B. Seshasayana Reddy, J.@mdashThese two appeals arise out of the common judgment dated 15-12-2006 passed in O.S. No. 4 of 1999 and O.S. No. 89 of 2001 on the file of III Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad.
2. The material facts may be briefly stated as follows:
Smt. Gadepalli Saraswathi and Gadepalli Shankaraiah are wife and husband. They have four sons and a daughter viz., G. Rama Rao, G. Jaya Prakash, G. Kishore, G. Vasudev and V. Lalitha. G. Shankaraiah and his four sons constituted a partnership firm in the name and style of M/s Karunasri Printers under a deed of partnership dated 14.12.1984. The partnership firm came to be reconstituted from time to time. The latest deed of partnership is dated 5.9.1994, copy of which has been exhibited as Ex.P-12. G. Vasudev, the youngest son died in the year 1997. G. Saraswathi purchased a house bearing No. 79/SRT, New Municipal No. 1-8-814, situated at Prakash Nagar, Begumpet, Secunderabad under Ex.A-1 registered sale deed dated 20.12.1968. G. Shankaraiah purchased land admeasuring 386 square yards in Survey No. 15 situated at Chandulal Bowli, Tadbund, Secunderabad under a registered sale deed in the year 1991 and constructed a house therein. Subsequently he disposed of the house constructed by him. While so, G. Saraswathi issued Ex.A-2 notice dated 1.4.1998 to G. Jaya Prakash demanding him to vacate the house bearing No. 79/SRT, New Municipal No. 1-8-814, situated at Prakash Nagar, Begumpet, Secunderabad. G. Jaya Prakash issued Ex.A-3 reply notice dated 28.4.1998 alleging that the property in his occupation is a joint family property and the said property fell to his share in the oral partition among the members of the joint family. G. Saraswathi filed O.S. No. 4 of 1999 against G. Jaya Prakash for eviction and recovery of possession of the suit schedule house i.e., No. 79/SRT, New Municipal No. 1-8-814, situated at Prakash Nagar, Begumpet, Secunderabad. According to G. Saraswathi, she permitted her son G. Jaya Prakash-defendant to occupy the premises in the month of June, 1997 on a promise to vacate the same by December, 1997. Since G. Jaya Prakash-defendant failed to vacate the said premises despite her demand by way of Ex.A-2 notice dated 1.4.1998, she chose to file the suit with the prayer stated supra. G. Jaya Prakash filed O.S. No. 89 of 2001 against G. Shankaraiah, G. Saraswathi, G. Rama Rao, G. Kishore Kumar for partition of the suit schedule properties and dissolution of the firm M/s Karunasri Printers and rendition of accounts. According to him, the house properties standing in the name of G. Shankaraiah and G. Saraswathi, which are more fully described as schedules I and II in O.S. No. 89 of 2001 are the joint family properties and, therefore, he is entitled to 1/4th share therein. It is also his plea that the partnership firm viz., M/s Karunasri Printers is not yet dissolved and therefore it is required to be dissolved and accounts are to be settled through the process of court. The reliefs sought for by G. Jaya Prakash as plaintiff in O.S. No. 89 of 2001 are:
1) For partition of schedules I and II properties by metes and bounds and to allot 1/4th share to the plaintiff;
2) For dissolution of partnership firm under the name and style of M/s Karunasri Printers, Tilleri road, Secunderabad and rendition of accounts;
3) For appointment of commissioner for passing final decree dissolution of partnership firm and rendition of accounts and to pay to the plaintiff his 1/4th share of profit and loss;
4) For costs of the suit;
5) Such other relief as the Court may deem fit and proper.
G. Shankaraiah and G. Saraswathi filed written statement in O.S. No. 89 of 2001 resisting the claim of G. Jaya Prakash. According to them, M/s Karunasri Printers is not a joint family concern and it is a partnership business and the share of partners in the partnership business is specified in the deed of partnership. It is also their case that the partnership business came to be dissolved w.e.f. 31.3.1997 under Ex.A-30 deed of dissolution dated 13.6.1997. They took the plea in the written statement that G. Jaya Prakash and his three brothers purchased house properties independently in the year 1985, copies of which have been exhibited as Exs.A-26 to A-29, and no properties have been acquired by the partners jointly. Pending the suits Smt. G. Saraswathi died. G. Shankaraiah and Smt. V. Lalitha came on record as plaintiffs 2 and 3 in O.S. No. 4 of 1999 as her legal representatives basing on Ex.A-35 WILL dated 6.6.1997. They claim that G. Saraswathi executed Ex.A-35 WILL dated 6.6.1997 bequeathing the suit property in their favour. As per Ex.A-35 WILL dated 6.6.1997, G.Shankaraiah has life interest and whereas Smt. V. Lalitha has absolute rights over the suit schedule house. G. Jaya Prakash claimed the suit schedule property No. 79/SRT, New Municipal No. 1-8-814, situated at Prakash Nagar, Begumpet, Secunderabad under an unregistered WILL dated 16.10.2005, which has been exhibited as Ex.B-29.
3. The learned Senior Civil Judge framed the following issues and additional issues in O.S. No. 4 of 1999:
1) Whether the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property?
2) Whether the suit schedule property fell to the share of the defendant in the oral partition among the members of the joint family as contended by the defendant?
3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the eviction of the defendant from the suit premises?
4) To what relief?
Additional issues:
1) Whether the will dated 16.10.2005 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff?
2) Whether the will dated 6.6.1997 was cancelled by the will dated 16.10.2005 and the same is true, valid and binding on the defendant?
The issues framed in O.S. No. 89 of 2001 are:
1) Whether the item No. 1 of the suit schedule property is the exclusive property of Dl?
2) Whether the Item No. II of the schedule property is the exclusive property of D2?
3) Whether the partnership firm M/s Karunasri Printers dissolved w.e.f. 31.3.1997 under dissolution deed dated 13.6.1997?
4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the partition and separate possession of the item No. 1 and II of the schedule property?
5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of dissolution of the partnership firm?
6) To what relief?
Both the suits came to be clubbed and evidence came to be recorded in O.S. No. 4 of 1999. On behalf of the plaintiffs, 3 witnesses were examined as P.Ws.1 to 3 and 35 documents were marked as Exs.A-1 to A-35. On behalf of the defendant, 3 witnesses were examined as DWs.1 to 3 and 31 documents were marked as Exs.D-1 to D-31. On considering the material brought on record and on hearing learned Counsel for the parties, the learned Senior Civil Judge, decreed the suit being O.S. No. 4 of 1999 while dismissing the suit being O.S. No. 89 of 2001, by a common judgment dated 15.12.2006. Hence, these two appeals. More precisely C.C.C.A. No. 153 of 2009 is filed against the judgment in O.S. No. 89 of 2001 and C.C.C.A. No. 13 of 2007 is filed against O.S. No. 4 of 1999. Gadepalli Jaya Prakash is the appellant in both the appeals. O.S. No. 4 of 1999 relates to one house property and O.S. No. 89 of 2001 relates to two house properties. House property situated at Chadulal Bouli came to be disposed of by G.Shankaraiah much prior to the filing of the suits. The purchaser is not a party to the suit being O.S. No. 89 of 2001. Therefore, the lis survives only in respect of house bearing No. 79/SRT, Prakash Nagar, Begumpet, Secunderabad, which is the subject matter in O.S. No. 4 of 1999. Whatever may be the pleas advanced by G. Shankaraiah/appellant, in both the appeals, his claim over the house property bearing No. 79/SRT, Prakashnagar, Begumpet, Secunderabad is based on Ex.B-29 unregistered WILL dated 16.10.2005 allegedly executed by G. Saraswathi. Whereas G. Shankaraiah and Smt. V. Lalitha claim the same property under Ex.A-35 registered WILL dated 6.6.1997 executed by G. Saraswathi. At this juncture, at the cost of repetition I may state that G. Jayaprakash is one of the sons of G. Saraswthi and whereas G. Shankaraiah and Smt. V. Lalitha are husband and daughter respectively of G. Saraswathi. Execution of Ex.A-35 WILL is not disputed by G.Shankaraiah-appellant. Even otherwise, the subsequent WILL (Ex.B-29) propounded by G. Shankaraiah-appellant contains a recital with regard to execution of Ex.A-35 by G. Saraswathi. The beneficiaries under Ex.A-35 WILL examined one of the attestors of the WILL as P.W.3.
4. Heard Sri. A.V. Seshasai, learned Counsel .appearing for the appellant in C.C.C.A. No. 13 of 2007 and C.C.C.A. No. 153 of 2009 and Sri. M. Adinarayana Raju, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 in C.C.C.A. No. 153 of 2009 and respondents 2 and 3 in C.C.C.A. No. 13 of 2007.
5. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the deceased-1st plaintiff prior to filing O.S. No. 4 of 1999 got issued a legal notice demanding the appellant to vacate the premises and thereupon the appellant got issued Ex.A-3 reply notice denying the title of the deceased-1st plaintiff and in which case the suit filed by the deceased-1st plaintiff for possession without seeking declaration of title is not maintainable. He would further submit that the deceased-1st plaintiff was admitted in NIMS hospital in September 2005 and after discharge from the hospital, she joined with the appellant and stayed till her death and that the deceased-1st plaintiff out of love and affection and keeping in view of the appellant being in occupation of the property since quite a long period, size of his family and injustice done to him in distribution of the assets of the partnership firm, executed Ex.B-29 WILL dated 16.10.2005 bequeathing her house property in favour of the appellant and that the lower court failed to consider these facts and thereby erred in decreeing the suit being O.S. No. 4 of 1999 and dismissing O.S. No. 89 of 2001. A further submission has been made by learned Counsel that the appellant proved Ex.B-29 WILL dated 16.10.2005 in accordance with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act by examining the attesting witnesses as DWs.2 and 3 and that the trial court committed serious error in discarding the evidence of DWs.2 and 3 on flimsy grounds. That the suit schedule properties in O.S. No. 89 of 2001 were acquired out of the income derived from the partnership business and therefore the appellant is entitled to 1/4th share in the suit schedule properties. That the very fact the deceased-1st plaintiff in O.S. No. 4 of 1999 died at the house of the appellant indicates that the deceased-1st plaintiff got complete satisfaction of the services rendered by the appellant at the fag end of her life and as a reciprocation of the services rendered by the appellant and his family members, conveyed the house property standing in her name in favour of the appellant by executing Ex.B-29 WILL and therefore, O.S. No. 4 of 1999 is liable to be dismissed. In support of his contentions, reliance has been placed on the following decisions:
1)
2)
3) Sridevi v. Jayaraja Shetty 2005(2) ALD 99 (SC)
4) Pentakota Satyanarayana v. Pentakota Seetharatnam 2005(6) ALD 35 (SC)
6. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 in C.C.C.A. No. 13 of 2007 and 1st respondent in C.C.C.A. No. 153 of 2009 contends that the deceased/1st plaintiff was disputing the claim of the appellant by tooth and nail and she was discarded by the appellant and thereby she was compelled to stay along with her husband in a senior citizen home till few days prior to her death and indeed she was shifted to NIMS hospital from senior citizen home when she sustained injury and after few days of her treatment as an inpatient in NIMS hospital, she was taken to her own house where she breathed her last. Such is the situation; it is highly unbelievable and improbable that she developed affection and soft corner towards the appellant to cancel the earlier WILL and execute Ex.B-29 WILL conveying her house property to the appellant ignoring the interest of her husband who has been with her till she breathed her last. He would also contend that the partnership firm stood dissolved under Ex.A-30 dissolution deed much prior to filing of the suits and in which case the question of granting decree for dissolution of the partnership firm does not arise. Learned Counsel further contended that except the partnership business, there were no joint family properties, which the appellant could seek for partition and whatever profits derived out of the partnership business were distributed among the partners as per the statement of accounts, which have been exhibited as Exs.A-13 and A-14. That the partners in the partnership business purchased the properties individually out of their own profits under registered sale deeds, copies of which have been exhibited as Exs.A-26 to A-29, and one partner was in no way concerned with the property purchased by another partner. Learned Counsel referred to Exs.A-26 to A-29 to buttress his submissions that the partners individually purchased the house properties. In elaborating his arguments, the learned Counsel contended that as on the date of the purchase of the property by the deceased-1st plaintiff in O.S. No. 4 of 1999, there was no partnership firm and there were no joint family properties and in which case the contention of the appellant that the property standing in the name of deceased-1st plaintiff in O.S. No. 4 of 1999 was out of the profits derived from the partnership firm has no basis. It is contended by him that WILL propounded by the appellant is surrounded with various suspicious circumstances such as pendency of litigation between the deceased-1st plaintiff and the appellant and stay of the deceased-1st plaintiff along with her husband in senior citizens home till few days prior to her death. These well-founded suspicious circumstances were not properly dispelled by the appellant and in which case the trial court was justified in holding that Ex.B-29 WILL propounded by the appellant was not legal and proper. In support of his submissions, learned Counsel placed reliance on the following decisions:
1)
2) Bharpur Singh v. Shamsher Singh 2009(2) ALT 33 (SC)
3)
4)
5)
7. The points that fell for consideration in these appeals are:
1) Whether Ex.B.29 WILL propounded by G. Shankaraiah/appellant is true and valid?
2) Whether the appellant is entitled to claim any share in the house bearing No. 79/SRT, Prakashnagar, Begumpet, Secunderabad?
8. Will being a document has to be proved by primary evidence except where the Court permits a document to be proved by leading secondary evidence. Since it is required to be attested, as provided in Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it cannot be used as evidence until one of the attesting witnesses at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. In addition, it has to satisfy the requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. In order to assess as to whether the Will has been validly executed and is a genuine document, the propounder has to show that the Will was signed by the testator and that he had put his signatures to the testament of his own free will; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind and understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and that the testator had signed it in the presence of two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to remove the suspicion by leading appropriate evidence. The burden to prove that the Will was forged or that it was obtained under undue influence or coercion or by playing a fraud is on the person who alleges it to be so.
9. In the case of
10. In the case of
The requirement of proof of a will is the same as any other document excepting that the evidence tendered in proof of a will should additionally satisfy the requirement of Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872. If after considering the matters before it, that is, the facts and circumstances as emanating from the material available on record of a given case, the Court either believes that the will was duly executed by the testator or considers the existence of such fact so probable that any prudent person ought, under the circumstances of that particular case, to act upon the supposition that the will was duly executed by the testator, then the factum of execution of will shall be said to have been proved. The delicate structure of proof framed by a judicially trained mind cannot stand on weak foundation nor survive any inherent defects therein but at the same time ought not to be permitted to be demolished by wayward pelting of stones of suspicion and supposition by wayfarers and waylayers. What was told by Baron Alderson to the jury in R. v. Hodge (1838) 2 Lewis CC 227 may be apposite to some extent.
The mind is apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts of one connected whole, and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was it, considering such matters, to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete.
The conscience of the Court has to be satisfied by the propounder of will adducing evidence so as to dispel any suspicious or unnatural circumstances attaching to a will provided that there is something unnatural or suspicious about the will. The law of evidence does not permit conjecture or suspicion having the place of legal proof nor permit them to demolish a fact otherwise proved by legal and convincing evidence. Well-founded suspicion may be a ground for closer scrutiny of evidence but suspicion alone cannot form the foundation of a judicial verdict- positive or negative.
It is well settled that one who propounds a will must establish the competence of the testator to make the will at the time when it was executed. The onus is discharged by the propounder adducing prima facie evidence proving the competence of the testator and execution of the will in the manner contemplated by law. The contestant opposing the will may bring material on record meeting such prima facie case in which event the onus would shift back on the propounder to satisfy the court affirmatively that the testator did know well the contents of the will and in sound disposing capacity executed the same. The factors, such as the will being a natural one or being registered or executed in such circumstances and ambience, as would leave no room for suspicion, assume significance. If there is nothing unnatural about the transaction and the evidence adduced satisfies the requirement of proving a will, the Court would not return a finding of ''not proved'' merely on account of certain assumed suspicion or supposition. Who are the persons propounding and supporting a will as against the person disputing the will and the pleadings of the parties would be relevant and of significance.
11. The mode of proving the will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and proof of signature of the testator, as required by law, is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where, however, there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Court accepts the will as genuine. Even where circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court. The suspicious circumstances may be regarding the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator''s mind, the disposition made in the will being unnatural, unprobable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances, or there might be other indications in the will to show that the testator''s mind was not free. In such a case, the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted, as the last will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes a prominent part in the execution of the will, which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. Any and every circumstance is not a ''suspicious circumstance. A circumstance would be suspicious when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal situation or is not of a normal person.
12. In Pinnaka Hanumantha Rao (died) per LR v. Garlapati Dhanalakshmi @ Andallu (9 supra), this Court after referring the relevant law culled out various principles with regard to proof of Will and while doing so, summarized inter alia the following circumstances which can be treated as suspicious:
The execution of the Will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances like,-
a) The signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful or not appears to be his usual signature.
b) The condition of the testator''s mind may be very feeble and debilitated.
c) The dispositions made in the Will may be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances like exclusion of or absence of adequate provision for the natural heirs without reasons.
d) The dispositions may not appear to be the result of the testator''s Will and mind.
e) The propounder takes a prominent part in the execution of the Will conferring substantial benefit on him.
f) The Testator used to sign blank papers.
g) The Will did not see the light of the day for long.
h) Incorrect recitals of essential facts.
i) The unregistered Will challenged as forged comes from the custody of major beneficiary.
13. Keeping in view of the proposition of law laid down by this Court and the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above, I may now take up the points referred supra for adjudication.
14. Point No. 1: The appellant claims that the deceased plaintiff who is no other than his mother executed Ex.B-29 Will on 16.10.2005 bequeathing her house property in his favour. To prove Ex.B-29-Will, the appellant got himself examined as Dw-1 and examined two attestors of it as Dws.2 and 3.
15. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously contended that Ex.B-29 Will has been proved by examining the two attestors as Dws.2 and 3, and therefore, the will is held to be true and valid and in which case the suit filed by the deceased plaintiff-testatrix is liable to be dismissed. The learned Counsel by referring the contents of Ex.B-29 would submit that the earlier Will which has been exhibited as Ex.A-35 has been revoked and the house property has been bequeathed in favour of the appellant. He would also submit that the appellant took care of the testatrix during her last days, which prompted her to bequeath her house property in favour of the appellant.
16. Before considering the submissions made by the learned Counsel, I deem it appropriate to note as to what sort of relationship existed between the deceased plaintiff- testatrix and the appellant soon before the alleged Ex.B-29 Will.
17. The deceased plaintiff issued a notice Ex.A-2 dated 01.4.1998 demanding the appellant to vacate the premises and deliver vacant possession of the same. The appellant issued Ex.A-3 reply notice dated 28.4.1998 denying the very title of the deceased plaintiff-testatrix in respect of the house property and he even went to the extent of asserting that the house property is a Joint Family property and in an oral partition, the house property fell to his share and he is in occupation of the house property in his own right. The deceased plaintiff-testatrix after receiving Ex.A-3 reply notice filed the suit for eviction and recovery of possession. Since few days prior to the death of the deceased plaintiff, she along with her husband, who has been examined as Pw.2, was staying in a Senior Citizens Home. The deceased plaintiff sustained a head injury in Senior Citizens Home and from there, she was shifted to NIMS Hospital, Hyderabad. Few days prior to her death, she was brought to her own house where she breathed her last.
18. Indisputably, the deceased plaintiff was litigating with the appellant for recovery of possession of the house property throughout her life. It has also come on record that except the house property in dispute, the deceased plaintiff has no other property. Her husband, who has come on record as plaintiff No. 2 and who has been examined as PW.2, also does not own any house. It is also pertinent to note that under Ex.A-35 registered Will, the deceased plaintiff conveyed life interest to her husband who is 2nd plaintiff and absolute rights to her daughter, who has been arrayed as 3rd plaintiff. The appellant has not placed any evidence on record to show that there were any disputes between the deceased plaintiff and her husband (Pw.2) during her lifetime. Even nothing was suggested to Pw.2 that there were any such disputes between him and the deceased plaintiff. Keeping these background facts in view, the evidence adduced by the appellant to prove Ex.B-29 Will is required to be scrutinized.
19. Dw-2 is one of the attestors of Ex.B-29 Will. He states in chief examination that he along with his friend N. Narsing Rao (DW.3) went to the house of the appellant to see the deceased plaintiff- testatrix at 79, SRT, Prakash Nagar. But, in the cross examination, he states that he does not know N. Narsing Rao (DW.3). He is no other than the brother-in-law of the appellant. What was stated in chief examination about his acquaintance with Narsing Rao, who has been examined as Dw.3, he has given a go bye in the cross examination. For better appreciation, I may refer the evidence of Dw.2 in his own words. He states in the cross examination as hereunder:
I gave my chief affidavit after knowing the contents therein through my advocate. The defendant in O.S. 4 of 1999 is my brother-in-law. I do not know one N. Narsing Rao. I do not know if the said Narsing Rao is co-brother of defendant Jaipraksh. The said Narsing Rao is not my friend. I do not know when the first plaintiff Gadepalli Saraswathi died. I also do not know in which hospital she was admitted prior to her death. I do not know the earlier disputes occurred between the said Saraswathi and defendant. I do not know about the injury caused to her death, but she was healthy when I saw her.
I alone went to the house of the defendant on 16.10.2005. I do not know why the said Saraswathi came to the house of the defendant and how she was brought to there. I do not know where she was residing before she was coming to 79 SRT. It is not true to say that the said Gadepalli Saraswathi since sustained head injury and not in a position to execute the Will as she lost her consciousness. It is not true to say that Ex.B29 Will was not executed by the said Gadepalli Saraswathi and the same was created by the defendant having colluded with me and another attestor and no such transactions took place as under the Will. It is not true to say that I also do not know what are the recitals in my chief affidavit and I simply tendered my signatures as per the request of the defendant. It is not true to say that the signature or thumb impression are found in Ex.B-29 Will at the place of executant do not belong to late Gadepalli Saraswathi and I am deposing falsely.
20. A close scrutiny of the evidence of Dw.2 discloses that there is no consistency in his evidence. Whatever stated in the chief examination with regard to his acquaintance with DW.3 has been given a go bye in cross-examination. When such is the inconsistency in the evidence of Dw.2, no credence can be placed on his testimony.
21. The appellant examined Dw.3 as 2nd attestor of the Will Ex.B-29. Dw.3 states in the chief examination that P. Suresh (Dw.2) is his friend and he went to the house of the appellant along with him to see his mother (deceased plaintiff) at 79, SRT, Prakash Nagar. In the cross-examination, he disowns his acquaintance with P. Suresh (Dw.2). He even went to the extent of denying his signature in the chief affidavit. For better appreciation, I may refer the evidence of Dw.3 in his own words, which reads as hereunder:
It is not true to say that I am co-brother of the defendant. I am owner of Pan Bandi at Shalibanda, Old City. I know the defendant since about 10 years. Earlier, we had money dealings but at present we are not having any such dealings. I do not know how may brothers the defendant is having. I also do not know about his parents. I do not know what was the state of relationship between the defendant and his parents and about the litigations pending in between them.
I never visited the house where the Gadepalli Saraswathi earlier used to stay. I do not know if the Dl (Jai Prakash) never resided with his parents. I do not know if his parents used to stay in Senior Citizens home because of their differences between their son Jaiprakash. I never saw the person by name P. Suresh nor I had any type of acquaintance with him.
I do not know the health position of Gadepalli Saraswathi and why she was admitted in the hospital and how many days she was inpatient in the hospital. I do not know if she also sustained any head injury, but I came to know as she was admitted in the Hospital. I do not know the date of death of Gadepalli Saraswathi but she died nearly 6 or 7 months back. But I was present when her dead body was taken to burial ground.
I do not know where the chief affidavit of mine was prepared. The witness after seeing his signature in the sworn affidavit of him, which is now shown, denied that it is his signature and so not able to say where it was signed by him.
I do not know if the said Gadepalli Saraswathi was not in a sound state of mind but when I Saw her as on the date of execution of will, she was found healthy. I also enquired her when she was on bed about her health and I was told as she was doing well. I do not know if she had lost her memory after 18/9/2005 having sustained with head injury and not able to identify even her husband. The date 16/10/2005 as mentioned in my affidavit was recorded in a Book in my Pan shop. It is not correct to say that late Gadepalli Saraswathi did not execute Ex.B29 will on 16.10.2005 and it was not signed by her and I did not see any such transactions and I attested the transactions. It is not true to say that the said Saraswathi was not in sound state of mind and she had lost her consciousness and not in a position to execute the Will and the signature and thumb impression found in her in Ex.B.29 do not belong to her. It is not true to say that I also did not go to the house where late G. Saraswathi was residing and Ex.B.29 will was not attested by me by witnessing the execution of the same by Saraswathi and I am deposing falsely. It is not true to say that Ex.B-29 will was created by the defendant having colluded with me and defendant.
22. The evidence of D.Ws.2 and 3 does not inspire confidence that they are speaking truth. The trial court evaluated the evidence of DWs.2 and 3 in right perspective and rejected their testimony. I do not see any reason to differ with the findings recorded by the trial court on this aspect. Therefore, the evidence of DWs.2 and 3 is liable to be excluded from consideration. There is no other witness examined by the appellant to prove Ex.B-29 WILL. The WILL propounded by the appellant is shrouded with the following suspicious circumstances, which are inherent in the transaction:
1) The deceased-plaintiff was resisting the claim of the appellant by tooth and nail till she breathed her last;
2) The deceased-plaintiff and her husband, who has been examined as P.W.2, were residing together in senior citizen home since few days prior to her death and P.W.2 continues to stay in the senior citizen home ever after the death of deceased-plaintiff-testatrix; and such is the situation, the deceased plaintiff would not go to the extent of taking away the life interest conferred on her husband-Pw.2 in Ex.A.35 Will.
3) The deceased-plaintiff-testatrix received head injury while staying in the senior citizen home and she was shifted to NIMS hospital for treatment few days prior to her death.
The deceased-plaintiff conferred life interest on her husband who has come on record as 2nd plaintiff after her death in Ex.A-35 WILL and there is no strong reason for her to take away the life interest conferred on her husband who has been by her side all through, by executing Ex.B-29 WILL. The appellant seriously disputed the title of the deceased-plaintiff over the house property and even went to the extent of claiming that the deceased-plaintiff is not the exclusive owner of the property and it is the property acquired out of the joint family funds and therefore he is entitled to 1/4th share therein. These are the well founded suspicious circumstances shrouding Ex.B-29 Will propounded by the appellant. The appellant tries to impress upon the Court that he brought the deceased-plaintiff to his house from NIMS Hospital and treated her cordially which made the deceased-plaintiff to execute Ex.B.29 will by canceling Ex.A-35 will. It is not to be forgotten that after the deceased-plaintiff was brought from the hospital to her own house, she survived only for 10 days. It is highly improbable for any one to believe that for 10 days service, even if assumed that the appellant and his family members served the deceased-plaintiff, she would change her mind and take away the life interest conferred on her husband who has been by her side through out her life. The appellant also tries to impress upon the court with regard to validity of Ex.B-29 Will on the ground that he has large family and has no shelter, which made the deceased-plaintiff to bequeath the property standing in her name in his favour. It has come on record that the appellant along with her brothers purchased houses in their names and the sale deeds have been exhibited as Exs.B-26 and B-29. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that he has no house, which made the deceased-plaintiff to execute Ex.B.29 WILL bequeathing her property in his name cannot be accepted.
23. In view of the above discussion, I find that Ex.B-29 WILL propounded by the appellant is not true and valid. Accordingly, the issue is answered against the appellant.
24. Point No. 2: The appellant pleaded in the written statement filed in O.S. No. 4 of 1999 that the house property standing in the name of defendant-plaintiff was purchased out of the joint family funds. He further pleaded that in the oral partition among the members of the family, the suit schedule house purchased in the name of deceased-plaintiff came to be allotted to his share. Except pleading in the written statement, he did not chose to adduce any evidence with regard to the division of the joint family properties and allotment of the suit schedule house standing in the name of the deceased-plaintiff to his share. Even otherwise the deceased-plaintiff purchased the property under a registered sale deed in the year 1968. As on the date of purchase of the property by the deceased-plaintiff, there were no joint family properties. The appellant who has been examined as DW.1 did not assert of any joint family properties existing as on the date of sale deed in the year 1968. Indeed, DW.l admits that his father did not inherit any property from his paternal father and that he and his brothers joined as partners for the first time in M/s Karunasri Printers on 6.11.1972. For better appreciation I may refer the evidence of P.W.1 in his own words. He stated in his cross-examination as under:
I was born in the year 1955. Originally M/s Karunasri Printers, a proprietary concern of which my father was proprietor Originally, Karunasri Printers was located on the rearside of Mahankali temple. I do not know the age of my elder brother. It is true that myself and my brother joined as partners for the first time are in Karunasri Printers on 6.11.1972. I was aged about 17 years at that time. It is true that the property bearing premises No. 79 SRT was purchased in the year 1968. I do not know the said sale deed was executed in favour of my mother. I have no independent business prior to joining as a partner in Karunasri Printers. It is not correct to say that I have no independent income of my own prior to 1972. I have no documentary proof to show that I had independent income prior to 1972. I do not know the said firm reconstituted in 1979. I do not know whether I contributed any capital towards the said partnership deed. I do not know the contents of Ex.B.2 partnership deed. I signed under the same as I was lost the sign. I studied upto 9th class in around 1968-69. I have not commenced any my own business after I joined in the business. My source of income is only from my share of profits derived from the partnership firm. I signed only the document at the instance of my father and I do not know anything about filing the said documents before any authority. It is not correct to say that since I joined the partnership firm I filed all my income tax returns only as an individual....
We are altogether 4 brothers. My grandfather died in the year 1963 or 1964. it is true that my father did not inherit any property from my paternal grand father. My eldest brother G. Rama Rao is elder to me by about one year. It is true that for the first time I joined as a partner along with my father and brother on 6.11.1972. My elder brother also joined as partner on 6.11.1972 prior to our joining as partners my father was the proprietor of Karunasree Printers. It is true that except the source of income in Karunasree Printers, I have no other income.
25. It is crystal clear from the evidence of DW.1 that as on the date of purchase of the property by the deceased-plaintiff, there were no joint family properties. The deceased-plaintiff while being examined as PW.1 specifically asserted that she purchased the property by selling the gold ornaments given by her parents. The appellant having asserted that the property was purchased in the name of deceased/plaintiff out of the joint family income failed to substantiate the same. Indeed the trial court considered the evidence brought on record in great detail and recorded a finding that the appellant/defendant failed to substantiate his plea that the property being purchased by the deceased-plaintiff out of the joint family income and that the house property fell to his share in the oral partition. Para 27 of the judgment needs to be noted and it is thus:
27. In fact the defendant has claimed for his absolute ownership and exclusive possession of the House bearing No. 79 SRT, Prakash Nagar, Begumpet, Hyderabad, the schedule property in O.S. No. 4/99 (item No. II of the schedule property in O.S. No. 89 of 2001) by also setting up a oral partition and as the said property fell to his share. In fact it is not his case as their joint family has any joint family properties and in the oral partition as effected he got any such share while giving equal shares also to other joint family members. Further, the defendant has raised a conflicting issue as he was the exclusive owner of the schedule property which stood in the name of his mother after setting up oral partition and for allotting the same to his share and another issue for the claiming of his 1/4th share even in that property by constituting it as the property of their partnership firm.
26. The trial court appreciated the evidence brought on record in right perspective and recorded a finding that the appellant failed to substantiate his plea that the property is being purchased by the deceased-plaintiff out of the joint family income and that the said property fell to his share in the oral partition. Therefore, I do not see any valid ground to interfere with the findings recorded by the trial court on this aspect. Accordingly, this point is held against the appellant.
27. In the result, these appeals fail and they are hereby dismissed with costs. The appellant is granted three months'' time for vacating the premises subject to the following conditions:
1) The appellant shall file an undertaking before the trial Court within two weeks from today that he would vacate the premises on or before the expiry of three months from today.
2) He shall deposit the arrears, if any, within one month from today at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month as directed by this Court in C.C.C.A.M.P. No. 24 of 2007 dated 25.01.2007 and as confirmed on 22.12.2008 and shall continue to pay the rents commencing from January, 2010, by 05th of every succeeding month till he vacates the premises.
