B. Sanyal, J.@mdashThe Review is directed against an order dismissing a writ petition. The moot question in this case is whether such a petition is maintainable, if so, under what circumstances. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that power of review inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction. On the other hand, learned lawyer for the State submits that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. Prior to amendment of the CPC review petitions were entertained under Order 47 rule 1 or Section 151 C P. C. treating the writ proceeding as Civil Proceeding. But, after the Amendment Act 104 of 1976 in the Code of Civil Procedure, the said power is no more obtainable, in view of Explanation to section. 141 of the CPC which specifically provides that, the procedure provided in the CPC will not apply to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. A Court has no power of review except when it is granted by Statute is axiomatic by long line of decisions. In the case of M.J. Kutinha v. Mrs. Nathal Pinto Bad & Anr. (A. I. R. 1941 Madras 272) it was observed that unless Statute provides a remedy by way of review the Court cannot review its own judgment except in very exceptional circumstances such as for example "when it passed an order inadvertantly or on account of some false representation by the officers of the Court". In the case of Patel Narshi Thaltershi A Ors. vs Pradyunan Singhji (A. I. R. 1970 Supreme Court 12/3) it was observed "the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication". The same is the view expressed in other cases also. (See A. I. R. 1974 Supreme Court. 1791 at 1793; 1976 Bihar Bar Council Journal 647).
3. As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, Article 137 of the Constitution of India confers on the apex Court power to review any judgment or order pronounced or made by it. There is no such similar provision to be found in the Constitution as far as the High Court is concerned. CPC is inapplicable to a writ proceeding by virtue of Explanation to section 141 C. P. C.
4. It will be useful at this stage to have a look at the decided cases under Article 137 of the Constitution and what limitations have been laid down for exercise of the said statutory power. In the case of N. P. Eswara Iyer etc v. The Registrar, Supreme Court of bulla (A. I. R. 1980 Supreme Court 808; while considering the scope of Article 137 the Court opined "that the substantive power is derived from Article 137 and is as wide for criminal as for civil proceedings". Their lordship have, however, hastened to add that even though such a power is conferred "it must be remembered that review is not a second dose of the same argument once considered and rejected. The rejection might have been wrong but that cannot be helped". In substance, a review application must not be an attempt to obtain a reconsideration of the judgment of the Court disposing of the substantive proceeding. In the case of M/s Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (A. I. R. 1980 Supreme Court 674) Justice Pathak, as be then was, while considering the scope of Article 137 of the Constitution, observed that "the normal principle that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. If a view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible one it cannot be held that there is an error apparent on the face of it." In the case of Sow Chandra Kanto And Anr. v Sheik Habib (A I. R. 1975 Supreme Court 1500), white considering the scope of Article 137, it was held that "a review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial falliability''. A second trip ever ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import is obviously insufficient. This, therefore, is the scope of review under Article 137 of the Constitution of India.
5. However, there is an exception to the rule of statutory power of review, where the Court is called upon to act ex-debito justitiae to correct its own mistake or-orders inadvertantly passed or to prevent gross miscarriage of justice. In the case of Chandrika Sah v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue (1981 Bihar Bar Council Journal 106). Agrawal, J., as he then was held "fur that matter every authority is entitled to correct its own mistake...taking any other view is bound to work out gross injustice and result in procedural imbalance". The question whether an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution could be reviewed came to be considered in the case of Shivdeo Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others (A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 1909) which was decided on 8th February, 1961. The Supreme Court held, while rejecting the submission that the High Court has not such power to review its judgment passed under Article 226 of the Constitution, that "there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it". In this case the order sought to be reviewed was passed against a person who was not a party to the proceeding. Subsequently, the person affected filed an application to implead him in the earlier writ and for rehearing the whole matter, which v. as allowed by the High Court. In those circumstances it was observed that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction in reviewing its previous order in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice and the High Court did what principles of natural justice required it to do. In a subsequent decision of 26th March, 1962 in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & others v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj (A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 946), the question whether an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution could be reviewed under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if not u/s 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court refrained from expressing any opinion. The ratio of Shivdeo Singh''s case (supra). in my opinion is that every Court of plenary jurisdiction has power to correct ex-debito justitiae its judgment and order to prevent abuse of its process and grave and palpable errors. Shivdeo Singh''s case was noticed in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Arlbam Pishak Sharma 6 ors (A. 1. R. 1979 Supreme Court 1047). In that case the High Court reviewed an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of power conferred under Order 47 rule 1 and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order of review was passed prior to incorporation of section 141 in the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the grounds, on the basis or which the review was sought, are not permissible, since plenary jurisdiction relates to preventing miscarriage of justice and to correct grave and palpable errors committed by the Court. This has its own limits.
6. What then is this plenary power possessed by the High Court in reviewing its judgment or order pronounced or made by it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Much light is obtainable from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others (A. I. R. 1981. Supreme Court 606), It was held in that case that the expression "review" is used in two distinct senses, namely, "(1) A procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a Review on merits when error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi''s Case (supra) held that no review lies on merit unless a statute specifically provides for it. Obviously when a review is sought due to procedural defect, the inadvertant error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex-debito justitiae, to prevent the abuse of its process and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal".
7. From the conspectus of the decided cases, referred to above, the power of reviewing judgments or orders pronounced and/or made under Article 226 of the Constitution is some-what analogous to section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which confers no new right on Courts but furnishes legislative recognition of an age old and well established principle that every Court has inherent power to act ex-debito justitiae to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This power is inherent in a Court which may be termed as a "procedural review" to correct orders passed under some misapprehension or inadvertantly or in breach of principles of natural justice or on account of some false representation and or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. This is an ancillary and incidental power necessary to discharge Court''s function effectively and for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. This power however, cannot be invoked for reconsideration of the judgment on merits and/or for re-hearing or fresh decision of the case and/or a routine review but a serious step only to be resorted to in very exceptional circumstances. The review petition, therefore, is maintainable only in the circumstances referred to above. In the present case Learned Counsel wants us to consider the merit once again as would be evident from the petition itself. This is not a case of exceptional circumstances where the Court is required to act ex-dibito justitiae.
Henee, the review petition is dismissed in limine.
R. N. Prasad, J.
I agree.
