@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
G. Bhavani Prasad, J.@mdashHeard Sri N. Naveen Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Dr. Y. Padmavathi, learned standing counsel for the 1st respondent. The alleged non-compliance with the common order in W.P. Nos. 13848 of 1999 and 16677 of 1999, dated 17-07-2007 is the subject of the present contempt case. In the said order, this Court directed the petitioner to give a fresh application to the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad within a period of four weeks from then seeking to fix the compensation in accordance with law, on receipt of which the Corporation may negotiate with the petitioner and fix the compensation within a period of four weeks thereafter. Further consequential directions were also given for payment of the compensation, if arrived at on mutual agreement or initiation of land acquisition proceedings by the Corporation, in the event of failure to arrive at a consensus. The petitioner claims that notwithstanding the said directions, the Corporation did not act on the representations submitted by him since the orders. Though he gave an application as directed by this Court on 17-08-2007 itself, neither negotiations were initiated nor steps for acquiring the land were taken in spite of repeated representations so made. While narrating the sequence of events in detail, the petitioner desired the Commissioner of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation and the Secretary of Municipal Administration Department, Government of A.P. to be (sic).
2. When the question of limitation involved in filing the case was raised during the hearing, Sri N. Naveen Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sabirabi v. B. Obula Reddy and others wherein following the decision in Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur (AIR 1992 SC 902), this Court held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court under Articles 129 and 215 cannot be curtailed by anything in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Division Bench opined that the limitation for initiation of contempt case starts from the date of knowledge of alleged violation of the order of the contempt Court and such initiation of contempt proceedings includes issuing of notice by this Court calling upon the contemnors to show cause. With reference to the facts of the present case, the alleged violation of the order of this Court since the passing of the order and since the submission of the application by the petitioner on 17-08-2007 was within the knowledge of the petitioner throughout and therefore, there is no circumstance that postpones the commencement of the computation of the period of limitation for filing the contempt case since the expiry of the time fixed by this Court for performance after the submission of an application by the petitioner within the period fixed by this Court.
3. While the limitation thus ran throughout, Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others was relied on by Dr. Y. Padmavathi, learned standing counsel wherein after an exhaustive review of the case law on the subject, the Apex Court made it clear that Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not stultify the powers under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution and therefore, like the other provisions of Contempt of Courts Act relating to the extent of punishment, which can be imposed, a reasonable period of limitation can also be provided. The Apex Court further stated that Section 20 applies both to criminal contempt and civil contempt and would also apply to the contempt committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme Court or even a Subordinate Court. The initiation of the contempt proceedings was noted by the Apex Court with reference to the rules framed by all the courts in India to be by the filing of an application or a petition in that behalf and if proceedings are not initiated by filing of an application within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed, then the Court shall not have jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The Supreme Court, therefore, was unambiguous that the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. This declaration of law by the decision is binding on this Court and there is nothing contrary to the view expressed by the Apex Court in the Division Bench decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner as the Division Bench opined that the there is no curtailment of the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court by any provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act even including Section 20 thereof. As the limitation for initiation of the contempt case commenced on the facts of this case on the expiry of the period fixed by this Court for performance by the petitioner and the respondent in the writ and as the initiation of the contempt case by filing the application or by the court issuing notice suo motu did not happen within the period of one year from the date on which the contempt was alleged to have been committed, the effect of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is to prohibit initiation of any contempt proceedings by the court either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of such period. Therefore, irrespective of the merits of the contempt case, it has to fail on the ground of limitation. The institution of this contempt case or the disposal of the same by this order shall not stand in the way of the petitioner pursuing any remedies available to him under law in respect of the subject matter of the writ petition or the contempt case, if he is so entitled to take recourse to them and is so advised. The contempt case is dismissed accordingly. No costs.
