B. Sudhakar Reddy Vs The S.H.O. and 4 Others

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

Ramesh Ranganathan, J.@mdashThe scheme in Part III of the Constitution of India-the fundamental rights-is to remove disabilities to which the Scheduled Castes are subjected to, and to provide positive rights in their favour. Article 38 and 46 in Part IV-the Directive Principles of State policy-fasten duties on the State to render socio-economic and political justice, and to protect them from all forms of exploitation and injustice. The Constitution charges the State to improve the quality of their life and social, economic and cultural pursuits as part of a meaningful right to life guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution. ( State of Karnataka Vs. Appa Balu Ingale and others, . The Constitutional protection of equality includes special help and care for the oppressed and the weak. While members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes are, ostensibly, equal citizens entitled to a life of dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution, they are, in reality, oppressed, humiliated and insulted in many parts of our country. Swaran Singh and Others Vs. State through Standing Counsel and Another, . Whenever they assert their economic rights in relation to property; their social rights in seeking access to various goods and services; claim the right of entry to shops, and other public places; and the political right to hold political offices; they are, more often than not, subjected to ignominies and humiliation. (Goluguri Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2005(2) ALT (CRL) 401( AP)). It is in furtherance of Article 46 of the Directive Principles of State Policy, under Part IV of the Constitution of India, that the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter called the "Act") was enacted. The Act not only seeks to prevent the commission of atrocities against members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, but also for relief and rehabilitation of the victims of such offences. The purpose of the Act, as is evident from the statement of objects and reasons, is to provide stringent measures and punishments for atrocities committed against members belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Section 3 of the Act details a large number of such statutory offences. The sine qua non, to attract the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, is that the victim should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, and the offence is committed against him as he belongs to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes. Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman Vs. State of Maharashtra, Ashabai Machindra Adhagale Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others,

2. In this Writ Petition, the petitioner seeks to have FIR No. 145 of 2012 on the file of the Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad Police Station, Ranga Reddy District, for the offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act, quashed. The contents of the complaint, as recorded in FIR. No. 145, are that, on 28.3.2012 at about 09-00 hours, while the complainant was going to his agricultural land to attend his work, the accused along with his henchmen were there and had abused the complainant in the name of their caste by saying "Madiga Lanja Kodukullara", and had threatened them with dire consequences. Enclosed to the FIR is a copy of the complaint given by the 5th respondent in Telugu which, when translated in English, reads thus:-

To

The Respected S.H.O. O.S. Shamshabad. R.G.I.A.

Sir,

I am Pothuganti Venkatayya, S/O late Lavayya, aged 56 years, resident of Shamshabad Mandal, Sathamrai village. Today i.e., 28.3.2012 morning at about 9.00 a.m. when I was going to my land in Sathamrai for agricultural work, Sri B. Sudhakar Reddy and his henchmen abused us in filthy language without any reason and attacked us. And while abusing in the name of caste "Madiga Lanja Kodukulla" they threatened to kill us if we went there. They abused in the name of caste in filthy language which cannot be revealed. Hence, we request you to take action in accordance with law against Sri B. Sudhakar Reddy and his henchmen and do justice to us.

3. The petitioner claims to have purchased Ac. 17.18 gts of land in Sy. No. 7 of Sathamrai village, Shamshabad, Ranga Reddy District, vide Registered sale deed No. 6621/2007 dated 28.08.2007, from the original owners including the 5th respondent. It is his case that the 5th respondent was arrayed as the 6th executant in the sale deed; the original owners, including the 5th respondent, had also executed a registered gift deed dated 25.08.2007 in favour of Sri Gunti Yadaiah for an extent of 15 guntas of land; later they executed a rectification deed dated 26.09.2007, rectifying the surname of the Donee; ever since the purchase, and execution of the gift deed, he and Sri Gunti Yadaiah were in possession of, and were cultivating, the subject lands; both of them applied for mutation of their names in the revenue records; the Tahsildar rejected their application on the ground that their vendors names were not reflected in the revenue records; thereafter some of his vendors, and Sri Gunti Yadaiah, had invoked the Record of Rights Act, and had instituted other related proceedings; it was found that illegal entries were made, through ROR proceedings dated 31.03.1995, by which the names of others were included in the revenue records; a petition was filed, u/s 3 of the ROR Act, before the Tahsildar; the persons, whose names were in the ROR, contested the matter by filing a counter; on receipt thereof, he came to know that fraud had been played on them, and two deeds dated 18.11.1981 and 15.10.1982 were executed fraudulently; against the order of the Tahsildar dated 21.12.2007 rejecting their application, they preferred a revision which was allowed on 15.12.2009 on the ground that notices, under the ROR Act, were not issued; W.P. No. 6356 of 2010, filed there against, was dismissed on 12.07.2010 directing the parties to approach the Civil Court; the petitioner''s vendors and Sri Gunti Yadaiah filed O.S. No. 700 of 2010 for cancellation of the sale deeds dated 18.11.1981 and 15.10.1982; an injunction was granted by order dated 14.07.2010, which was confirmed by the appellate Court in C.M.A. No. 90 of 2010 dated 26.11.2010; in the I.A. the plaintiffs had mentioned that land, of an extent of Ac. 7.18 gts, was sold, and an extent of 15 gts was gifted; the petitioner''s name was restored in the revenue records after the illegal entries therein were deleted; the Tahsildar, by his proceedings dated 06.03.2010, implemented the order of the Joint Collector dated 15.12.2009; by proceedings dated 04.11.2010, the petitioner''s name was directed to be mutated; the petitioner was, thereafter, issued pattadar pass books and title deeds; he applied to the gram panchayat for sanction of a gate, a compound wall and labour quarters etc; after the prescribed fee was paid, the gram panchayat of Sathamrai Village had, vide proceedings dated 18.08.2011, accorded permission for construction of a compound wall, two labour quarters etc; the APCPDCL sanctioned electricity and service connection, vide letter dated 16.05.2011, for the total extent of land which was in their possession; as per the sanctioned permission, a big gate was also set up by constructing an L shaped wall for which a compound wall was constructed in the land in Sy. No. 2 attached to the compound wall constructed around the land adjacent thereto; two electricity meters were set up, one for the bore-well, and the other for the house constructed thereat; persons who were inimically disposed towards the petitioner, as he had refused to pay money under extortion, had instigated the 5th respondent and some of his vendors; they started pestering the petitioner, for the past several months, for money on one pretext or other; the 5th respondent instigated his cousin Sri Babaiah to file an appeal against the mutation order; in the appeal, an order of suspension was passed on 04.10.2010; the said order was questioned before this Court in W.P. No. 10302 of 2012, wherein interim stay was granted; as the petitioner refused to part with money, and concede to their illegal demands, Sri Pothuganti Venkataiah, Jalpally Narander, Pothuganti Narender, Pothuganti Shankaraiah, Pothuganti Prabhakar came to the land in Sy. No. 7 of Sathamrai village on 28.03.2012, trespassed into the petitioner''s land, damaged the property, and stole valuable goods; the petitioner submitted a complaint on 28.03.2012 before the Shamshabad police station which was registered as FIR No. 144 of 2012; as a counter-blast, the 5th respondent had filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner vide FIR. No. 145 of 2012; and the petitioner came to know of the case having been booked against him only on 23.4.2012 when he went to the Police Station, to produce documents to prove his ownership over the land, in connection with the investigation of F.I.R. No. 144 of 2012.

4. Smt. Neeraja Sudhakar Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that FIR No. 145 of 2012 must be quashed on the grounds that the alleged offence was neither committed in a public place nor within public view, as the place of the offence is not identifiable; the word "my field" in the complaint denoted that the 5th respondent was having a field, and nothing more; the complaint does not disclose the identity of the field, whether the field is situated in public view, and whether there was anyone when the alleged words were uttered; it is not even mentioned as to whether the said land is on the main road or on any other road, or in the middle of the village and whether it was located in view of the public; the place of the alleged offence was not even mentioned in the complaint; the complainant never stated that he was having land only at one place, and that too specifically at Sy. No. 7; even if the place of offence, as mentioned in the FIR, is presumed to be in Sy. No. 7 of Sathamrai Village, the said land belongs to the petitioner who is a lawyer and a law abiding citizen; the subject land is not a public place, it is his private property and is enclosed with a compound wall with a big gate; the 5th respondent was a member of ward No. 10 of Satham Rai Gram Panchayat, when the Gram Panchayat granted permission in the petitioner''s favour on 18.8.2011; the latest pahani patrika clearly showed that the petitioner was the pattedar, and was in possession of the property; the 5th respondent never mentioned the place of offence which is crucial, as it should be in the view of the pubic; the complaint does not state that the accused belonged to a caste other than SC & ST; the complainant does not mention the names of alleged witnesses in whose presence the alleged offence is stated to have been committed; the complaint does not allege that Respondent No. 5 was abused in the name of his caste in the public view; the complaint refers to many people in every sentence, but was submitted by only one person; the alleged abuse in the name of caste cannot be termed as "intentionally insulting or intimidating with an intent to humiliate the complainant in a place within public view"; the complaint was filed as a counter-blast to the complaint submitted by the petitioner in FIR No. 144 of 2012, wherein the 5th respondent is the first accused; the case was being investigated by a Sub-Inspector of Police, contrary to the mandatory requirements of Rule 7 of the Rules; though the petitioner had submitted the complaint in FIR No. 144 of 2012 around 11.30 hours, it was wrongly mentioned as 20.15 hours; whereas in FIR No. 145 of 2012 it was mentioned that the complaint was given at 20.30 hours; the timing was also manipulated to facilitate booking of the case against him; though there was a delay of 11 hours, it was reported that there was no delay; the complaint is being used as a weapon for extortion of money by abusing the process of law; and it was filed with the oblique motive to grab the petitioner''s land under threat of his arrest.

4. Before examining the submission of the Learned Counsel, it is useful to briefly refer to the scope of interference by this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to quash an FIR. An accused can approach the High Court, u/s 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226/ 227 of the Constitution, to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, The jurisdiction under Article 226 or Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution. In exercise of the powers, the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to an abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. Minu Kumari and Another Vs. The State of Bihar and Others,

5. The jurisdiction which this Court exercises under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, or u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a complaint, even before completion of investigation, is limited. The law laid down, in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604, which has been followed in several other judgments of the Supreme Court, is that interference is permissible in cases (a) where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not, prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (b) where the allegations in the FIR and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers u/s 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, and the evidence collected in support of the same, do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (d) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; and (e) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused, and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. The Supreme Court further held that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection, and that too in the rarest of rare cases; the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint; the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice; and even if a complaint has been laid only on account of personal animosity that, by itself, will not be a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. The Supreme Court, in Bhajan Lal8, relied on its earlier judgment in Sheonandan Paswan Vs. State of Bihar and Others, wherein it was held that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant. In Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Ramesh Gandhi, , the Supreme Court, noticed the principles laid down in R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab, and Bhajan Lal8, and held that the law regarding the scope of the jurisdiction to quash an FIR, either in the exercise of the statutory jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was well settled; and, in a catena of decisions, the Supreme Court had laid down clear and consistent principles, and had indicated the parameters within which an FIR could be quashed.

6. The High Court should not exercise its power to repress or stifle a legitimate prosecution. ( State of Karnataka Vs. M. Devendrappa and Another, ). Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, or u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised with care. G. Sagar Suri and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, . The powers possessed by the High Court thereunder are very wide, and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The High Court, being the highest court of a State, should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary and Others, and Dr. Raghubir Sharan Vs. The State of Bihar, Minu Kumari and Another Vs. The State of Bihar and Others,

7. Bearing in mind the limited scope of interference by this Court, to quash an FIR, is this Court required to examine the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner. The ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act are attracted where a person, who does not belong to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, intentionally insults, or intimidates with the intent to humiliate, a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. It is no doubt true that when the basic ingredients of the offence, u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act, are missing in the complaint, permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the accused to face the rigmarole of a criminal trial would not be justified, and may amount to an abuse of the process of law; Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. and Others, ); and the prosecution has to be vigilant to avoid the possibility of the Act being misused for harassment of citizens even though they have not committed an offence under the Act. Karan Singh and Others Vs. The State of M.P., ). While the possibility of members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes misusing the provisions of the Act, to wreak vengeance on others, cannot be ruled out in all cases, such instances are rare and isolated and, in an overwhelming majority, it is the complainant, (member of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes), who has suffered insults and humiliation. Interference by this Court, to quash a complaint made under the Act, is warranted only when, ex-facie, the complaint does not attract the ingredients of an offence under the Act.

8. On the petitioners own showing, while his complaint in FIR No. 144 of 2012 was registered as having been given at 20-15 hours the counter-complaint of 5th respondent, stated to have been given at 20-30 hours, was registered as FIR No. 145 of 2012. Even in cases where a prior complaint is already registered, a counter-complaint is permissible. Upkar Singh Vs. Ved Prakash and Others, Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi Administration), While it is true that the counter-complaint of the 5th respondent does not mention the location of the "field" where the incident occurred or its identity, the location of the land in the complaint filed by the petitioner in FIR No. 144 of 2012 is the same location referred to in the counter-complaint in FIR No. 145 of 2012. u/s 154(1) Cr.P.C. even in cases where the information is given in writing, the substance of the information is required to be entered in a book kept by the officer incharge of a police station. Column No. 5 of the FIR requires the place of occurrence of the offence to be recorded. It is evident that the reference made to the identity of the field in the FIR, though it is not specifically referred to in the complaint, is because the place of occurrence of the offence is required to be noted therein.

9. Neither does the information furnished by the complainant in writing, nor the FIR registered thereafter, require exhaustive details of the incident to be stated therein. An FIR is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the reported offence. The law does not require the mentioning of all the ingredients of the offence in the FIR. It is only after a complete investigation that it may be possible to say whether an offence is made out on the basis of the evidence collected by the investigating agency. What is of significance is that the information lodged must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. If a police officer has reasons to suspect, on the basis of the information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is neither necessary for the police officer to be convinced that a cognizable offence has been committed, nor is he required to satisfy himself of the truth of the information. The question as to whether the FIR is true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the FIR discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and discover true facts, if he can. It is only after a complete investigation that the police officer may be able to report on the truth or otherwise of the information. Even if the information does not furnish all details, the police officer must find out those details in the course of investigation, and collect all necessary evidence. The information, disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence, only sets in motion the investigative machinery with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordance with law. ( Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. and Others Vs. Tapan Kr. Singh, Ashabai Machindra Adhagale Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others,

10. The requirement of Section 3(1)(x) is that the insult or intimidation of a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe must be intentional; the intention must be to humiliate him; and the insult or intimidation should be in "any place within public view". As noted hereinabove the complaint, in FIR 145 of 2012 filed by the 5th respondent, is that at 9.00 AM, when he was going to his land for agricultural work, the accused and his henchmen had abused them in filthy language in the name of their caste, calling them "Madiga Lanja Kodukullara", and had threatened to kill them if they went there. It is not even the case of the petitioner-accused that he belongs to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes. It is beyond dispute that the words allegedly used, by the accused against the complainant, is an insult against a member of the Scheduled Castes in the name of his caste. The said complaint records the presence of a plurality of persons at the scene of the incident i.e. the accused and his henchmen, and the complainant along with others. The incident is alleged to have taken place at 9-00 A.M. in broad day light. As FIR No. 145 of 2012 is a counter-complaint of FIR No. 144 of 2012, the alleged place of occurrence is the same in both the complaints i.e., at Sy. No. 7, Sathamrai. The term ''public view'' is not defined in the Act. People at large are compendiously called the ''public''. In contra-distinction to the word ''private'', the word ''public'' denotes the concept of a plurality. In "Words and Phrases (Vol. 35 Permanent Edition, by West Publishing Company)", the word "public place" is defined in various ways. A public place is a place where the public has a right to go and be. It is one attended by public for business, entertainment or similar reasons, and is a place where the public generally are permitted to assemble. (Goluguri Ramakrishna Reddy 2005(2) ALT (CRL) 401( AP)). The words used in Section 3(1)(x) are in a place within "public view", and not in a "public place". There is a distinction between an incident within the "public view", and an incident in a "public place". Karan Singh and Others Vs. The State of M.P., The Legislature has used the words "...in any place within public view..." and not merely the term "public place" or the term only "public view". The phrase ''in a place within the public view'' may be taken as a place where, ordinarily, the public visit for some purpose or the other, with uninterrupted regularity though not continuously. "Public view" occurs in a place that is reasonably expected to be viewed by another, and it is not necessary that the incident was actually viewed by the public. It would be a contradiction in terms to hold that, if a member of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes is insulted or intimidated with the intention of humiliating him in a public place where there are no onlookers, it is not an offence, but if a third person, other than the offender and the victim, is present in the place it would be an offence. Such a thin line cannot be drawn, while interpreting any of the clauses of Section 3(1) of the Act which, by themselves, are atrocities. The moment a member of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes complains that the accused has insulted or intimidated him, by using the name of his caste, an atrocity is committed which must be dealt with in accordance with law. Whether or not an offence, u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act, is committed in a place within public view are matters of enquiry by the Investigation Agency, and adjudication by the Criminal Court while conducting trial; and cannot be a ground for quashing the criminal case at the stage of investigation. (Goluguri Ramakrishna Reddy 2005(2) ALT (CRL) 401( AP)). In Swaran Singh and Others Vs. State through Standing Counsel and Another, the Supreme Court observed:-

... the gate of a house is a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or a Gram Sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies....

(emphasis supplied)

11. The allegations in the complaint, on the premise that they are true, disclose that members of the Scheduled Castes were insulted and intimidated. Whether such an insult or intimidation was intentional; and whether they were intended to humiliate the complainant; are again matters of investigation by the investigating officer, and not for this Court to examine in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Factual aspects including whether the subject land belongs to the petitioner, whether it is his private property, whether it is enclosed within a compound wall, whether the complaint was filed with oblique motives, whether witnesses were present when the alleged offence was committed, whether the place where the incident occurred was "a place within public view", whether the complaint is merely a ruse to extract money from the petitioner and is an abuse of process of law; whether the complaint was filed with the oblique motive of grabbing the petitioner''s land etc., are all matters for investigation, and should not, ordinarily, be examined in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution more so in cases where the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked for the FIR to be quashed. The criminal complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the alleged offence. As long as the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, the criminal proceedings should not be quashed merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the alleged offence. Padal Venkata Rama Reddy @ Ramu Vs. Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy and Others, Rajesh Bajaj Vs. State NCT of Delhi and Others, Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Ltd. and Others, . The Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. The extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice. Rajesh Bajaj Vs. State NCT of Delhi and Others, State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, ). It would be wholly inappropriate to examine the contention, whether the complaint filed by the petitioner in FIR No. 144 of 2012, was given at 11-20 hours but was wrongly mentioned as 20-15 hours, as this Writ Petition is confined to a challenge to the validity of the complaint registered as FIR No. 145 of 2012, and the validity of FIR No. 144 of 2012 is not the subject matter of challenge in these proceedings.

12. The judgments cited by Smt. Neeraja Sudhakar Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, are of no avail. In Mahesh Sakharam v. State of Maharashtra, 2009 Crl.L.J. 3831 (Bom) the complainant alleged that when he was in the house, and when he came out of the house and was in the courtyard, he was insulted/intimidated by petitioners 1 to 3 at 3.30 am who called him a "Mhardya"; and his family members, and his resident servant, were present when the incident occurred. It was not the complainant''s case that, besides these persons, any other member of the public was either present or had heard the remarks. While examining the question whether, in the facts of the case, the provisions of section 3(1)(x) of the Act were attracted, the Bombay High Court held:-

... A mere presence of the family members, including resident servant, in my opinion, is not sufficient to constitute an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act. Family members or resident-servant cannot be treated as members of public. Members of the public should either be present when the offence is committed and even if the incident was not visible, atleast the utterances or the remarks should be audible to the members of public to constitute an offence under the Act. For instance, if the complainant was insulted/intimidated in a closed cabin, and if the remarks were clearly audible outside the cabin and if they were heard by the public, that would also constitute an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act. Similarly, if no member of public was present when the accused uttered the abuses at a public place, it would not constitute an offence. Therefore, to constitute an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act, the incident should occur in the presence of the public or atleast the utterances should be audible to the member/s of public.

... In the context of the facts of the present case, the word "public" would include members of the public, already in the locality as residents as well as visitors from outside. The members of family or the resident-servant, as observed earlier, cannot be treated as members of public. The complainant in the FIR does not make any reference to either residents in the locality or to any visitors. The incident occurred at 3.30 am, when the entire locality was in fact asleep, and perhaps that seems to be the reason why no person from or outside the locality was present. The learned APP has not placed any material on record to show that the alleged abuses were heard by the neighbours or any other members of the public, nor has the complainant so stated in the FIR.

... The FIR lodged by the complainant in the present case speaks about intimidation to him by applicant nos. 1 to 3 referring him as "Mhardya". Insofar as applicant no. 4 is concerned, he was not even present when the alleged incident occurred. The complainant in the FIR has simply expressed his doubt that applicant nos. 1 to 3 must have committed the offence at the instance of applicant no. 4. Thus, from perusal of the FIR, treating the allegations to be correct, a criminal offence u/s 3(1)(x), in my opinion, is prima facie not made out. In the circumstances, the applicants are entitled for anticipatory bail and hence the following order. In the event of arrest, applicant nos. 1 to 4 be released on bail in the sum of Rs. 5000/- each with one or two sureties to make up the said amount subject to the conditions stipulated in sub-section (2) of Section 438 of Cr.P.C. Further, the applicants are directed to report to the concerned police station on every Wednesday and Saturday between 10 am and 11 am till 10.5.2009 and thereafter on every alternate 8 Saturday between 10 am and 11 am for a period of ninety days or till filing of the chargesheet, whichever is earlier....

(emphasis supplied)

13. Unlike in Mahesh Sakharam 2009 Crl.L.J. 3831 (Bom-HC), where the insult or intimidation had allegedly taken place at 3.30 AM when the entire locality was asleep, in the present case the incident is alleged to have taken place in broad day light at around 9.00 AM. Further the Bombay High Court found that no person from outside the locality was present when the alleged abuse was hurled at a member of the Scheduled Caste. In the present case, however, the complaint refers to the presence of the accused and his henchmen, and the complainant and others. The incident is alleged to have occurred when the complainant was going to his land, in Sy. No. 7 of Sathamrai, for agricultural work. It cannot, therefore, be said with certainty that the alleged offence did not occur in a place within public view.

14. In Mukesh Kumar Saini and ors Vs. State (Delhi Administration), an electrician of DESU, who restored electricity to the house of the petitioners, did not restore electric supply to the rest of the area; when the complainant objected, his brother also came to the spot from his shop; the complainant was allegedly dragged, inside the shop, by the petitioners who also used humiliating words before arrival of the neighbours; when the complainant''s brother raised an alarm, the neighbours rescued him; and the FIR did not initially mention Section 3 of the Act. It is in this factual background that the Delhi High Court held that these words could not be said to have been uttered in the "public view"; the basic ingredients of the offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act were not made out; two cross cases were registered; both the parties were injured; and the possibility of the complainant having a grudge, in getting the petitioners arrested, could not be ruled out. The said judgment has also no application to the facts of the present case.

15. Smt. Neeraja Sudhakar Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would refer to certain documents, which she claims relate to the previous and pending disputes between the accused and the complainant. She would contend that the animus of the complainant is established thereby; and the institution of criminal proceedings by the 5th respondent against the petitioner is clearly malafide. She would place reliance on Rukmini Narvekar Vs. Vijaya Satardekar and Others, State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, ; and Gorige Pentaiah (2008) 12 SCC 531 in this regard.

16. In Rukmini Narvekar Vs. Vijaya Satardekar and Others, the Supreme Court held that while, ordinarily, defence material cannot be looked into by the Court while framing of the charge, there may be rare and exceptional cases where some defence material, when shown to the trial court, would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is absurd, preposterous and concocted; and, in such very rare cases, the defence material can be looked into by the Court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance. In State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, the question which arose for consideration was whether the trial court, at the time of framing of charges, could consider the material filed by the accused. The Supreme Court referred to an earlier judgment of a two judge Bench, in Satish Mehra Vs. Delhi Administration and Another, wherein it was observed that, if the accused succeeds in producing reliable material at the stage of taking cognizance or framing of charges, which might fatally affect even the very sustainability of the case, it would be unjust to suggest that no such material should be looked into by the court at that stage. The Supreme Court held that the object of providing an opportunity to the accused, of making submissions, as envisaged in Section 227 Cr.P.C., is to enable the court to decide whether it is necessary to proceed to conduct the trial; if the materials produced by the accused, even at that early stage, is of unimpeachable character of sterling quality and would clinch the issue, the court should not shut it out saying that such documents need be produced only after wasting a lot more time in the name of trial proceedings; the trial court would be within its power to consider even material which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated in Section 227 Cr.P.C.; and the width of the powers of the High Court, u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of Constitution of India, is unlimited whereunder, in the interests of justice, the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

17. In Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. and Others, , the Supreme Court observed:-

... On careful consideration of the prayer made in the second suit, it becomes abundantly clear that Respondent 3 was not even in possession of the suit property on the date of incident and this fact has not been disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the State of Andhra Pradesh. When Respondent 3 was not even in possession of the land in question, the allegation made in the complaint, that the appellant demolished the wall on 14-6-2004, could not arise. The allegations are totally baseless and without any foundation. On the face of it, it looks that the criminal complaint filed by Respondent 3 was totally false and frivolous. The complaint was filed with an oblique motive. In this view of the matter, charges under Sections 427 and 447 are also wholly illegal and unsustainable in law. In our considered view, in a case of this nature, the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and quashed the complaint....

... The questions before us are: whether the case of the appellants comes under any of the categories enumerated in Minu Kumari and Another Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, Is it a case where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not make out a case against the accused under Sections 420, 467 and 120-B IPC? For determination of the questions it becomes relevant to note the nature of the offences alleged against the appellants, the ingredients of the offences and the averments made in the FIR/complaint....

(emphasis supplied)

18. Unlike in the present case, both in Rukmini Narvekar (2008) 14 SCC 1 and Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568, the question which arose for consideration was whether defence material could be examined by the Court either at the stage of taking cognizance or when charges were being framed. What is sought in this writ proceedings is examination of material produced by the petitioner-accused to adjudicate whether the FIR should be quashed or not. It is only after investigation is complete, and a final report is filed, would the Court decide whether or not to take cognizance. It is only thereafter would the question of the Court framing charges arise. It would be wholly inappropriate for this Court, at the stage of investigation of an FIR, to consider the material produced by the accused and determine whether or not the allegations in the complaint are true or false. In Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. and Others, , the Supreme Court quashed the FIR applying the tests laid down in State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others,

19. The contention of Smt. Neeraja Sudhakar Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the complaint is unclear in various aspects regarding the offence committed u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act; and the document produced by the accused before this Court would establish the falsity of the allegations are matters which cannot be examined at this stage, i.e., when investigation has just commenced. No Court can arrive at a definite, or even a plausible, conclusion based on hazy and vague material placed, by the accused, for evaluation by the Court. It would be hazardous for the Court to venture into the arena of conjectures to find answers. (Goluguri Ramakrishna Reddy 2005(2) ALT (CRL) 401( AP)). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant, in the light of all probabilities, in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable, and on such a premise arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous for the Court to assess the material before it, and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. It is not necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction to quash the proceedings. ( Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary and Others, State of Karnataka Vs. M. Devendrappa and Another,

20. Where the facts are unclear, and the possibility of the atrocity having been committed cannot easily be ruled out, interference by this Court is not called for as it may well render the provisions of the Act, made with the laudable object of protecting the most backward of the backwards from constant harassment and humiliation, illusory. It is not as if the petitioner-accused would suffer irreparable loss and injury if the FIR is not quashed, for it would only result in the complaint being investigated; and if the investigation reveals that the accused has not committed the offence, alleged against him under the Act, he cannot be proceeded against thereafter; and, even otherwise, he would be entitled to avail his legal remedies at that stage. The laudable object of this legislation, enacted in furtherance of Article 46 of the Directive Principles of State Policy, would become redundant if this Court were to interfere for the mere asking, more so at the very inception when an FIR is merely registered, and investigation is at a nascent stage. Suffice it to hold that, while the submissions of Smt. Neeraja Sudhakar Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, are not wholly without merit, these are all matters for the investigation agency to examine, and not for this Court to consider in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

21. The only question which remains for examination is whether the Sub-Inspector of Police can proceed with the investigation in F.I.R. No. 145 of 2012. Rule 7(1) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 stipulates that an offence, committed under the Act, shall be investigated by a police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police; the investigating officer should be appointed by the State Government, or the Director General of Police or the Superintendent of Police after taking into account his experience, sense of ability and justice to perceive the implications of the case, and to investigate it along right lines within the shortest possible time. In view of this statutory stipulation, it is not permissible for the Sub-Inspector of Police to investigate a complaint under the Act. The 4th respondent shall, forthwith, entrust investigation of FIR No. 145 of 2012 to a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Subject to the aforesaid directions, the Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.