1. Sri Mahboob Ali, the workman, joined the service of the petitioner-company on 11th July, 1943 as a Fitter. By Proceedings dated June 6, 1978, the workman was intimated that he would retire from service with effect from July 11, 1978 on completion of 35 years of full-time service. Questioning the effect thereof, a reference was sought for u/s 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, "the Act"). Ultimately, by Reference dated 2nd December, 1983, the Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court thus :
"Whether the retirement of Shri Mahboob Ali from service, after completion of 35 years of service, by the Management of Hyderabad Allwyn Metal Works, Sanatnagar, Hyderabad is justified ?
If not, to what relief he is entitled ?"
2. The Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court by Award dated May 27, 1985 in ID. No. 94/83, held that, on the date when the workman entered into the service of the petitioner-company, there was no age of superannuation prescribed. Subsequently, Certified Standing Orders have come into force with effect from 22nd July, 1948, and they were amended on 1st March, 1979. Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders gives discretion to the management to retire a workman who completes 35 years of full-time service. The workman in this case was discriminated against in as much as persons similarly placed viz., Sarvasri Easwariah and Narayana, who had completed 35 years of service in the petitioner company have not been retired, and no reasons have been given to make such an invidious discrimination. The workman would have retired after completing 58 years of age. Therefore, the action taken by the petitioner-company is not fair, and amounts to improper exercise of the discretionary power on the part of the petitioner-company. The workman was unfairly discriminated and removed from service, it further held that the termination of the workman was not justified, and directed his reinstatement into service forthwith with continuity of service with all other attendant benefits including full backwages. It also declared that the workman would be entitled to be retained and continued in service till he attained the age of 58 years i.e. the age of superannuation. Assailing the legality thereof, the writ petition has been filed.
3. The contention of Sri K. Srinivasa Murthy, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-company is that, according to Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders, retirement of the workman would either be on completion of 35 years of full-time service in the petitioner company, or on attaining the age of superannuation i.e., 58 years, whichever event shall first occur. Thus the management has been given discretionary power to retire their workmen on completion of either of the events which shall first occur. Accordingly, the petitioner-company had exercised their power. It is in terms of Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders. As such, the Industrial Tribunal has committed grievous error in going into arbitrariness or discrimination in as much as it is uncalled for in view of the fact that Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders not only empowers the petitioner-company to retire their workmen but also binds the workmen. This was resisted by Sri Ramachandra Rao, the leaned counsel for the workman. According to Sri Ramachandra Rao, though Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders gives discretion to the petitioner-company, it should be exercised consistent with the spirit of the Rule. The Rule postulates that the workman is entitled to be in service until he attains the age of superannuation of 58 years. If any action is to be taken, as to retirement, before he attains the age of superannuation of 58 years, there must be reasons recorded for the same, and the action must not be discriminatory. In the instant case, no such reason has been given while directing the workman''s retirement. The question of continuance of the workman in service after superannuation is always discretionary of the management but, before his attaining 58 years of age, though he completed 35 years of full-time service, the management must assign reasons for taking such an action. In this case, no such reasons have been assigned. Therefore, the Industrial Tribunal is well-justified in giving the Award.
4. The question, therefore, is whether the Award is valid in Law ?
5. Let us read Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders. It reads thus :
"The Company may, in its discretion, retire from its service any workman who has completed 35 years of full time service in the Company or has attained the age of 58 years whichever event shall first occur and no workman shall have any claim to be continued in service of the Company thereafter."
It is clear from the above, that retirement of a workman is in terms of Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders i.e., for retirement, workman (i) shall have completed 35 years of full-time service in the petitioner company; OR (ii) shall attain the age of 58 years, whichever event shall first occur; and (iii) no workman shall have any claim to be continued in the service of the company thereafter.
6. In
"The obligation imposed on the employer to have standing orders certified, the duty of the certifying authority to adjudicate upon their fairness and reasonableness, the notice to be given to the union and in its absence the representatives of the workmen, the right conferred on them to raised objections, the opportunity given to them of being heard before they are certified, the right of appeal and the right to apply for modifications given to workmen individually, the obligation on the employer to have them published in such a manner that they become easily known to the workmen, all these provisions abundantly show that once the standing orders are certified and come into operation, they become binding on the employer and all the workmen presently employed as also those employed thereafter in the establishment conducted by the employer. It cannot possibly be that such standing orders would bind only those who are employed after they came into force and not those who were employed previously but are still in employment when they come into force. The right of being heard given to the union or, where there is no union, to the representatives of the workmen, the right of appeal and the right to apply for modification given to the right to apply for modification given to workmen individually clearly indicate that they were provided for, because the standing orders as they emerge after certification, are intended to be binding on all workmen in the employment of the establishment at the date when they come into force and those employed thereafter."
7. Thus it is a settled law that the Certified Standing Orders are binding not only on the Employees or workmen who are on the rolls of the establishment on the date when they come into force but also on those who are appointed subsequently as also those who were appointed earlier to the coming into force of the Certified Standing Orders. In that case, the question raised was, whether the workmen who were already in service before the Standing Orders came into force, were entitled to continue in service beyond the age of superannuation prescribed by the Standing Orders. It was held therein that they would be binding on all those who were appointed earlier to the coming into force of the Standing Orders. The ratio applies to the facts in this case. Though the workman was appointed prior to coming into force of the Certified Standing Orders, Clause-26 thereof applies to and is binding on him.
8. The next question is as to how the language used in Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders viz., "whichever event shall first occur" and the expression "thereafter" shall be construed ?
9. The contention of Sri Ramachandra Rao, the learned Counsel for the workman is that, the expression "thereafter" would be applicable only to those persons who have attained the age of superannuation of 58 years i.e., the discretion to be exercised by the petitioner-company would be only in respect of those who have attained the age of superannuation of 58 years. But, when the discretion is exercised in respect of workmen, who have completed 35 years of full-time service, or, 58 years of age, then the petitioner-company is obligated to assign reasons for exercise of such power. The question then is, whether such a construction would be given ?
10. It is a well settled statutory construction that, every statute, section or word should be construed harmoniously giving effect to every part thereof, and no part would be rendered surplus or superfluous or ineffective by putting up such a statutory construction. Further, in ''Craies On Statute Law, Seventh Edition'', at page 83, it is stated :
"The rule of law upon the construction of all statues is to construe them according to the plain, literal, and grammatical meaning of the words. But besides the fact that ''the language of statutes is not always that which a rigid grammarian would use'', it must be borne in mind that a statute consists of two parts, the letter and the sense. "It is not the words of the law ...... but the internal sense of it that makes the law, and our law (like all other) consists of two parts viz., of body and soul; the letter of the law is the body of the law, and the sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law-quia ratio legis est anima anima legis".
11. It is seen that the first limb of Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders is that, a workman who has completed 35 years of full-time service in the company is liable to retire. The second limb thereof is that, on attaining the age of superannuation of 58 years also, a workman is liable to retire. In a case where a workman completes 35 years of full-time service in the company but does not attain the age of 58 years, the event of completion of 35 years of full-time service first occurs before he attains the age of superannuation of 58 years, and discretion has been given to the company the company to retire him by exercise of their powers under Clause-26 of the certified Standing Orders. In such an event, the last limb of Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders viz., "no workman shall have any claim to be continued in service of the company thereafter", would come into operation as otherwise, it would be rendered surplus and otiose. However, when a workman attains the age of 58 years, automatically, he loses his right to continue in service unless the company, in exercise of their general power and right to management, extends service of the workman beyond the age of superannuation but not in exercise of their power under Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders. Therefore the last limb of Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders would operate only in respect of the first limb thereof viz., exercise of discretion by the company to retire a workman who has completed 35 years of full-time service in the company but has not attained the age of superannuation of 58 years as on that date. If this harmonious construction is not given, then it would amount to defeating the very purpose of the power given to the company under Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders.
12. The next question is, whether it is necessary for the company to give reasons for exercise of their power under Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Order ?
13. Ex-facie, Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders does not postulate giving of any reasons. On the other hand, it puts an end to the claim of the workman to continue in service of the company after completion of 35 years of full-time service in the company. In
"The officers upon attaining the age of superannuation or putting the required number of years of service do not earn that benefit or privilege. The High Court has completely misunderstood the nature of right and purpose of the proviso. The proviso preserves discretion to the Bank. It is a discretion available with every employer, every management, State or otherwise. If the Bank considers that the service of an officer is desirable in the interest of the Bank, it may allow him to continue in service beyond the age of superannuation. If the Bank considers that the service of an officer is not required beyond superannuation, it is an end of the matter. It is no reflection on the officer. It carries no stigma".
In paragraph 12 at page 161, it was further held :
"With due regard to exigencies of service, the Bank in one year may give extension to all suitable retiring officers. In another year, it may give extension to some and not to all, in a subsequent year, it may not give extension to any one of the officers ..... The Bank may not need the service of all retired persons in another year. The Bank may have lesser work load in succeeding year. The retiring persons cannot in any year demand that ''extension to all or none''. If we concede that right to retiring persons, then the very purpose of giving extension in the interest of the Bank would be defeated. We are, therefore, of opinion that there is no scope for complaining arbitrariness in the matter of giving extension of service to retiring persons".
14. The same ratio applies to this case where the company exercised their powers under Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders and retired the workman who has competed 35 years of full-time service in the company though not attained the age of superannuation of 58 years. It is one of discretion. Discretion is given to the company by Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders, which gives power to the company to retire their workmen on the occurring of either of the two events mentioned earlier. When discretion has been exercised in terms thereof, the obligation to give reasons is obviated because it is no part of their duty to give reasons for retiring the workman who is governed by Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders. If it were a case where the company intends to take any action by way of penal or disciplinary measure, certainly the workman is entitled to an opportunity, and there is a corresponding obligation on the part of the company to give reasons or conduct an enquiry in terms of the Certified Standing Orders. But, when the company has exercised its discretion under Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders, then introducing the expression viz., give reasons for exercise of that power, would mean rewriting or modifying the Standing Orders, which could be done at the behest of Union or concerned body of representatives of the workmen. No such action has been taken. If any undue hardship is caused to the workmen, it is always open to their Union or representatives to initiate such procedure as is provided under the Certified Standing Orders or the relevant statute for adjudication of the matter.
15. I am informed that the Certified Standing Orders were amended with effect from 1st March, 1979 providing for a right to the workman to continue in service until he attains the age of 58 years, and the exception is with regard to completion of 35 years of full-time service. Considered from this perspective, I have no hesitation to hold that the company is justified in exercise of the power under Clause-26 of the Certified Standing Orders and retiring the workman on completion of his 35 years of full-time service in the company, and that there is no manifest error of law committed by the company in exercise of their power. It is not discriminatory nor mala fide, as vaguely said by the Industrial Tribunal.
16. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
