S.R. Nayak, J.@mdashThe petitioner while serving as II Additional Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada was removed from service as a disciplinary measure having found him guilty of a certain misconduct by the impugned Government Order contained in G.O. Ms. No.223 Law (LA & J- Courts-C) Department dated 15-10-1998 on a recommendation made by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
2. The background facts leading to the filing of the writ petition be noted briefly, and they are as follows: The petitioner was appointed as District Munsif on 10-4-1981 and he was promoted as Subordinate Judge through proceedings Roc.No.5887/89-B (Special) dated 4-10-1989 of the High Court and was posted at Wanaparty, Mahabubnagar District. The petitioner took charge of the post on 19-10-1989. Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred to Vijayawada as It Additional Subordinate Judge by the order of the High Court dated 7-6-1990. The petitioner, while serving as II Additional Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada, by the order Roc.No. 159/0-B-Spl. (SC) dated 26-6-1990 issued by the High Court, was placed under suspension pending enquiry into certain irregularities alleged to have been committed by him as a Subordinate Judge at Wanaparty in the disposal of certain land acquisition cases. This action was taken against the petitioner on the basis of the report submitted by the Special Deputy Collector (LA & Rev) SSP, Wanaparty, dated 23-3-1990 and 28-4-1990 and the report of the learned District Judge, Mahaboobnagar dated 3-5-1990. The High Court by the order dated 26-6-1990 appointed an Enquiry Officer to conduct a departmental enquiry on the alleged irregularities in the disposal of certain land acquisition cases. A charge-sheet dated 8-10-1990 consisting of the following charges was served on the petitioner:
Charge No. 1: That while you were working as Sub-Judge at Wanaparty, you have passed orders in Land Acquisition OPs., pertaining to acquired houses fixing compensation at Rs.440.08 paise per sq. metre for the acquired house at the rate of 20.39 for running feet for compound wall and at the rate of Rs.20/- per sq. metre for the house site though the Awards do not contain the said categories of areas, without giving any finding with regard to the extent of each category and thereby giving scope to the claimants to claim excessive compensation of Rs.440.08 sq. metre, as if the entire acquired portion is house portion with a view to benefit the claimants on account of extraneous consideration. Relevant OPs., are OP No. 2265 of 1984 and batch, OP No. 1650 of 1984 and batch, OP No. 2874 of 1984 and batch disposed of on 22-2-1990, 26-4-1990 and 28-3-1990 respectively.
Charge No. 2: While making enquiry in OP No. 1650 of 1984 and batch, 1553 of 1984, 1564 of 1984, 1605 of 1984 you have signed the depositions of PW2 on 6-3-1990 and RW 1 on 26-3-1990, as if you have recorded the depositions of the said witnesses on those days in the open Court in the said OPs., but the said depositions are only carbon copies of the evidence of PW2 and RW1 recorded in OP No. 1628 of 1984 which indicates that you did not record the evidence in the open Court in these OPs., on that dates but used the depositions recorded in OP No. 1628 of 1984 which act of yours unbecoming a Judicial Officer.
Charge No. 3 : In OP No. 130 of 1986 and OP No. 123 of 1986 though it is in the record, that the claimants died, you have pronounced orders, without taking any steps to bring the legal representatives on record as if the said persons are alive, indicating that you have pronounced orders mechanically without going through the records which act of yours is not in consonance of the duties of a judicial officer.
Charge No. 4 : While making enquiry in OP No. 802 of 1985 you wrote a docket order dated 2-2-1990 that OP No. 156 of 1985 (obviously a mistake for OP No. 156 of 1986) clubbing the said OP with OP No. 802 of 1985 though you have already recorded some evidence in OP No. 156 of 1986, that clubbing order was not made in the docket file of OP No. 156 of 1986 on 2-2-1990 on the other hand it is shown in the docket order in OP No. 156 of 1986, dated 17-1-1990 that the case was posted to 28-2-1990 that there is also no docket order in OP No. 156 of 1986 that this OP No. 156 of 1986 was disposed of along with OP No. 802 of 1985, on 22-2-1990 which act of yours obviously shows that you have not gone through the record of OP No,156 of 1986 while delivering judgment in OP No. 802 of 1985 and batch though it is mentioned in the cause title that OP No. 156 of 1986 is also disposed of. The above act of yours would show that you are not diligent in discharge of your duties.
Charge No. 5 : While making enquiries in land acquisition OPs., in different stages some OPs., were clubbed with the main OP after recording the obedience of the petitioners/ claimants some OPs., are clubbed in the main OP some after recording the respondents evidence, some at the argument stage and some after hearing arguments for Example : OP Nos.1650 of 1984, 2265 of 1984, 2874 of 1984, 802 of 1985, 155 of 1986, 310 of 1984, 870 of 1984, 330 of 1984, etc., indicating your anxiousness to dispose of as many as possible with ulterior motive on account of extraneous consideration.
Charge No-6 : While making enquiries in OP No. 155 of 1986 though there is no mention in the memo dated 25-1-1990 to club OP Nos.554 of 1985 and 245 of 1986, in the docket order dated 25-1-1990 it is mentioned that these two OPs are clubbed along with other OPs and there is interpolation in the docket order with regard to these OPs which act of yours is unbecoming of ajudiciat officer.
Charge No. 7 : In OP No. 330 of 1984, an order was passed on 26-12-1989 by clubbing OPs. 339 of 1984, 400 of 1984, 402 of 1984, 414 of 1984 and 415 of 1984 but the judgment does not contain OP 339 of 1984, 400 of 1984 and also 398 of 1984, 401 of 1984 and 403 of 1984 which were clubbed with OP No. 415 of 1984 on 16-9-1987 which acts of yours are unbecoming of judicial officer.
Charge No. 8 : During the enquires in IAs and EPs in the Land Acquisition OPs you have passed orders for attachment of certain amounts which are refundable to the Special Deputy Collector concerned, without passing orders on the cheque petitions filed by the Special Deputy Collector for withdrawal of the amounts, which are pending disposal, with a view to help the claimants for extraneous consideration. For example, OP 502 of 1985, 508 of 1985, 523 of 1985 and the concerned petitions and EPs in those OPs.
Charge No. 9: That you have admitted second claim petitions in some OPs with bogus claims long after the filing of the original OPs not giving a chance to the Special Deputy Collector to file reply statements in some OPs and disposed of the OPs awarding exorbitant compensation for submerged houses basing on such second claim petitions and closed certain land acquisition OPs. In the absence of the concerned Special Deputy Collector and without recording the evidence of the Special Deputy Collector, with ulterior motive for extraneous considerations: For example, OP Nos. 3-25 of 1984, 1442 of 1984, 26 of 1985, 2772 of 1984, 1650 of 1984 etc.,
Charge No. 10 : That you have examined RW1 on 25-4-1990 in five batches of OP Nos. 1553 of 1984, 1605 of 1984, 1628 of 1984, 1564 of 1984 and 1650 of 1984, heard arguments and reserved for orders and on the next day itself, orders were delivered in the above batches of OPs and also in six other batches of OP Nos. 2970 of 1984, 2993 of 1984, 2862 of 1984, 3025 of 1984, 2948 of 1984, 2957 of 1984 approximately in 200 OPs which indicates that you have not gone through the records of each OP and that either you have prepared the orders even before hearing the arguments, or that you have pronounced orders without writing them, which acts of yours are unbecoming of a judicial officer.
Charge No. 11 : You have delivered orders in LAOPs, from December, 1989 to 26-4-1990 in about 2000 OPs., and particularly in the month of April 1990 when usually the Courts will close for Summer Vacation in more than 600 OPs., that too without making proper entries in the diaries and the dockets of each OP which indicates your anxiousness to dispose of number of cases for extraneous consideration. ''
The petitioner submitted his explanation dated 29-11-1990 denying all the charges. Thereafter, charge No. 3 was amended and an additional explanation dated 16-1-1991 was also submitted by the petitioner. The enquiry officer appointed by the High Court, after conducting a regular enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of A.P. Civil Service (CC&A) Rules, submitted his report dated 29-1-1992 holding that none of the charges were proved and that the petitioner had awarded compensation in land acquisition OPs., on the basis of compensation awarded in respect of similar cases by the learned District Judge, Mahabubnagar in OP No. 1036 of 1980 and batch dated 29-4-1981, which was subsequently confirmed by the High Court in AS No. 1903 of 1981 and batch dated 7-11-1988. The High Court, after consideration of the report of the enquiry officer and on perusal and reappraisal of the evidence on record, disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and provisionally concluded in its order dated 26-5-1992 that charge Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 in toto and charge No. 6 to the extent indicated in Annexure A appended to that order are proved. In view of this, the High Court called upon the petitioner in its show-cause notice dated 26-5-1992 as to why the findings of the enquiry officer on charge Nos. l to 7 framed against him should not be disagreed with and why the said charges 1 to 5 and 7 in toto and charge No. 6 to the extent indicated in Annexure A appended to the said notice should not, for the reasons stated in Annexure A, be held proved, and why punishment of dismissal from service should not be imposed upon him, having regard to the gravity of the charges proved against him. The petitioner submitted his reply on 16-11-1992 to the above show-cause notice. The High Court, on consideration of the reply submitted by the petitioner,'' the findings of the enquiry officer and after perusal of the entire record of enquiry, by its order dated 1-2-1993, imposed on the petitioner the punishment of removal from service as a disciplinary measure. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed WP No. 204933 of 1993 for setting aside the order dated 1-2-1993 of the High Court mainly on the ground that in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.Lakshmi Narasimha Chary v. High Court of A.P., and Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 577, the High Court was not competent to impose the penalty of removal from service and, therefore, the order made by it on 1-2-1993 was one without jurisdiction and competence. A Division Bench of this Court, by its order dated 16-7-1996, allowed WP No. 20433 of 1993 on the short ground that in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in T.Lakshmi Narasimha Chary ''x case (supra), the High Court has no competence to make the impugned order removing the petitioner from service. While doing so, the High Court observed that it would be open to the High Court to make appropriate recommendation to the Governor as indicated in the Judgment of the Supreme Court in T.Lakshmi Narasimha Chary''s case (supra). Thereafter, the High Court by its order dated 28-7-1998 directed that the petitioner shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension from 3-4-1993 and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. The matter was reconsidered by the High Court in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of T.Lakshmi Narasimha Chary (supra) and a recommendation was made to the Governor that the petitioner be removed from service as a disciplinary measure, being guilty of charges I to 7. In pursuance of the recommendations of the High Court, the Governor by the impugned Government Order, G.O.Ms.No. 223 dated 15-10-1998 removed the petitioner from service as a disciplinary measure and that order was served on the petitioner on 2-11-1998. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a mercy petition on 14-4-1993 to the learned Chief Justice of the High Court and that petition was rejected by the learned Chief Justice by order dated 4-8-1993. Hence this writ petition assailing the validity of G.O.Ms.No.223 dated 15-10-1998. Opposing the writ petition, the High Court has filed a detailed counter affidavit.
3. Sri Nooty Rama Mohan Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner, with his usual forceful persuasion and vehemence of advocacy contended that the show-cause notice dated 26-5-1992 issued by the High Court disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer and proposing the penalty of dismissal from service as a disciplinary measure is not in accordance with the principles of natural justice and law. In support of this submission, Sri Nooty Rama Mohan Rao placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in
4. Sri C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the High Court, on the other hand, would support the impugned Government Order and maintained that the findings recorded by the High Court disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer are based on relevant materials and evidence on record, and that there is no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the findings recorded by the High Court are perverse. The learned Standing Counsel also maintained that the principles of natural justice are not violated in the instant case and, as a matter of fact, the petitioner was given adequate and reasonable opportunity before the impugned order was passed to have his say in the matter and that the two decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have no bearing on the facts of this case. The learned Standing Counsel also highlighted the scope of judicial review by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters of disciplinary actions and that the High Court can interfere with the disciplinary action taken by the employer only if the High Court finds infraction of mandatory statutory rules or substantive procedural illegalities or irregularities in the conduct of enquiry or violation of principles of natural justice resulting in prejudice to the charged employee and where the punishment imposed by the employer, in the judicious estimation of the Court, is totally disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct proved against the delinquent officer and such penalty shocks the conscience of the Court. The learned Standing Counsel concluded by contending that in the instant case, none of the above grounds were made out warranting interference with the impugned order made by the High Court on administrative side.
5. At the threshold, it needs to be emphasized that the scope of judicial review of decisions of departmental authorities in the domain of disciplinary actions is well settled by a long catena of decisions of the Apex Court and the High Courts. Interference with the decisions of the disciplinary authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, only if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice, or in violation of mandatory statutory regulations prescribing the mode of enquiry or if the decision of the disciplinary authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or if the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, on the face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious and that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. It is also well settled that the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can interfere with the quantum of punishment only where the Court finds that the penalty imposed by the employer on a delinquent employee is totally disproportionate to the gravity and nature of the misconduct proved against him, and such penalty shocks the conscience of the Court. It is also well settled legal position that while reviewing the findings recorded by the enquiry officer/ disciplinary authority, if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then, adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In
"The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: iris concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent Officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence."
The above position has been reiterated by the Apex Court in subsequent decisions, including the one in
6. In the premise of the aforementioned well settled principles, let us proceed to consider the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. It is trite that the High Court, being the disciplinary authority, had undoubtedly power to disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer. This petition is well settled by the decisions of the Apex Court in
"The reasoning of the High Court that when the Disciplinary Committee differed from the finding of the Inquiry Officer it is imperative to discuss the materials in detail and contest the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer, is quite unsound and contrary to the established principles in administrative law. The Disciplinary Committee was neither an appellate nor a revisional body over the Inquiry Officer''s report. It must be borne in mind that the inquiry is primarily intended to afford the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and also to afford the punishing authority with the materials collected in such inquiry as well as the views expressed by the Inquiry Officer thereon. The findings of the Inquiry Officer are only his opinion on the materials, but such findings are noi binding on the disciplinary authority as the decision making authority is the punishing authority and, therefore, that authority can come to its own conclusion, of course bearing in mind the views expressed by the Inquiry Officer. But it is not necessary that the disciplinary authority should "discuss materials in detail and contest the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer." Otherwise the position of the disciplinary authority would get relegated to a subordinate level."
It is well settled that the disciplinary authority may agree with the enquiry report or may differ, either wholly or partially from the conclusions recorded in the report. In H.C. Goel''s case (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the following principle-
"If the report makes findings in favour of the public servant and the Government disagrees with the said findings and holds that the charges framed against the public servant are prima facie proved, the Government should decide provisionally what punishment should be imposed on the public servant and proceed to issue a second notice against him in that behalf."
A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank Case (supra), relying on the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Bimal Kumar ''s Pandit''s case (supra),
"...whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favorable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer."
In Yoginad D. Bagde''s case (supra), the Supreme Court, on consideration of the provisions of Rule 9 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 held as under:
"In view of the provisions contained in the statutory rule extracted above, it is open to the Disciplinary Authority either to agree with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority or disagree with those findings. If it does not agree with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, it may record its own findings. Where the Inquiring Authority has found the delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and the Disciplinary Authority agrees with those findings, there would arise no difficulty. So also, if the Inquiring Authority has held the charges proved, but the Disciplinary Authority disagrees and records a finding that the charges were not established, there would arise no difficulty. Difficulties have arisen in all those cases in which the Inquiring Authority has recorded a positive finding that the charges were not established and the delinquent officer was recommended to be exonerated, but the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with hose findings and recorded its own findings that the charges were established and the delinquent officer was Viable to be punished. This difficulty relates to the question of giving an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer at that stage. Such an opportunity may either be provided specifically by the rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution or the Disciplinary Authority may, of its own, provide such an opportunity. Where the rules are in this regard silent and the Disciplinary Authority also does not give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer and records findings, different from those of the Inquiring Authority that the charges were established, "an opportunity of hearing" may have to be read into the rule by which the procedure for dealing with the Inquiring Authority''s report is provided principally because it would be contrary to the principles of natural justice if a delinquent officer, who has already been held to be "not guilty" by the Inquiring Authority, is found "guilty" without being afforded an opportunity of hearing on the basis of the same evidence and material on which a finding of "not guilty" has already been recorded.
Thus, it becomes imperative on the part of the disciplinary authority to issue show-cause notice in the event of it disagreeing wilh the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, either wholly or partially, recording its provisional conclusions in the notice in order to giving the delinquent employee a reasonable opportunity to have his say in the matter. In the instant case, it is not the case of the petitioner that no show-cause notice was issued to him by the High Court before it recommended to the Governor for his removal from service as a disciplinary measure. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the composite notice dated 26-5-1992 issued by the High Court disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer and proposing the penalty of removal from service as a disciplinary measure is violative of principles of natural justice. This contention is grounded on the assumption that before issuing the notice dated 26-5-1992; the High Court had made up its mind as regards the punishment to be imposed on the petitioner-delinquent, and such an action tantamounted to condemning a person unheard. This reason flowing from the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in our considered opinion, is totally misconceived. Suffice it to state that the findings recorded by the High Court in its notice dated 26-5-1992 as reflected in the Annexure A appended thereto and the punishment of dismissal from service proposed as a disciplinary measure were only provisional/tentative and not final. The very fact that the High Court, before recommending removal of the petitioner from service as a disciplinary measure, thought it necessary to issue notice to the petitioner to have his say in the matter, clearly indicates that the High Court wanted to give a fair opportunity to the petitioner-delinquent judicial officer to have his say in the matter as regards findings on charge Nos. 1 to 7 as well as the quantum of punishment. In that view of the matter, the judgment of the Apex Court in Punjab National Bank case (supra) and Yoginad D. Bagde''s case (supra), on which the learned Counsel for the petitioner had placed strong reliance, are of no help to the petitioner. Moreover, those judgments are distinguishable on facts too.
7. In Punjab National Bank case (supra), the main contention was that the disciplinary authority, who had chosen to disagree with the conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer could not have come to adverse conclusions without giving the delinquents an opportunity of being heard and the orders passed against the delinquents were, therefore, liable to be quashed. The Court, as a matter of fact, found that the disciplinary authority chose to disagree with the conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer without hearing the delinquents. However, it was contended on behalf of the disciplinary authority viz., Management of the Punjab National Bank, that Punjab National Bank Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 did not require an opportunity of being heard being given to the delinquent officers when the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the enquiry authority once the enquiring authority had given a hearing to them. It was also contended by the Management of the Bank that the requirement of giving such hearing could not be read into the above Regulations and no prejudice could be said to have been caused to the respondents-delinquent officers, inasmuch as the enquiring authority had given full opportunity to them. The Apex Court, while rejecting the above contention of the Management of the Bank, placing reliance on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in B. Karnuakar''s case (supra), held that it would not stand to reason that when the findings in favour of the delinquent-officers are proposed to be over-turned by the disciplinary authority, no opportunity should be granted to the delinquent-officers. The Court held that if the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent-officer, but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then the disciplinary authority which is deciding against the delinquent-officer must give him an opportunity of being heard, for otherwise, he would be condemned unheard. In the instant case, the High Court by issuing the show-cause notice dated 26-5-1992 gave a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to have his say in the matter as regards provisional/tentative findings recorded by the High Court set out in the Annexure A appended to the notice and also the provisional/tentative penalty proposed in the notice. Therefore, it cannot be said that the High Court had violated the principles of natural justice or doctrine of fair pay in action while disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer or in recommending the penalty of removal from service as a disciplinary measure, to the Governor.
8. The other judgment of the Apex Court in Yoginath D. Bagde ''s case (supra), cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is also of no help to the petitioner. In that case, the District Judge (enquiry officer) had recorded the findings that the charges were not proved. These findings were submitted to the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court which disagreed with those findings and issued a notice to the appellant-delinquent requiring him to show-cause why he should not be dismissed from service. In that case, it was true that along with the show-cause notice the reasons on the basis of which the Disciplinary Committee had disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer were communicated to the appellant, but the Disciplinary Committee, instead of forming tentative opinion, had come to a final conclusion that the charge against the appellant were established. Along with the show-cause notice, a copy of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer as also the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Committee for disagreeing with those findings were communicated to the appellant. The Supreme Court, as a matter of fact, found that the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Committee are not provisional or tentative, but they are final conclusions, and since final conclusions are reached by the Disciplinary Committee without giving any opportunity of hearing to the appellant, the Court held that the principles of natural justice as laid down by the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank case (supra) were violated. The facts of this case are distinguishable. In the instant case, in the show-cause notice dated 26-5-1992, the High Court while expressing its inclination to take different view of the findings, materials and circumstances of the case in respect of charge Nos. 1 to 7, called upon the petitioner-delinquent to show-cause within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the notice. The operative portion of the notice dated 26-5-1992 reads as follows:
"Accordingly, Sri S.C. Azeemuddin, the Charged Officer is hereby called upon to show-cause within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the proceedings by him as to why:
(a) the findings of the Enquiry Officer under charges 1 to 7 framed against him, should not be disagreed with, and why the said charges 1 to 5 and 7 in toto and charge No. 6 to the extent indicated in Annexure-A appended to this notice should not, for the reasons stated in the said Annexure-A, be held proved; and
(b) the punishment of dismissal from service should not be imposed upon him, in view of the gravity of the charges now held proved against him.
A copy of the Enquiry Officer''s report is herewith enclosed. (Annexure-B)"
A careful reading of the show-cause notice dated 26-5-1992 makes it very clear that the opinion formed by the High Court as reflected in Annexure A is only tentative and not final and, therefore, the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in Yoginad D. Bagde''s case (supra) has no application to the facts of this case. The High Court, only after consideration of the reply of the petitioner to the show-cause notice dated 26-5-1992, recorded its final findings and recommended to the Governor to impose the penalty of removal from service as a disciplinary measure on the petitioner-delinquent judicial officer. The procedure adopted by the High Court is in perfect conformity with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases noticed above.
9. We do not agree with the contention of Sri Nooty Rama Mohan Rao that the findings recorded by the High Court disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer are perverse or that there was no valid basis for the High Court to disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer. As already pointed out supra this Court while reviewing the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner cannot go into the question of adequacy or sufficiency of evidence on the basis of which the findings are recorded. The only thing to be seen by the Court is whether the findings recorded by the High Court are based on some legally permissible substantive evidence or not, and that if the Court finds that the findings are grounded on some legally permissible substantive evidence, then, there will not be any scope for the Court to interfere with the disciplinary action on that count. After going through the materials placed before us, we are of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by the High Court on charge Nos. I to 7 cannot be said to be perverse for want of evidence.
10. As regards charge No. 1, the evidence of PW1 discloses that the awards Exs.Pl to P3 passed by the LAO do not contain areas of the three categories and that in the relevant judgments, Exs.A4 to A6 the petitioner did not give any finding with regard to the extent of each category. The reason given by the High Court not to accept the plea of the petitioner that the extent of each category given by the claimants in their claim statements are not disputed by the land acquisition authorities and, therefore, he awarded compensation for the three categories mentioned in the claim statements, cannot be said to be perverse, because, it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the correct position by calling for the appropriate evidence and to give a finding on the claims pleaded by the claimants in the claim statements based on sound reasoning and the Court is not expected to allow the claims of the claimants without there being any evidence in support of such claim.
11. The second charge framed against the petitioner is that he did not record the evidence of PW2 on 6-3-1990 and RW1 on 26-3-1990 in OP Nos. 1650 of 1984 and batch in open Court, but used carbon copies of the evidence of PW2 and RW1 recorded in another OP No. 1628 of 1984 and that this act is unbecoming of a judicial officer. The plea of the petitioner is that both the contesting parties agreed that nothing more needs to be added and therefore the carbon copies of the depositions in the earlier OP were used. This version of the petitioner was not acceptable to the High Court, because, in its opinion, and according to us quite correctly, the very manner in which the evidence was recorded is ex-facie illegal and that particular procedure will not become legal simply because both the parties did agree for such a course of action. The material procedural infirmity pointed out by the High Court could not be cured by the consent of the parties nor the fact of administering of oath to the concerned before putting them to the contents of the copies of the depositions makes the manner in which it was recorded any more legal. Similarly, the plea of the petitioner that the said practice of obtaining depositions was in vogue and that this predecessors also followed the same procedure is also untenable. Therefore, the finding recorded by the High Court on charge No. 2 cannot be said to be perverse or based on no evidence.
12. As regards charge No. 3, it is not in dispute that the two OPs., mentioned in the charge i.e., OP Nos. 130 of 1986 and 123 of 1986 were disposed of by the petitioner along with main OP No. 805 of 1985 on 22-2-1990. The relevant docket entry in OP No. 130 of 1986 dated 27-3-1986 shows that the notices were "returned reporting the death of the claimants. The subsequent docket entries in the said OP, disclose that from 15-7-1986 it was coming up for steps till 19-8-1987. On 25-9-1987, it was posted for enquiry to different dates and by the time the petitioner took charge, the said OP was coming up for enquiry. Similarly, the entries in the docket sheet in OP No. 123 of 1986 denotes that the said OP was coming up for enquiry from 25-10-1987. The petitioner disposed of the said two OPs, on 22-2-1990 along with OP No. 802 of 1985. The plea of the petitioner that for nearly two years before he took charge i.e., from 25-9-1987 onwards, the two OPs., were listed for enquiry, if did not, therefore, occur to him that the claimants in the two OPs., have since died and the legal representatives of the deceased claimants are yet to be brought on record, is untenable, because PW3, the Steno-Typist to the petitioner in her evidence has stated that the petitioner passed orders after going through the records, in that whenever he dictated the orders, he would keep the concerned bundle with him and only after perusing the file he used to dictate the orders. When the petitioner, as per the deposition of PW3, meticulously, gone through the case records before dictating the orders, it is incomprehensible as to why he did not notice the notings on the docket sheet. The only plausible explanation in this regard would be that petitioner was dictating the common order in the batch OPs, after going through the record in the main OP only and that he was either not perusing the records of the OPs, which were clubbed with the main OP or was perusing other material except the docket sheet. In that view of the matter, the finding of the High Court on charge No. 3 cannot be condemned as perverse.
13. Charge No. 4 relates to clubbing ofOP No. 156 of 1986 with OP No. 302 of 1985 and disposing it off along with OP No. 802 of 1985 on 22-2-1990. The material allegation in this charge against the petitioner is that the did not pass clubbing order on the docket of OP No. 156/86 on 2-2-1990 and on the other hand it is noted on the docket sheet of OP No. 156 of 1986 under date 17-1-1990 that it was posted to 28-2-1990 and that he did not also pass any order on the docket sheet of OP No. 156/86 that it was disposed of along with OP No. 80/85 on 22-2-1990 and that the aforesaid acts obviously show that the petitioner has not gone through the record of OP No. 156/86 while delivering the judgment in OP No. 802/85 and batch though it is mentioned in the cause title that OP No. 156/86 is also disposed of, and the petitioner was, therefore, not diligent in discharge of his duties. The docket in OP No. 156/86 (Ex.P16) discloses that OP Nos. 537/85, 541/85/542/85, 118/86, 254/86, 139/86 and 128/86 were clubbed with OP No. 156/86 on 20-4-1986 and that PWs.1 and 2 were examined on 5-6-1986, Exs.Al and A2 were marked and the petitioner''s evidence was closed. When the matter stood thus, mysteriously, two entries are made on the docket (Ex.P16) under dates 28-2-1990 and 2-2-1990 in that order and neither of them bear the signature of the petitioner. On 17-1-1990, OP No. 146/ 86 was adjourned finally on the ground that ''respondent not ready''. It bears the signature of the petitioner. But curiously on 28-2-1990, it was noted RNR - 2-2-1990. On 2-2-1990 underneath the docket entry dated 28-2-1990, it was noted "on the memo this case is clubbed with main OP No. 802/ 85 by modifying the earlier clubbing order". It is incomprehensible and ununderstandable as how the said OP which on 17-1-1990 was adjourned to 28-2-1990 could be adjourned on a later date to 2-2-1990. There is absolutely no evidence on record to presume that the said OP was preponed lo 2-2-1990 from 28-2-1990. It is trite that the docket sheet should be written and signed by the Presiding Officer. It is the duty of the Presiding Officer, whenever he passes orders clubbing various OPs., with the main OP to pass orders to that effect on the main OP as also on the dockets of each and every OP which is clubbed with the main OP and his duty does not cease by writing the order on the docket sheet of the main OP only. He is also expected to necessarily scrutinize meticulously as to whether such orders are written and signed on the docket sheets of each and every OP which are clubbed with the main OP. The High Court, after considering tlie glaring omissions and commissions committed by the petitioner held that charge No. 4 is proved and disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer. The finding recorded by the High Court, therefore, cannot be condemned as perverse.
14. As regards charge No. 5, the finding recorded by the High Court that the petitioner had no inclination to pass orders judiciously, but was eager to add some more OPs whenever any advocate approached him for clubbing and went on clubbing such OPs., and passed orders granting the same compensation to the claimants in all such clubbed OPs., is also based on acceptable materials and sound reasoning. It is found that the petitioner clubbed OPs., indiscriminately and irrationally at various stages on the mere asking of the concerned advocates and granted compensation uniformly in respect of all the houses that were submerged and such OPs, were disposed of by common judgment without application of mind.
15. The finding recorded by the High Court on charge No. 6 is also based on legally permissible materials and evidence and sound reasoning and they do not call for interference by the Court. Charge No. 6 relates to clubbing of OP Nos. 554/85 and 245/86 with OP No. 155/86. In the clubbing memo, Ex.P20, filed in OP No. 155/86, there is no mention of OP Nos. 554/85 and 245/ 86. Nevertheless, the said memo was allowed by order dated 25-1-1990. In another clubbing memo Ex.P21, filed on 2-2-1990 on OP No. 155/86, there is no mention of OP Nos. 554/85 and 245/86. However, in the docket order dated 25-1-1990 in OP No. 155/86, i.e., Ex.P22 the two OPs. 554/85 and 245/86 are clubbed in interpolation in between the lines and the said OPs were also disposed of along with OP No. 155/86 by judgment dated 5-2-1990. The petitioner, who examined himself as DW2 in the enquiry, in his deposition has stated that after Ex.P22 docket order was passed by him, another memo, Ex.D2, was filed by the Counsel for claimants on the same date i.e., 25-1-1990 to club OP Nos. 554/85 and 245/86 with OP No. 155/86, that the same was allowed, but by mistake that memo, Ex.D2, was kept in the file of OP No. 554/85 and after filing of the said memo he added the said OPs in the batch OP No. 155/ 86. It is true that Ex.D2 memo was filed on 25-1-1990 for clubbing OP No. 554/85 and 245/86 with main OP No. 155/86. It is also true that on the said memo the petitioner passed orders on 25-1-1990 allowing the memo after hearing the learned Government Pleader. However, in the circumstances stated above, the appropriate course for the petitioner would have been to pass another order underneath Ex.P22 order, to the effect that in view of the order passed by him on Ex.D2 memo, the two OPs., 554/85 and 245/86 are also clubbed with main OP No. 155/86 and batch instead of interpolating in his earlier order Ex.P22 by adding these two OPs in between the lines. In that view of the matter, no exception can be taken to the finding recorded by the High Court that the procedure followed by the petitioner is irregular.
16. As regards charge No. 7, it needs to be emphasized that Ex.D18 is the memo filed in OP No. 415/84 on 20-8-1987 praying the Court to club OP Nos. 398/84, 401/84, 403/84 and 414/84 with OP No. 415/84. The said memo was allowed by order dated 16-9-1987 (Ex.D18). Ex.D4 is the petition filed on 26-12-1989 requesting to club OP Nos. 399/84, 400/84, 415/84 and two other OPs with OP No. 330/84 and batch. By his order passed on the same day viz., 26-12-1989, the petitioner allowed the said petition for clubbing the said 5 OPs with OP No. 330/84. It may be seen that OP No. 398/ 84, 401/84 and 403/84 were clubbed by order dated 16-9-1987 (Ex.D18) with OP No. 415/84 and OP No. 415/84 was clubbed with OP No. 330/84 and batch by the order passed by the petitioner on 26-12-1989 i.e., Ex.D4. These three OPs viz., OP Nos. 398/ 84, 401/84 and 403/84 which were already clubbed with OP No. 415/84 had to go along with OP No. 415/84 and be included in the OP No. 330/84 and batch. But, curiously in the judgment delivered by the petitioner on 29-12-1989 in OP No. 330/84 and batch, only OP No. 415/84 figures and not the other OPs. The reason given by the High Court not to accept the plea of the petitioner that while dictating the judgment in OP No. 330/84 and batch, he found, on scrutiny of records, that the subject-matter of OP No. 399/84 concerns compensation for lands only while the other OP Nos. 330/ 84 and batch pertain to compensation for submerged structures and, therefore, he considered it improper to pass award in OP No. 399/84 along with OP No. 330/84 and batch and accordingly he delinked OP No. 399/84 from the rest of the batch, is quite sound and reasonable. We say this because the petitioner vide his order under Ex.D4 had clubbed OP No. 400/84 with OP No. 330/84 and batch. Further, it is seen that in the judgment passed by petitioner on 28-12-1989 in OP Nos. 330/84 and batch, only OP No. 415/84 figures along with other OPs but the three OPs i.e., OP Nos. 398/84, 401 and 403/84, which were clubbed by virtue of the order Ex.D4, are not included. It is further seen that the petitioner did not pass any order on the docket of main OP No. 330/84 on the date of the delivery of the judgment about the delinking of OP.No.339/84, 400/84 etc., and separation of OP Nos. 398, 401 and 403/84 from OP No. 415/84. Thus, the findings recorded by the High Court on charge No. 7 also cannot be said to be perverse.
17. The Courts have held and reiterated repeatedly that while reviewing the findings of the disciplinary authority, the Court cannot go into the adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence on the basis of which such findings are recorded. The Court will interfere only in a case where it finds that the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority are based on no evidence. That is not the situation obtaining in the instant case. We are satisfied that the findings recorded by the High Court on the administrative side on charges 1 to 7 are based on legally permissible substantive evidence and sound reasoning.
18. This takes us to the last contention of Mr. Nooty Rama Mohan Rao that the penalty or removal from service imposed on the petitioner as a disciplinary measure is very harsh, totally disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct committed by him and, therefore, it is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We do not agree with this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The Apex Court in number of pronouncements highlighted the unique quality of judicial service and showed how the judicial service is distinctly different from other services under the State. At whatever level they may be, the Judges represent the State and its authority unlike the bureaucracy or the members of the other services. Strictly speaking, judicial service is not merely an employment nor the Judges merely employees. The Judges, regardless of their ranks, whether they are Munsifs or the Judges of the Apex Court, exercise sovereign judicial power and the Judges are holders of public office of great trust and responsibility. The Apex Court in Shasikant S. Patil''s case (supra) held-
"... If a judicial officer "tips the scales of justice its rippling effect would be disastrous and deleterious". A dishonest judicial personage is an oxymoron..."
K. Ramaswamy, J., speaking for the Bench of the Supreme Court in High Court of
"The lymph nodes (cancerous cells) of corruption constantly keep creeping into the vital veins of the judiciary and the need to stem it out by judicial surgery lies on the judiciary itself by its self-imposed or corrective measures or disciplinary action under the doctrine of control enshrined in Articles 235, 124(6) of the Constitution. It would, therefore, be necessary that there should be constant vigil by the High Court concerned on its subordinate judiciary and self-introspection."
19. An independent judiciary is one of the basic features of the Constitution. The Indian Constitution has jealously guarded independence of judiciary. In order to protect and guarantee independence of judiciary, the High Courts are vested with the disciplinary control over the members of judicial service exclusively under Article 235 of the Constitution, which power includes the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings, suspend them pending enquiries and impose punishment on them other than punishments in the form of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or termination of services of judicial officer. It is also well settled that though the High Court is not the competent authority to impose the penalty of dismissal/removal/reduction in rank as a disciplinary measure on a delinquent judicial officer, the recommendations made by the High Courts to the Governor bind the Governor and he is left with no discretion to pass orders contrary to the recommendations of the High Courts. The Constitution has trusted and invested a significant constitutional function in the High Court to regulate and control the conduct and functions of the members of judicial service. Therefore, when such a constitutional function was exercised by the High Court on administrative side, any judicial review thereon should be made with great care and circumspection by strictly confining to the parameters set by the Apex Court in its pronouncements noticed above. Although this* Court has the power to interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed on a delinquent judicial officer if the penalty imposed by the High Court on administrative side shocks the conscience of the Court, in the sense that such penalty being totally disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct committed by the judicial officer, in the instant case, we do not find such a situation which could persuade us to step in and reduce the penalty though Sri Nooty Rama Mohan Rao appealed to us with emotional touch to reduce the penalty at least to compulsory retirement. The charges proved against the petitioner-delinquent judicial officer cannot be said to be trivial. The charges are grave in nature and if the integrity and credibility of the institution is of paramount importance and consideration to the High Court to protect the institution by sustaining the trust and confidence of our masters, the People, then, it becomes necessary for the High Court and the State to resort to disciplinary and/or judicial surgery to pluck and weed out the unscrupulous personnel from the body of Judges. No compromise can be made in that regard. Misplaced sympathy in the decision-making is the worst enemy of a judicious mind.
20. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
