1. All these Writ Appeals arising out of a common order passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.Nos.20741, 20923 and 20916 of 2001 respectively were heard together and are being disposed of by this common Judgment.
2. The only question that arises for consideration in these appeals filed by M/s Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd., Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) is, whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction to reopen the matter enabling the parties to adduce further evidence and mark documents etc once hearing was concluded and the matter was reserved for judgment.
3. The controversy arose in the following factual matrix: The 1st respondent herein is a retired employee of the appellant-organisation having retired from service under Voluntary Retirement Scheme introduced by the appellant-management in the year 1998. He filed M.P.No.75 of 1999 on the file of the Labour Court-I, Hyderabad for recovery of the arrears due towards terminal benefits. The learned Labour Court heard the matter on 27.10.2000 and reserved the same for orders and directed it to be listed on 8.11.2000. According to the petitioner, the matter was suo motu reopened by the Labour Court and posted to 16.11.2000 and thereafter further it was further adjourned to 5.12.2000 for hearing.
4. On 5.12.200, the 1st respondent filed an interlocutory application being I.A.No.403 of 2000 to receive (1) Income Tax certificate issued by the appellant to the 1st respondent dated 31.3.1998 and (2) the clarification issued by the Joint General Manager (HRM), HMT Ltd., dated 4.11.2000 on Voluntary Retirement Scheme(s). According to the 1st respondent, in the clarification issued by the 2nd respondent, it was clarified that the period of training undergone by the trainees can be reckoned for computation of VRS compensation subject to certain criteria. The case of the 1st respondent is that these two documents are traced out after the case was reserved for orders and they are crucial for the purpose of determination of his claim in the main M.P.
5. On 19.1.2001, the 1st respondent filed another application being I.A.No.32 of 2000 to reopen the case and to mark the aforesaid documents filed along with I.A.No.403 of 2000 contending that the Labour Court has inherent powers under rule 17 of the A.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Rules'') to take evidence at any stage of the case.
6. On 8.5.2001, the 1st respondent filed another interlocutory application being I.A.No.262 of 2000 to recall WW.1 to adduce further evidence in the interest of justice.
7. The appellant resisted the aforesaid applications contending that the matter cannot be reopened after the case is reserved for judgment as once the hearing has been completed and matter is posted for judgment, there is no hiatus between the posting of Judgment and passing of judgment and the applications are thus not maintainable. It was also contended that the clarification issued by the 2nd respondent on 11.9.2000 cannot be made applicable to employees retired from service in 1998 as the same would be applicable only to those who had retired under the VRS scheme subsequent to 1998.
8. On a consideration of the rival submissions of the parties, the Labour Court by three separate orders dated 14.9.2001 allowed all the aforesaid applications taking the view that under Rule 17 of A.P. Industrial Rules, 1958, the respondent has a right to adduce further evidence in support of his case and the appellant has also got a similar right to file documents at any stage under Rule 17.
9. Challenging the orders of the Labour Court, the appellant has filed three separate writ petitions for a writ or order in the nature of writ of certiorari and to quash the same as illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Rule 17 of the Rules and also order 20, Rule 1 of the CPC and also contrary to the well settled principles of law and the decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court and therefore liable to be set aside and consequently direct the Labour Court to pronounce the judgment in the case without any further delay. By the order under appeal, the learned single Judge declined to interfere with the orders of the Labour Court holding that the orders do not suffer from any incurable legal infirmities, which requires to be corrected by this Court in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction and under Rule 17 of the Rules, the Labour Court has power to reopen the case.
10. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeals.
11. During the pendency of the Writ Petitions, this Court stayed further proceedings in the matter and, therefore, the Labour Court has not proceeded further in the matter.
12. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant Sri S.A. Chari and Sri A.K. Jaya Prakash Rao for the respondent and the learned Government Pleader for Labour.
13. Sri Chari contends that once the matter is heard and reserved for Judgment, there is no hiatus between the reservation of judgment and the pronouncement of it and a party cannot invoke the provisions of law to reopen the case as held by the Apex Court in ARJUN SINGH v MOHINDER KUMAR1 and the decision of this Court in SALEH BIN OMER v VIJAYACHAND2. The Labour Court, therefore, erred in allowing the applications filed by the respondent after the case was reserved for judgment and posted for orders. He would further submit that the learned Judge ought to have held that the provisions of Rule 17 of the Rules would not be of any help to the 1st respondent since the rule says that a Labour Court may accept and admit, or call for evidence at any stage of the proceedings before it in such manner as it may think fit which means the Labour Court may admit at any stage of the proceedings before it and once the Labour Court has reserved the case, there was no stage left of the proceedings before it.
14. The same analogy is seen in CPC where after the hearing of the case and reserving the case for judgment, there is no hiatus between the reservation of judgment and the pronouncing of it and a party cannot invoke the provisions of law to reopen the case after the judgment is reserved. In other words, the learned counsel contends, that if the Judgment was pronounced without reserving the same, the matter could not have been reopened and it is only because of lack of time, the Court had reserved the matter for judgment and the party cannot take advantage of the same to reopen the case and adduce further evidence. In support of his contention he has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v SMT. LAKSHMIDEVAMMA3. It was also submitted that while the procedure under the CPC may not be applicable but the principle of law would be applicable in any judicial proceedings as otherwise there cannot be end to the proceedings.
15. The learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent would submit that the Labour Court has committed no error in reopening the case and no prejudice has been caused to the appellant.
16. He further submitted that the strict rule of evidence is not applicable in the proceedings before the Labour Court and the CPC is applicable only to the limited extent. The Labour Court has inherent powers u/s 11(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ''the Act'') read with Rule 17 of the Rules to reopen matter for proper adjudication at any stage of the proceedings when justice and equity demands. He has also relied on a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in2001 ILR 529 wherein the Supreme Court has considered the words before proceedings are closed and held that "evidence can be adduced at any stage including a stage where the Labour Court had concluded the proceedings". According to the learned counsel, the reasons assigned by the Labour Court are sound and valid in law and do not call for any interference by this Court.
17. We have perused the entire pleadings, the order of the Labour Court, the order under appeal, the original records of the Labour Court produced before us as also the Judgments cited by the respective parties.
18. Rule 1 of Order XX of the CPC reads as follows:
Judgment when pronounced:
(1) The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in open court, either at once or, as soon thereafter as may be practicable, on some future day; and when the judgment is to be pronounced one some future day, the Court shall fix a day for that purpose of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.
Provided that where the judgment is not pronounced at once, every endeavour shall be made by the Court to pronounce the judgment within fifteen days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where it is not practicable so to do, the Court shall fix a future ay for the pronouncement of the judgment, and such day shall not ordinarily be a day beyond thirty days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded, and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given to the parties or their pleaders:
Provided further that, where a judgment is not pronounced within thirty days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded, the Court shall record the reasons for such delay and shall fix a future day on which the judgment will be pronounced and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.
19. The applicability of Order 20, Rule 1 CPC to the proceedings before the Labour Court has to be considered with reference to the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Before we consider the issue, let us have an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder by the State of Andhra Pradesh.
20. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is welfare legislation enacted protecting the rights of the workmen. Chapter IV of the said Act deals with procedure, powers and duties of authorities. Section 11(1) provides that subject to any rules that may be made for the said purpose, an Arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think fit. Sub-section (3) provides that every Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) when trying a suit, in respect of the matters, namely, (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects, (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and (d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. Section 15 deals with duties of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals and submission of the award to the appropriate Government within the period specified. Section 17 deals with publication of reports and awards and Section 17A provides for commencement of the award.
21. Part-III of the Rules provides for powers, procedures and duties of Conciliation Officers, Boards, Courts, Labour Courts, and Tribunals etc. Rule 12 and 12A deals with proceedings before the Labour Court and Tribunal. Rule 15 provides for place and time of hearing. Rule 16 provides for quorum for Boards and Courts. Rule 17 which is relevant for our purpose provides for evidence and it reads thus: A Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or an Arbitrary may accept and admit or call for evidence at any state of the proceedings before it/him and in such manner as it/he may think fit.
22. Rule 18 provides for administration of oath. Rule 19 provides for summons and 20 provides for service of summons or notice. Rule 23 provides for the procedure at the first hearing. Rule 24 provides for the power of the Labour Court to proceed ex parte.
23. Rule 25 deals with power of entry and inspection by the Labour Court/Tribunal of the workshop, factory etc. Rule 26 provides as follows: Power of Boards, Courts, Labour Courts and Tribunals: In addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Courts or Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908), when trying a suit in respect of the following matters:
(a) discovery and inspection:
(b) granting adjournment;
(c) reception of evidence taken on affidavit.
and the Board, Court, Labour Court or Tribunal may summon and examine any person whose evidence appears to it to be material an shall be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of Sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898).
24. Rule 29 provides for decision by majority and Rule 30 provides for correction of errors of the award at any time either on its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. Rules 32-A and 32-B deals with publication of the award.
25. On an analysis of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the Labour Court has its own procedure to be followed in relation to matters referred for its adjudication unlike a detailed and exhaustive procedure contemplated under the CPC.
26. The rule of strict evidence as contemplated by CPC or Order 20, Rule 1 CPC, in our view, has no application to the proceedings before the Labour Court.
27. Under the provisions of the Act, the Labour Court passes an award and it shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of publication u/s 17 and subject to the provisions u/s 17A.
28. u/s 17A(1)(a), the appropriate Government has power to make an order rejecting or modifying the award of the Labour Court.
29. Therefore, in our view, Order 20, Rule 1 CPC, which deals with pronouncement of the Judgments, will have no application at all to the proceedings before the Labour Court.
30. Thus the application of the CPC in matters relating to industrial disputes referred to by the appropriate Government for adjudication by the Labour Court is limited only to the extent indicated hereinabove ie. as contemplated u/s 11(3) of the Act which provides for enforcement of the attendance of witnesses, production of documents etc. and Rule 26 of the Rules providing for discovery and inspection, granting adjournments, reception of evidence taken on affidavit etc. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that Order 20, Rule 1 CPC is applicable to the proceedings before the Labour Court in the matter of pronouncement of Judgments. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the matter cannot be reopened after it was reserved for Judgment cannot be accepted. The Labour Court is constituted under the Act only for the limited purpose of adjudication of disputes referred to it by the appropriate Government and it cannot be termed as a "Civil Court" for all purposes and procedure except for the purposes indicated hereinabove. The Labour Court passes only an award and not judgment and the same is subject to Section 17A of the Act.
31. Rule 17 of the Rules clearly state that the Labour Court or Tribunal may accept and admit or call for evidence at any stage of the proceedings before it and in such manner as it may think fit. Therefore, the Labour Court has been conferred with discretion whether to admit or call for evidence at any stage of the proceedings in the manner it thinks fit and proper depending upon the circumstances of each case and keeping in view the principles of natural justice. If such discretion has been property exercised and no arbitrariness is involved in it, it would not be proper on the part of this Court to interfere with such discretion. In the instant case, the Labour Court in exercise of its discretion thought it fit to exercise the discretion in favour of the workman.
32. We do not find any illegality or perversity in the discretion exercised by the Labour Court.
33. Further, merely because the documents were permitted to be taken as evidence or that WW1 is permitted to adduce further evidence, it cannot be said that the Labour Court will base its decision solely on such evidence. The evidentiary value of such evidence will have to be appreciated by the Labour Court on the merits of the documents and the oral evidence adduced in regard thereto and the other evidence on record while determining the real issue involved in the order of reference.
34. Therefore, no prejudice will be caused to the appellant by reopening the case and permitting the 1st respondent to adduce further evidence. Further, the appellant is not debarred from rebutting the evidence so adduced by the respondent and it will have an opportunity to cross-examine or adduce any evidence on their behalf to establish that the clarification issued on 4.11.2000 will have no application to the case of the 1st respondent. We, therefore, find no merit in the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant.
35. In the view we have taken, we do not think that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant will have any application to the facts of the case.
36. The decision in Arjun Singh v Mohinder Kumar arose in a different context. Therein the Apex Court was considering the provisions of Order 9, Rule 7 CPC and Order 9 Rule 13 CPC vis--vis the principle of res judicata. In our view the said decision has no application.
37. In Saleh Bin Omer v. Vijayachand, a learned single Judge of this Court was considering the power of the Civil Court to recall witnesses under Order 18, Rule 17 CPC. This Court held that hearing of suit comes to an end when Judgment is delivered or where suit is posted for Judgment where it is reserved.
38. In view of our above conclusions, this decision also has no application.
39. In KARNATAKA STATE RTC v SMT. LAKSHMIDEVAMMA, the Apex Court was considering the right of the Management under Sections 10 and 33(2)(b) of the Act to lead evidence/additional evidence before Labour Court.
40. On the said aspect, there were two decisions of the Apex Court viz., (1)
Under Section 11(3), Labour Court/Tribunal and other authorities mentioned therein have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the CPC when trying a suit in respect of certain matters which include enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath and compelling the production of documents and material objects. It is consistently held and accepted that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to proceedings before the Labour Court/Tribunal but essentially the rules of natural justice are to be observed in such proceedings. Labour Courts/Tribunals have power to call for any evidence at any stage of the proceedings if the facts and circumstances of the case demand the same to meet the ends of justice in a given situation.
41. We reiterate that in order to avoid unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings, the management has to seek leave of the Court/Tribunal in the written statement itself to lead additional evidence to support its action in the alternative and without prejudice to its rights and contentions. But this should not be understood as placing fetters on the powers of the Court/Tribunal requiring or directing parties lead additional evidence including production of documents at any stage of proceedings before they are concluded if on facts and circumstances of the case it is deemed just and necessary in the inertest of justice.
42. From the above, it is clear that the Labour Court has power to call for any evidence at any stage of proceedings if the facts and circumstances demand and to meet the ends of justice and there was no fetter on the power of the Court requiring or directing parties to lead additional evidence including production of documents at any stage of the proceedings before they are concluded. The proceedings will be concluded only on the passing of the award by the Labour Court. Therefore, the Labour Court in exercise of its power under Rule 17 of the Rules has ample power to permit the parties to adduce evidence at any stage before the proceedings are concluded and award is passed. Further, the Apex court in the aforesaid decision has considered the words "before the proceedings are closed" and held that evidence can be adduced at any stage including a stage where the Labour Court had concluded the proceedings.
43. We, therefore, hold that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to reopen the matter under Rule 17 of the Rules at any stage of the proceedings before they are concluded.
44. In view of the above, we find no error in the conclusions arrived at by the learned single Judge. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeals and the same are liable to be dismissed.
45. The appeals, in our view, are liable to be dismissed for yet another reason. In the instant case, the Labour Court reserved the matter for orders and before passing the award, suo motu reopened the same on 8th November, 2000 and posted to 5.12.2000 for hearing as could be seen from the orders passed by the Labour Court itself. The 1st respondent subsequently has filed the aforesaid three interlocutory applications. In such circumstances, for all practical purposes, the hearing of the matter cannot be construed as concluded. Keeping in view this only, the Labour Court permitted the 1st respondent to adduce further oral and documentary evidence in support of his claim. Once the matter is reopened by the Court suo motu for hearing, the parties on both sides will always be at liberty adduced further oral and documentary evidence on their behalf. In our view, in such a situation, no fetters shall be placed on the power of the Court to permit the parties to adduce evidence in the facts and circumstances of the case in order to meet the ends of justice. The Labour Court, in our opinion, has rightly exercised its discretion while allowing IAs and it cannot be said that the orders are either perverse or suffers from any incurable legal infirmities which requires to be corrected by this Court.
46. For the reasons aforesaid, all the appeals are dismissed. The Labour Court is directed to proceed further in the matter and dispose of the main M.P. in accordance with law after affording an opportunity to both sides to adduce further oral and documentary evidence and after hearing both sides.
47. Since the matter is ending for a long time, we direct the Labour Court to dispose of the main M.P. within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order or on production of a copy of the order by either party whichever is earlier. There shall be no order as to costs.
