@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy
1. This batch of writ petitions relates to the proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ''the Act'') for acquiring different extents of lands for the purpose of establishment of Special Economic Zone under the auspices of A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation. As the issues are almost common in all these cases, the details of lands and the notifications issued u/s 4(1) of the Act and the declaration u/s 6 of the Act need not be specifically referred to. It will suffice to note that twenty notifications were issued proposing to acquire large extents of lands, which include the land belonging to the petitioners. Different notifications are questioned in these writ petitions by the owners of different extents of lands so notified.
2. Sri P. Venu Gopal, learned counsel for the petitioners appearing in all these cases, submitted that in respect of the lands covered by W.P. No. 32450 of 2011, the names of the petitioners have not been included in the notification disabling them from participating in the enquiry envisaged u/s 5A of the Act and that the declaration issued u/s 6 of the Act is beyond one year from the date of publication of notification u/s 4(1) of the Act and consequently by operation of clause-(ii) of first proviso to Section 6 of the Act, the notifications lapsed.
3. The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition while opposing the above submissions submitted that except in W.P. No. 32450 of 2011, in all other cases no grievance has been raised that the names of the petitioners have not been included in the notification. That W.P. No. 32450 of 2011 is barred by laches as the said writ petition has been filed nearly five years after issuance of the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act. The learned Government Pleader further submitted that mere non-notification of the names of the petitioners does not vitiate the acquisition proceedings and that at any rate, the petitioners failed to plead any prejudice on this account. The learned Government Pleader further submitted that the last of the publications in the locality was made on 24.04.2006, while the declaration u/s 6 of the Act was made and published in the District Gazette on 18.04.2007 within the time prescribed by the statute.
4. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.
5. With respect to the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in W.P. No. 32450 of 2011 filed by two individuals, their names were not notified in the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act, it is an admitted fact that their names were not mutated in the revenue records. It is the pleaded case of the respondents that on the basis of the Adangals, the names of the land owners were published in the notification. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in
6. In Gubbala Chinna Ganga Rao (1 supra), the entire Ac.0.24 cents owned by the petitioners without leaving any part of the land for their personal occupation was proposed to be acquired for providing shelter to others, apart from the fact that their names were not mentioned in the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act and at no stage of the acquisition proceedings, notices were served on them. A purported consent award was passed u/s 11(2) of the Act even though no such consent was given by the petitioners. Taking into account all those cumulative circumstances, this Court observed that the petitioners were denied reasonable opportunity of putting forth their objections and that mere absence of mutation in revenue records does not absolve the Land Acquisition Officer from collecting necessary information as to the true owners of the property at the time of issuing notification. This Court held "there is, therefore, some justification for the petitioners in complaining that the land acquisition proceedings were initiated behind their back. The records also do not show that notices are served on them u/s 9(3) of the Act".
7. In my opinion, the above judgment is not an authority for the proposition that wherever the names of the owners of the land are not mentioned in the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act, acquisition proceedings will automatically get vitiated. Unless the real owners of the land come before the Court with the plea that the notification is vague, which does not contain the details of the lands, apart from their names not being shown in the notification and pleading prejudice on account of such lapses, the acquisition proceedings cannot be held to be vitiated. The Supreme Court while dealing with such situations held that vagueness in the notifications vitiates the acquisition proceedings (See
8. It is not the pleaded case of the petitioners that the impugned notifications are vague as to the description of the lands. It is not as if no names have been published. The names of the predecessors-in-title of the petitioners have been published. If the petitioners were diligent, it would not have been difficult for them to find out whether the lands purchased by them have been notified for acquisition or not. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, in W.P. No. 32450 of 2011, no plea has been raised to the effect that on account of non-publication of their names, they were deprived of the opportunity of participating in the enquiry u/s 5A of the Act. Indeed, a Division Bench of this Court in Ch. Bhaskara Rao (2 supra) held that mere non-mentioning of the names in the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act is of no consequence and accordingly declined to set aside the notification on that ground.
9. On a careful consideration of the facts in their entirety, I am of the opinion that the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act cannot be set aside merely on account of non-mentioning of the names of some of the owners of the property notified for acquisition.
10. With regard to the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the declaration u/s 6 of the Act is made beyond one year from the date of publication of notification u/s 4(1) of the Act, the learned counsel placed reliance on the Division bench of this Court in G. Pattabhi Ramayya & Co., Visakhapatnam v. District Collector, Visakhapatnam and others 2010(1) AID 64 (DB), while the learned Government Pleader relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in
11. In recognition of the fact that inordinate delays were taking place in concluding the acquisition proceedings, sweeping changes were brought about to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the Act 68 of 1984 w.e.f., 24.09.1984. One such amendment relates to publication of declaration u/s 6 of the Act. The second proviso to Section 6 of the Act in respect of the land acquisitions relating to the State of Andhra Pradesh stipulated that in cases where notification u/s 4(1) of the Act was published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation Act) Ordinance, 1957, but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, no declaration u/s 6 of the Act shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of notification. Similarly, in respect of the notifications published after commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, also no declaration shall be issued after one year from the date of publication of notice.
12. The question that needs to be addressed- is whether the declaration made and published on 18.04.2007 was within the period of one year from the date of publication of notification u/s 4(1) of the Act?
13. u/s 4(1) of the Act, different modes of publication of notifications have been envisaged and the last of the date of such publication shall be treated as the date of publication of notification. It is the specific case of the respondents that the last of the publications was by way of local publication made on 24.04.2006. As noted above, declaration u/s 6 of the Act was made and published on 18.04.2007. It is, therefore, clear that the publication of declaration u/s 6 of the Act was made well within the period of one year.
14. When a doubt was expressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners about the publication of the notification in the locality, record has been summoned which was produced by the learned Government Pleader. The learned counsel for the petitioners was given an opportunity to peruse the record. After such perusal, the learned counsel fairly conceded that the record contains the evidence of publication of notices in the locality, even though he has stated that there is no endorsement of the Collector (LAO) on record. In my opinion, there is no statutory requirement that the record relating to publication of notices in the locality needs to be signed by the Collector. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, stated that since the last of the date of publications of the declaration u/s 6 of the Act was on 14.05.2007, which date needs to be reckoned as per the Division Bench Judgment in G. Pattabhi Ramayya & Co., (5 supra), the declaration is barred by limitation.
15. In Urban Development Trust (6 supra), the Supreme Court held that different phraseology is used in Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act, that Section 6(1) of the Act does not require that such declaration could not be published in the official gazette after expiry of one year from the date of publication of notification u/s 4(1) of the Act and that time limit of one year is prescribed for a declaration to be made that the land is needed for a public purpose under the signature of a Secretary or authorised Officer to Government.
16. In Sriniwas Ramnath Khatod (7 supra), notification u/s 4(1) of the Act was published in the local newspapers on 03.11.1985 and 06.11.985, the local publication in the village was made on 30.01.1986, declaration u/s 6 of the Act was issued on 29.01.1987 and the same was published in the local newspaper on 30.01.1987, in the official gazette on 19.03.1987 and in the locality concerned on 24.05.1987. The Supreme Court has repelled the contention of the land owners that one year period shall be reckoned from the last of the date of publication of notification u/s 4(1) of the Act to the last of the date of publication of declaration u/s 6 of the Act. It held as under:
In our view the wording of Sections 4, 6 and 11-A leave no room for doubt that the Land Acquisition Act made a distinction between a "declaration" and "publication". To be noted that u/s 4 the notification has to be published. Again u/s 11-A the period of two years has to be computed from the date of "publication of the declaration." As distinct from this under the first proviso to Section 6(1) a "declaration" cannot be made after the expiry of one year from the date of "publication of the notification u/s 4". The words "published" in clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1) refer to the publication of notification u/s 4. A plain reading of Section 6 shows that a distinction is made between a "declaration" and a "publication". Viewed from this angle the wordings of the first proviso to Section 6(1) becomes important. The proviso lays, down that "no declaration (under Section 6) shall be made after expiry of three years [under clause (i)] where the notification u/s 4 is published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 and after expiry of one year [under clause (ii)] where notification u/s 4 was published after commencement of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984. Thus the proviso clearly talks of "Publication" in respect of notification u/s 4 end then provide a time for "making of declaration" u/s 6. The legislature is purposely omitting to use the words "Publication of declaration" in the proviso to Section 6.
In our view, it is clear that the "declaration" must be made "within one year from the date of "last publication of Notification" u/s 4. Thereafter the publication u/s 6(2) may take place at a later date as it is merely a ministerial act.
(Emphasis added)
17. The ratio laid down in the above-noted judgments of the Supreme Court is, thus, clear to the effect that while the commencement of the limitation period of one year is from the date of the last publication of the notification u/s 4(1), limitation stays running on the making of declaration u/s 6 of the Act with the subsequent publication of the declaration being treated as a mere ministerial act. In other words, there is no relevancy for the publication of declaration u/s 6 of the Act unlike in the case of publication of notification u/s 4(1) of the Act.
18. In G. Pattabhi Ramayya & Co. (5 supra), the last of the publication of notification u/s 4(1) of the Act was made in the locality on 13-6-1995, the declaration u/s 6 was made on 1-6-1996, it was published in the Gazette on 11-6-1996 and in the newspapers on 29-6-1996 and 30-6-1996. Thus, within one year from the last publication of notification u/s 4(1) of the Act in the locality, declaration u/s 6 of the Act was made. The Division Bench held that as the publications, including the local publication, were made after the expiry of one year from the publication of notification u/s 4(1), there is a clear violation of statutory mandate and accordingly the acquisition proceedings were declared a: having lapsed. With due respect to the Division Bench, the view taken by it in G. Pattabhi Ramayya & Co. (5 supra) is contrary to the above mentioned authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court. ''As the declaration was made on 1-6-1996, which was well within the period of one year from the publication of notification u/s 4(1) of the Act, the acquisition proceedings have not lapsed. It therefore requires to be held that the Judgment of the Division Bench in G. Pattabhi Ramayya & Co. (5 supra) is not in consonance with the law declared by the Supreme Court.
19. As noted above, in this case, the declaration u/s 6 of the Act was approved by the Collector on 18.04.2007 and was published on the same day in the official gazette. Further declaration u/s 6 of the Act in the newspapers has no relevance for the purpose of computing the period of one year.
20. On the above analysis, I do not find any merit in the writ petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed.
21. As a sequel to dismissal of the writ petitions, interim orders, if any granted, shall stand vacated and the interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand disposed of as infructuous.
